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ABSTRACT
The enactment of ocean-related legal and policy instruments and the establishment of
ocean-mandated institutions driven by the United Nations in the past 30 years have
not succeeded in protecting the oceans and their resources as the continuing
depletion of ocean resources and deterioration of marine ecosystems attest. It is
assumed that the overall system of ocean governance is plagued by problems
characterised by a sectoral approach towards management and uncoordinated
proliferation of legal and policy instruments as well as institutional organisations.
This thesis utilises principles of international law as analytical tools to argue that
their introduction in the legal and institutional frameworks for ocean governance can
contribute to reducing these governance problems. These principles are cooperation,
integration, ecosystem and precautionary approaches. The selected principles of
international law were chosen because all of them are compatible with the notion that
ocean problems are interrelated and multi-dimensional in their nature. It is argued
that the negative effects of the governance problems can be reduced if the
interrelated and multi-dimensional nature of the oceans is recognised through the
inclusion of the principles of international law within the text of ocean-related legal
and policy instruments and in the practice of ocean-mandated institutions.
It is concluded that the inclusion of the above-referred principles in several of the
ocean-related policy and legal instruments and in the practice of some institutions
contributed to a shift in paradigm in ocean governance from a prevalence of sectoral
views and uncoordinated proliferation of legal and policy instruments and
institutions to a more holistic approach in ocean management. The thesis gives
particular consideration to linkages (or their absence) among sectoral management
initiatives from a legal and institutional perspective. The results suggest that despite
the shift to a more holistic approach in ocean management, there still remain
problems due to the prevalence of a dichotomy in ocean governance between the
widespread approach towards single use and sectoral management and new
approaches that support more integrated, cooperating, ecosystem and precautionary
approaches towards ocean governance. This thesis also offers suggestions on how
some of the persisting governance problems can be overcome.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

From the 15th until the 19th century, the oceans were primarily used for navigation
and exploitation of marine living resources.1 This period is characterised by the
absence of regulation with regard to ocean uses and exploitation of its resources. 2
Growing disputes over appropriation of portions of the oceans3 coupled with the first
disputes over exploitation of marine living resources4 resulted in the adoption of the
first ocean-related treaties5 to regulate the use of the oceans and their resources.6
These were the initial steps towards what is today known as ocean governance. In the
last 30 years, a variety of ocean-related legal and policy instruments have emerged to
address the negative impacts of various human activities on the oceans. These legal
and policy instruments promoted a change in paradigm from no or scarce regulation
towards ‘a more managed environment, with constraints and responsibilities being
placed on states as they exercise their rights in ocean areas.’7
Under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), a prolific and structured system of
ocean governance emerged to address ocean issues. Among the most important legal
instruments sponsored by the UN is the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (LOSC), adopted in 1982, which regulated several uses of the seas. The
LOSC embodied the codification of customary law and treaty maritime law at the

1

Lawrence Juda, “Basic Trends in the Evolving Law of the Sea and Their Implications for Ocean Use
Management,” Oceanography, 14(2001): 18.
2
Lawrence Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management: The Evolution of Ocean
Governance (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 2.
3
As early as 1736, Great Britain adopted the ‘Hovering Acts’ which allowed for arrest of smugglers
beyond a 3-mile limit. Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management, 13.
4
In 1837 Great Britain and France established a commission to define the limits within which coastal
fisheries were exclusively reserved to their respective nationals. Juda, International Law and Ocean
Use Management, 15.
5
For instance, the Convention between Great Britain and France signed on 2nd August, 1839 for
defining and regulating the Limits of the Exclusive Right of the Oyster and other Fishery on the
Coasts of Great Britain and France and the North Sea Fisheries Convention signed in 1882 by Great
Britain, Germany, France, Denmark, and Belgium.
6
Douglas M. Johnston, “The Challenge of International Ocean Governance: Institutional, Ethical and
Conceptual Dilemmas,” in Towards Principled Oceans Governance: Australian and Canadian
Approaches and Challenges, ed. Donald R. Rothwell and David L. VanderZwaag (New York:
Routledge, 2006), 349.
7
Juda, “Basic Trends in the Evolving Law of the Sea,” 17.

1

time of its adoption, thus being regarded as the most prominent treaty in ocean
governance.8
Parallel to the adoption of ocean-related legal and policy instruments, a complex
institutional arrangement was driven by the UN. The institutional framework for
ocean governance comprises competent international organisations, agencies,
permanent bodies and programs, with oceans as part of their mandates.9 In recent
years, the institutional framework for ocean governance had the inclusion of nonstate entities, particularly non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which are
gradually becoming legitimate partners in the governance of the oceans.10
The enactment of ocean-related legal and policy instruments and the establishment of
ocean-mandated institutions to manage the oceans did not succeed in protecting the
oceans and their resources as the continuing depletion of ocean resources and
deterioration of marine ecosystems attest.11 The assumption is that ocean governance
is plagued by governance problems characterised by segmentation,12 overlaps of
initiatives and mandates, and contradictions within its legal and institutional
frameworks. Another hypothesis is that these governance problems persist as a result
of the prevailing paradigm in ocean governance which is marked by a sectoral
approach towards ocean management and uncoordinated proliferation of ocean
related legal and policy instruments as well as of institutional organisations (with
8

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), United Nations Publication (New
York: United Nations, 1997), Preamble.
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For example: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), Division for Ocean Affairs
and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC), the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and Commission on Sustainable Development
(CSD).
10
For instance, most recent initiatives such as the United Nations Informal Consultative Process on
Oceans and the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS) have been fostering the participation of NGOs in their
forum of discussion and decision-making process. According to UNICPOLOS I report, ‘the
participation by the relevant intergovernmental organizations and representatives of major groups
enhanced the value of the discussion.’ Report of the First United Nations Open-ended Informal
Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS), A/55/274 of 31/07/00, Part
A, page 04; para. 57, page 17; and para. 86 page 20 and United Nations General Assembly Resolution
(UNGA) A/RES/54/33 of 18/01/10, which ‘recognised the significant contribution that major groups,
as identified in Agenda 21, can make to this goal [international cooperation and coordination].’
11
Independent World Commission on the Oceans, The Ocean Our Future (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 139-140.
12
In this thesis, segmentation and fragmentation will be used interchangeably. Also, fragmentation,
overlaps of initiatives and mandates and contradictions are used interchangeably to governance
problems or governance failures.
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oceans as part of their mandates). This thesis will analyse the evolution of ocean
governance from both legal and institutional perspectives to investigate if
advancements resulting from the introduction of new legal concepts (i.e. principles of
international law) within the texts of ocean laws and policies contributed to
significantly reducing the above-referred persisting governance problems. The thesis
aims to provide with its findings suggestions on how some of the governance
problems can be overcome.
The thesis utilises principles of international law13 – namely cooperation, integration,
ecosystem and precautionary approaches14 – as analytical tools. These principles
were chosen because they epitomise a change in paradigm in ocean governance:
from a time of prevalence of sectoral views and uncoordinated proliferation of legal
and policy instruments to a time when the interrelatedness of the oceans and their
‘multi-dimensional nature’15 started to be taken into account.16 Interrelatedness is a
concept found in the third paragraph of the LOSC preamble which reads: ‘the
problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a
whole’. A multi-dimensional approach to ocean governance is based on the
consideration of ‘linkages among sectoral management initiatives’.17 Both concepts interrelatedness and multi-dimensional nature of ocean problems - inform the legal
analysis in this thesis. The two concepts explain how the root causes for governance
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In the next chapter, the principles of international law will be analysed in detail.
In this thesis, both the ecosystem and precautionary approaches are considered principles of
international law given their inclusion in various ocean-related legal and policy instruments. For
instance, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic
(OSPAR) listed ecosystem and precautionary approaches along with international cooperation and
polluter-pay principle as the guiding principles to its application. OSPAR Website. OSPAR
http://www.ospar.org/content/content.asp?menu=00320109000000_000000_000000. Accessed on
12/03/11. Similarly VanderZwaag referred to them as principles in the following terms: ‘While
numerous other normative principles, such as intergenerational equity, public participation,
community-based management, integration, and ecosystem management are driving marine
environmental protection reforms, the precautionary principle is often referred to as one of the most
fundamental principles given its far-reaching implications for decision making. The principle
promises to be the “big balancer” in sustainable development by reversing the burden of proof to
proponents of change/ development to demonstrate some level of acceptability or safety.’ David
VanderZwaag, “The Precautionary Principle and Marine Environmental Protection: Slippery Shores,
Rough Seas, and Rising Normative Tides,” Ocean Development & International Law, 33 (2002): 166.
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(Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK: IUCN, 2001), 53.
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Kimball, International Ocean Governance, 53.
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problems originated from the prevailing sectoral view towards ocean management
and uncoordinated proliferation of ocean related law and policy instruments. The
principles of international law under analysis in this thesis also corroborate this idea.
This is because the selected principles are a result of advancements in ocean
governance that indicate a rupture with the sectoral approach towards ocean
governance.
The rationale for each of the selected principles is that consideration must be taken to
a series of relationships among various aspects of ocean governance in order to better
conserve the oceans. These relationships are, for instance: the linkages among sectors
(i.e. economy, biology, social issues, ecology, legal aspects, etc.), among
components of the ocean ecosystem (i.e. living and non-living resources, habitats,
etc.) and other relationships. All selected principles of international law imply a
relational analysis between these various aspects of ocean governance. For instance,
to build consensus towards the solution of a common ocean problem, one needs to
rely on cooperation as a result of ‘the common nature’ of the problem. In order to
manage the oceans, one needs to consider socio-economic issues (an illustration of
the need for integration). To better conserve the ocean resources, one needs to
measure and prevent the negative impact of human activities in the marine ecosystem
and its surroundings (i.e. ecosystem-approach). Lastly, one needs to consider the
potential risks of an environmental impact which could irreversibly damage the
health of the marine environment if the activity that generates the risk is not halted
under the excuse that there is a lack of full scientific certainty about the risks (i.e.
precautionary approach).
In applying these principles ocean managers take into consideration the interrelated
and multi-dimensional nature of ocean problems. That said, the principles of
international law were chosen as analytical tools because all of them are compatible
with the fundamental understanding that guides this thesis, which is that ocean
problems are interrelated and multi-dimensional in their nature. Another premise
supporting the choice of principles is that governance problems can be greatly
reduced when oceans are viewed as whole interrelated ecosystems. Since the period
of absent regulation in the 15th century until the emergence of a more structured
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ocean governance in the 20th century,18 ocean laws and policies reinforce a view of
the oceans that causes the governance problems to persist. This view is a result of
perceiving ocean problems from a sectoral perspective that is limited to the confines
of specific subject-areas such as navigation, protection of the marine environment, in
particular the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from various
sources, and the conservation and management of living resources. Thus, an incident
of marine pollution is managed by the competent international organisation (i.e. the
International Maritime Organization - IMO) by adopting legal instruments and nonbinding instruments on pollution control and prevention. As will be explored later,
when a marine pollution incident occurs, little or no attention is given to the
relationship of such incident, for instance, with fisheries, tourism and the health of
the ocean ecosystem as whole. This thesis aims to analyse the evolution of ocean
governance from the perspective of these linkages and relationships (or their
absence). In applying the rationale of the selected principles of international law, a
polluting episode, for instance, would be dealt with within a broader scenario of
linkages between pollution-fisheries, pollution-navigation, pollution-preservation,
pollution-tourism, pollution-coastal ecosystems, and pollution-recreational fishing.
Nevertheless, the fact that for several decades ocean managers and law makers
viewed oceans from a sectoral perspective is not considered a governance failure in
itself. As the historical analysis of the evolution of ocean governance will argue, the
sectoral view was a necessary initial step in the manner in which the oceans were
managed for many decades. As will be argued in this thesis, the paradigm of single
use or sectoral management was for a long time necessary for the initial formation
and consolidation of the legal and institutional frameworks for ocean governance.
For instance, it was important for law makers to focus on prevention and control of
marine pollution so that specific treaties could be adopted by the competent
international organisation, namely IMO. However, as a result of evolution, which can
be defined as a process of gradual and progressive change, the paradigm of single use
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The concept of a ‘more structured’ ocean governance refers to the period in which treaties and
policies were adopted more frequently to manage oceans as opposed to an initial period in which
treaties were adopted to resolve parochial issues such as conflict over living marine resources and
domination of portions of the ocean space.

5

management characterised by sectoral treaties and institutions adopted or set up in
isolation has been under scrutiny in the 21st century and is in need of change.
The evidence for a need for change is found in the development of new approaches
towards ocean management to counteract the old paradigm.19 According to these
approaches, the oceans are viewed as an indivisible whole. The evolution in ocean
governance can be described as an evolution from a sectoral view of the ocean to a
holistic one. This evolution is more apparent with the introduction of new legal
concepts in particular principles of international law such as the ones outlined above.
Along with other principles such as community-based management, intergenerational
equity, public participation, and polluter-pay, the principles of cooperation,
integration, ecosystem and precautionary approaches20 are useful tools which enable
the ocean manager to depart from an exclusively sectoral view of ocean management
to a more holistic one.21 As will be shown below, all these principles entail
consideration for all integral parts of the ocean ecosystem and its interface with
surrounding areas. In this thesis it will be investigated if the introduction of the
principles of international law in the legal and institutional frameworks for ocean
governance can contribute to reducing the levels of fragmentation, overlaps and
contradictions within ocean governance.
In answering to this inquiry, this thesis will examine the evolution of ocean
governance over the course of six centuries (from the 15th Century until the present).
The evolution of ocean governance will be divided into three discrete analytical
periods. The objective of dividing the analysis into discrete periods is to facilitate the
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For instance: Large Marine Ecosystems (LME), Integrated Ocean and Coastal Management,
Ecosystem-Approach, Community-based Management. The selected principles of international law in
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In this thesis, the expressions ‘precautionary approach’ and ‘precautionary principle’ are used
synonymously. It is acknowledged however that there is research on the distinction between the two
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Miguel A. Recuerda, "Dangerous Interpretations of the Precautionary Principle and the Foundational
Values of the European Union Food Law: Risk versus Risk,” Journal of Food Law & Policy 4 (1): 5
(2008).
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study of the historical evolution of ocean governance in view of the great number of
ocean-related treaties and policies adopted during the course of six centuries. The
analysis will focus on selected treaties, policies and organisations during the three
analytical time periods. The periods were determined in relation to the occasion of
the adoption of the LOSC.
The LOSC was used as a landmark for the analytical periods because of its
importance to ocean governance, as the first treaty in international law to regulate
several ocean uses and resources. Consequently, the first analytical period is the PreLOSC which focuses on legal and institutional developments that preceded the
adoption of the LOSC in 1982. The LOSC period covers the lengthy negotiation
process that resulted in the adoption of the LOSC. The third period is the Post-LOSC
which deals with the various ocean-related treaties and policies that succeeded the
adoption of the LOSC. Additionally, the analysis will take into consideration the
major global environmental and ocean conferences that occurred during the PreLOSC, LOSC and Post-LOSC periods due to the great influence that these
conferences exerted in the development of ocean laws and policies.22
The adoption of the Pre-LOSC, LOSC and Post-LOSC periods is also based upon the
occurrence of trends or distinct paradigmatic changes that took place within each of
the analytical periods in the course of six centuries of evolution of ocean governance.
Thus, it will be argued that during the Pre-LOSC, ocean governance was
characterised primarily by two discrete phases. The first phase comprised an
extensive period of no regulation followed by a period of enactment of the first
treaties to regulate growing conflicts over portions of the oceans and resources. The
second phase within the Pre-LOSC witnessed the beginning of a change in paradigm
in ocean governance as a result of a more conservationist view of the oceans. As a
result of this change, during the end of the Pre-LOSC some of the selected principles
of international law were introduced in ocean governance. This change of paradigm
reflected a more holistic view of the oceans. The second analytical period, the LOSC,
22

Among these conferences is the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
I). Chapter 5 will discuss global conferences adopted during the Post-LOSC period such as the United
Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE), the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD).
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is characterised by the consolidation of the new trend towards the interrelatedness of
oceans and the need for oceans problems to be considered as whole (third paragraph
of the LOSC preamble). During the LOSC period, the principles of international law
were reinforced by some of the provisions of the LOSC which in many occasions
incorporated in their meaning (if not expressly at least implicitly) the legal content of
the principles, as will be shown. Lastly, the Post-LOSC period is characterised by a
larger acceptance of the principles of international law in ocean governance. This is
because these principles were introduced in several ocean-related treaties and
policies as will be argued, as well as because the global conferences that took place
during this period23 emphasised the need for the adoption of these principles in ocean
affairs.
The study of the evolution of the institutional framework for ocean governance will
also follow the same method of analysis. Thus, selected institutional arrangements
will be analysed within each period. The selected organisations are primarily the
international competent organisations with mandates in the areas of navigation,
protection and preservation of the marine environment, conservation and
management of marine living resources, and marine scientific research.24 The
mandates in their respective areas are expressed not only in their constituent
instruments or statutes but were also consolidated by provision of the LOSC25 which
attested their competencies.26 Thus, FAO is competent to manage conservation and
management of marine living resources, IMO for the prevention and control of
marine pollution and navigation, UNEP for the preservation of the marine
environment in particular at regional level, and UNESCO/IOC for marine scientific
research and marine technological transfer. The institutional analysis will also
encompass other organisations with oceans as part of their mandates in particular
those created under the umbrella of the UN. The UN-based organisations will be
analysed in a chronological order. Firstly, the period in which most of these
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Tullio Treves, “The Role of Universal International Organizations in Implementing the 1982 UN
Law of the Sea Convention,” in Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention Through
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Sea Institute, 1991), 14.
24

8

organisations was created (Pre-LOSC). Subsequently, the organisations that resulted
from the adoption of the LOSC in 1982 will be considered. Lastly, tha analysis will
focus on the Post-LOSC and primarily on the surfacing of a new trend marked by the
growing participation of NGOs as legitimate partners in decision-making processes
in ocean governance.

1.1 Thesis’ Main Argument
The thesis analyses the evolution of the concept of ocean governance over three
predetermined periods (i.e., Pre-LOSC, LOSC and Post-LOSC periods) with regard
to the areas of navigation, protection and preservation of the marine environment,
conservation and management of marine living resources, and marine scientific
research. It is argued that despite the enactment of ocean-related legal and policy
instruments and the establishment of ocean-mandated institutions to manage the
oceans, the international community did not succeed in protecting the oceans and its
resources as the continuing depletion of ocean resources and deterioration of marine
ecosystems attest. The assumption is that ocean governance is plagued by persisting
governance problems characterised by segmentation, overlap and contradiction. The
main argument to be investigated in the thesis is that if the recognition within ocean
governance of the interrelatedness and multi-dimensional nature of ocean problems
can assist in decreasing the governance problems. It will be explored if the negative
effects of the sectoral-approach towards ocean management and of proliferation of
ocean-related

treaties,

policies

and

organisations

can

be

reduced

when

interrelatedness of the oceans is recognised in particular through the adoption of
principles of international law.
Thus, this thesis will assess if the introduction of principles of international law
within the texts of the several ocean-related legal and policy instruments adopted
during the Pre-LOSC, LOSC and Post-LOSC periods can contribute to reduce the
ingrained governance problems. These principles are cooperation, integration,
ecosystem and precautionary approaches. Special focus will be given to the principle
of international cooperation. This is because the interrelatedness of the oceans
requires states to cooperate in order to solve common ocean problems and to better
9

manage shared resources. The thesis also offers with its findings suggestions on how
some of the persisting governance problems can be overcome.

1.1.1 Importance of Placing Emphasis on the Principle of Cooperation
The current international legal and institutional frameworks that inform ocean
governance are a result of centuries of evolution, from times when governance was
synonymous with navigational and military uses, to an era characterised by an
intensification of traditional uses (fishing and navigation) as well the addition of new
uses. These new uses include offshore oil and gas exploration, waste disposal,
construction of artificial islands, structures, platforms and deep seabed mining.27 The
intensification of ocean uses resulted in cross-fertilisation between them and the
transboundary nature of resources and environmental impacts (i.e., marine
pollutants). Principles of international law such as cooperation, integration,
ecosystem and precautionary approaches were adopted to address the complex nature
of these ocean issues.
The prospect of states acting independently to solve ocean problems is extremely
troublesome for ocean governance. The very definition of ‘ocean governance’
embraced by this thesis, as it will be further analysed in Chapter 2, implies that states
agreed to cooperate in establishing ‘a set of treaties, policies and international
organisations with ocean mandates created to regulate the oceans and their uses and
resources.’ Thus, cooperation is a pre-requisite for governance. Most states would
prefer to solve problems unilaterally given that ‘solution is arrived at more rapid pace
and the opportunity for less costs.’28 However, the class of ocean problems is
‘collective action problem.’29 In this regard,
Indeed, collective good are what needs management in the oceans. It is
necessary to get ‘stakeholders’ to cooperate to pursue their joint welfare.
27

Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management, 2.
Robert Friedheim, “A Proper Order for the Oceans: An Agenda for the New Century,” in D. Vidas
and W. Østreng, eds., Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century, (Netherlands: The Fridtjof
Nansen Institute, 1999), 538.
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[A]lthough, some ocean problems are amenable to a bilateral or regional
solution, many are not. The goods are in ‘joint supply’ and, too often,
accessible to the use of all.30
The ‘collective action’ nature of ocean problems also implies that ‘the individual
launching of activities by states or non-state actors cannot provide a sufficient basis
for protection.’31 Moreover, ‘cooperation among states is deemed to be the most
urgent requirement for effective protection of the world’s ocean environment.’32 That
is the reason why Principle 24 of the Stockholm Declaration required international
cooperation in matters related to the protection of the environment.33 In this regard:
International cooperation, both at global and regional level, becomes crucial
today for the promotion of a world policy in environmental protection and
management. The protection of the marine environment constitutes but one of
these issues.34
Therefore the nature of ocean problems entails cooperation due to their interrelated
nature. Interrelatedness requires that the oceans problems are considered as whole,
which might result, as it will be examined, in decreasing the levels of segmentation,
contradiction and overlaps within the system of ocean governance.

30

Friedheim, “A Proper Order for the Oceans,” 538.
Grigoris Tsaltas, “Towards a World Protection Framework for the Marine Environment through the
Promotion of International and Regional Cooperation under the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea,” in Unresolved Issues and New Challenges to the Law of the Sea: Time before and Time After,
ed. Anastasia Strati et.al (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 74.
32
Patricia Birnie, “Impact on the Development of International Law on Cooperation: the United
Nations Law of the Sea, Straddling Stocks and Biodiversity Conventions,” in The Stockholm
Declaration and Law of the Marine Environment, ed. Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore and
Said Mahmoudi (The Hague and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 85.
33
Stockholm Declaration, Principle 24 reads as follows: ‘International matters concerning the
protection and improvement of the environment should be handled in a cooperative spirit by all
countries, big and small, on an equal footing.’
34
Tsaltas, “Towards a World Protection Framework,” 74.
31

11

1.2 Problems within Ocean Governance
In 2001, the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Oceans and
Law of the Sea (SG Report) stated that ‘there is a need to reorganize what is
becoming an incoherent and highly complex architecture of ocean governance’.35 The
complexity to which the SG Report was alluding can be associated with the high
levels of segmentation, overlap and contradiction within the system of ocean
governance, among other problems.36 The root causes for these problems or
governance failures37 within the system of ocean governance are twofold. Firstly, the
governance failures are a direct result of uncoordinated and incoherent proliferation
of ocean-related treaties and policies and international organisations with ocean
mandates. Secondly, governance problems result from the sectoral approach upon
which the entire system of ocean governance is built.
The first root cause (proliferation) results from the adoption of more than 450 oceanrelated treaties at international and regional levels regulating various sectors such as
fisheries, and pollution from all sources such as vessels, land-based, dumping and
navigation among other sectors.38 This phenomenon is also known as ‘treaty
congestion’.39 The UN has admitted that ‘proliferation of treaties, which overlap in
many cases, is not producing the needed synergy in particular because of a lack of
coordination between them’.40 In this regard:
Many new treaties have been adopted in the last decade. They are very often
the result of disparate negotiating processes or political compromises. With
no cohesive framework they often result in overlap and duplication, which in
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Report of the Secretary-General on Oceans and Law of the Sea (SG Report), A/56/58 of 09/03/01,
para. 11, page 10.
36
The SG Report also made reference to the lack of implementation of the various ocean-related
treaties that have been adopted. SG Report, A/56/58 of 09/03/01, para. 11, page 10.
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turn leads to inefficient and ineffective international decision-making.
Coordination is necessary.41
The UN also stated that in addition to the adoption of treaties, the increase in legal
instruments in ocean governance has been accompanied by the introduction of ‘new
international policy mechanisms’ established by parties, such as non-binding
programs, action plans and codes of conduct.42 The same phenomenon of incoherent
proliferation occurs in the realm of organisations that are established to implement
the ocean legal framework, the so-called ‘institutional realm’. For instance, just
within the UN, which is the main focus of this thesis, there are at least 14 agencies
and 19 intergovernmental organisations that have oceans as part of their
responsibilities.43 The large increase in the number of organisations with ocean
mandates creates an institutional overload,44 which in turn creates overlaps. For
instance, the issue of capacity building has been discussed and negotiated in various
fora. In this regard, SG Report mentioned the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) Resolution 55/7 of 27/02/01, in which the need for capacity-building is
underlined, and requested that the Secretary-General and all relevant international
organisations identify the duplications that need to be avoided and the gaps that need
to be filled to ensure consistent approaches, at both the national and regional levels,
in order to implement the LOSC.45
The second root cause (sectoral approach) results from various maritime regulatory
systems being established separately to regulate several areas of ocean governance
such as navigation, marine pollution and conservation of marine living resources.
The sectoral manner in which the sub-systems of ocean governance are set resulted
in these systems being managed in isolation. The study of the evolution of ocean
governance will show that the non-formation of linkages between the several sub-
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systems generated governance problems. Linkages between sub-systems of
governance are important in view of the characteristic of the oceans as an indivisible
system, featuring complex and inextricable bio-physical, ecological and socioeconomic processes.
Based on the sectoral view, oceans are managed from a ‘land-based’ perspective,
relying on territorial boundaries, and also by dividing the oceans into legal subsystems for each subject-matter (navigation, pollution, fisheries). Pureza argued that
‘the regulatory model that has ruled the oceans for two centuries now is a land-based
one, conceived in land and exported to the sea’.46 Several arguments have been used
to legitimise the fragmentation of the oceans, such as national security and economic
interests (i.e., economic exclusive zone).47 The fragmentation of the oceans is also
manifested in the various ‘subject-matter’ or disciplinary boundaries such as
fisheries, pollution from all sources, and navigation, among other sectors. The
problem is that the application of a ‘land-based management approach’ to the oceans
is showing signs of failure within the context of modern ocean governance.48
For instance the high levels of pollution of the marine environment persist because
ocean managers have not yet developed an integrated plan that could successfully
address not only sea-based sources of marine pollution but land-based sources as
well. This is of relevance in view of the fact that land-based sources
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heavily industrialised coastal areas are the greatest source of marine pollution. Landbased pollution, directly or through the atmosphere, accounts for up to 80 per cent of
all marine pollution, and it is by far the major threat to the long-term health of marine
systems.50 According to Kimball, another lesson learned is that marine and coastal
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problems should be considered broadly to take into account linkages with watershed
development, for instance.51 Similarly, a broad view towards ocean governance
should be applied to overfishing which can be reduced significantly if there is
consideration of economic factors, such as fishing subsidies, ‘by-catch’,52 new
fishing technologies, social and economic pressures causing unsustainable fishing
practices, over-capacity of fishing vessels, and destructive practices. That is to say
that overfishing cannot be prevented solely by establishing fishing quotas such as
Total Allowable Catches (TAC) coupled with conservation and management
measures. To better address overfishing, a broad management approach, including
economic considerations is necessary. A broad management approach is also needed
because the negative impacts of overfishing are not limited to the fishing sector. In
this regard:
Overfishing does not just deplete fisheries and reduce catches. It makes
fishing very expensive, reducing its economic benefits, as boats have to go
further, stay at sea longer, and burn more fuel to gather their harvest.53
The interrelated nature of oceans should prompt policy-makers, legislators and ocean
managers to regulate and manage the oceans differently.54 As Borgese pointed out,
‘neither fish nor pollution will respect man-made boundaries’.55 It needs to be
emphasised that there is no fundamental problem in establishing sectoral legal
regimes to regulate issue-specific areas such as navigation, pollution and fisheries. A
high level of expertise is needed to consider these issues thoroughly and efficiently.
The purpose of issue-specific regimes is that by definition they are generally
established to deal with problems within specific issue-areas.56 The lack of
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recognition that there are links between these various maritime sectors or regimes is
the problem.57 A sectoral approach implies that the global system of governance
comprises issue-specific sub-systems. The main problem is that the system is
designed in a way that minimally recognises linkages among the diverse by
interrelated sub-systems. These sub-systems, including navigation, pollution,
fisheries and marine scientific research, essentially do not operate in isolation in the
ocean realm. Consequently, the major flaw of the sectoral approach to ocean
governance is that it does not adequately recognise the unique characteristic of the
oceans as an undivided global ecosystem.58 A sectoral approach also neglects the
fundamental principle enshrined in modern maritime law: that ‘all ocean problems
are interrelated and need to be considered as whole’.59

1.3 Scope and Limitations
Despite the existence of several ocean uses,60 the thesis only examines the evolution
of the concept of ocean governance with regard to the areas of navigation, protection
and preservation of the marine environment (in particular pollution), conservation
and management of marine living resources (in particular fisheries), and marine
scientific research. It would be impractical within the scope of a thesis to cover all
ocean-related uses given their great number. The rationale for the selection of these
areas is that they form the bulk of the activities taking place in the ocean realm, and
also because they have triggered intense law-making processes. The selection of
ocean-related treaties, policy instruments and ocean-mandated organisations was
based on the relevance of these instruments and organisations to ocean governance in
terms of promoting a change of paradigm in the manner in which the oceans were
57
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viewed in particular through the inclusion of the principles of international law
(cooperation, integration, ecosystem and precautionary approaches) within their
texts. Besides, the selected areas of ocean governance are sufficient to assist in the
investigation if the introduction of the chosen principles within treaties that regulated
the areas of navigation, pollution, fisheries and marine scientific research can
contribute to reducing the governance problems.
Another limitation in this thesis is that it only focuses on pertinent provisions of
ocean-related treaties and policies as they relate to the principles of international law
(cooperation, integration, ecosystem and precautionary approaches) and will not
assess their implementation. This thesis is limited to the analysis of the introduction
of the principles of international law within selected ocean related legal and policy
instruments. The investigation of the introduction of the principles of international
law will assist in answering the following research question:
- Can the negative effects of the proliferation of treaties and organisations and of the
sectoral-approach governance in ocean governance be reduced by introducing the
principles of international law within ocean related legal and policy instruments?
In view of the fact that the principles of international law indirectly support in their
meaning the interrelated and multi-dimensional nature of the oceans. The result is
that implementation of the legal and policy instruments is not relevant for the main
argument, thus falling outside the scope of this thesis. Besides, analysis of
implementation of several treaties and ocean policies would be impractical within the
context of a thesis.
The thesis analyses the evolution of the concept of ocean governance over three
predetermined periods (i.e., Pre-LOSC, LOSC and Post-LOSC periods). The choice
to divide the historical analysis of ocean governance into three time periods which
span six centuries was made to make viable the examination of the most significant
treaties and policies in ocean governance. The analysis of all treaties and policies
adopted every year within the time period extending for six centuries would be
unfeasible. Also, in order to avoid data overload the analysis of the evolution of
ocean governance required a clear criterion to demarcate the timeframe and the
17

number of instruments to be covered, which is the reason why the LOSC was used as
a landmark for the time periods.
The same rationale was used for the selected principles of international law.
Cooperation, integration, ecosystem and precautionary approaches were chosen as
analytical tools because these principles support a view of the oceans in which the
interrelatedness and multi-dimension nature of ocean problems is given more regard
as opposed to a prevalent exclusively sectoral view of the oceans. That is to say that
the selected principles are not the only ones which postulate the change in paradigm
in ocean governance. Other principles such as community based management and
sustainable development among others also promote change in paradigm. However,
for the sake of narrowing the data pool of this thesis during the early decision and
planning stage of this thesis, the selected principles namely cooperation, integration,
ecosystem and precautionary approaches were chosen to also avoid data overload.
Thus, the selected principles are used as auxiliary tools to assist in the analysis if
their introduction contributed to reducing the governance problems.
Similarly, the thesis will not assess the practice of the ocean-mandated international
competent organisations and other ocean-mandated bodies. That would require case
studies of each of the selected international organisations with competence for
regulating the areas of navigation, protection and preservation of the marine
environment, conservation and management of marine living resources, and marine
scientific research (i.e. IMO, UNEP, FAO, IOC/UNESCO).61 Given that the method
of this research is based on a ‘descriptive conceptual framework’,62 as it will be
demonstrated below, the study of the practice of the above-referred organisations
would not be compatible with the chosen research method. The practice of these
organisations would be more suitable for case study analysis. Consequently, the
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practice of these organisations falls outside the scope of this research. The last
limitation is that due to the multi-level nature of ocean governance (local, regional,
sub-regional, international), it is implausible to encompass all levels within
theanalysis; thus the thesis focuses primarily on the international level of ocean
governance and occasionally addresses the regional level whenever it is relevant to
the above-referred principles.

1.4 Research Method: Descriptive Conceptual Framework
The thesis will utilise a descriptive conceptual framework63 based on selected
principles of international law to analyse the evolution of ocean governance over the
three predetermined periods. A descriptive conceptual framework was construed
from the various treaties and policies under analysis. The inclusion of the abovereferred principles in several of ocean-related policy and legal instruments is
evidence that ocean governance is a concept in constant evolution resulting from a
shift in paradigm in the manner in which the oceans were managed. This is because
before the introduction of the principles of international law, ocean governance was
for many centuries characterised solely as a single use approach. It is within this
context that the thesis will investigate the content of the concept of ocean governance
based on the postulation that ‘human understanding and concepts of the oceans have
changed over time as well as governmental approaches to the oceans and their
uses’.64 In assessing the evolution of ocean governance within selected areas over the
Pre-LOSC, LOSC and Post-LOSC periods, the analysis will highlight how some of
the governance problems can be overcome.
To assist in the application of the chosen research method, the thesis will be based on
‘document analysis.’65 In doing so, the thesis will research primary and secondary
sources of literature.The primary sources include international and regional binding
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and non-binding instruments in the areas of navigation, protection and preservation
of the marine environment, conservation and management of marine living
resources, and marine scientific research over three predetermined periods (i.e., PreLOSC, LOSC and Post-LOSC periods). In addition, the research will rely on UN
ocean-related resolutions, annual reports of the UN Secretary-General, reports of the
various organisations with ocean mandates in the concerned areas within and outside
the UN system, and reports of inter-agency coordinating mechanisms such as the UN
Subcommittee on Ocean and Coastal Areas (SOCA), the Commission on Sustainable
Development (CSD), the UNICPOLOS and the Oceans and Coastal Areas Network
(UN-OCEANS). Secondary sources include peer-reviewed publications, books and
conference proceedings. Additional institutional information will be obtained from
official websites of relevant ocean-related agencies at global and regional levels.

1.4.1 The Principles of International Law and Governance Problems
This thesis will investigate if the principles of international law can contribute to
decreasing the levels of fragmentation, segmentation, overlaps and contradictions
within ocean governance. As stated earlier, the main root causes for the abovereferred governance problems are proliferation of legal and policy instruments and
institutions in addition to the sectoral-approach upon which the system of ocean
governance has been based. According to Juda, the shortcomings of the single use,
sectoral focus have become increasingly apparent.66 This is because ocean
governance ‘requires consideration of multiuse and ecosystem concepts.’67 As stated
in previous sections, all the principles of international law outlined above recognise
the multi-dimensional and interrelated nature of ocean problems.68 For example, the
multi-dimensional and interrelated nature of ocean problems are manifest in the
following ocean related problems: the effects of global warming, overharvesting of
fish stocks, the development consequences of aquaculture, the impacts of multiple
forms of marine pollution, competition over maritime space between both
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international and local actors, ineffective maritime regulation and enforcement, and
maritime security concerns.69
The recognition that multi-dimensional and interrelated ocean problems take place
throughout the oceans at the same time in an overlapping manner requires a change
in paradigm in the way in which ocean governance is structured. This means a
change from a paradigm focused on isolated uses to one that considers the multidimensional and interrelated nature of ocean problems (holistic approach). The unidimensional paradigm or single use approach to management in ocean governance
perpetuates the governance problems in particular by accentuating a sectoral view of
the oceans. The introduction of the principles of cooperation, integration, ecosystem
and precautionary approaches in several ocean-related treaties and policies is
indication that a change in paradigm has taken place in ocean governance. In this
regard:
Various legal principles have emerged through international agreements,
declarations and codes of conduct, and they are acting like engines of change
in the normative transition. Those principles include, among others,
integration,

precaution,

the

ecosystem

approach,

community-based

management and indigenous rights.70
The change in paradigm towards ‘principled’ ocean governance’71 is in contradiction
with the sectoral manner in which the oceans have been traditionally managed. The
old paradigm emphasises ‘state entitlement and general responsibilities over ocean
areas’.72 Conversely, the new paradigm emphasises the application of cooperation,
integration, ecosystem and precautionary approaches towards ocean management.
For instance, in terms of integration, ocean governance must be practiced among
levels of government (national, regional and global); among economic sectors
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(tourism, oil and gas, fishing, mining); between land and oceanic sides of the coastal
zone; and between disciplines (natural sciences, social sciences, engineering).73 The
recognition of the linkages among sectors and levels of government and between
land and oceanic sides and disciplines, which results from the application of an
integrated approach to ocean governance, decreases the levels of fragmentation,
segmentation, overlaps and contradictions within ocean governance. This is because
all the missing links between the sectors, levels of government, disciplines and
ecosystem components are acknowledged.
With regard to the ecosystem approach, the change in paradigm meant that the
oceans needed to be considered as ‘one unity in a physical sense’.74 In accordance to
a definition established by the Biodiversity Committee of the Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR), an
ecosystem approach focuses on:
[b]iological interactions between all marine species in the same as well as in
neighbouring zones, and the ecological conditions of the physical
surroundings.75
Evidence that the application of an ecosystem-approach reduces levels of
segmentation within ocean governance is found in the fisheries area. For instance,
several policy and treaties in the area of fisheries such as the FAO Code of Conduct
of Responsible Fisheries adopted during the Post-LOSC introduced ecosystem-based
management in their provisions. This signified that fisheries would be managed
within a broad context taking into consideration various aspects such as: impacts
from other sectors affecting fisheries, including land-based pollution and habitat, the
impacts of non-sustainable fishing techniques and practices on the ecosystems, as
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well as considerations related to biodiversity and the effect of climate on fisheries.76
This is indication that FAO indirectly recognises that an exclusive sectoral approach
toward fisheries governance is inadequate given that broader consideration needs to
be given to other areas that have impacts on fisheries. Thus, the application of an
ecosystem-approach results in reducing the levels of segmentation. The need for an
ecosystem approach towards ocean governance prompted some scholars to call for
the institution of an ‘international ecosystem law’.77
Similar to ‘prevention,’ the notion of ‘precaution’ implies the avoidance of ‘serious
or irreversible damage’.78 As stated above, one of the diverging features between the
notion of ‘prevention’ and ‘precaution’ is that the precautionary approach asserts that
‘lack of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing measures to
prevent environmental degradation.’79 In this regard, the precautionary approach is
considered to be ‘the most developed form of prevention which remains the general
basis for environmental protection measures.’80 This circumstance indicates that the
precautionary approach ‘reminds policy makers and ocean managers that very little is
known about the impact of human activities on ecosystems.’81 The application of the
precautionary approach requires an environmental risk analysis which indicates that
the multi-dimensional nature of ocean problems is taken into account. The basis for
the application of a precautionary approach goes beyond a sectoral approach toward
ocean management because its application depends on an analysis of the
relationships between the risk of irreversible damage, scientific uncertainty and the
need for protection of the marine environment. In applying the precautionary
approach in the present when there is uncertainty, one avoids having to adopt
policies or even treaties to solve the problem (or attempt to) in the future. This
circumstance is evidence that the precautionary approach results in sparing the
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adoption of new policies and treaties (proliferation) to the already overloaded system
of ocean governance.
The adoption of a precautionary approach also implies that the threat of
environmental damage to the marine environment will be scrutinised based on a
broad array of factors. This broad risk analysis is an indication that the precautionary
approach is generally incompatible with a sectoral approach towards ocean
governance. To illustrate this point, if a sectoral approach is utilised in a risk
assessment analysis, the ocean manager would traditionally not consider elements
such as scientific uncertainty to justify not proceeding with an activity that could
potentially cause irreversible damage to the marine environment. The analysis of
scientific certainty or uncertainty is often absent from sectoral approach ocean
management. Thus, one can attest to the myopic view of a sectoral approach as
opposed to the sophistication of the precautionary approach. Based on a sectoral
approach, a policy permitting certain activities could be adopted only to be changed
in the future in view of the damages caused to the marine environment by such
policy. That is the reason why a sectoral approach is counterproductive to ocean
governance because it generates contradictions within the system. In view of
scientific uncertainty as to the possibility of irreversible damage to the marine
environment, the traditional sectoral approach towards ocean governance must be
discontinued. That is the reason why the precautionary approach assists in decreasing
segmentation, fragmentation, contradiction and overlap within ocean governance.
For instance, the introduction of genetically engineered fish into the marine
environment should be taken with ‘precaution’ given the uncertainty surrounding
their unknown impact on the entire marine ecosystem. Genetically engineered fish
are characterised by increased size and accelerated growth.82 The risks of disrupting
food chains for several marine living resources could be irreversible. Furthermore,
genetically engineered fish have ‘the potential to become invasive species and could
cause irreversible damage to entire populations of wild fish stocks as well as to the
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wider marine environment.’83 In this regard,
Scientific experiments had suggested that the introduction of a few transgenic
individuals could wipe out entire populations within just a few generations.84
In terms of cooperation, the nature of most ocean problems indicates that they are
best solved through cooperation than by states acting independently.85 This means
that in most cases states need to cooperate for their common solution. Cooperation is
common practice between areas that share similar activities and mandates. For
example, the navigation sector needs to work jointly with meteorological experts to
assist

in

charting

safer

routes.

Consequently,

partnerships

between

the

Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) and the IMO in pooling
resources and expertise for maritime safety are not uncommon.86 But, it is
cooperation between areas that do not traditionally work together that gained the
attention of ocean policy and law makers in recent years. The multi-dimensional and
interrelated nature of ocean problems prompt states to build cooperation across
different areas within ocean governance. In doing so, states avoid perpetuating
unnecessary proliferation of treaties that are confined and deal with sectoral areas.
The natural outcome of building cooperation between different sectors that impact
one another is less contradiction and overlap with ocean governance. This is because
building consensus and pooling together interested actors from two distinct areas will
be necessary to prevent one area from encroaching onto the other or contradicting
each other.
For instance, states need to build cooperation between fisheries and pollution and
between trade and the environment. The relationship between these distinct areas of
ocean governance has not been acknowledged very often by ocean policy and law
makers. This can be the result of the complexity in dealing with different areas or
sectors at the same time. However, cross-sectoral cooperation in ocean governance
needs to be addressed for the entire system to be improved. For that reason,
83
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cooperation between several sectors of ocean governance results in reducing the
levels of fragmentation, segmentation, contradiction and overlaps within the system
of ocean governance.
The multi-dimensional and interrelated nature of ocean problems also indicates that
problems from one sector can negatively affect another. It is also an indication that
‘natural and anthropogenic factors interact in a complex and cascading manner’.87 In
view of this new realisation, the levels of segmentation within the system of ocean
governance can be reduced if new cooperating agreements or other arrangements of a
cross-sectoral nature are established. For instance, issues such as pollution from landbased sources affecting fisheries and the listing of commercially exploited aquatic
resources (including fisheries) by the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and its implication to the
FAO need to be taken into consideration.88 The CITES/FAO relationship is relevant
because there is a potential for overlap given that FAO is mandated with the
regulation of fisheries.89 In this regard:
It can help governments and stakeholders review linkages among sectoral
management initiatives; and, if problems cross national boundaries, indicate
which convention(s) may be called into play.90
Once agreements on cooperation between these distinct areas started to be adopted,
the immediate consequence is that the need to adopt isolated sectoral treaties dealing
with single use is eliminated. Also, because there is consensus building through
cooperation between areas which initially had conflicting objectives, the immediate
outcome is the reduction in contradiction, overlaps and fragmentation. For the above
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reasons cooperation plays an important role in reducing the levels of fragmentation,
segmentation, overlaps and contradiction within ocean governance.

1.5 Thesis’ Structure
This introductory chapter addresses the need to include the principles of cooperation,
integration, ecosystem and precautionary approaches within ocean governance on the
basis of the interrelatedness and multi-dimensional nature of the oceans. It addresses
the persistent governance problems negatively affecting ocean governance.
Moreover, the chapter outlines the main argument, scope, limitations, and structure
of the thesis. It also describes the methods that are utilised to analyse the legal, policy
and institutional frameworks for ocean governance in major areas namely navigation,
protection and preservation of the marine environment, conservation and
management of marine living resources, and marine scientific research.
Chapter 2 introduces the concept of ocean governance to provide a workable concept
of governance upon which this thesis’s main argument is made: ‘ocean governance’
can be made more effective through the development of ocean-related policies and
legal frameworks that are informed by the principles outlined in international
environmental law. These principles are cooperation, integration, ecosystem and
precautionary approaches. This chapter will argue that an ideal framework for ocean
governance incorporates these principles of international law, and doing so can
greatly reduce the ingrained levels of segmentation, proliferation, overlaps and
contradictions that pose obstacles to effective ocean governance.
Chapter 3 analyses the evolution of the legal framework for ocean governance from
the 15th century, a period characterised by the absence of regulation, until the 20th
century, when more elaborate systems of governance were adopted, including several
ocean-related bilateral, regional and international treaties, as well as ocean policies.
This chapter concludes that despite advancements that resulted from the adoption of
treaties to regulate ocean uses and resources – in particular the outcomes of the
United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) in 1972 – the entire
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system of ocean governance is still negatively affected by deep-rooted governance
problems.
Chapter 4 provides a review of the legal framework for ocean governance as a result
of the adoption of the LOSC. The chapter will provide an overview of the provisions
on cooperation and the other selected principles of international law within the
LOSC. It will also highlight the advancements brought forth by the LOSC with
regard to decreasing the persistent governance problems within ocean governance.
An analysis of the requirements for cooperation in the particular ocean issue-areas
within the LOSC will be also provided, following the same criteria utilised for the
Pre-LOSC period.
Chapter 5 provides a review of the legal and policy frameworks for ocean
governance during the Post-LOSC period. The analysis also identifies the presence
of the chosen principles of international law, in particular cooperation, within the
legal and policy frameworks of the Post-LOSC period. The chapter will highlight the
departure from a model of adoption of formal agreements to non-binding instruments
such as programs, action plans and codes of conduct. The analysis gives particular
emphasis to the remedies adopted during the Post-LOSC to improve some of the
provisions of LOSC in particular regard to the conservation and management of
highly migratory fisheries and the principle of cooperation. In addition, it will be
demonstrated that the Post-LOSC period has among its advancements the
consolidation and strengthening of the ecosystem and precautionary approaches.
Chapter 6 analyses the corresponding institutional framework set up to implement
the Pre-LOSC, LOSC and Post-LOSC legal frameworks for ocean governance. This
chapter discusses the challenges that various institutions, organisations and bodies
within ocean governance are confronted with in executing their mandates. These
challenges include fragmentation, lack of multi-sectoral and multi-level approaches,
absence of an overarching global oceans organisation to coordinate the various
ocean-mandated agencies, lack of accountability, transparency and implementation,
and lack of continuous technical and financial resources.
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Chapter 7 describes inter-agency coordinating mechanisms created in an attempt to
streamline the incoherent institutional arrangements for ocean governance. These
include the UN Inter-agency Committee on Sustainable Development (IACSD) and
its Subcommittee on Ocean and Coastal Areas (SOCA), and more recent initiatives
such as UNICPOLOS and UN-Oceans. While describing relevant coordinating
mechanisms, the chapter emphasises both their assets and shortcomings in addressing
governance problems within the system of ocean governance.
Chapter 8 synthesises the results of the research and concludes that the introduction
of the selected principles within policies and treaties that regulated the areas of
navigation, pollution, fisheries and marine scientific research contributed to reducing
governance problems to a certain degree. Despite the efforts to improve the legal and
policy frameworks for ocean governance during the Pre-LOSC, LOSC and PostLOSC periods, with the inclusion of the principles of international law, there has
been a pattern of repetition of governance failures characterised by segmentation,
proliferation, overlaps and contradictions that pose obstacles to effective ocean
governance. The thesis assumes that the pattern of repetition is caused by the
prevalence of a dichotomy characterised by the persistent sectoral view of the oceans
and an ecosystem notion that acknowledges all ocean problems as interrelated,
among other problems. This causes the interrelatedness of the oceans (including their
problems) to be overridden. The thesis provides with its findings some suggestions
on how some of the governance problems can be overcome.
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CHAPTER 2 - OCEAN GOVERNANCE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the concept of ocean governance with the goal of providing a
workable concept of governance upon which the main argument of the thesis can be
made. The main argument is that the recognition within ocean governance of the
interrelatedness and multi-dimensional nature of ocean problems can assist in
decreasing the persistent governance problems characterised by fragmentation,
overlap and contradiction. Another premise of the thesis is that principles of
international law acknowledge the interrelated and multi-dimensional natures of
ocean problems. Thus, ocean governance can be more effective91 through the
development of ocean-related policies and legal frameworks that are informed by the
principles outlined in international environmental law. These principles are
cooperation, integration, ecosystem and precautionary approaches. This chapter will
argue that an ideal framework for ocean governance incorporates these principles,
and in doing so can greatly reduce the ingrained levels of governance problems that
pose obstacles to the effectiveness of ocean governance. The chapter will also
illustrate the lack of coordination and cooperation of the entire system. Lastly, this
chapter focuses on the principle of international cooperation. It will be argued that
the principle of cooperation can contribute most to decreasing the negative effects of
the persistent governance problems. This is because the interrelatedness of the
oceans requires that states cooperate in order to improve management of common
ocean problems and resources. For example, the mobility of fisheries that straddle
multiple jurisdictional zones; the trans-boundary nature of pollutants that percolate
into the national boundaries of neighbouring states; waste from shipping vessels that
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is dumped in the high seas and affects surrounding coastal states – all these issues
require international cooperation.

2.2 Concept of Ocean Governance
In this thesis, ocean governance comprises the various ocean-related treaties and
policies, and the ocean-mandated organisations set up to implement them. Despite
the enactment of these various ocean-related treaties and policies, and the
establishment of several ocean-mandated organisations, there is no clear definition
for ocean governance.
In fact, ‘ocean governance’ has not even been crystallised as an accepted concept in
international maritime policy and law documents. Consequently, there has been no
consensus around its precise meaning. The concept is marked by confusion with
regard to its scope and elements.92 With regard to this, it has been said that the term
‘governance’ has ‘no clear meaning and also lacks a broadly accepted framework of
reference as to its exact meaning’.93 It is also important to note that ‘governance’ is
used across disciplines and this complicates its meaning.94 The Commission on
Global Governance provided a definition for global governance ‘as a continuing
process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and
cooperative action may be taken’.95 Birnie and Boyle stated on the topic of
governance that ‘there is not a single model or form of global governance, nor is
there a single structure or set of structures. Governance is a broad, dynamic, complex
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process of interactive decision-making’.96 The term ‘governance’ has also been
defined by network approaches as ‘self-organising, interorganisational networks
which complement markets and hierarchies

as governing structures for

authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and coordination.’97 Based
on the definition provided by the network approaches, the distinction between ‘state’
(i.e. governments) and ‘civil society’ (i.e. other stakeholders such as NGOs, business
community) becomes hazy resulting in creating challenges for government to enable
these networks to find new forms of cooperation.98
The confusion in regards to the term ‘governance’ extends to ‘ocean governance.’
Despite its lack of clarity, ocean governance has become a top priority in the
international arena, with many international conferences and meetings devoted to the
discussion of it.99 Discussions of ocean governance have also intensified in the last
decade as a result of the realisation that the entire system of ocean governance is
plagued by persistent problems such as segmentation, proliferation, overlaps and
contradictions, which pose challenges to effective ocean governance, as referred
above.100 Another driving force for the increased interest in discussing ocean
governance is the continuing levels of marine degradation.101
To achieve the purpose of this chapter and the thesis as a whole, a workable concept
for ocean governance has been adopted with the objective to explain how the
introduction of the selected principles of international law can decrease governance
problems. The concept of ocean governance adopted in this thesis will also serve to
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trace the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for ocean governance
from the 15th century until the present.102
Ocean governance is defined in this thesis as a set of treaties, policies and
international organisations with ocean mandates created to regulate the oceans and
their uses and resources. This definition purposefully incorporates not only legal and
policy frameworks but also international organisations. International organisations
are relevant because they either sponsor various ocean-related treaties and policies or
are established to implement them. The above-referred definition incorporates both
legal and institutional components in order to assist the analysis of the evolution of
ocean governance from a twofold perspective. Firstly, an analysis of the historical
evolution of the legal framework for ocean governance will be conducted in the
following three chapters. Subsequently, the evolution of the institutional
framework,103 namely international organisations and other bodies set up to
implement laws and policies, will be examined in Chapter 6.
The definition of ocean governance adopted in this thesis departs from other views
that emphasise the distinction between ‘government’ and ‘governance’.104 The
distinction between ‘government’ and ‘governance’ is usually made to argue that
intergovernmental systems, such as the UN and international organisations, have
been dealing inadequately with complex ocean problems.105 According to this view,
there is a need for new approaches to ocean governance, called ‘governance systems’
– as opposed to ‘government’ – in which different sectors of civil society such as
non-government organisations (NGOs), community leaders and businesses have as
much stewardship over the oceans as state actors.106
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Despite the importance of non-state actors’ participation in the governance of the
oceans, this thesis focuses mainly on international treaties and international
organisations set up by governments. These treaties and organisations comprise the
legal and institutional frameworks for ocean governance, particularly treaties and
organisations that fall within the UN system for ocean governance. Nevertheless,
because the evolution of ocean governance will be detailed from its beginning until
the most recent global conferences, the participation of non-state actors will also be
part of the analysis. This is because the role played by NGOs in the most recent
global ocean conferences and their direct involvement in managing and protecting
ocean uses and resources have increased considerably in particular after the
convening of the global conferences sponsored by the UN in 1992 and 2002.107 Thus,
the role of the NGOs will be addressed as part of the historical analysis of the
evolution of ocean governance.
Since there is not a single set of treaties and polices and organisations established to
govern the global oceans, it results in ocean governance being comprised by various
sub-systems of governance. These sub-systems were established to regulate different
ocean issues and sectors. These various sub-systems usually operate as if they were
self-contained governance entities without communication with each other. That is,
in fact, as pointed out in the previous chapter the root causes of governance problems
associated with fragmentation, overlaps and contradiction within the system of ocean
governance.108 Given the complexity and inherent failures within the system of ocean
governance, a question is posed as to what would be an effective system of ocean
governance that could reduce some of the endemic governance failures from within
the system. Recent research in ocean governance has noted the presence of marketbased instruments in addressing governance failures.109 The premise is that

107

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 and the
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002.
108
On the failures of the current system of governance for the high seas, see: Rosemary Rayfuse and
Robin Warner, “Securing a Sustainable Future for the Oceans Beyond National Jurisdiction: the Legal
Basis for an Integrated Cross-Sectoral Regime for High Seas Governance for the 21st Century,” The
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 23 (2008), 399-421.
109
Marcus Haward and Joanna Vince, Oceans Governance in the Twenty-First Century: Managing
the Blue Planet (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar, 2008), 11.

34

‘governance is more than government.’110 For instance, transferable quotas in
fisheries, user fees and charges for resources users, and certification of products are
all new tools to address regulatory failures.111 However, it has also been pointed out
that these measures cannot replace traditional forms of government. In this regard:
[r]egulation, market and community are not mutually exclusive approaches.
Indeed effective market or community approaches are based on appropriate
legislative and regulatory instruments.112
In the absence of conceptual elements that could offer a clear-cut definition for ocean
governance, principles of international law will be used as analytical tools to explain
the concept of ocean governance. It is argued that principles of international law can
provide substance and content to the concept of ocean governance. If these principles
are introduced in the texts of ocean laws and policies and later implemented, they can
provide more coherence to a system negatively affected by governance problems.
The chosen principles of international law also serve as a basis to analyse the
evolution of ocean governance from its beginning in the 15th century until the 21st
century. Accordingly, the main argument of this thesis is that an ideal ocean
governance is based on the premise of a ‘principled’ ocean governance.113
‘Principled’ ocean governance is founded on the understanding that the principles of
cooperation, integration, ecosystem and precautionary approaches can improve the
management of ocean uses and resources, as well as decrease the negative effects of
governance failures within the system of ocean governance. Similar to the oceanrelated treaties and ocean-mandated organisations, these principles are the result of
an evolution in human understanding of the oceans.114 This evolution began with an
anthropocentric view of the oceans based on uncontrolled and unsustainable
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exploitation of their resources, and evolved towards a more conservation-oriented
approach of ocean governance.
The change in the manner in which the oceans are governed is most evident in the
last three decades, when new ocean laws and policies called for a more integrated,
cooperative, precautionary and ecosystem approach. It is assumed that due to the
introduction of these concepts in many ocean-related policies and treaties, they
gained the status of principles in international law. However, there is no consensus
about their precise status from a legal point of view. For the sake of substantiating
the main argument of this thesis, integration, cooperation, and precautionary and
ecosystem approaches will be deemed as principles of international law to justify the
adoption of the definition of a ‘principled’ ocean governance. Consequently, the
debate on the legal status of these principles falls outside the scope of this thesis.
Along with the evolution of ocean governance, and its legal and institutional
frameworks, this thesis will also analyse the evolution of the principles of
cooperation, integration, precaution and ecosystem approaches along the three the
analytical periods (Pre-LOSC, LOSC and Post-LOSC periods).

2.3 Principles of International Law and Ocean Governance
The introduction of principles of international maritime law into the texts of oceanrelated treaties and policies is clear evidence of a change in human understanding
and conception of the oceans.115 Principles of international maritime law such as
cooperation, integration, precautionary and ecosystem approaches also serve to guide
the practices of several ocean-related international organisations in implementing
their mandates.
As stated earlier, in the context of this thesis, effective ocean governance is
synonymous with ‘principled’ ocean governance, which refers to the governance that
incorporates and implements116 the principles of cooperation, integration,
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precautionary and ecosystem approaches. In common among these principles is the
underlying notion that the ocean must be viewed as an interconnected and indivisible
global system. This notion also reinforces a fundamental principle in ocean
governance that sustains the interrelatedness of ocean problems, and the need for
ocean problems to be treated as whole. An overview of each of the above-referred
principles is now provided.

2.3.1 Principle of Integration
There is no single subject-area that can provide all the answers in addressing ocean
problems. The oceans have biological aspects, such as inextricable ecological
linkages among their living resources and their habitats; mineral and genetic
resources; and masses of water, winds, currents, radiation and other energy
sources.117 In addition, there is the economic aspect of the oceans, which serve as
suppliers of food, fibre, genetic resources, metals, minerals and services (e.g., trade
routes and tourism).118 Among the ocean-related economic sectors are oil and gas,
tourism, seaborne trade, fishing, submarine telecoms and fibre optics cables, ports
and harbours, marine technological equipment and naval defence.119 These are only
two perspectives, namely biological and economic, of the various perspectives by
which the ocean can be viewed and analysed from an integrated viewpoint.120
The various aspects of the oceans (i.e., legal, economic, ecological and social) are
indicators of the oceans’ interrelated and multi-dimensional natures. A cross-
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disciplinary or multidisciplinary approach is critical to solve complex and
interrelated ocean problems. Oceans are also a scenario for complex governance
arrangements, which are characterised by fragmenting the oceans into various subregimes, namely navigation, conservation, pollution and marine scientific research,
among others. In view of the variety of activities and the inextricable connections
among ecological, political and economic facets of the oceans, there has been a call
for integration to improve the management of the oceans. Integration in ocean
governance requires that ecological, economic, social and cultural aspects be taken
into consideration in the policy-making process.121 That is why integration depends
upon a multidisciplinary approach, drawing from various disciplines such as law,
biology and economics to be put in practice. Integration can be also seen ‘as an effort
to ensure that links122 among issue areas are not neglected in the making of policy
decisions’.123
Integration was first included in an international environmental policy in 1972
through the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (Stockholm Declaration). In its principle 13, the Stockholm Declaration
called on states to integrate environmental and developmental issues in order ‘to
achieve a more rational management of resources and to improve the environment’.
That was the first time that the term ‘integration’ was expressed in a multilateral
environmental document. Principle 13 of the Stockholm Declaration reads as
follows:
[I]n order to achieve a more rational management of resources and thus to
improve the environment, States should adopt an integrated and coordinated
approach to their development planning so as to ensure that development is
compatible with the need to protect and improve environment for the benefit
of their population.
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Despite the Stockholm Declaration being a non-binding instrument, it has played an
important role in the development of international environmental law. The influence
of the Stockholm Declaration can be seen in various policy and legal instruments,
such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).124 After the
convening of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE), the
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) adopted, under the guidance of
Principle 13 of the Stockholm Declaration, a comprehensive, integrated, resultoriented approach to combat environmental problems facing the marine and coastal
areas of certain regional seas. This initiative was known as the Regional Seas
Program (RSP). The RSP functions through action plans, which are generally
accompanied by regional conventions and associated protocols.125 Although limited
to a particular geographical area, the RSP Action Plans are examples of development
of more integrated management plans for a region.126 This is because the RSP Action
Plans include provisions on various areas stemming from environmental assessment,
management and legislation, as well as institutional and financial arrangements.127
In 1992, one of the outcomes of the United Nations Conference of Environment and
Development (UNCED), Agenda 21 – The United Nations Programme for Action
from Rio (Agenda 21) – devoted its Chapter 17 to ‘integrated management and
sustainable management of coastal areas, including economic exclusive zones’.
According to Forbes, UNCED has given legitimacy to the concept of ‘integrated
ocean and coastal management’, underscoring the importance of integration in the
process, something to which up until 1992 only academics had given importance.128
Despite being issue-specific, two post-UNCED developments have also incorporated
the concept of integration in their texts – the Global Program of Action for the
Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities (GPA-LBA) and
the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea Relating to the Conservation and Management of
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Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks
Agreement).129
However, integration in ocean management is not limited to a cross-disciplinary
approach (i.e., between various disciplines from the natural sciences to social
sciences to engineering).130 Integration can also mean that the various government
levels – national, sub-national and local, for instance – will synchronise their policies
and government approaches towards an improved management of the coasts and
oceans.131 In addition, integration signifies a management approach that links the
oceanic side to the coastal side;132 considering land and sea as integrants of a
continuum. Lastly, integration entails linkages between the various economic sectors
such as tourism, oil and gas, fisheries and mining,133 with due regard to conservation
and protection of the coastal and marine environments. Because integration promotes
all the missing linkages among levels of governments, economic sectors,
environmental protection and land-sea continuum, it is vital for the elimination of the
governance problems characterised by fragmentation, overlaps and contradictions.

2.3.2 Ecosystem Management Approach
Another important concept that should guide ocean governance is the ecosystem
approach. The ecosystem approach is never referred to in the doctrine of
international maritime law or in ocean-related legal instruments as a principle of
international law. ‘Ecosystem approach’ is more often treated as a management tool
or approach, as its name indicates. For instance, the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) developed twelve principles or characteristics of the ecosystem
approach to biodiversity management; they are known as the CBD Malawi
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Principles.134 However, it is assumed in this thesis that the ecosystem approach has
gained a de facto status as a principle, as a result of its inclusion in various policy
and legal documents, as will be shown. The ecosystem approach has also served as
policy guidance for many international institutions with ocean mandates. Most
importantly, the ecosystem approach is fundamental to supporting the main argument
of this thesis that effective ocean governance can only be achieved if and when
humankind fully understands that:
[o]ur actions interact with other actions and with the ocean ecosystem. We
can only begin to understand these interactions if we have a complete picture
of what is happening in the ocean and if we introduce the procedures to
enable us to see the picture.135
The ecosystem approach is the appropriate tool that enables ocean managers to have
the ‘complete picture’ of the interactions between humans and the marine
environment. This is because the ecosystem approach focuses less on the
implications of political boundaries to ocean management and more on ecosystem
dynamics, such as the interactions between the marine environment and pollutants.136
In order for these interactions to be fully understood, it is necessary to develop
appropriate conceptual frameworks that portray the dynamics of these interactions.
Traditional models rely on discreteness, analysing the interactions in isolation from
others.137 This model is also known as a single use approach which is characterised
by a sectoral view in the manner in which the oceans are managed. This approach
has proven problematic.138 There is a need for a systemic paradigm.139 The ecosystem
approach invites ocean managers, legislators and all stakeholders within ocean
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governance to promote this change in paradigm towards a more systemic or holistic
paradigm.
Moreover, the ecosystem approach challenges the tradition of human-made
boundaries in the ocean realm.140 The tradition of line-drawing increases the
endogenous fragmentation and segmentation of the system of ocean governance,
given that the political boundaries obliterate the view of the oceans as a whole by the
ocean manager. In other words, political boundaries obliterate an ecosystem view of
the oceans. On the other hand, the ecosystem approach invites ocean managers to
perceive the oceans as not separated from their living marine resources. The marine
environment and its associated living and non-living resources are part of an
indivisible system.141 Moreover, the ecosystem approach asserts that since the oceans
constitute ‘one body of water, one ocean’, there is a need to consider that body of
water and the resources therein as a whole.142 The ecosystem approach also highlights
the need for the relationship between living and non-living marine resources and
their surrounding environment, as well as the impact of human activities in the
marine environment to be taken into consideration.
In acknowledging the impact of human activities, the ecosystem approach accounts
for the impact of stressors such as pollution or overfishing on the marine
environment. Because of the complex interactions between living systems and their
surroundings, and depending on the level of energy put into the marine environment
as a result of pollution or overfishing, the marine system can lose its ‘coherence’.143
According to Rayner, the loss of coherence in the marine environment is a result of:
[t]he input of energy from pollution or overfishing, exceeding a certain
threshold beyond which the marine system could no longer conserve its
symmetry or balance.144
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An ecosystem approach would be able to identify the thresholds for the optimal
levels of input that the marine ecosystem could absorb. An ecosystem approach can
also introduce the concept of ‘externalities’ to the area of ocean management.
According to Uderdal, externalities can be defined as the consequences of one’s
actions for others.145 Accordingly, the interplay between uses must be considered by
lawmakers and ocean managers in general. As Juda and Burrroughs stated:
Oil drilling in the continental shelf may result not only in oil production but
also blowouts and subsequent pollution of the marine environment; as well as
ocean dumping may provide a solution for waste disposal problem but it also
damages the well-being of fishery industry. The pattern of functionality based
responsibility or segmental treatment encompassed in governmental
structures tends to undercut any systematic consideration of these
externalities until problems have reached crisis proportions. The focus is
upon small pieces of a big picture and cumulative and synergistic impacts
may not be seen in an appropriate time frame which would allow for effective
response. 146
Despite its importance for the analysis of interactions between human activities and
the marine environment and its associated living and non-living resources, there is no
generally accepted definition for the ecosystem approach. The absence of a broadly
accepted definition might be a result of the novelty of the concept. However, the
Biodiversity Committee of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) defines ‘ecosystem management’
as follows:
The comprehensive integrated management of human activities based on the
best available scientific knowledge about the ecosystem and its dynamics in
order to identify and take action on influences which are critical to the health
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of marine ecosystems, thereby achieving sustainable used of ecosystem goods
and services and maintenance of ecosystem integrity.147
The ecosystem approach has been introduced in recently adopted international
treaties. For example, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources (CCAMLR), adopted in 1982, defines the geographical scope of
the treaty by utilising ecosystem considerations as opposed to political boundaries.
For instance, article 1 (3) of CCAMLR states that:
[t]he Antarctic marine ecosystem means complex of relationships of
Antarctic marine living resources with each other and with their
physical environment.
The important aspect of the definition introduced by article 1 (3) of CCAMLR is its
emphasis on the complex relationships between marine living resources with each
other and with their physical environment. Similarly, article 2(3)(b) asserts that the
ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and related populations of
Antarctic marine living resources should be maintained. The ecosystem approach has
also been incorporated into the international framework for the conservation of
marine living resources, in particular fisheries. In 1995, UN Fish Stocks Agreement
in its article 5(e) prescribed that coastal states and states fishing on the high seas
shall:
Adopt, when necessary, conservation and management measures for species
belonging to the same ecosystem or dependent on or associated with the
target stocks, with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such
species above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously
threatened.
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Also, UN Fish Stocks Agreement adopted an ecosystem approach while referring to
‘biological unity and characteristics of the stocks’ in its article 7(2)(d). In this regard,
article 7(2)(d) of UN Fish Stocks Agreement requires states to establish conservation
and management measures in the high seas by circumscribing to the following
ecosystem considerations:
[T]ake into account the biological unity and other biological characteristics of
the stocks and the relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the
fisheries and the geographical particularities of the region concerned,
including the extent to which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under
national jurisdiction.
By adopting an ecosystem approach, treaties such as CCAMLR and UN Fish Stocks
Agreement highlight the inconsistency between ecosystem-defined ocean spaces and
human-defined boundaries in the oceans.148 There has been a new trend in ocean
governance towards inclusion of the ecosystem approach within ocean-related
treaties.149 CCAMLR and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement treaties are successful
examples of this trend. These treaties are excellent models of how legal and policymaking in ocean governance can deviate from the traditional practice of enacting
policies and legislation that increase the levels of fragmentation, segmentation,
overlaps and contradiction within the system.

2.3.3 Precautionary Approach
The notion of ‘precaution’ was only introduced in ocean governance during the PostLOSC period. The precautionary approach is a novel concept in international law.150
The notion of ‘prevention’, however, surfaced from the UNCHE process by virtue of
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Principles 6 and 7 of the Stockholm Declaration. A preventive approach in terms of
pollution control means, for instance, that ‘states should cease to discharge toxic and
other substances in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the
environment to render them harmless, to ensure that serious or irreversible damage is
not inflicted upon ecosystems.’151 A precautionary approach on the other hand is
applicable ‘when the obligation to prevent environmental harm is too difficult to
apply due to the existence of scientific uncertainty regarding the existence and nature
of an environmental risk.’152 Ellis and Wood pointed out that a simple way to
distinguish ‘prevention’ and ‘precaution’ is that ‘precaution’ takes into consideration
the nature of the environmental risk and uncertainty.153
Given the similarities between ‘prevention’ and ‘precaution’ as well as the fact that
‘prevention’ served as an initial development to the later concept of ‘precaution’, it is
worthwhile to discuss the preventive approach. Principle 7 of the Stockholm
Declaration stated the need for prevention with respect to the marine environment by
urging the following:
[a]ll states to take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by
substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living
resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea.154
The preventive nature of Principle 7 is expressed in the assertion that certain human
activities ‘are liable to create hazards’. Similarly, the precautionary approach states
that ‘where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.’155 At first glance, the preventive and precautionary
approaches seem to not imply that the interrelated nature and multi-dimensional
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nature of ocean problems are part of their rationale. However, on closer analysis,
given the risk posed by an activity on a certain area of the marine environment and
the scientific uncertainty in regards to the negative consequences of such risk (the
environmental damage could be irreversible), it can be concluded that several
linkages were take into consideration in the application of the preventive and
precautionary approaches. These linkages consist of the relationship between the
health of the marine environment in association with the ‘liable’ threat of damage
(preventive approach). In regards to the precautionary approach, it implies a linkage
between scientific uncertainty and preservation of the marine environment, in the
sense that ‘lack of full scientific certainty’ shall not be used for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation. Based on the existence of
these inter-relationships in the foundation of the preventive and precautionary
approaches, one can determine that both approaches recognise the interrelated and
multi-dimensional nature of ocean problems.
Besides the relationship between the ‘liable’ threat of damage and preservation of the
marine environment against pollution in Principle 7 of the Stockholm Declaration,
another relationship is also recognised. That is, an episode of marine pollution, for
instance, could result in harm for the marine environment, human health, other living
resources and marine life. The interrelated nature of the oceans and their linkages
with human and marine living systems is directly linked to the application of the
preventive approach by virtue of Principle 7 of the Stockholm Declaration.
The precautionary approach has evolved from the context of the marine pollution
sector in the framework of the North Sea Inter-ministerial Conferences.156 However,
the precautionary approach has been extensively applied to fisheries management (i.e
UN Fish Stocks Agreement)157 and has been incorporated in the framework of the
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CCAMLR, for instance.158 The most prominent expression of the precautionary
approach at a global level occurred in 1992 at the occasion of the convening of
UNCED.159 The precautionary approach was expressly prescribed in Principle 15 of
the Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration), in the
following terms:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
Originally the precautionary principle was introduced in international law to deal
with uncertainties with regard to the environmental risks resulting from emissions of
certain substances that negatively impact the ozone layer and climate change. In this
regard,160
[t]he precautionary principle was developed to help law- and policy-makers
reach decisions in cases such as these where scientists are uncertain as to the
potential environmental impacts of a given substance or activity.161
The precautionary approach acknowledges the complexity involving the unknown
consequences of human impact on the marine environment. Similar to the other
chosen principles, namely cooperation, integration and the ecosystem approach, the
precautionary principle can also decrease the levels of segmentation, fragmentation,
overlap and contradictions within the system of ocean governance. This is because
158
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the precautionary approach has been recognised in the international arena as a
relevant ‘response to transboundary harm and threats to the global commons.’162 This
assertion indicates that the precautionary approach considers the complexities and
interactions of the oceans. Another remarkable feature of the precautionary approach
is that it:
[a]ccepts uncertainty regarding environmental outcomes as a sufficient reason
for action, recognising that we should not wait for conclusive proof of
environmental harm before adopting appropriate avoidance measures.163
Given the complexity of the ocean realm164 and the uncertainty surrounding the
negative impacts of pollutants and other stressors on the marine environment, ocean
governance incorporated the concept of precaution into ocean issues. The
precautionary principle was developed to deal with cases in which the scientific
community lacks consensus on the consequences of continuing intensive practices of,
for example, dumping and harvesting. Thus, the complexity of the marine
environment in terms of unknown consequences of continuing ocean uses has led to
the emergence, in ocean governance, of the precautionary principle in an attempt to
avoid irreversible damage to the marine environment and its resources. The general
idea is that when impacts of actions are not well understood and anticipated by
science, greater weight should be given to caution in order to protect the marine
environment against irreversible damages.165
The precautionary principle also undermines the prevalence of the doctrine of
‘assimilative capacity’ of the oceans.166 For long time, the oceans were used as
dumping site, to a point that even nuclear waste was dumped into the sea.167 The
dumping of waste in the oceans was thought to be without major consequences for
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the ocean’s integrity, given the ocean’s size and the belief of its unlimited
‘assimilative capacity’ of ocean areas. According to this outdated view, the oceans
were seen as great absorbers for the waste generated on shore. With the rise in
environmental consciousness spurred by the convening of the UNCHE in 1972 and
the consequent adoption of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and other Matter (London Dumping Convention), a change took
place in the understanding that no longer could the ocean be deemed as an
unregulated dumping site. In fact, the 1972 London Dumping Convention states in its
preamble that ‘the capacity of assimilation of the sea to render them harmless was
not unlimited’.168 The preventive nature of the 1972 London Dumping Convention
was the initial step towards the development of a more advanced idea, which is
precaution. A decade later, the Rio Declaration adopted the most ‘well-known and
widely accepted version’169 of the precautionary principle, as incorporated in its
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, transcribed above.
Similar to the principles examined above, the precautionary principle lacks a clear
definition with regard to its status in international law, its meaning and scope.170
Some scholars even criticise the precautionary principle as being ‘overly vague and
therefore impractical’.171 Despite its critics, the precautionary principle has been
widely adopted in various international treaties.172 Among these treaties is the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement in its article 6(1) and (2) which elaborated on the
precautionary approach in the following terms:
States shall apply the precautionary approach widely to conservation,
management and exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
fish stocks in order to protect the living marine resources and preserve the
marine environment.
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States shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable or
inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not be used
as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management
measures.

2.3.4 Principle of Cooperation
Of the four principles under analysis, the principle of cooperation can contribute
most to decreasing the negative effects of persisting problems within the system of
ocean governance. International cooperation was considered ‘the most effective
means of considering the problems of ocean space as a whole’.173 This is because the
principle of cooperation entails interdependence between states. This means, for
example, that when states cooperate through the enactment of a treaty, they expressly
acknowledge that they share problems, resources or any other related issues. By
cooperation, states indicate that they share ocean problems which by their nature are
multi-dimensional and interrelated. Perrez defines ‘cooperation’ as ‘the opposite of
acting independently’, implying a sharing of certain authority, competence or
power.174 Perrez further examines the reasons leading to ‘collaboration’ while
describing ‘collaboration’ as synonymous of ‘cooperation’:175
[i]n cooperating, the states accept to take into account the interests of other
states, to give up the authority to make decisions independently and
unilaterally and to coordinate their activities, their jurisdiction and their
enforcement with other states.176
Thus, cooperation is an implied formal declaration between states of their
interdependency. Interdependency is a fundamental concept to overcome the
governance problems within the system of ocean governance. Most recent oceanrelated treaties and policy documents prescribed international cooperation in ocean
173
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governance as a means to achieve better governance. For instance, the LOSC and
Agenda 21 pointed in this direction by ‘prescribing international coordination and
cooperation in almost every area’.177 The LOSC is ‘hailed as the most comprehensive
framework for such coordination and cooperation in ocean affairs’.178 That is why
both the principle of cooperation and the LOSC itself are given much attention in this
thesis, due to their relevance in reducing fragmentation, contradiction and overlaps.

2.3.4.1 Definition of Cooperation
The rationale for cooperation can be found on the basis of states agreeing to solve
shared problems. Thus, cooperation is largely utilised when states make a common
effort towards the solution of a shared problem. It is seldom that unilateral measures
are adequate to solve ocean problems due to the unique ecology and indivisible
nature of the ocean realm. Also, the interconnected and multi-dimensional natures of
the ocean problems require cooperation for their solution.
In practical terms, cooperation means that interested parties involved in a common
ocean issue will seek agreement, usually through the adoption of treaties or any other
means formally prescribed by law in view of finding an optimal solution for a shared
problem. Along these lines, the UN applies the term ‘cooperation’ broadly to the
efforts of states to reach agreement on common issues; for example, maritime
boundaries or the use of international channels for navigation.179 Such agreements are
formalised through the enactment of bilateral or multilateral treaties, the latter at
regional and global levels.
Similar to other principles under analysis, a legal definition for cooperation and its
legal status are nonexistent. The term ‘cooperation’ has been defined neither by the
maritime international law’s books nor by any legal instrument, nor have
international courts provided a definition for cooperation. Despite the absence of a
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definition for cooperation, many treaties prescribe cooperation in addressing ocean
issues, including the LOSC.180 Also, international courts have prescribed cooperation
as a legal benchmark to substantiate some of their decisions. For instance, decisions
in which conflicts over environmental issues were resolved through cooperation are
the following: Trail Smelter (United States v. Canada)181 and Gabcikovo-Nagymoros
Project (Hungary v. Slovak Republic).182 In 2001, the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the Mox Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom)
considered cooperation as a ‘fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution of
the marine environment’.183
The literature on ‘cooperation’ is dominated by differing schools of thought, which
increases the difficulties in understanding and defining this legal concept. For
instance, the rational choice theory, or game theory, defined ‘cooperation’ on the
basis of ‘pay-offs’, referring to states as utility-maximisers that engage in
cooperation if they can gain advantage from it.184 The managerial school of thought
explained the phenomenon of cooperation in connection with the concept of
effectiveness in the following terms:
[e]ffective cooperation takes place when it influences the actor’s behaviour to
manage the common problems and resources that originally led to the need to
cooperate.185
Other schools of thought equated cooperation to an avoidance conflict tool.186
Wolfrum and Matz described cooperation as ‘voluntary and coordinated action, of
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two or more subjects of international law that has a joint objective as its aim’.187
However, Wolfrum and Matz point out that as a concept, ‘cooperation’ is not very
precise, even in its ordinary meaning. In legal terms or used in legal terminology, the
concept is considered to be very ‘broad and not precisely defined’.188 In similar
terms, Scholtz points out that it remains unclear the exact content of what
cooperation principle entails.189 Other authors suggested that the problem does not
rest in the absence of a definition for ‘cooperation’ but rather in the lack of explicitly
codified, clarifying standards of conduct that define cooperative and uncooperative
behaviour.190 Oye pointed out that codification of norms could create favourable
conditions of play in order to limit the definitional ambiguity around the concept of
cooperation.191 In this regard:
There is no determinative threshold for deciding how well or how poorly a
state may be said to have been cooperative, since the requirement to
cooperate is generally stipulated, and therefore, unlike a domestic legislative
standard, it is not spelled out in concrete steps respecting specific areas of
activity requiring cooperation.192
From a principle of law standpoint, there is prolific literature that reinforces the view
of cooperation as a principle (see, e.g., Boyle;193 Kiss and Shelton;194 Sands;195 and
Scholtz196). Sands adopted the argument of cooperation as a principle of international
law, but he equated the principle of cooperation with the principle of good
187
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neighbourliness in the environmental law field. 197 According to Sands, cooperation is
the only principle of international customary law that had its legal status as a
principle settled.198 Similarly, Kiss and Shelton asserted that although custom in the
field of environment is still in its infancy, state practice through the adoption of
various binding and non-binding international instruments has given the duty to
cooperate the status of a principle of customary international law.199 Lastly, the
principle of cooperation has been greatly strengthened as a result of the convening of
four mega-conferences under the auspices of the UN; all four conferences devoted a
great deal of attention to cooperation.200 According to Boyle, the international
customary duty for states to cooperate in solving global ocean problems can be
inferred from judicial decisions and numerous ‘soft-law’ instruments.201

2.3.4.2 Rationale for the Principle of Cooperation in Ocean Governance
In the absence of a definition for cooperation, this thesis relies on the rationale for
the principle of cooperation in ocean governance to further explain the elements of
the concept. The rationale for the principle of cooperation in ocean governance can
be depicted in three diverse and yet interrelated perspectives as follows: ecological,
legal and institutional.
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2.3.4.2.1 Ecological Rationale for the Principle of Cooperation
The world’s oceans occupy almost 140 million square miles and cover nearly 71 per
cent of the Earth’s surface.202 This single global system comprises inextricable
ecological linkages among its living resources and their habitats; mineral and genetic
resources; and the mass of water, winds, currents, radiation and other energy
sources.203 In this regard, Thurman stated:
[t]aken as whole, the world ocean comprises one of the earth’s largest
interacting, interrelated and interdependent systems. As humankind continues
to impact marine and terrestrial ecosystems, it is necessary to understand how
the oceans operate, and how they interact with other systems such as
atmosphere, biosphere, and hydrosphere’.204
The ocean is also considered to be the ‘great integrator of planet’ given that it
connects all continents.205 Borgese argued that the ocean is an essential part of the
biosphere; it is a crucial element in the carbon cycle and a determinant of the planet’s
climate. In addition, the ocean’s contribution of ‘ecosystem services’ is much larger
than that of terrestrial ecosystems.206
The biophysical and ecological interconnected features of the oceans are the
foundation for the ecological rationale of the principle of cooperation. The principle
of cooperation in ocean governance needs to be applied and introduced in the text of
ocean-related treaties and policies based on the ecological reality that the world’s
oceans as a single indivisible body of water. In other words, ocean-related treaties
and policies need to incorporate this ecological reality. However, the reality of the
current system of ocean governance only introduced considerations to the indivisible
ecological reality of the oceans in the 20th century. The persisting resistance or
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neglect to acknowledge the interconnected and multi-dimensional natures of the
oceans within the various ocean-related treaties and policies result in fragmentation,
contradiction and overlaps.
However, there are some areas of ocean governance that demonstrate some
improvements while introducing the ecological rationale in the text of ocean-related
laws; in particular, treaties that prescribe the obligation to cooperate. For instance,
the interconnected ecological and biophysical features of the oceans were recognised
by the third paragraph of the preamble of the LOSC which states that:
Conscious that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need
to be considered as a whole.
The LOSC also introduced in several of its articles an ecosystem view, which
indicates acknowledgement of the unique indivisible ecological reality of the
oceans.207 The third paragraph of the preamble of the LOSC implies that in dealing
with ocean problems, the ‘ocean space’ must be governed as an indivisible
management unit. The understanding of the interrelatedness of ocean problems
informs the obligation to cooperate within the LOSC.
The LOSC prescribed the principle of cooperation as the solution for several ocean
problems – stemming from conservation of living marine resources208 to protection
and preservation of the marine environment209 – the LOSC upheld within its text the
ecological rationale for international cooperation in ocean governance. By doing so,
the LOSC paved the way for other agreements to require cooperation while treating
the ocean space as an indivisible whole. Along these lines, other developments in
ocean policy also supported cooperation based on ecological rationale, such as the
management approach known as Large Marine Ecosystems (LME).210 The LME
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approach defines large portions of oceans based on their ecological characteristics
rather than political boundaries.211

2.3.4.2.2 Legal Rationale for the Principle of Cooperation
There are various circumstances that entail cooperation from a legal point of view.
Firstly, because the ocean ignores human-made boundaries and, for instance,
valuable living marine resources migrate through the boundaries of several states,
this circumstance has the potential to create conflict. Juda points out that ‘human use
of marine environment and its resources has contributed to the potential for both
international conflict and cooperation’.212 That is why most cooperating agreements
are enacted to either solve existing conflicts between parties or to avoid the eruption
of a conflict. Thus, very often the driving force for cooperating actors to jointly draw
formal instruments is the attempt to reconcile opposing interests.213
Another legal rationale for the principle of cooperation is related to the evolution of
ocean governance and the manner in which the system of governance has been
structured for the past 30 years. Ocean governance evolved from just a few bilateral
agreements to a large number of multilateral ocean-related treaties. As stated earlier,
the proliferation of ocean treaties has the potential to generate fragmentation,
contradiction and overlaps within the system of ocean governance. In addition to
proliferation, the legal system of ocean governance is characterised by being
comprised of several sectoral sub-systems that regulate various subject areas, such as
navigation, pollution and the conservation and management of living marine
resources, among others.
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The sectoral view of ocean governance, coupled with the large number of oceanrelated treaties, justifies the need to increase cooperation among these sub-systems.
Cooperation needs to be developed among these several disconnected sub-systems.
In view of the fact the oceans are characterised by interconnectedness of their
biophysical and ecological features, the legal framework for ocean governance must
reflect this reality. The means to promote linkages among the various sub-systems is
through cooperation.
One of the most significant governance failures within the system of ocean
governance is the failure to incorporate within its legal framework the interrelated
and multi-dimensional natures

214

of the oceans. For instance, a polluting incident

may impact surrounding fisheries, as well as other industries, such as tourism.
Navigational issues, such as the designation of sea lanes, can also impact protection
of the marine environment if the designated sea lanes overlap with the migratory
routes of marine mammals. As a result of the impact that one single legal regime or
sub-system exerts on another, there has been a need to develop inter-linkages among
diverse regimes. Cooperation was considered to be the best vehicle for such an
endeavour.215

2.3.4. 2.3 Institutional Rationale for the Principle of Cooperation
Ocean governance comprises two major frameworks: legal and institutional. The
legal

framework

consists

of several

ocean-related

treaties

and

policies.

Theinstitutional framework comprises international organisations, bodies, agencies
and programs established to implement these laws and polices. The legal framework
could not exist without its institutional counterpart; the two frameworks are
interdependent. The UN plays a significant role in relation to the institutional
framework for ocean governance, because most of the international organisations
with ocean mandates fall under the umbrella of the UN. Similar to its legal
framework, the institutional framework for ocean governance is also negatively
214
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affected by governance problems. Among these problems is overlapping mandates.
For instance, an overlap occurs when two or more institutions affect each other’s
development and performance, including their effectiveness.216
Overlaps in the realm of international organisations are profuse. For example, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) is primarily responsible for regulating
safety and security of international shipping and the prevention of marine pollution
by ships.217 The International Labour Organization (ILO) is mandated with
establishing and overseeing international labour standards.218 IMO during its 22nd
Assembly session adopted two resolutions sorely related to seafarers. Resolution
A.930 (22) ensures financial assistance for abandonment of seafarers and Resolution
A.931 (22) deals with claims for personal injury to or death of seafarers. ILO
Governing Body has approved these resolutions and their implementation is to be
monitored by IMO/ILO Ad Hoc Expert Working Group specially created for that
end.219
In this example, the overlap resulted in inter-agency cooperation. As will be seen in
the institutional Chapter 6, this is not often the case, particularly when international
organisations consider an intrusion in their mandates to discuss issues that are, in
their view, only pertinent to them. ‘Turf wars’ between international organisations
are unfavourable to the development of inter-agency cooperation.
Since the 1970s, a great number of organisations such as specialised agencies were
established within the UN system to implement the various environmental treaties.220
The proliferation of organisations occurred in an uncoordinated manner. According
to Wolfrum and Matz, the proliferation of international organisations is not limited to
governmental actors; more recently a number of NGOs have also been recognised as
216
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legitimate subjects of international law.221 The proliferation of international
organisations was described as ‘institutional congestion’.222 Young identified
‘institutional congestion’ as the process resulting from the proliferation of
disconnected ‘regimes’ or institutions. In this regard, Young stated:
[t]he demand for governance continues to grow in international society,
intersections arising from processes of this sort will become increasingly
common. In effect, the prospect of institutional congestion will drive parties
to think seriously about building substantive links among arrangements that
began life as unrelated regimes.223
For instance, just within the UN system there are at least 19 intergovernmental
organisations with ocean mandates.224 International organisations, such as Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), IMO, ILO, World Trade Organization (WTO),
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), International Maritime Satellite
Organizations (INMARSAT) are autonomous entities. Their autonomy is reflected in
the fact that they possess through their secretariats the ability to enter into legal
contracts, own property, sue and be sued.225 These organisations possess legal
personality.226 These international organisations also possess their own personnel,
budgets, physical facilities or seats and equipment.227

As a result of these

organisations being mandated with specific subject areas or sectors, as well as having
their own operational apparatuses, they end up acting in isolation. This accentuates
the levels of fragmentation, overlap and contradiction within the system of ocean
governance, from an institutional viewpoint.
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In conclusion, the institutional rationale for the principle of cooperation invites all
international organisations that comprise ocean governance to abolish the notion of
self-confined organisations. This is encouraged by the creation of a forum where
member states of these organisations can discuss issues and solve problems that go
beyond their sectoral mandates and are inextricably related. Institutional rationale for
the principle of cooperation shifts the focus towards building linkages among the
various sectoral organisations. This will prompt international organisations to build
linkages among themselves to decrease the negative effects of ‘institutional
congestion’.228

2.3.4.3 A Multi-layered Approach to Cooperation in Ocean Governance
Ocean governance is multi-layered. This means that there are at least three levels in
which legal and institutional arrangements are structured, namely national, regional
and international. Similarly, cooperation takes place at national, regional and
international levels. There are two manners in which cooperation can take place.
Firstly, cooperation, or lack thereof, takes place within the same level of governance.
This kind of cooperation is usually related to cooperation between different sectors
of ocean governance, such as navigation, fisheries and pollution. It can also be
described as horizontal. The other manner in which cooperation occurs is related to
cooperation, or lack thereof, across the various layers or levels of governance, such
as between local and regional, and between regional and international levels (or
vertical cooperation).
Also, the fashion in which cooperation takes shape is dependent upon the nature and
extension of the ocean problem at stake. The most common determining factor in
establishing a cooperating agreement is the number of interested parties involved.
Factors such as geographical features of a particular region and migratory patterns of
a given species are also relevant in crafting a cooperating agreement and determining
its regulatory scope. Accordingly, cooperation can occur in several layers, ranging
from bilateral to multilateral agreements on global or regional scales. As a result,
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some ocean problems can be satisfactorily solved by two interested parties, therefore
requiring only bilateral cooperation. Other problems are better managed if addressed
regionally. Still others require global cooperation.229 An analysis of the various levels
of cooperation in ocean governance is now provided.
2.3.4.3.1 Bilateral Cooperation
As stated in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the evolution of ocean governance
can be described as the path from the total absence of regulation with regards to
ocean uses and exploitation of their resources230 to a more cooperative environment
in which treaties are enacted to solve conflicts and regulate use of shared marine
resources. As mentioned earlier, the shift towards cooperation was primarily
triggered by conflicts over the exploitation of marine resources, such as marine
mammals231 and fish populations.232 The pioneering manner in which cooperation was
designed was on a bilateral basis, with the objective to solve conflicts between two
parties over the exploitation of resources. In the case of neighbouring states, bilateral
cooperation is most suited to effectively provide a solution for trans-boundary
conflicts, such as those involving maritime delimitation, shared fisheries resources
and pollution. Bilateral cooperation usually takes place through consensual
agreement in which the cooperating parties recognise the benefits of achieving a joint
agreement instead of resorting to costly dispute settlements.233 States also tend to
adopt bilateral cooperation to conflicts to preserve good relationships with their
neighbours. Because consensus is very difficult to achieve in a diverse international
community comprised of more than 190 states,234 bilateral agreements are largely
used ‘when governments are unable to cooperate on a global scale’.235 Similarly,
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when a multilateral agreement is difficult to accomplish, ‘governments often turn to
discriminatory strategies to encourage bilateral or regional cooperation’.236
Examples of bilateral agreements abound. For instance, as a result of an international
court’s decisions or alternative dispute settlements, parties are requested to cooperate
through bilateral agreement with a view to resolving the dispute.237 The Stockholm
Declaration in its Principle 24 also acknowledged cooperation through bilateral
agreement as a means to effectively control, prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse
environmental effects. Bilateral agreements are also largely used in regions where
there is high political tension, and a bilateral agreement is established as a first step
towards a more comprehensive regional agreement. A case in point is the
disagreement over disputed maritime boundaries in Northeast Asia. Involved parties
in this dispute resorted to bilateral agreements in order to manage and conserve
shared fishery resources as a provisional measure until the main point of contention
is solved.238 In this case, a bilateral agreement not only diminishes the potential for
conflict, but also serves as a preparation for a broader agreement.

2.3.4.3.2 Regional Cooperation
Regional cooperation takes place when more than two states, usually located within
the same geographic area, adopt a treaty to manage common resources or solve
shared environmental problems, such as transboundary pollution. There is an
extensive body of literature that advocates the regional approach as the most
effective for the management of ocean problems.239 As an expression of endorsement
236

Oye, “Explaining Cooperation,” 21.
Kiss and Shelton, International Environmental Law, 45-46, 273-290; and Sands, Principles, 198.
238
Mark J. Valencia, “Regional Maritime Regime Building: Prospects in Northeast and Southeast
Asia,” Ocean Development and International Law 31 (2000): 240-241; see also Guifang (Julia) Xue,
“Bilateral Fisheries Agreements for the Cooperative Management of the Shared Resources of the
China Seas: A Note,” Ocean Development and International Law 36 (2005): 363-374.
239
For instance Lee A. Kimball, “Whither International Institutional Arrangements to Support Ocean
Law?” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 307 (1998); Lee A. Kimball and Thomas L. Laughlin,
“A New Approach to Tackling International Environmental Governance: A Regional Oceans Model”
(paper presented at the 50th Anniversary of the World Conservation Union, Fontainbleau, France,
November 1998). Also Jutta Brunnée, “The Baltic Sea Area and Long-Range Atmospheric Pollution –
How Regional Cooperation Fits into the Larger Picture,” McGill Law Journal 36 (1991); Martin
Tsamenyi, “The Institutional Framework for Regional Cooperation in Ocean and Coastal Management
in the South Pacific,” Ocean and Coastal Management 42 (1999).
237

64

of the regional approach, in 1972 the UN adopted a regional approach for ocean
affairs through its UNEP Regional Seas Program. Article 197 of LOSC asserts that
‘states shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis’ for
the protection and preservation of the marine environment. In 1989, the World
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) recommended the regional
approach as the most suitable to deal with the unity of the oceans and the shared
characteristic of ocean resources.240 In 1992, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 on oceans and
coasts reinforced the importance of regional cooperation and called for its
implementation.241 Most recently, all the international fishery agreements, including
the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement and the FAO Code of Conduct, are primarily
regional in their approach.
Kimball claimed that most ocean problems, such as fisheries and land-based
pollution, for example, are better dealt with through regional approaches.242 Kimball
and Laughlin also criticised the excessive emphasis on global approaches to
managing ocean problems:
It is widely accepted that regions (including watersheds) are more logical
units for sustainable ocean management than a global approach. Most marine
fish stocks are regional, and the effects of marine pollution, modified river
flow, and atmospheric change are usually contained within coastal/marine
ecosystems at the regional level.243
Another advantage of regional agreements over multi-lateral agreements is that the
former are more cost-effective given that regional cooperation involves fewer
interested parties resulting in fewer ‘transaction costs’. This assumption is based on
the school of thought that sustains that ‘transaction costs’ of an agreement increase
rapidly as a function of various factors, such as size of membership.244 Another
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advantage of regional approaches to cooperation is that often regional agreements are
adopted by state parties that are located within the same region. This circumstance
creates favourable conditions – economy of scale by establishing centralised
institutions with mandate over the entire region.245 Another favourable condition is
that usually these states share language and environmental characteristics, and
possess similar economic development profiles. These favourable conditions are not
solely influenced by the common biophysical features of the regional oceans, but
also by greater homogeneity of states’ interests and greater incentives to act
regionally.246 Other factors that facilitate regional cooperation are long-standing
cultural relations, similarity of political systems, and levels of development.247
Moreover, regional cooperation is vital for developing countries to maximise scarce
resources, expertise and infrastructure for managing vast areas of oceans.248
Accordingly, regional cooperation has been largely utilised by developing nations in
order to overcome the problems of limited financial resources and lack of expertise
to create organisations. Regional cooperation is particularly relevant for ocean
governance in view of the fact that among the 191 member-states of the United
Nations, the majority are developing nations.249 Since large portions of the oceans fall
within the jurisdiction of developing nations, it is in the best interest of the entire
global community that developing countries achieve improved levels of cooperation.
The importance of regional cooperation for these countries includes achieving
greater coherence in regional planning; mapping the regional environmental agenda;
identifying priorities; pooling resources; costs savings; and achieving economies of
scale.250
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2.3.4.3.3 International or Multilateral Cooperation
A great number of ocean problems are global in their scale, thus there is a need to
devise multilateral or international cooperation for their solution.251 Multilateral or
international cooperation is characterised by both great membership and a global
geographic scale. For instance, in addressing issues such as the regulation of highly
migratory species (e.g., whales and tuna that cross the entire global ocean in their
migratory cycles), or to address worldwide commercial shipping, multilateral
agreements are optimal.252 Similarly, a global approach is also more suitable for
climate change and ozone depletion.253
Several issue-specific multilateral agreements have been adopted to deal with global
ocean issues. For instance, ocean dumping,254 pollution from ships,255 fisheries,256
climate change,257 navigational safety258 and marine biodiversity.259 The most
ambitious multilateral agreement in the entire evolutionary history of ocean
governance is the LOSC. This is because the LOSC, unlike any other instrument,
regulated several ocean uses. By doing so, the LOSC sought to provide coherence to
the scattered system of ocean governance. The LOSC is a result of a great
codification effort within a system of governance that is characterised by
fragmentation. Such codification effort can only be achieved through multilateral or
international cooperation to gather a greater number of possible of signatories. At
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stake in a multilateral agreement is the building of consensus in an attempt to
overcome deeply ingrained divergences in political interests or economic status
among a great number of members with various levels of socio-economic
development and conflicting interests at times.
As stated before, the oceans are an indivisible whole, which results in most ocean
problems being global in their scale. The LOSC recognises the need for multilateral
agreements as a means to curb the levels of fragmentation, overlaps and
contradictions within the system of governance. For instance, the LOSC prescribes
cooperation by means of entering into agreements either directly or through
appropriate international organisations to find solutions to multi-dimensional and
interrelated ocean problems such as transboundary pollution and the management of
shared natural resources.260
Furthermore, multilateral cooperation can assume many shapes and forms. States can
adopt a treaty by signing directly without any intervening international organisation.
However, multilateral treaties can also be adopted by international organisations,
such as UN specialised agencies, which possess vast memberships and are usually set
up to deal with specific subject areas.
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building of consensus and uniformity of rules would be perhaps intangible. The
above sections demonstrated the various forms in which cooperation can take shape
and the numerous advantages in achieving cooperation regardless if it is bilateral,
regional or international cooperation.

2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has presented an analysis of the concept of ocean governance. It pointed
out that there is no clear definition for ocean governance and the concept is marked
by confusion with regard to its scope and elements. This chapter then adopted a
working definition of ocean governance based on principles of international maritime
law, specifically the principles of cooperation, integration and precautionary
ecosystem-based approaches. The chapter maintained that by adopting the principles
of cooperation, integration, precaution and the ecosystem approaches, ocean
governance would decrease the negative effects of fragmentation, overlaps and
contradictions within its system. This is because these principles are based on the
fundamental notion that the ocean is an interconnected and indivisible global system,
which needs to be managed as a whole. The chapter highlighted in particular the
importance of the principle of cooperation for delivering effective ocean governance.
Lastly, the principle of cooperation was analysed in view of the rationale for
cooperation (ecological, legal and institutional) and the various layers in which it can
be shaped (bilateral, regional and multi-lateral). The succeeding chapters will
examine the historical evolution of ocean governance and its legal and institutional
framework.
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CHAPTER 3 - LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR OCEAN GOVERNANCE
DURING THE PRE-LOSC PERIOD

3.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 analyses the evolution of the legal framework for ocean governance from
the 15th century, a period characterised by the absence of regulation, until the 20th
century, when more elaborate systems of governance were adopted, comprising
several ocean-related bilateral, regional and international treaties, as well as ocean
policies. This chapter analyses the evolution of ocean governance from a legal
perspective262 until before the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (LOSC) in 1982.263 This analytical period is defined as the Pre-LOSC
period.264 The principles of international environmental law outlined in previous
chapter, namely cooperation, integration, ecosystem and precautionary approaches
will serve as analytical tools to demonstrate how their inclusion in the texts of oceanrelated policies and treaties can assist in decreasing governance problems
characterised by segmentation, overlaps and contradictions.
This chapter will also show the trends and changes that took place in ocean
governance over the time period covered. This chapter will demonstrate that despite
advancements that resulted from the adoption of some of the principles of
international law within the text of treaties that regulate ocean uses and resources and
the outcomes of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE)
in 1972, the entire system of ocean governance is still negatively affected in its legal
framework by deep-rooted governance problems.
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3.2 Pre-LOSC Period
The Pre-LOSC can be divided into two discrete periods. The first segment of this
period, which lasted from the 15th century until the end of the 19th century, is
characterised by the absence of regulation with regard to ocean uses. The first
segment is also associated with the appropriation of entire portions of the global
oceans by prominent maritime powers at the time.265 The second part of the PreLOSC period is marked by the adoption of the first ocean-related treaties to regulate
ocean uses, such as maritime trade, fisheries and exploitation of marine life, in
particular fisheries and seals. The Pre-LOSC ends with the convening of the UNCHE
in 1972, which imprinted a strong focus on environmental protection, in particular to
curb marine pollution. The UNCHE is also remarkable because this conference was
the first global effort to promote cooperation as a means to reduce the levels of
fragmentation, overlaps and contradictions within the system of ocean governance.

3.3 Treaty of Tordesillas
In the absence of rules in the 15th century to regulate the international relations
between Europe and the non-European world and new continents, Portugal and
Spain, two major European maritime powers at the time, adopted a doctrine that
Christians had the right to occupy and possess all lands, including significant
portions of the ocean, regardless of the native people.266 The Portuguese argued that
once a ship had sailed through parts of the ocean for the first time, this would give
the legal right of occupation to the nation that owned the ship.267 Therefore, in 1454
Pope Nicholas V ‘persuaded by the Portuguese’ issued a formal proclamation which
granted Portugal the title over territories it had ‘discovered’ along the African coast
and towards India.268 The Spanish, fearing Portuguese counterclaims over

265

Lawrence Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management: the Evolution of Ocean
Governance (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 8.
266
Ram Prakash Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea: History of International Law
Revisited (The Hague and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 43.
267
Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management, 9.
268
Anand, Origin and Development, 43.

71

Christopher Columbus’s discoveries, pressured Pope Alexander VI to recognise
Spanish sovereignty over a newly found continent. Thus, on 4 May 1493, Pope
Alexander VI divided the world in two between Spain and Portugal.269 This Papal
bull was changed in 1494 to determine the rights of both parties more clearly and a
new treaty was sealed. This treaty was known as the Treaty of Tordesillas. It was
sanctioned by Pope Julius II in 1506.270 These historical events demonstrated that
navigation coupled with disputes over the recognition of sovereignty over large
portions of the ocean and lands under the maritime powers’ ‘possession’271 were the
driving force for the first developments in ocean governance. The Treaty of
Tordesillas pioneered a trend in the governance of the oceans of establishing
imaginary lines to ascertain national possessions over ocean areas.
These human-made boundaries also served as parameters to craft and adopt
pioneering regulatory instruments for navigation and the establishment of maritime
trade routes, among other activities. The line-drawing process was an emulation of
the practice of delimiting boundaries on land.272 In the case of the Treaty of
Tordesillas, the line ran north and south through the mid-Atlantic, ‘from pole to
pole’, to indicate Portuguese and Spanish possessions. Remarkably this approach as
applied to ocean space would remain uncontested until the 20th century when it
would start to be considered inadequate to manage ocean issues, as it will be
demonstrated in succeeding chapters. However, at the time of the adoption of the
Treaty of Tordesillas, there was no awareness of the ecosystem nature of the ocean
and its resources. Ecosystem perspective is a modern concept which would arise in
the 20th century. At the time of the adoption of the Treaty of Tordesillas, the oceans
were perceived in the same manner as the land for the purpose of asserting
possession. Thus, the manner in which maritime powers used to determine ownership
over the sea was a replication of the demarcation techniques utilised for terrestrial
possessions. The awareness of the inadequacies generated by rigid land-based like
boundaries as applied to the ocean realm would only surface centuries later.

269

Anand, Origin and Development, 43.
Anand, Origin and Development, 44.
271
Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management, 9.
272
José Manuel Pureza, “International Law and Ocean Governance: Audacity and Modesty,” RECIEL
8 (1999): 73.
270

72

In the 20th century, ocean managers would acknowledge that the oceans, because of
their interrelated ecological configurations, would require another approach from law
and policy-makers.273 The ‘land-based’ management approach towards the ocean and
its uses and resources would become part of the governance problem associated with
the high levels of fragmentation, contradiction and overlaps within the system of
ocean governance. This is because the fluidity of the ocean space and the mobility of
its living resources result in exposing the inadequacy of human-made lines
demarcating the ocean space. However, for centuries during the Pre-LOSC period
humankind did not possess scientific knowledge about the unique ecological
configuration of the oceans. The lack of scientific knowledge about the ecological
reality of the oceans resulted in having human-made boundaries unchallenged as
management tool for the oceans for many centuries.
As it will be demonstrated, during the 20th century, although still necessary to
ascertain rights and obligation of participants of the international community over the
ocean space, boundaries needed to go through a process of adjustment to the new
perceptions on the reality of the oceans (in regards to their interconnected and multidimensional natures). The catalyst for the need for adjustment was the governance
problems characterised in particular by segmentation and proliferation of oceanrelated treaties and policies. But even before the Post-LOSC challenge, the trend of
setting rigid lines to ascertain possession over ocean space was opposed by a doctrine
known as Freedom of Seas (examined below). Although, the reason for the tradition
of human-made lines to be challenged by the Freedom of the Seas doctrine was far
from the recognition of the fluidity and ecosystem characteristics of the oceans.
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3.4 Doctrine of Freedom of the Seas (Mare Liberum)
With the decline of the Portuguese and Spanish empires,274 and the rising of the
British and Dutch as the new maritime powers, there were more legal disputes over
the Spanish and Portuguese claims.275 Maritime trade between Holland and the Far
East was intensifying, which generated mounting opposition to the terms of the
Treaty of Tordesillas from the Dutch and other European nations.276 This is because
the Treaty of Tordesillas hampered trade relations between the Dutch and the far
eastern Portuguese and Spanish ‘possessions’.277 This state of affairs created
opportunity for the publication in 1609 of a legal treatise known as Mare Liberum
(verbatim from Latin, ‘free seas’) by a Dutch jurist named Hugo Grotius. In his
treatise, Grotius opposed the claims of the Portuguese and Spanish over large
portions of the world’s ocean as expressed in the Treaty of Tordesillas.278 Grotius
made a case for freedom of navigation.279
The main focus of Grotius’s treatise was to safeguard that the right of navigation
ought to be exercised by all maritime powers without any impairment or control. The
real goal of Grotius’s treatise was to ensure that maritime trade could continue
without limitations.280 As a result of the publication of Mare Liberum and its wide
acceptance among nations involved in the maritime trade at the time, the doctrine
known as ‘freedom of the seas’ or Mare Liberum, was adopted.281 Grotius’s doctrine
had a significant impact on ocean governance, hence becoming a widely recognised
custom of international law.282 In relation to marine life, the Mare Liberum doctrine
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proclaimed their exploitation without limits or regulation based on the belief that
marine life was inexhaustible. The understanding at the time was that it was
inconceivable that fisheries could be extinguished from the vast ocean.283 Grotius
expressed his views on this matter in the following terms:
Everyone admits that if a great many persons hunt on the land or fish in a
river, the forest is easily exhausted of wild animals and the river of fish, but
such a contingency is impossible in the case of the sea.284
As a consequence of the Mare Liberum doctrine, the foundation for the unrestricted
practice of exploitation of marine life was established and would prevail for more
than three centuries.285 This also meant that somewhat ‘flawed’ perceptions about the
ocean ecosystem would inform the management of the ocean for centuries with
detrimental consequences in particular for fisheries resources. Despite the fact that
ocean manager at that time did not possess scientific knowledge on sustainable
exploitation of fisheries resources, this understanding of the inexhaustibility of living
resources would result in deleterious consequences for fisheries. In fact, even during
recent years when there is plenty of scientific knowledge, irresponsible fishing
practices would cause approximately 75 per cent of the world’s fisheries to be either
fully exploited or overexploited.286
The perceptions about the inexhaustibility of ocean resources would only be
considered faulty centuries later based on the scientific knowledge that would be
acquired by ocean managers and law makers. Thus, during the time of Grotius,
which was a time of consolidation of the initial phase of regulation of oceans uses,
the understanding of ocean functioning was limited and unscientific which facilitated
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the surfacing of unsound management decisions. In summary, ocean governance,
according to the terms of treaties such as Treaty of Tordesillas and the doctrine of the
Mare Liberum, was based upon three major pillars: the practice of line-drawing to
assert possession over ocean areas; the misconception of inexhaustibility of marine
life; and the irrefutable international custom of freedom of navigation. As it will be
further examined in the next sections, two premises, namely the drawing of lines and
the belief of inexhaustibility of marine life, would constitute major obstacles for
delivering ‘principled’ or effective ocean governance. This is because these two
constructs would result in the unrestricted and unsustainable exploitation of marine
living resources. As stated earlier, the line-drawing approach poses difficulties to
ocean management in view of the fluidity of marine resources and the ocean’s unique
bio-physical characteristic as an indivisible ecosystem. The scientific knowledge that
would be gained centuries later about the ecological reality of the oceans would
expose the governance failures resulting from the wide acceptance of these two
constructs. This thesis focuses on the evolution of ocean governance which requires
acknowledging that at the time of the establishment of human-made boundaries to
ocean space and unrestricted exploitation of resources, maritime powers were acting
based on the understanding they have of the oceans at the time. Similarly to ocean
governance as a concept, the understanding of the oceans is also part of a non-stop
evolving process of developing new perceptions and adopting new approaches.

3.4.1 Challenge to the Freedom of the Seas Doctrine
In 1635, a reply to Grotius doctrine Mare Liberum was published by an English
scholar named John Selden who wrote on behalf of the English Crown a book called
Mare Clausum, or literally ‘the Closed Sea’.287 Selden relied on historical data and
state practice in an attempt to support the argument that ‘admitting private dominion
of the seas; and exercising maritime sovereignty’ was a long-held custom among
various nations since antiquity; therefore, oceans could not be considered as
‘commons’, and could not be subject to appropriation as sustained by the Mare
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Liberum doctrine.288 The Mare Clausum view supported the national appropriation of
maritime spaces. It resulted that the Mare Clausum doctrine conflicts with the Mare
Liberum doctrine in particular in regards to the ocean areas adjacent to the land,
which would be later known as territorial seas.
This conflict between the two doctrines Mare Liberum and Mare Clausum would
have practical consequences for ocean governance. This is because the conflict
demonstrates the resurgence of segmentation in the form of human-made boundaries
as a means to ascertain possession. The consequence of Mare Clausum is that the
culture of segmentation based on setting ocean boundaries in ocean governance
would be reinforced.
The underlying reason for the British to challenge the Mare Liberum doctrine was
growing concern over the ‘allocative implications’ of marine resources being
available for all.289 As seen before, according to the Mare Liberum doctrine,
exploitation of marine life was unrestricted and available for all. Declines in fisheries
resources led the British to challenge the Mare Liberum doctrine.290 Accordingly,
Selden in his response to Grotius, rejected the inexhaustibility of marine life.291
Selden’s main concern was not the biological and physical aspects of the fish stocks,
but rather the protection of British fishing interests. The understanding was that the
British fish trade would be less profitable if other nations fished within the waters
surrounding Great Britain.292 At the time, fish trade was considered to be as valuable
as gold from the Indies.293 Both doctrines, Mare Liberum and Mare Clausum, would
prevail in ocean governance for centuries. The Mare Liberum doctrine was more
predominant and became a custom of international maritime law given the
importance of navigation for all nations.294 However, the trend to segment the ocean
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into national portions under the exclusive control of their nations for the purpose of
exploitation of resources (in particular fisheries in adjacent waters) would co-exist
with the fundamental principle of freedom of navigation. This meant that the Mare
Liberum doctrine did not necessarily deny the Mare Clausum doctrine in practical
terms. Both doctrines prevailed as guiding principles in the initial stages of the
formation of what is today known as ocean governance.
According to Pureza, the two doctrines in fact complement each other, since for a
long time ‘the principle of the freedom of the seas has been a very powerful legal and
political basis for a selective de facto appropriation of the ocean spaces, resources
and uses’.295 This is because in the context of an Eurocentric society at the time, ‘only
economic, technological and militarily powerful countries have effectively benefited
from the open access opportunities, since the regulatory minimalism of the freedom
of the seas doctrine has led to the cynicism of the “first come, first served” rule’.296
Of relevance for this thesis is the fact that the process of national appropriation of
maritime spaces or the ‘enclosure model’ advocated by Selden would introduce the
trend of segmentation in ocean governance. From then on, treaties would rely on the
drawing of human-made lines or boundaries to ensure possession over ocean areas.

3.5 Rule of Three Nautical-Miles of Surrounding Seas
The trend of segmentation in ocean governance through the process of drawing
arbitrary lines to assert national jurisdiction over portions of the ocean was
strengthened by a movement towards the delimitation of the length of the belt of
water surrounding a nation’s coasts.297 The belt of water surrounding the nation’s
coasts would later be known as the ‘territorial sea’. To determine the length of the
territorial sea, a judge from the Supreme Court of Appeals of the Netherlands
declared in 1703 that the jurisdiction and control of a state should extend as far as a
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projectile could be fired from a cannon on the shore, which at the time corresponded
to three nautical miles (3 ‘nm’).298
The British had a similar understanding while adopting the Hovering Acts in 1736,
which prescribed that it would be illegal for ships carrying certain cargoes to hove, or
anchor, within two leagues of the coast.299 The Hovering Acts were adopted not only
to protect British interests over ocean areas adjacent to their coasts, but also because
of growing concern over diminished profits as a result of various nations fishing
within those areas.300 Subsequently, in 1837, Great Britain and France established a
commission to define the limits within their coasts where they would have exclusive
rights for fishing. This joint initiative resulted in the adoption of a convention that
reinforced the three nm rule as the limit that indicated the ‘coastal fisheries
exclusively reserved to their nationals’.301
The three nm rule gained customary status in international law due to its wide
acceptance and state practice. Despite furthering the trend of segmentation in ocean
governance, the three nm rule brought a level of certainty to the international
maritime law of the time. For instance, in the beginning of the 20th century, the three
nm rule served as a benchmark to regulate a conflict over marine life between the
United States of America and the United Kingdom/Canada.302 The issue at stake was
overexploitation of fur seals and the consequent decline in population, which put at
risk the profitable sealing industry.303 The United States maintained that because the
seals have their pupping grounds within their territorial jurisdiction, they had the
right of protection and property over the seals on the high seas (beyond three nm).
The United States justified its position by stating that ‘the seals had an animus
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revertendi, returning cyclically to US territory, thus needing to be equated to
domesticated animals, which could be subject to property rights’.304 In its 1898
decision, the arbitral tribunal re-stated the three nm rule by denying the United States
the right to protect the seals beyond their national boundaries. According to the
arbitral tribunal’s decision, areas beyond three nm were considered high seas, and
were thus subject to the international custom of freedom of the high seas.305 Although
being defeated in the arbitral tribunal, it is noteworthy that the United States used a
biological argument based on the migratory patterns of the seal in its legal defence.
However, the use of biological argument was done solely for the purpose of
substantiating the legal argument for the appropriation of domestic animals. At the
time, there was no conservationist intent in the legal reasoning of the United States,
or any ecosystem considerations for that matter. The three nm rule at the time of the
fur seal case was deemed as a solution for conflicts over marine living resources.
However, from the perspective of this thesis, maritime boundaries as such would be
considered inadequate in the 20th century to manage highly migratory marine living
resources upon the realisation that living marine resources defy human-made
boundaries. Thus, these maritime boundaries would be later challenged based on new
knowledge and perception of ocean issues.
Although the realisation of the inadequacy of human-made boundaries to manage
living marine resources was not present in the late 19th century, this absence does not
undermine the argument that the trend of establishing boundaries was the trigger for
the root cause of segmentation within ocean governance. The evolution of ocean
governance will show that concepts and understanding on how to manage the oceans
became outdated as a result of the inclusion of new concepts such as the principles of
international law which would challenge long held understanding and perceptions of
the oceans.
The decision in the Behring Sea Fur Seal case would eventually become ineffective
because it did not include all interested parties, resulting in the collapse of the sealing
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industry. This is because parties that were originally connected to the decision of the
arbitral tribunal were only the United States and Canada/Great Britain. The case did
not involve Russia and Japan, which ultimately would be responsible for the overexploitation of fur seal stocks.306 The absence of all interested parties undermines
cooperating efforts in ocean governance. The reason is: if all interested stakeholders
do not engage in a collaborative effort (or cooperation) to solve common ocean
problems, the treaty or any other instrument used to formalise cooperation is destined
to fail. In the case of the fur seal dispute, only the conclusion of an international
regulatory treaty among all states involved in the sealing could have better protected
the interest of the sealing industry and sustainability of the resources.307
The absence of all interested parties in a cooperating agreement would only be
perceived as a problem in ocean governance in terms of weakening cooperation in
the 21st century. In order to solve this problem, new treaties started to exclude parties
from benefiting from a cooperating agreement if they did not participate in it or
comply with the agreed measures within its scope. Therefore, it is only during the
Pos-LOSC period that the international community would realise the importance of
involving all interested parties in cooperation.308 This meant that for many centuries
cooperating agreements were adopted without further consideration being given to
the relevance of their memberships for the common problem to be solved. This is an
indication that the pace in which those involved in decision-making in ocean
governance perceived failures and promote change within the system is very slow.
The slow pace for change is detrimental to the conservation of ocean resources and
the ocean realm as a whole.
Of relevance for the main argument of this thesis is that the three nm rule reinforced
fragmentation in ocean governance. The fact that the United States lawyers based
their legal defence on the migratory patterns of the fur seal indicated that boundaries
such as the three nm radius would not be fully satisfactory to ascertain rights and
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obligation with regard to the exploitation of highly migratory marine life, like seals.
However, because (as stated above) the inadequacy of political boundaries to deal
with highly migratory marine life would only be challenged during the Post-LOSC
period, the tradition of rigid lines to delimit use of resources would remain
unchallenged.

3.6 League of Nations’ Codification Conference
From the mid-20th century and beyond, ocean governance was influenced by a trend
towards harmonisation or codification of the body of ocean law. This signals that
ocean governance was already comprised of various scattered legal instruments. The
codification movement of the 1930s309 was a clear indication that the deleterious
effects of proliferation of ocean-related treaties for ocean governance which were
adopted in an uncoordinated manner. The proliferation became noticeable by the
League of the Nations. Thus, there was a need to streamline ocean governance, and
codification was sought as the best avenue in pursuing this goal. One of the main
causes of proliferation of treaties and agreements in ocean governance is its reactive
nature. Often, proliferation is a result of the adoption of treaties to resolve parochial
issues in an uncoordinated manner. This results in the legal framework being
characterised by the absence of an overarching set of principles to guide ocean
governance.
Proliferation spreads in a domino fashion through all levels of governance, from
local to regional to international. As a result of the proliferation of treaties in ocean
governance, in 1930 the League of Nations convened its Codification Conference in
The Hague, Holland. Another issue that triggered the convening of the League of
Nations’ Codification Conference was the lack of certainty about the breadth of the
territorial sea, which remained unsettled.310 At that time, disagreements had grown
surrounding the three nm rule, resulting in each country adopting the limit of
territorial water that best met their interests.311 The fact that there were disparities
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among countries on the breadth of the territorial sea indicated that the three nm rule
could no longer be accepted as a general principle of international law.312 At the end
of the Codification Conference, convening parties did not reach an agreement with
regard to the breadth of the territorial sea313 due to the great diversity of views and
conflicting interests among the participating nations.314 The League of Nations’
Codification Conference did not accomplish much in terms of providing coherence
through codifying the existing law of the sea.
However, in fairness to the Codification Conference, this conference paved the way
for future and more ambitious efforts for codification of the law of the sea. Among
its positive outcomes, the League of Nations’ Codification Conference brought
discussions on conservation and allocation of fish stocks and the impact of new
technologies on ocean law to the forefront of the international arena.315 The work of
the League of Nations’ Codification Conference was also important for recognising
the role played by scientists, fishery experts and industry representatives in shaping a
new fisheries regime.316 The recognition of the role to be played by stakeholders from
diverse sectors such as scientists and the fishery business community as well as the
impact of new technologies for ocean law reveals that the need for integration was
present at the time of the convening of the League of Nations’ Codification
Conference. However, integration as a legal principle would only be construed
decades later. This meant that although the need for integration in ocean governance
was present at the time, the realisation of the need was absent in the 1930s.
Another aspect that shows signs of progress in ocean governance is the fact that until
the League of Nations’ Codification Conference, lawmaking in the area of fisheries
was done by ‘diplomats and lawyers who did not possess the technical expertise for
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such a task’.317 That is the reason why trying to involve other experts from other
sectors was a step in the right direction toward a more ‘integrated’ (although not
acknowledged as such) ocean governance. However, the issue of engaging a more
diverse range of professionals in the international law making process was secondary
in view of the fact that the main objective of the Codification Conference which was
to codify the law of the sea at the time.

3.7 First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I)
In view of persistent problems within ocean governance as a result of the
segmentation and proliferation of ocean treaties and policies, another codification
effort took place in the middle of the 20th century. In 1958, the United Nations (UN)
sponsored a major codification effort, the main goal of which was the harmonisation
of international ocean law.318 This codification effort would be known as the First
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I). Among UNCLOS I
objectives was the delimitation of the breadth of the territorial sea.319
In view of the failure of the League of Nations’ Codification Conference, there was a
need to provide coherence to the entire legal framework of ocean governance. Hence,
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) called for the convening of
UNCLOS I to codify existing law of the sea and settle relevant issues of ocean
governance.320 The International Law Commission (ILC),321 in preparation for the
convening of UNCLOS I, justified its decision to recommend the codification of the
current law of the sea based on article 15 of its statute.
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When the International Law Commission was set up, it was thought that the
Commission's work might have two different aspects: on the one hand the
‘codification of international law’ or, in the words of article 15 of the Commission's
statute, ‘more precise formulation and systematisation of rules of international law in
fields where there has already been extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine;’
and on the other hand, ‘the progressive development of international law or the
preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by
international law, or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently
developed in the practice of States.’322
UNCLOS I was convened because the law of the sea at the time fit both criteria:
there had been extensive state practice and there was a need to develop new laws to
regulate, for instance, the regime of the high seas fisheries and the breadth of the
territorial sea. The endorsement of the International Law Commission based on its
article 15 that there was a need for more ‘systematisation of the rules’ already
adopted to regulate ocean issues is indication of the negative effect of proliferation
on ocean governance, deserving to addressed by the participants of UNCLOS I.
UNCLOS I was convened in Geneva with the participation of 86 states.323 The
International Law Commission, in preparation for UNCLOS I, selected the regime of
the high seas and territorial waters as the main topics for codification.324 The UNGA
Resolution 1105(XI) of 21/02/57 mandated the conference with the following issues:
[t]o examine the law of the sea, taking account not only of the legal but also
of the technical, biological, economic and political aspects of the problem,
and to embody the results of its work in one or more conventions or other
appropriate instruments.
This diversified mandate in terms of subject-areas is evidence of the beginning in
ocean governance towards a more integrated view of the oceans. To take into
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account technical, biological, economic and political aspects is to steer away from a
strictly legal view of ocean issues, which means the UN was beginning to recognise
the integrated nature of ocean problems. Also, by introducing a more integrated view
of the oceans, the UN was signalling towards an understanding of the ocean as a
complex management unit that could not be analysed exclusively from a legal
perspective. In this regard, the UNGA referred to ocean problems as follows:
The problems relating to the high seas, territorial waters, contiguous zone, the
continental shelf and the superjacent waters were closely linked together
juridically as well as physically.325
The recognition of the integrated nature of ocean problems during UNCLOS I would
lead two decades later to the development of an integrated approach at the convening
of the UNCHE in 1972 by virtue of principle 13 of the Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration). Although
convening nations could not come to an agreement about the most controversial issue
– the breadth of the territorial sea – UNCLOS I was very successful in adopting four
treaties:

326

the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; the

Convention on the High Seas; the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas; and the Convention of the Continental Shelf (the
1958 Geneva Conventions).327 In terms of codification, UNCLOS I was only partially
successful because the initial recommendation given by the ILC during preparatory
sessions was to primarily compile the entire body of ocean law into one instrument in
order to give more coherence to the system of ocean governance. The International
Law Commission justified the need for the codification of the existing law of sea by
stating the following:

325

UNGA Resolution 798 (VIII) of 07/12/53.
The four treaties were adopted on the same day (29 April 1958).
327
UNCLOS I also adopted resolutions on nuclear tests on the high seas, pollution of the high seas by
radioactive materials, international fishery conservation conventions, cooperation in conservation
measures, humane killing of marine life, special situations relating to coastal fisheries, ‘regime’ of
historic waters, convening a second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and tribute to
the International Law Commission. United Nations Website. United Nations Diplomatic Conferences.
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea-1958/lawofthesea-1958.html. Accessed
on 10/10/09.
326

86

[t]he various sections of the law of the sea hold together, and are so closely
interdependent that would be extremely difficult to deal with only one part
and leave the others aside.328
UNCLOS I did not succeed in adopting one single treaty. The outcome of UNCLOS
I consisted of the above-referred 1958 Geneva Conventions, which regulated four
distinct subject-areas. This outcome is indicative of two main trends in ocean
governance. First, it exposes the difficulties of imprinting coherence to the system of
ocean governance by codifying the entire law of the sea into one single treaty.
Second, the adoption of four treaties dealing with different subject-areas of ocean
governance illustrates how convening states at UNCLOS I were still dealing with
ocean issues in a disconnected and sectoral manner. Nevertheless, the outcomes of
UNCLOS I could be deemed partially successful in the sense that never before had
the international community been able to compile the law of the sea within four
major treaties. In this regard, UNCLOS I contributed to some extent to giving more
systematisation and coherence to the body of ocean law.

3.7.1 UNCLOS I and II and the Principle of Cooperation
UNCLOS I brought forth some positive developments for ocean governance,
particularly with regard to the principle of cooperation. The Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (the 1958 Convention on
Fishing on the High Seas), for example, recognised in its preamble that the nature of
the problems regarding conservation of marine life required international cooperation
through the concerted action of all states.329 Furthermore, the 1958 Convention on
Fishing on the High Seas filled a gap in ocean governance by setting up regulatory
mechanisms to govern two kinds of ocean problems: problems arising from the
relations between states fishing in high seas areas adjacent to coastal states’
territorial seas330 and the regulation of states fishing for the same stocks in the same

328

United Nations, Yearbook, 256.
Preamble, the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Living Resources of the High Seas.
330
The 1958 Convention on Fishing on the High Seas, art. 6(3).
329

87

high seas areas.

331

The rationale for the adoption of provisions to regulate these two

fisheries was the mobility of living resources which migrate back and forth between
areas inside and outside state jurisdiction. This circumstance generated the need for
legal mechanisms to regulate their exploitation and avoid conflicts. Cooperation was
the means sought to achieve these goals.
The drafters of the 1958 Convention on Fishing on the High Seas also relied on
cooperation to curb the ‘danger of overexploitation of resources’ resulting from the
rapid development of modern fishing technologies.332 The provision on fishing
technologies is also an indication of a more integrated approach, although not
expressly acknowledged, towards ocean management in view of the realisation that
cooperation towards conservation measures can be undermined if the impact of
modern fisheries technologies on fisheries is not taken into consideration. The
framework for cooperation brought forth by the 1958 Convention on Fishing on the
High Seas initiated a trend in adopting more elaborate and detailed provisions on
cooperation.333 This is because this convention did not simply state that states should
cooperate, but prescribed how cooperation could be achieved. For instance,
cooperation was required through the adoption of measures for the conservation of
high seas marine life.334 With regard to states fishing in the area of high seas adjacent
to the territorial sea of a coastal state, distant water fishing nations (DWFN) should at
the request of the coastal state negotiate an agreement establishing measures for
fishing resources conservation and exploration.335
It seems that the 1958 Convention on Fishing on the High Seas used the wording
‘enter into negotiation’ as synonymous with cooperation. The 1958 Convention on
Fishing on the High Seas introduced an extremely innovative feature in international
ocean law by virtue of its article 4(2), which allowed the inclusion of any nation
which had fishing activities on the high seas and did not originally take part in
negotiating a cooperating agreement but later manifested interest, to be bound by the
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terms and conditions of such agreement. In this case, the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO) would play an important role by notifying the new fishing states
of the existing conservation measures that had already been negotiated.336 Article 4(2)
attempted to avoid a common governance failure caused by the absence of all
interested parties in cooperating agreements. The rationale for the adoption of
provisions such as article 4(2) was that conservation measures adopted by the coastal
states were undermined by DWFNs which did not take them into account. Later,
during the Post-LOSC period, as will be further discussed in Chapter 5, the absence
of all interested parties from a cooperating agreement would gained more attention
from law makers. During the Post-LOSC period treaties would be adopted containing
provisions prescribing that states which did not engage in cooperation would be
excluded from benefiting from the fisheries resources covered by conservation and
management measures in the coverage area of a corresponding cooperating
agreement. This indicates an evolving trend in regards to the inclusion of all
interested parties in a cooperating agreement which initiated in 1958 by virtue of
UNCLOS I conventions; a trend that would evolve to impose sanctions on those nonparticipating states by virtue for instance of the UN Fish Stock Agreement in 1995.
The 1958 Convention on Fishing on the High Seas was also innovative in the sense
that it introduced what would be later known as an integrated approach in ocean
governance. In its articles 2 and 3, the Convention utilised a scientific parameter
called ‘optimum sustainable yield’ to obligate states to cooperate. Similarly in its
article 2, the Convention indicated that the ‘conservation measures of the living
resources of the high seas’, should translate into ‘the aggregate of the measures
rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to
secure a maximum supply of food and other marine products’. The mention of the
‘optimum sustainable yield’ parameter is an indication that the framers of the 1958
Convention on Fishing on the High Seas followed the International Law
Commission’s directive to utilise a more integrated approach, meaning to examine
the body of ocean law from legal, technical, biological, economic and political
perspectives. In this case, 1958 Convention on Fishing on the High Seas
demonstrated that it had informed its provisions with biological criteria. Years later
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during the Post-LOSC period provisions on cooperation within the context of
fisheries in which only biological considerations were taken into account would be
challenged by the need to incorporate into their regulatory system others
considerations such as socio-economic factors. This evolution shows that the initial
step in fisheries governance towards integration was to inform its provisions with
biological considerations, but later fisheries would need to be regulated from a multidimensional perspective to include other considerations such as measure with
economic repercussions (fishing efforts, non-sustainable fishing practices, subsidies,
etc).
In terms of cooperation, the other three 1958 Geneva Conventions – the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the High Seas and
the Convention of the Continental Shelf – were of little relevance. These treaties did
not go further than merely prescribing the obligation to cooperate. Within their texts,
they did not clarify the means to achieve cooperation. These treaties, however, serve
to demonstrate the importance of zones or human-made boundaries for ocean
governance such as territorial seas, contiguous zone, high seas and continental
shelf.337 The reliance of ocean governance in human-made boundaries although
necessary to ascertain rights and obligations will be deemed inadequate to regulate
mobile fisheries resources and other marine living resources as well as in other
circumstances in which the unique characteristic of the oceans as fluid ecosystems
would challenge the rigidity of boundaries in the context of management.
In conclusion, even though the original purpose for the convening of UNCLOS I was
to codify the governance of the oceans in one single cohesive and systematic treaty
of law, the outcome was the adoption of the four 1958 Geneva Conventions which
337
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indicated that ocean governance was still evolving along the path of segmentation by
adopting four disjointed agreements. This is because each of the 1958 Geneva
Conventions dealt with four different issue-areas: high seas fisheries, continental
shelf, territorial sea and high seas. In addition, there was no over-arching framework
in which the four conventions were embedded. Each of these Conventions were
adopted and implemented in isolation. The outcome of UNCLOS I signifies that it
was still difficult to imprint coherence to the system of ocean governance. The
UNCLOS I process also reveals that ocean law makers at the time believed in the
path of specialisation by adopting four segmented treaties dealing with specific (but
related) issues as the best approach towards managing the oceans. This belief would
be radically changed during the convening of UNCLOS III in 1982 which resulted in
the adoption of one all-encompassing treaty, the LOSC.
Another shortcoming of UNCLOS I is that because it did not solve the controversial
issue of the breadth of the territorial sea, the result was that its outcomes (the four
1958 Geneva Conventions) were outdated even before their conclusion.338 A second
conference known as UNCLOS II was convened by the UN in 1960 to discuss
codification and the unsettled issues left by UNCLOS I, namely the breadth of the
territorial sea, with particular regard to fishery limits.
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At the time distant water

fishing states (DWFS) were satisfied (‘although not enthusiastically’) with the
compromised achieved during UNCLOS I in 1958 in terms of fishing rights.340
However, developing nations, while recognising that the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas was a ‘step in the right direction’ in terms of recognising the special
interests of coastal states in fisheries, were not satisfied and expected to have their
exclusive fishing rights applied to extended offshore zones. 341 Most of the proposals
during UNCLOS II recognised the need for an extension of exclusive fishery zones
beyond the 3-mile limit if consensus would have to be achieved.342 UNCLOS II
failed, ‘by only one vote’, to reach consensus on a proposal for a six-mile territorial
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sea and a six-mile fishery zone.343 A compromise on the breadth of the territorial was
also not achieved.344 Thus, UNCLOS II failed to reconcile differences over unsettled
issues from UNCLOS I, resulting in an intensification of ‘conflicts over offshore
jurisdictional claims and the management of human use of ocean space’.345 The table
below shows the summary of the major events which took place in the first part of
the Pre-LOSC and their main characteristics:

Table 3.1 - Main Events and Trends during First Part of the Pre-LOSC Period.

Main
characteristics/
objectives:

Treaty of
Tordesillas
(1506)
Imaginary
lines
to
ascertain
national
possessions
over ocean
areas

Mare
Liberum
(1609)
Freedom
of
navigation;
Inexhaustibility
of
living
resources

Mare
Clausum
(1635)
Private
dominion of
the seas to
exercise
maritime
sovereignty

3 NM (1703)

Belt of water
surrounding
the nation’s
coasts
known
as
territorial
sea

League
of
Nations
(1930)
Codification
movement

UNCLOS I
(1958)
Codification
Conference
1958
Geneva
Conventions
(Principle of
Cooperation)

The next section explores the move towards more conservation in ocean governance
which resulted in the convening of a global conference in which the main focus of
discussion was to find ways to better conserve natural resources of the Earth
(including oceans).

3.8 United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE)
In the late 1960s, ocean governance shifted its focus from the unsettled issues left by
the UNCLOS I and II conferences to address mounting environmental problems.
These problems included ‘dangerous levels of pollution in water, air, and living
beings; disturbances to the ecological balance of the biosphere; destruction and
depletion of irreplaceable resources’.346 This new shift in ocean governance signalled
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the surfacing of a common global effort to preserve the environment. The new trend
towards preservation of the environment also denoted a change in paradigm, from
one based on the exploitation of the environment and its living and non-living
resources irrespective of the

negative consequences of human-made impacts, to

one based on preservation of the environment.347 The UN embraced the change in
paradigm by virtue of its UNGA Resolution 2398 (XXIII) of 03/12/68, which stated
that the effects of the fast and uncontrolled technological advancement were felt as a
consequence of ‘the impairment of the quality of the human environment caused by
factors such as air and water pollution’.348 In view of these developments, the UNGA
decided to convene the United Nations Conference on Human Environment
(UNCHE).349 The UNCHE was convened in 1972 in Stockholm, Sweden. The
UNGA Resolution 2581 (XXIV) of 15/12/69 stated the purposes of the conference:
[a]mong the main purposes of the UNCHE was to serve as a practical means
to encourage and to provide guidelines for, action by governments and
international organisations designed to protect and improve the human
environment and to remedy and prevent its impairment, by means of
international cooperation.350
In 1972, UNGA also emphasised ‘that problems of the environment constitute a new
and important area for international cooperation and that the complexity and
interdependence of such problems require new approaches’.351 In view of this, the
UNCHE was convened and brought forth a ‘new approach’ by virtue of the
Declaration of the United Nations on Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration)
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while prescribing the following: cooperation,352 integration,353 ecosystem view354 and
preventive approach.355
The UNCHE preparatory committee also justified the convening of the UNCHE
based on the need for a ‘more systematic coordination of continuing activities of the
organisations in the United Nations system relating to the seas and oceans’.356 The
need for a more systematic coordination at the level of organisations within the UN
system (institutional level) was a result of the UNGA’s request for a ‘full review of
the existing activities of the organisations in the United Nations system relating to
the seas and oceans’.357 According to the UNGA, the institutional review was
‘urgently required in order to avoid overlapping and duplication of programmes and
gaps in competence’.358 The call for a more systematic coordination at the
institutional level is an acknowledgement that an uncoordinated proliferation of
agencies, organs and programmes was as detrimental to governance as the
proliferation of treaties.359
Among other objectives of the UNCHE process were to raise awareness of the
increasing levels of environmental degradation, as well as to focus attention on ‘the
importance of ensuring that the global efforts in the field of the human environment
be supplemented and made more effective by agreements at regional and subregional basis’.360 The UNCHE process reinforced the importance of cooperation at
the regional level for the preservation of the marine environment. Among the 132
UN member states, 113 participated in the UNCHE process.361 The significant
participation of UN member signified that participating members would be exposed
to the need for paradigmatic changes and the need to engage in international
cooperation to solve common environmental problems, including ocean problems.
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Major outcomes of the UNCHE are the Stockholm Declaration, which comprises 26
principles, and the Action Plan for the Human Environment (Stockholm Action
Plan), which contains 109 recommendations for action. The Stockholm Action Plan
devoted an entire section of its recommendations to marine pollution, in particular
the protection and preservation of the marine environment of enclosed and semienclosed seas.362 Of relevance for this thesis it is the fact that the UNCHE process
incorporated the concepts of cooperation, integration, ecosystem view and preventive
approach within its outcomes.

3.8.1 Principle of Cooperation
From its onset, the UNCHE process aimed at remedying the levels of segmentation
in the management of the environment by choosing international cooperation as the
ideal pathway for solving environmental problems.363 In this regard, the Stockholm
Declaration stated the following:
A growing class of environmental problems, because they are regional or
global in extent or because they affect the common international realm, will
require extensive cooperation among nations and action by international
organisations in the common interest.364
In 1968, the UN had recognised that there was a need to develop a new approach to
environmental governance that would give ‘consideration to those aspects of the
problems of the human environment that could only or best be solved through
international cooperation and agreement’.365 In following this directive, the
Stockholm Declaration required cooperation for the purpose of establishing the legal
framework of liability and compensation for the victims of pollution in general. 366
The Declaration also set forth the means by which cooperation would be effective to
control, prevent, reduce and eliminate negative environmental impacts resulting from
362
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human activities.367 In this regard, the UNCHE called for the adoption of multilateral
or bilateral agreements.368 Regarding marine mammals, the Stockholm Action Plan
recommended cooperation for the adoption of an international agreement to control
whaling. The Plan also proposed the strengthening of the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) and the increase of international scientific research in this area.369
Other areas of ocean governance that were covered by the outcomes of UNCHE in
relation to cooperation were the following:
•

the need to adopt an instrument to control ocean dumping;370

•

the need to exchange and disseminate international marine scientific research
through the International Oceanographic Commission (IOC), with due regard
to the needs of developing countries;371

•

cooperation between governments, Food and Agricultural Organisation
(FAO) and other UN agencies and international fishing organisations for
exchanging data; evaluation and monitoring of world fishery resources;372

•

effective measures to control sources of marine pollution, including landbased sources; and 373

•

the transfer of experience – the free flow of up-to-date scientific information
and environmental technologies to facilitate the solution of environmental
problems for developing countries in particular.374

In 1971, the UNGA urged its member states, agencies, programs and other
international organisations to promote ‘international cooperation in the field of the
environment, taking into account the need for increased technical and financial
assistance to the developing countries’.375 In response to the UNGA’s call, the
UNCHE addressed the need for increased technical and financial assistance to
developing countries by stating emphatically in its Stockholm Declaration that
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‘resources should be made available’ to developing countries in terms of ‘technical
and financial assistance’, ‘environmental technologies’ and ‘transfer of experience’
‘to improve the environment’ and ‘to facilitate solution of environmental
problems’.376
The UNCHE also addressed institutional cooperation. This is because the
participants of the UNCHE process were conscious of the problems associated with
the lack of coordination, or inter-agency or institutional cooperation among the
various UN specialised agencies, intergovernmental organisations and programs with
ocean mandates. In this regard, Principle 25 of the Stockholm Declaration asserted
that ‘states shall ensure that international organisations play a coordinated, efficient
and dynamic role for the protection and improvement of the environment’.377 With
regard to pollution, the Stockholm Action Plan in its recommendation 92(b) invited
governments:
[t]o take early action to adopt effective national measures for the control of all
significant sources of marine pollution, including land-based sources, and
concert and coordinate their actions regionally and where appropriate on a
wider international basis.
By stressing all levels of governance, the UNCHE process acknowledged the need
for multi-level planning to forestall the impairment of the environment, including
oceans. Although the UNCHE process did not express its preference for regional
cooperation as the most effective and adequate level to protect the marine
environment against pollution, the UNCHE outcomes paved the way for the UN to
create a regional program to combat marine pollution – the Regional Seas Program
(RSP).
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3.8.1.1 Regional Seas Program (RSP)
During the UNCHE, participating governments, intergovernmental organisations and
other organised groups concluded that many environmental problems were better
dealt with through ‘regional collaborative action’.378 Based on this understanding, the
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP)379 was given the mandate to
promote regional cooperation (or ‘regional collaborative action’) to address the
problem of marine pollution affecting enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. In fulfilling
its mandate, UNEP launched the Regional Seas Program (RSP) in 1974. The RSP
was designed to be a policy-making process in various regions. The execution of the
RSP depended upon the adoption of framework conventions coupled with associated
protocols and non-binding action plans especially designed to address the needs of a
particular region.380 The UNEP was mandated to carry out secretariat functions for
the RSP conventions. The RSP signified a shift in cooperation from international
policy and legal frameworks to regional policy-making processes.381 For instance, the
Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution (Barcelona
Convention), the first RSP launched by UNEP, developed a comprehensive
framework for regional cooperation. The Barcelona Convention was specifically
crafted to address marine pollution in the Mediterranean regions. In this the Preamble
of the Barcelona Convention stated:
[e]xisting international conventions on the subject do not cover, [a]ll aspects
and sources of marine pollution and do not entirely meet the special
requirements of the Mediterranean Sea Area.382
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From then on, the trend of adopting regional cooperating agreements to solve ocean
problems would be consolidated in ocean governance.383

3.8.2 Principle of Integration
With regard to integration, the UNCHE established, for example, the link between
environmental consequences and economic growth by stating that ‘protection and
improvement of the human environment is a major issue which affects the well-being
of peoples and economic development throughout the world’.384 Thus, from the
outset the conference imprinted an integrated approach by linking economic
development to the protection of the environment. The UNCHE, therefore,
recognised the importance of including nature conservation, such as the protection of
the wildlife and its habitats, in the planning for economic development of
countries.385 With regard to integration per se of Principle 13, the Stockholm
Declaration stated the following:
In order to achieve a more rational management of resources and thus to
improve the environment, States should adopt an integrated and coordinated
approach to their development planning so as to ensure that development is
compatible with the need to protect and improve environment for the benefit
of their population.
The UNCHE’s utilisation of the concept of ‘natural ecosystem’ in the context of
management and planning386 is further evidence of its trend towards an integrated
approach. By borrowing concepts from two distinct disciplinary fields, namely
natural sciences and economic planning, the UNCHE also demonstrated a level of
integration from an inter-disciplinary viewpoint. The UNCHE process paved the way
for the development of a concept that would embody integration of socio-economic
developmental goals and protection and preservation of the environment – that is, the
383
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concept of ‘sustainable development’ – 387 which would be introduced in 1987 by the
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in its report Our
Common Future.388 The concept ‘sustainable development’ was later consolidated in
the context of another UN-sponsored global environmental conference, the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).389
With regard to marine pollution, the Stockholm Declaration demonstrated a certain
level of integration by acknowledging the hazards caused by marine pollution to
human health and to marine life,390 taking into consideration both the human
environment and the living resources of the marine environment. Principle 7 of the
Stockholm Declaration also indicated an integrated view by acknowledging that
various legitimate uses of the sea could be adversely affected by marine pollution.
Lastly, the entire UNCHE process emphasised the need to integrate social, economic
and environmental considerations into urban and national planning for developing
countries in particular.391

3.8.3 Preventive Approach
The UNCHE highlighted the deleterious consequences for the environment as a
result of industrialisation and technological development in the developed world, and
as a result of under-development in developing countries.392 The Stockholm
Declaration, in its Proclamation 6, asserted that:
[t]hrough ignorance or indifference we can do massive and irreversible harm
to the earthly environment on which our life and well being depend.
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Furthermore, the UNCHE associated the concept of irreversible environmental harm
with the rgency to prevent further environmental degradation. For instance, Principle
6 of the Stockholm Declaration stated:
[a]ll discharges of toxic substances or of other substances and the release of
heat, in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the
environment to render them harmless, must be halted in order to ensure that
serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems.
Despite the fact that Principle 6 of the Stockholm Declaration did not expressly
mention ‘prevention’, the practical result of the application of Principle 6, meaning
the halting of discharges and releases of toxic and other substances at levels that
were deemed harmful to the environment, was preventive in nature. At the time of
the convening of UNCHE, the concept of ‘prevention’ was not fully developed
because the discharge and release of toxic substances was acceptable under the
condition that such toxic discharges were in concentrations that did not ‘exceed the
capacity of the environment to render them harmless’. Prevention would evolve
decades later through the adoption of treaties that would not permit any discharge or
release of certain toxic substances; for instance, those that were black listed

393

.

Another novelty introduced by the Stockholm Declaration that resulted in fostering
‘prevention’ of further environmental damages was the idea of guaranteeing the right
of a healthy environment not only for the present generations but also for future
generations. The right of present and future generations to a healthy environment was
enshrined in Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration, which reads:
[m]an has the fundamental right to adequate conditions of life, in an
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he
bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for
present and future generations.394
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Principle 2 also referred to the right of present and future generations to a healthy
environment.395 Principles 1 and 2 of the Stockholm Declaration are groundbreaking
in the sense that never before was the idea of protecting the environment for future
generations contained in any policy or legal documents. Similar to Principle 6 of the
Stockholm Declaration, Principles 1and 2 did not expressly refer to ‘prevention’, but
these principles contained and implied the idea of prevention. This is because the
practical consequences of the application of Principles 1, 2 and 6 are the preservation
of the environment,396 including the marine environment, for present and future
generations. What is important to emphasise is that although the concept of
‘prevention’ was not clearly stated in the Stockholm Declaration, the seeds for its
later development into a fully-fledged principle of environmental law were planted.
With respect to the marine environment, Principle 7 of the Stockholm Declaration
unequivocally stated the need for prevention by urging as follows:
[a]ll states to take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by
substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living
resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea.397
Principle 7 would greatly influence the next generation of ocean-related treaties in
the prevention of marine pollution, in particular treaties sponsored by the
International Maritime Organization (IMO).398 Among these treaties is the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from the Ships (MARPOL
73/78)399 and the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
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Wastes and other Matter (London Dumping Convention).400 MARPOL 73/78401 and
London Dumping Convention heavily relied on prevention as tool for the proper
management of resources. Lastly, the concept of precaution was absent from the
outcomes of UNCHE. The legal concept of ‘precaution’ would be introduced two
decades later as a result of the convening of the UNCED in 1992, during the PostLOSC, as will be seen in Chapter 5.402

3.8.4 Ecosystem Approach
There are a number of indications that attest that the UNCHE process implicitly
adopted an ecosystem view of the environment. A fully-fledged ecosystem approach
would only be introduced during the Post-LOSC period, as will be discussed later in
this thesis. Nevertheless, Principle 2 of the Stockholm Declaration made reference to
‘natural resources of the earth’ in ecosystem terms by enlisting all components of the
global ecosystem as follows: ‘the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially
representative samples of natural ecosystems’.403
With particular regard to the ocean realm, the UNCHE process recognised at least
implicitly the idea of the interrelated and multi-dimensional natures of the oceans by
asserting that the effects of marine pollution can travel several miles far beyond the
place in which the polluting incident occurred. This notion of the ‘global
consequences of marine pollution, affecting peoples many thousands of miles away
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from the source of pollution’404 indicated an ecosystem view of the marine
environment. This is because ecosystems are inextricably connected, causing
pollution to adversely affect the human environment and their natural ecosystems
‘thousands of miles away from the source of pollution’.
One last reference of an ecosytemic view of the oceans within the UNCHE process,
although also implied, is present in Principle 7 of the Stockholm Declaration.405 This
Principle acknowledges the consequences of marine pollution for human health,
living resources and marine life, as well to amenities and other legitimate uses of the
sea. The all-encompassing list of components in Principle 7 indicates an ecosystem
view because it acknowledges all the components of the environment (human and
natural).406

3.8.5 Final Observations on UNCHE Process
The UNCHE and its outcomes developed more emphatically three of the main legal
concepts that inform ‘principled’ ocean governance namely: cooperation, integration
and ecosystem considerations. The notion ‘precaution’ would be introduced later
during the Post-LOSC period. The principles of cooperation and integration were
more clearly stated in the UNCHE outcomes.
At the level of treaties, as a result of convening the UNCHE, international
cooperation was considered to be the best means to solve interconnected complex
ocean problems. The UNCHE process went further to acknowledge the need to
design regional cooperating agreements that took into account similar and shared
bio-physical characteristics of a region. The UNEP RSP is an example of a strategy
to promote regional cooperation as espoused by the UNCHE to address ocean
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problems. At the institutional level, the UNCHE created UNEP, which would serve
as a coordinating mechanism within the UN to streamline and oversee the activities
of all agencies, programs and inter-governmental organisations with ocean
mandates.407 These initiatives per se were created to specifically address problems
that stem from the segmentation of ocean governance and proliferation of
organisations with ocean mandates, respectively. By doing that, it is clear indication
that the UN set the agenda towards reducing some of the governance problems
plaguing ocean governance. The UNGA intended with the convening of the UNCHE
to find ‘a common outlook and direction’ to remedy the problems.408 This means that
at the core of the UNCHE process was the goal to eradicate from environmental
governance (including ocean governance) diverging and multiple segmented courses
of actions. There was a need for a global agenda to be built in which common
solutions for problems that in particular could only be solved ‘through international
cooperation and agreement’.409
The UNCHE process was comprehensive not only because it embraced most of the
main principles of effective or ‘principled’ ocean governance, but also because the
process complemented its blueprint with the following recommendations:
•

need for financial assistance for developing countries to preserve and
improve the environment,410

•

need for developing countries to build national institutions entrusted with the
task of planning, managing and controlling environmental resources;411

•

application of science and technology for the identification, avoidance and
control of environmental risks and the solution of environmental problems;412

•

promotion of environmental education for young and adult population;413 and

•

promotion of scientific research, at national and international levels, in
particular developing countries.414
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The repercussions of the UNCHE for ocean governance were significant in view of
the fact that despite the Stockholm Declaration being non-binding for states, the
declaration has influenced the development of international environmental law.415
The UNCHE also attempted to overcome the negative effects of segmentation within
ocean governance by stating that all environmental problems must be dealt with from
an interconnected perspective. By doing so, the UNCHE reinforced the concept of
‘ecosystem’ as essential for management of natural resources and their surroundings.
While the UNCHE represented a progressive global effort towards more coherence
and coordination within the global system of environmental governance, it also
showed the pitfalls of the myopic view of the environmental community (ocean
managers, policy-makers and legislators) at the time. This is because the UNCHE
process was much more focused on trying to balance economic development and
preservation of environment than developing guidelines to connect the various areas
of the governance of the environment under a global framework.
This is evidence of how difficult a task it was to achieve the main goal of the
UNCHE process, which was based on the acknowledgement ‘that problems of the
environment constitute a new and important area for international cooperation and
that the complexity and interdependence of such problems require new
approaches’.416 There is no doubt that by including the concepts such as cooperation,
ecosystem view of the environment, prevention and integration in its outcomes, there
was a clear indication that a new approach was at work in the governance of
environment. However, discussions and recommendations on how to put the
‘complexity and interdependence of environmental problems’ in legal and practical
terms were absent from the UNCHE process. The absence of such discussion is
extremely troublesome for ocean governance because ocean problems are ‘complex
and interdependent’. With regard to the outcomes of the UNCHE process, Birnie
pointed out that its principles ‘ended up being vague in content and non-specific
415
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regarding many issues that needed cooperation’.417 The Stockholm Declaration,
UNCHE’s major outcome, mostly dealt with general issues concerning the
interrelationship between environment and development.
During the UNCHE, discussions on ‘aspects of the problems that could be best
solved through international cooperation’ resulted digressing into discussions
surrounding the political issues of environmental protection and socio-economic
development. In particular, discussions were monopolised by the legitimate agenda
of developing countries in safeguarding their right to economic development in the
face of pressure exerted by the developed countries to curb environmental
degradation. This resulted in the UNCHE not developing specific frameworks for
those problems that could only be solved through international cooperation with the
exception of marine pollution at the regional level by virtue of the creation of the
UNEP-RSP.
With particular regard to ocean governance as a whole, the UNCHE process focused
almost exclusively on marine pollution. The focus on marine pollution indicates
another governance failure. The failure is a result of the reactive nature in which
ocean governance evolves, which can be characterised by the adoption of treaties in
an uncoordinated fashion, often in response to major polluting incidents or any other
pressing issue. The reactive nature perpetuates segmentation within the system of
ocean governance, given the piecemeal manner in which legislation is adopted. It is
no coincidence that at the time of the convening of the UNCHE, the ‘biggest oil
pollution incident ever recorded up to that time’, the Torrey Canyon oil accident,
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took place.418 That explains why the UNCHE process devoted most of its discussion
on ocean governance to marine pollution. In addition, it was clear during its
preparatory process that the UNCHE process would prioritise issues that needed
urgent large-scale action, such as water supplies, marine pollution and urban crises. 419
In fact, most of the recommendations contained in the Stockholm Action Plan
addressed those issues. In conclusion, the UNCHE process assisted in reducing
segmentation while acknowledging in its outcomes that environmental problems
(including ocean) are ‘complex and interdependent’. The UNCHE also reduced
segmentation because it acknowledged the principle of cooperation and the notion of
integration, ecosystem considerations and ‘prevention,’ although not always
expressly. But the UNCHE also reinforced persisting governance problems with the
UN system such as the excessive focus on segmented areas of governance. Thus, the
UNCHE process presents a mixed picture in terms of results. The table below shows
the concepts of cooperation, integration, ecosystem considerations and prevention in
relation to the outcomes of the UNCHE process.

418

In 1967, the supertanker Torrey Canyon carrying more than 120,000 tons of crude oil struck a rock
due to a navigational error and wrecked off the coast of England, causing unprecedented
environmental damage. This was the first major oil spill and there was no contingency plan. The
impact of this casualty was felt in neighbouring countries. The Torrey Canyon accident changed the
regulatory regime for oil spills in international law and prompted the adoption of various international
treaties on this matter, such as the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties. The Intervention Convention aimed at regulating actions and
measures to be taken in the event of maritime casualties involving oil spills in particular when they
take place on the high seas. After various attempts to salvage the wrecked ship, which proved
unsuccessful, the British Navy decided to bomb the wrecked supertanker. It was believed that by
bombing the supertanker, the oceans would absorb the oil pollutants, given the bigger ratio of water in
relation to oil. Upon another failed attempt to contain the spread of crude oil, a total volume of 8,000
tons of detergent, mostly highly toxic, were used by the Government for the on-shore cleaning. This
measure resulted in disaster, causing even more ecological damage to the marine environment,
especially to the wildlife. Paulb Urrowsc, Harlesr Owley and David Owen, “Torrey Canyon: A Case
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UNCHE, Brief Summary of the General Debate, Number 40,
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Table 3.2 - The UNCHE Process and Principles of International Law.
UNCHE
Cooperation
Principles, 22, 24, and
25 of the Stockholm
Declaration; Stockholm
Action Plan rec. 33, 46-

Integration

Prevention

Principles 13, 2 and 7
of

the

Stockholm

Declaration

Ecosystem
Considerations

Principles 1, 2, 6 and

Principle 2 and 7 of

7 of the Stockholm

the

Declaration

Declaration

Stockholm

50, 86 (c), 91 and 92(b)

Despite UNCHE’s accomplishments, there was still further need for a continuing
effort towards more coherence in ocean governance. In this context, a new wave of
change in ocean governance would emerge in 1973 with the convening of a
conference that would adopt the most important treaty in the history of ocean
governance: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). The
LOSC, along with new trends in ocean governance, will be analysed in the following
chapter.

3.9 The Pre-LOSC Period and its Contribution to Reducing Governance
Problems
One question that remains to be addressed is how the Pre-LOSC period contributed
to decreasing the levels of segmentation within the system of ocean governance.
Among all the analytical periods under analysis in this thesis the Pre-LOSC period
most distinctly demonstrates the contribution towards diminishing levels of
segmentation and proliferation within the system of ocean governance. This is
because the first four centuries of Pre-LOSC were characterised by the adoption of
sectoral legal instruments and setting up of sectoral ocean mandated organisations
(this long period served to consolidate the legal and institutional frameworks). The
first centuries of the Pre-LOSC also served to deeply ingrain a culture of
segmentation within ocean governance which would ultimately result in the
governance problems. Then, in the second part of the Pre-LOSC period, changes
were introduced towards a more holistic ocean governance in particular with the first
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mention to the principles of cooperation and integration, and the notions of
ecosystem considerations and preventive measures within the text of ocean related
policies and treaties.
For four centuries, the oceans were treated as if they were land-based assets and their
resources were deemed inexhaustible. The ownership of the oceans was ascertained
by the process of drawing boundaries in the same way maritime powers at the time
ascertained possession over their lands. Thus, the first part of the Pre-LOSC period,
which lasted from the 15th century until the 19th century, showed the evolution of a
system of boundaries and reliance upon them to assert rights and obligations. Two
major examples of treaties and doctrines that set the tone for segmentation during
this period are the Treaty of Tordesillas and its imaginary lines dividing the world’s
oceans into two large portions, and the Mare Clausum doctrine.
This trend of delineating boundaries, coupled with the proliferation of organisations,
generated governance problems. The recognition of these emerging problems
prompted the beginning of a debate for more coherence within the ocean governance
system. For instance, during the second part of the Pre-LOSC period, there was a
push for codification of the law of the sea (i.e., the League of Nations’ Codification
Conference), which indicated the need for more coherence in a system plagued by
the proliferation of institutions. During UNCLOS I, ocean problems started to be
perceived as ‘closely interdependent’. The main objective of UNCLOS I was ‘to hold
all the sections of the law together.’ Despite not succeeding in unifying the entire law
of the sea, UNCLOS I and its outcomes (1958 Geneva Conventions) initiated the
debate in ocean governance toward greater coherence, recognising the need to move
away from a segmented and fractured view of the world’s oceans and their
governance.
The evolution of ocean governance in the Pre-LOSC period toward a more holistic
approach is also evident from a radical change in paradigm. This is because the
period began with centuries of no regulation and unrestricted exploitation of marine
resources, and ended with intense law making processes and attempts to consolidate
the body of ocean law within a more coherent, overarching instrument. The progress
made during the second part of the Pre-LOSC period helped to establish the
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groundwork for what was accomplished in the next period (the LOSC period): the
development of a comprehensive legal framework for ocean governance. There was
also progress in regards to the development of the first ocean treaties which
introduced a conservationist approach towards governance as opposed to one
exclusively oriented towards unlimited and unregulated exploitation of marine
resources.
The Pre-LOSC period showed great advancements towards reducing segmentation in
ocean governance with the convening of the UNCHE. The UNCHE was a global
event that set the tone for a more conservationist environmental policy, including the
prevention and reduction of marine pollution. The UNCHE process prompted the
adoption of the UNGA resolution which proposed the creation of a coordinating
mechanism within the UN, later known as UNEP. It is clear from the UNGA
resolution that ‘ocean problems’ ought to be perceived as ‘complex’ and
‘interdependent’, thus requiring new approaches.420 The manner in which the
UNCHE process devised these new approaches for ocean governance was to
introduce in the international agenda the principles of cooperation, integration, and
the notions of ecosystem considerations and preventive measures.
As stated in the introductory chapter of this thesis, these legal concepts sustained the
idea of interrelatedness of ocean problems and their multi-dimensional nature.
Consequently, the concepts introduced by the UNCHE process contributed to
reducing segmentation by promoting a change in the manner in which ocean
problems were perceived. That is, a change from the perception that these problems
were isolated and disconnected, toward the view that these problems were in fact
interdependent and complex. From an institutional perspective, the UNCHE also
contributed to reducing segmentation by prompting the creation of coordinating
mechanisms within the UN such as the UNEP. In terms of regional cooperation, the
UNCHE process endorsed the creation of the Regional Seas Programs (to prevent
marine pollution at regional level). This Program emphasised regional integrated
management by considering all sectors involved in a region in its ocean management
and planning. As discussed previously, a case in point is the Barcelona Convention
420
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which developed a comprehensive framework for regional cooperation. Regional
cooperation as practiced in the context of the UNEP RSP and its protocols has the
potential to not only be more efficient because it considers the unique characteristics
of a region but also embraces the multi-dimensional nature of ocean problems.

3.10 Conclusion
This chapter analysed the evolution of the legal framework for ocean governance
over five centuries. It concluded that the Pre-LOSC period is characterised by an
initial phase of non-regulation. Subsequently, ocean problems that emerged from this
lack of regulation generated the need to enact several ocean-related policies and
treaties. The uncoordinated adoption of treaties and policies resulted in problems
characterised by segmentation and proliferation within the system of ocean
governance. The Pre-LOSC period ended with a global policy effort, the UNCHE, in
an attempt to imprint more coherence to the system of governance. Despite being
non-binding, the main UNCHE outcomes introduced groundbreaking legal concepts
to ocean governance, particularly in the area of marine pollution. The legal concepts
introduced by the UNCHE process were international cooperation, integration,
prevention of environmental damages and ecosystem considerations. The next
chapter will discuss the LOSC period and how global ocean governance evolved
towards further incorporation of these legal concepts.
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CHAPTER 4 - LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR OCEAN GOVERNANCE
DURING THE LOSC PERIOD

4.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 analyses the evolution of the legal framework of ocean governance since
the beginning of the negotiation process of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (LOSC), in 1973, until its adoption in 1982. This period is known as
the LOSC period. This analysis of the LOSC period will focus on the advancements
introduced by the LOSC provisions, in particular those related to the principle of
cooperation. Additionally, this analysis will assess whether the other principles of
international law – integration, ecosystem and precautionary approaches – were
introduced within the text of the LOSC. This chapter will address how the LOSC
contributed to decrease the levels of segmentation, contradictions and overlaps
within the system of ocean governance.

4.2 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III)
One year after the United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE)
was held in 1973, the United Nations (UN) convened a global conference to review
the existing law of the sea and to adopt a comprehensive treaty regulating several
uses of the seas. This conference is known as the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). UNCLOS III was a follow-up to the two
previous global conferences on the law of the sea, UNCLOS I and II which occurred
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in the Pre-LOSC.421 UNCLOS III had among its objectives422 the settlement of issues
that were left unresolved in the previous UNCLOS I and II, such as the breadth of the
territorial sea.423 UNCLOS III also aimed to review the regimes of the high seas, the
continental shelf and the contiguous zone; fishing and conservation of living
resources of the high seas; preservation of the marine environment with particular
focus on marine pollution prevention; and marine scientific research.424 The broad
and diverse agenda of negotiations during UNCLOS III indicates that the drafters
intended to adopt a more cohesive and all-encompassing treaty. This analysis will
examine if the intended outcome (the LOSC) resulted in diminishing the governance
problems within the system of ocean governance.
UNCLOS III negotiation process lasted for about a decade, from 1973 until 1982.425
UNCLOS III resulted in the adoption of the LOSC. UNCLOS III was notable for its
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In this regard, the LOSC indicated in its Preamble the following: ‘Noting that developments since
the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea held at Geneva in 1958 and 1960 have
accentuated the need for a new and generally acceptable Convention on the law of the sea’.
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Another major reason for the convening of UNCLOS III was the scientific discovery of manganese
nodules in areas beyond national jurisdiction. In 1958, scientific studies conducted at the University of
California concluded that many important metals could be produced from oceanic sources at 50 per
cent to 75 per cent of the cost of land-based mining. In 1965 a scientist named John Mero suggested
that if only 10 per cent of the ocean’s manganese nodules proved minable, this amount could supply
the human needs for thousands of years. Mero’s projection was that in 10 years’ time, deep seabed
mining would start operating at great capacity. Lawrence Juda, International Law and Ocean Use
Management: the Evolution of Ocean Governance (Routledge: London and New York, 1996), 188189. The discovery of manganese nodules immediately prompted interest in the economic exploitation
of these mineral resources. At the time, there was no regulatory regime to deal with deep seabed
mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Juda, International Law and Ocean Use, 171. In order to
clarify this issue, UNCLOS III aimed ‘to arrive at a clear, precise and internationally accepted
definition of the area of the seabed and ocean which lies beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, in
the light of the international regime to be established for that area’. United Nations General Assembly
Resolution (UNGA) Resolution 2574 (XXIV) of 15/12/69.
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seas, such as Benin, Congo, Ecuador, Liberia, Peru, Somalia and Togo. UN/DOALOS Website. Table
of claims to maritime jurisdiction (as at 24 October 2007).
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The process of negotiating the LOSC extended for over fourteen years. United Nations, The Law of
the Sea: Obligations of States Parties under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and
Complementary Instruments (New York: United Nations, 2004), 1.
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universal membership.426 The number of states participating at UNCLOS III was
increased by new members of the UN, in particular the newly independent states427
and land-locked states that did not participate in the two previous conferences
(UNCLOS I and II).428 The LOSC embodied the codification of existing customary
law and treaty maritime law.429 Under the influence of the UNCHE process,
UNCLOS III introduced some of the UNCHE’s principles and concepts within the
text of the LOSC, in particular, principles and concepts that were influenced by ‘the
rising tide of environmentalism’.430 Among these concepts is the protection and
preservation of the marine environment. This environmentalist tone was absent from
the two previous law of the sea conferences. In this regard, Falk and Elver stated:
[I]f the LOS Convention [LOSC] had been negotiated 20 years earlier, it is
likely that problems of environmental protection would have received
virtually no attention’.431
The resulting codification effort from UNCLOS III meant that various sectoral areas
of ocean governance, such as protection and preservation of the marine environment,
conservation and management of marine life, and navigation were now parts of one
all-encompassing treaty – the LOSC. Before the adoption of the LOSC, ocean
governance was basically structured in isolated clusters, which demonstrates the
prevailing sectoral approach towards the management of ocean uses and resources.
With the adoption of the LOSC, ocean governance gained more coherence while
joining several ocean uses under one all-encompassing treaty. The LOSC constitutes
a clear change in paradigm from the Pre-LOSC paradigm of enacting piecemeal
treaties regulating single-uses of the oceans towards the consolidation of the body of
ocean law in one legal instrument. Thus, UNCLOS III was a success in terms of
426

In this regard, Nandan referred to a ‘near universal acceptance’ that the LOSC attracted. Satya
Nandan, “Developments in the International Legal Framework for Global Ocean Governance” (paper
presented at the Oceans and Coasts at Rio + 10 Conference, UNESCO, Paris, December 2001), 3.
427
In the 1970s, the international community increased its members by virtue of the disintegration of
colonial powers and the consequent proliferation of newly independent developing states, in particular
from Africa and Asia. Juda, International Law and Ocean Use, 209.
428
UNGA Resolution 3067(XXVIII) of 16/11/73 and UNGA Resolution 2750 B (XXV) of 17/12/70.
429
LOSC, Preamble.
430
Richard Falk and Hilal Elver, “Comparing Global Perspectives: the 1982 UNCLOS and 1992
UNCED,” in Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century, eds. D. Vidas and W. Ostreng (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 148.
431
Falk and Elver, “Comparing Global Perspectives,” 148.

115

codification. As it will be shown, the fact that the LOSC was a result of successful
codification effort does not indicate that segmentation was totally eliminated from
ocean governance. This is because the foundation of the LOSC was still embedded in
a deeply segmented system of governance.
However, the LOSC introduced in its text some innovations that contributed to
decreasing some of the negative effects of segmentation. An important aspect
introduced by the LOSC is that it consolidated the principles of international
maritime law that inform effective ocean governance – namely cooperation,
integration, preventive (not precautionary) and ecosystem approaches. It will be
demonstrated that the negative effects of the sectoral-approach towards ocean
management and of proliferation of ocean-related treaties, policies and organisations
can be reduced if interrelatedness of the oceans is acknowledged in particular
through the adoption of principles of international law.
In fact, the principle of cooperation is an underpinning concept in several of the
LOSC’s provisions, as will be seen below. The relevance of cooperation for the
LOSC is so great that this treaty is deemed to be a legal treatise on the principle of
cooperation at international, regional and bilateral levels. The fact that the LOSC
mandated within its provisions the principles of cooperation, integration, preventive
and ecosystem approaches indicates that its adoption constitutes a move in the right
direction in reducing persistent ocean governance failures. An analysis of how each
of these principles was mandated within the text of the LOSC follows. This analysis
will also assess if the adoption of the LOSC resulted in decreasing the level of
segmentation, contradictions and overlaps within this system.

4.3 Interrelatedness of Ocean Problems
Before proceeding with the analysis of the principles of international law within the
context of the LOSC, it is important to emphasise a concept that epitomises the
foundation upon which the entire text of the LOSC was based. This foundational
principle is the ‘interrelatedness of ocean problems’. From its onset, the LOSC, by
virtue of its preamble, introduced a change in ocean governance by presenting ocean
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problems in a non-segmented fashion. The third paragraph of the preamble reads as
follows:
[t]he problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be
considered as a whole.
The change introduced by the preamble is in harmony with underlying notion
supported by this thesis that oceans should be considered an integral and indivisible
whole. The rationale for this paragraph in the preamble is that given the ecological
features of the oceans, there was a need to view and manage them, as an indivisible
and interconnected single global system. With the preamble serving as a landmark
for the interpretation of its provisions, the LOSC promoted a shift in the manner in
which the oceans were viewed. This shift meant that the view of ocean problems as
sector-related problems was no longer the only perspective supported by the newly
adopted ocean law, the LOSC. The LOSC sustains the notion of the interrelatedness
of ocean problems. This was the beginning of a new way of perceiving ocean
problems. This is because, as will be demonstrated, the LOSC was still
predominantly based upon a system of governance characterised by segmentation.
Both perspectives (the sectoral view and the more holistic introduced by the
preamble) were now part of the same system of governance.
By virtue of its preamble, the LOSC, assisted in attenuating the negative effects of
the prevailing culture of segmentation within ocean governance. If ocean problems
are dealt with as interrelated and multi-dimensional, consequently all linkages
between sectors would be taken into regard. This meant that ocean problems would
not be considered as isolated events but they would be addressed in relation to the
oceans as whole. Thus, a polluting accident would be dealt with taking into account
the repercussions for marine living resources, neighbouring countries, sensitive and
fragile marine ecosystems affected, liability, among other relationships.
There remains to be seen how the preamble would be made operational in the
provisions of the LOSC. In other words, to what extent the preamble informed the
provisions of the LOSC. It can be stated that the LOSC, while introducing principles
of international law, has strengthened and corroborated the wording of the preamble.
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This is because, these principles, namely cooperation, integration, ecosystem and
preventive approaches, all endorse the notion that ocean problems are interrelated
and multi-dimensional. The analysis of each of the above-referred principles within
the context of LOSC and how they contributed to reducing the governance problems
within ocean governance follows.

4.4 Principle of Cooperation and the LOSC
With regard to cooperation, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) had
stressed in 1970 that given ‘the interrelated nature of ocean problems’, the new law
of the sea needed to be structured within a framework of international cooperation. 432
From a textual analysis of the LOSC, the principle of cooperation is prescribed in
more than 70 provisions. This is significant in view of the fact that LOSC has a total
of 320 articles. For this reason, the LOSC is regarded as ‘a monument to
international cooperation in the treaty-making process’.433 The relevance of the
principle of cooperation within the LOSC is also reflected in the variety of issueareas in which cooperation is prescribed. Among the areas in which cooperation is
prescribed in the LOSC are:
•

conservation and management of marine life;434

•

protection and preservation of the marine environment;435

•

marine scientific research;436

•

transfer of marine technology and scientific knowledge;437

•

cooperation among international organisations; 438

432

UNGA Resolution 2750 C (XXV) of 17/12/70.
United Nations, The Law of the Sea Official Texts of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea and of the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations: New York, 2001), 1.
434
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LOSC, arts. 242, 243, and 244.
437
LOSC, arts. 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 273, 276, and 277.
438
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•

marine casualty or incident of navigation on the high seas;439

•

assistance and rescuing of people found in danger at sea and to ships after
collision;440

•

repression of piracy;441

•

suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances;442

•

unauthorised broadcast from the high seas;443 and

•

protection of objects of an archaeological and historical nature found at sea.444

References to cooperation within the LOSC are sometimes clearly stated and at other
times are indirect, such as through the use of expressions like ‘seek to agree, directly
or through subregional or regional organization’; 445 ‘set up regulatory measures after
consultations with the other states;’446 ‘to enforce by agreement;’447 and ‘to establish
through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements;’448 Despite the prominence
enjoyed by the principle of cooperation within its text, the LOSC did not provide for
a definition of cooperation. Also, the LOSC did not address the legal consequences
of state parties not engaging in the prescribed cooperation. For instance, the LOSC
did not anticipate the negative consequences of the non-cooperating parties and nonparties. Non-cooperating parties are those that are parties to an agreement, for
instance, but they undermine its obligations or conservation measures in the case of
fisheries. Non-parties are those that refuse to join a cooperating effort by choosing to
act in isolation. Non-parties also undermine the terms and conditions of cooperating
arrangements.
This reality would change during the Post-LOSC period when treaties started to
incorporate provisions that exclude non-cooperating and non-parties from the
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benefits of a cooperating agreement, as will be seen in the next chapter.449 The
analysis now will highlight the requirements set forth by the LOSC for cooperation,
particularly for the areas of protection and preservation of the environment,
conservation and management of marine life, and marine scientific research and
technological transfer. The focus of this analysis will be in selected major areas
because the LOSC devoted most of its provisions on cooperation to them. As
explained in Chapter 1, these areas were selected because they form the bulk of
ocean governance and prompted intense treaty-making processes. The intended
outcome of this analysis is to depict the obligation to cooperate within the LOSC text
and to assess how the framework for cooperation established by the LOSC can
contribute to reducing the levels of segmentation within the system of ocean
governance.

4.4.1 Cooperation and Conservation and Management of Marine Living
Resources
The area of conservation and management of marine living resources is the area in
which the LOSC provided for the most detailed provisions on cooperation. This
richness of details in prescribing cooperation for this subject-area is what makes the
LOSC so remarkable and unprecedented. Until the adoption of the LOSC in 1982,
there was no precedent of an international treaty with such large membership
detailing and prescribing conditions to be fulfilled in complying with the obligation
to cooperate for the conservation and management of marine life.
A common feature in most of the LOSC’s conservation and management provisions
on marine living resources is that these provisions expressly specify the requirements
to achieve cooperation as opposed to merely prescribing cooperation without going
further in determining the means to achieve it. This feature is in itself an
improvement if compared with the previous framework for cooperation prescribed

449

For instance, art. 8(4) of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks
Conference), adopted in 1995.
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by the 1958 Convention on Fishing on High Seas, for instance.450 This is because the
law of the sea from 1958 simply required states to cooperate without providing
detailed and clear requirements to achieve cooperation. There were no clear
guidelines on how to achieve cooperation within the legal framework of the 1958
Convention on Fishing on High Seas. This reveals the evolution of the principle of
cooperation from the 1958 process to 1982.
The analysis will attempt to pinpoint how these new features, introduced by the
LOSC, contributed to decreasing the levels of fragmentation and segmentation within
ocean governance.

4.4.1.1 Content of the Obligation to Cooperate
The LOSC informed the content of the obligation to cooperate for the conservation
and management of marine life through the adoption of conservation and
management measures.451 The conservation and management measures were based
on the following requirements: best scientific evidence; total allowable catch (TAC)
and maximum sustainable yield (MSY); migratory patterns; exchange of
information; and subregional, regional or international organisations.

4.4.1.1.1 Best Scientific Evidence, Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and Maximum
Sustainable Yield (MSY)
The LOSC, similar to previous agreements from the Pre-LOSC period, could have
adopted provisions requiring states to simply cooperate through the adoption of an

450

The Convention on Fishing on the High Seas in its article 6(3) required any state fishing in the area
of the high seas adjacent to the territorial sea of the coastal state to enter into negotiation in view of
adopting an agreement establishing the measures for the conservation of the shared resources. The
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agreement towards the conservation and management of marine life without detailing
‘how’. However, the framework for cooperation within the LOSC went further than
simply prescribing vague and simplistic provisions that mandated the obligation to
cooperate. Science played a major role for the LOSC to be considered a ‘wellelaborated’ treaty on cooperation, given that scientific concepts informed the
obligation to cooperate for the conservation and management of marine life. For
instance, article 61(2) prescribes that coastal states and competent international
organisations, whether subregional, regional or global, should cooperate to ensure,
through proper conservation and management measures, the maintenance of living
resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)452 in order to avoid overexploitation of these resources. The primary obligation of article 61(2) is to
cooperate in conserving and managing the resources found in the EEZ. Secondly,
interested parties should cooperate as appropriate in establishing conservation
measures to this end. Thus, the conservation measures serve as a vehicle through
which cooperation can be practiced. But most importantly, it is the need for
interested parties to join efforts towards the elaboration of the conservation
measures. The interdependence between interested parties is the core issue of the
need for cooperation. It would be detrimental to cooperation if parties independently
adopted measures which could have the potential to conflict with each other.
The LOSC further provided guidelines on how these conservation measures should
be designed. Accordingly, in its article 61(2), the LOSC states that the coastal states,
in cooperation with states that fish within their EEZ, should adopt conservation and
management measures based on ‘the best scientific evidence’. Science-based
measures should inform the obligation to cooperate. According to the LOSC, ‘best
scientific evidence’ could be obtained regarding the following aspects of fish stocks
and fishing in general: ‘identity of unit stocks; their boundaries and ranges; and
information on catch removed from each unit stock, by-catches, discards, level of
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LOSC, art. 55 which reads: ‘The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the
territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and
jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the
relevant provisions of this Convention.’
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fishing effort, information on estimates of population biomass’.453 The requirement of
‘best scientific evidence’ is indication that the LOSC is compatible with the rationale
of the precautionary principle (which would be elaborated a decade later) in the sense
that this principle endorses the need for scientific certainty for resource management
purposes.
The LOSC also introduced concepts such as ‘fishing pattern, interdependence of
stocks, effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested species’.454 By
doing so, the LOSC embraced the ecological rationale for cooperation, which
purports the understanding that the oceans should be viewed and managed as an
indivisible global ecosystem. Greater acceptance of concepts such as the
interdependence of stocks results in decreasing the level of fragmentation within
ocean governance because these concepts support an ecosystem view of the oceans.
By doing so, the LOSC would prompt the beginning of a trend towards multi-species
management in fisheries governance which would be later consolidated during the
Post-LOSC period. Similar to the Pre-LOSC period single species models were still
prevalent during the LOSC period. While the LOSC included concepts such as the
interdependence of stocks, the scientific mindset at the time was still firmly based
upon single species approach.
Other scientific concepts that informed the obligation to cooperate for the
conservation and management of marine life were ‘total allowable catch’455 and
‘maximum sustainable yield’.456 Accordingly, coastal states should determine their
TAC in order to maintain or restore stocks at levels that can produce the MSY. The
TAC system is an effort management system which indicates the catch limit.457 With
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regard to MSY, the LOSC in its article 61(3) states that the measures mentioned in
article 61(2) should be taken ‘to maintain or restore populations of harvested species
at levels which can produce the MSY’. Although the MSY parameter was not new in
view that it was already introduced by the 1958 Convention on Fishing on the High
Seas,458 its inclusion in the LOSC text in association with TAC (catch limit system) is
an improvement to the framework for cooperation. This is because by just limiting
the MSY (total amount of fish to be caught in a year) without determining how the
total would be shared among interested stakeholders could result in undermining
cooperation in the event that one of the parties or more would fish more than it was
allocated for them. The MSY parameter applied with the TAC agreed upon by
cooperating states gave more clarity and regulatory strength to the obligation to
cooperate. The outcome is that the principle of cooperation is strengthened and
interdependence among parties is fostered.
Both concepts, TAC and MSY, also support an ecosystem view of the oceans, thus
decreasing the levels of segmentation. By linking fishing to the impact of fishing, the
LOSC indicated an endorsement of an ecosystem view of management. The text
LOSC could have omitted ecosystem considerations and limited its provisions to
regulate fishing activities without addressing the repercussion of fishing activities to
the marine ecosystem as a whole. The purpose of both concepts (TAC and MSY) is
an important step towards restoring and maintaining the ecosystem balance of the
resources impacted by fishing activities. Though these concepts originate from
single-species models, their application across state-defined geographic boundaries
gives these concepts a view that points towards an ecosystem perspective. Thus,
articles 61(2) and (3) are in harmony with the notion of the ocean as an indivisible
ecosystem. Other features introduced by the LOSC that contributed to informing the
obligation to cooperate were migratory patterns of stocks, exchange of information
and subregional, regional or international organisations.
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4.4.1.1.2 Migratory Patterns of Stocks
Another parameter utilised by the LOSC to further inform its framework for
cooperation for the conservation and management of marine life was the migratory
patterns of marine life. Migratory patterns entail account for various species and their
patterns of migration which can be unpredictable at times. The LOSC adopted
migratory patterns to assist in designing suitable conservation arrangements to each
species to fulfil the obligation to cooperate towards their conservation and
management.459 The LOSC recognises that ‘different categories of species behave
differently’.460 Kimball pointed out that this approach is known as ‘species by
species’ approach.
By adopting a ‘species by species’ approach,461 the LOSC implied a certain degree of
inadequacy in the system of boundaries or jurisdictional zones (i.e., EEZ) for the
management of fisheries. Or at least the LOSC attempted by adopting the migratory
patterns system to circumvent the difficulties that derive from the rigidity of the
human-made lines (such as EEZ) in view of the mobility of these resources. This is
because very often stocks are not neatly confined within the political boundaries of
two or more states or the high seas, thus requiring the LOSC drafters to devise a
more efficient mechanism that could adjust to the reality of the migratory character
of fish stocks. Migratory patterns are defined by ecological circumstances and not
political boundaries. As it will be further argued, the LOSC is structured on the basis
of conflicting concepts where ecosystem notions or the ideal of interrelatedness of
ocean problems coexist with a rigid system of political boundaries to ascertain rights.
The first of these criteria refers to stocks that straddle between the EEZs of their
coastal states and in the zones of high seas immediately adjacent to their EEZs.462
These stocks are known in the legal doctrine as straddling stocks.463 Article 63(2)
recognises the mobility of the straddling resources. The LOSC identified the
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ecological reality of straddling stocks and made a special mention in its text for the
need of a cooperating agreement to be established between interested parties which
in this case are coastal states and states fishing for these resources in the adjacent
high seas. Another situation that characterises migratory patterns is when stocks
occur within the EEZs of two or more states.464 The doctrine named these resources
as shared or joint stocks.465 According to the LOSC, interested parties fishing for both
shared and straddling stocks are required to cooperate in the following terms: ‘to
agree upon measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and
development of such stocks’.466
Another category of migratory pattern introduced by the LOSC is the highly
migratory species, which migrate throughout the EEZs of two or more countries and
their adjacent high seas areas and beyond.467 The distinct characteristic of these
highly migratory species is the fact that their migratory cycle normally moves
through the national boundaries of various states, and at times moves through
international waters of the entire globe. The LOSC provided a list of highly
migratory species in its Annex I, in which tuna, marlins, swordfish and oceanic
sharks are included.468 The importance of adopting migratory patterns goes beyond
the introduction of ecosystem concepts within the text of the LOSC; it also provides
guidance on which concerned parties share the same resources to be covered by the
cooperating agreement. While acknowledging the different migratory patterns, the
LOSC imprinted clarity to the provisions on cooperation in the area of fisheries.
Besides adding more clarity, the system of migratory patterns also strengthens
cooperation by circumventing the limitations of the system of boundaries. This is
because more adequate conservation and management measures can be devised
giving due regard to the various categories of stocks (shared, straddling, highly
migratory). This circumstance benefits cooperation which in turn reduces the level of
segmentation within the system of ocean governance. The linkage between
ecosystem consideration and fishing activities is fostered by the LOSC.
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4.4.1.1.3 Exchange of Information
Another important factor that informs the content of the obligation to cooperate
within the LOSC is the duty to exchange information between interested parties.
Although the primary obligation is to cooperate for the conservation and
management of marine life, this main obligation is informed by a secondary
obligation to exchange available scientific information, catch and fishing effort
statistics and other data relevant to the conservation of fish stocks.469 The LOSC
utilised strong language when prescribing the obligation to share scientific
information. Accordingly, the LOSC prescribes that states ‘shall’ contribute and
exchange information on a regular basis.470 This obligation reflects the need for all
parties to be fully informed so better conservation measures can be devised.
Ultimately if a cooperating agreement is based on well-elaborated and science-based
provisions and it is adopted between well-informed parties, it has more chances to be
successful in terms of achieving cooperation than an ill-devised agreement. This
circumstance also benefits cooperation which in turn reduces the level of
segmentation within the system of ocean governance. In this case the linkage
between science as applied to fisheries and fishing is legally obligated by the
provisions of the LOSC.

4.4.1.1.4 Subregional, Regional or International Organisations
The last feature within the LOSC framework that informs the obligation for the
conservation and management of marine life is cooperation through subregional,
regional or international organisations. These institutional arrangements are
commonly known as subregional or regional fisheries organisations (RFO).471 The
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LOSC emphasised cooperation through subregional, regional or international
organisations in several of its provisions in the area of conservation and management
of marine life.472
The frequent reference to subregional, regional or international organisations within
the LOSC leads to the conclusion that the LOSC elected RFOs as the preferable
means to achieve cooperation for the management and conservation of fisheries
resources. This is evident, for instance, in articles 61 through 119 of the LOSC. The
LOSC went further to require that in the absence of a RFO, states shall cooperate to
establish one.473 The emphasis given by the LOSC to RFOs indicates a new trend in
ocean governance. This is because in the previous law of the sea regime, in particular
the 1958 Convention on Fishing on the High Seas, there was no reference to the
establishment of subregional, regional or international organisations as a means to
achieve cooperation for the management and conservation of marine life.474
Although there was no reference in the previous law of the sea regime (1958),
cooperation through RFOs has been a common practice in ocean governance since
the 1940s.475 The FAO played a pivotal role by sponsoring the creation of several of
those RFOs.476 The manner in which those RFOs are more commonly set up is
through the adoption of regional agreements that establish their corresponding
organisation or administrative body to be responsible for adopting measures for the
conservation and management of marine life within their regulatory area. The RFOs
evolved from being originally mandated solely with the obligation to produce and
exchange scientific data to fully-fledged organisations with regulatory powers. The
RFOs were no longer created with the sole purpose of generating scientific and
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statistical data on fisheries. Additional responsibilities and powers were delegated by
member states to these RFOs to establish conservation and management measures
falling within the scope of their treaties.477 RFOs had their mandates broadened to
encompass regulatory powers over conservation and management issues which
demonstrate recognition for the RFOs’ effectiveness in achieving cooperation among
their members.
Until the adoption of the LOSC in 1982, RFOs were only regulated by regional
agreements binding exclusively on their parties. With the endorsement by the LOSC
of the important role played by the RFOs, cooperation through RFOs became a
crystallised norm of international maritime law, thus enforceable upon the various
signatories of the LOSC and any other member of the international community
bound by international maritime customs contained in the LOSC’s text. Because
most of the organisations managing shared fisheries are regional in their scope, the
endorsement by the LOSC of the RFOs entails an endorsement of the regional
approach as the best scale to manage fisheries resources. This is a direct result of the
effectiveness of the RFOs, and their evolution from repositories of fishing data to
gain unrestricted regulatory powers. The emphasis on regional cooperation through
RFOs within the LOSC also corroborates with some ocean scholars in ocean
governance who argue that the regional approach is the most efficient scale to
manage the oceans. In this regard, Kimball and Laughlin maintain as follows:
It is widely accepted that regions (including watersheds) are more logical
units for sustainable ocean management than a global approach. Most marine
fish stocks are regional, and the effects of marine pollution, modified river
flow, and atmospheric change are usually contained within coastal/marine
ecosystems at the regional level.478
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Kimball and Laughlin rightly argued that ‘most marine fish stocks are regional’, as
opposed to highly migratory species, which needed a broader international
arrangement in order to encompass a broader range of interested parties under the
international organisation to manage highly migratory species. The emphasis on
regional cooperation contained in the LOSC reinforced the trend that was initiated as
a result of the convening of the UNCHE in 1972, which argued that the regional
approach was adequate for the solution of most ocean problems, particularly when
dealing with fisheries issues.479
In view of the above-referred arguments, it can be said that regional cooperation
through RFOs decreased levels of segmentation within ocean governance, by pooling
together concerned state parties, which shared the same ocean problems and
resources and problems. Also, RFOs contribute to creating interdependency among
states. As said in the introductory chapter, the principle of cooperation is vital for
‘principled’

or

effective

ocean

governance

because

cooperation

entails

interdependency among states. Moreover, interdependency prevents interested
stakeholders from acting in isolation, which intensifies levels of segmentation within
ocean governance.

4.4.2 Cooperation and Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment
A framework for cooperation for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment was included in Part XII of the LOSC. The LOSC framework includes
various sources of pollution, such as from shipping, dumping, land-based, seabed and
marine pollution from and through the atmosphere,480 among others.481 Before the
LOSC, the regulation of pollution was done in a piecemeal manner, mostly by virtue
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of various ship-borne pollution treaties sponsored by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO).

4.4.2.1 Characteristics of the Framework for Cooperation for the Protection and
Preservation of the Marine Environment
The LOSC framework for cooperation in the area of pollution was influenced by the
UNCHE outcomes because the LOSC incorporated most of the features introduced
by the UNCHE process. These features included a preventive approach to marine
pollution; technical cooperation and capacity building; regional cooperation; and
procedural rules to inform the obligation to cooperate.482 This set of characteristics
was also present in the various treaties adopted by IMO, such as the Convention on
the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter (London
Dumping Convention)483 and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from the Ships (MARPOL 73/78).484 The reason for the similarities among
the three processes, namely the UNCHE, UNCLOS III that resulted in the adoption
of the LOSC and IMO pollution-related treaties, is that at the beginning of the long
negotiation process of the LOSC in 1973, the UNCHE had just taken place a year
before and the IMO was going through a productive treaty-making phase.485 In fact,
the 1970s are known as a period of ‘extensive treaty action’486 for the IMO.487
Because the three processes (UNCHE, UNCLOS III and IMO’s treaty-phase) were
contemporaneous, they have share similar concepts and novelties that were
introduced in ocean governance at the time, as it will be demonstrated below.
The LOSC provided for cooperation for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment to achieve three major goals. The first of these goals was to cooperate in
482
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taking measures to prevent, control and reduce pollution of the marine environment
from any source.488 The second goal was cooperation towards enforcement of
international rules and standards adopted through the IMO.489 The third goal was
cooperation for the implementation of liability laws with respect to damage caused
by pollution.490

4.4.2.1.1 Measures for the Prevention, Control and Prevention of Pollution of the
Marine Environment
The LOSC prescribes cooperation to prevent, control and reduce pollution of the
marine environment from any source in the following terms: states should
individually or jointly take all measures that are necessary to prevent, control and
reduce pollution.491 Article 194(1) did not refer expressly to cooperation; however, by
using the expression ‘jointly’, the LOSC implied cooperation. The LOSC provided a
framework that outlined the means to achieve cooperation while specifying that
states should use ‘the best practicable means at their disposal’ and ‘should endeavour
to harmonize their policies in this connection’.492
Another aspect of the framework for cooperation for the protection of the marine
environment is the major role played by competent international and regional
organisations. These organisations are the preferred vehicles for cooperation among
parties for the formulation and elaboration of international rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures.493 However, LOSC does not exclusively
prescribe cooperation through a competent international or regional organisation. By
virtue of its article 197, LOSC provides states with the option to cooperate directly
among them without the mediation of an international organisation. Nevertheless,
cooperation for the prevention of pollution at the international level is largely
practiced through the competent specialised agency with the UN system, the IMO.
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The prominent role exercised by competent organisations such as the IMO is made
clear by the sheer number of treaties adopted by the IMO while regulating vesselsource pollution. In addition to the IMO’s role in adopting various treaties, another
aspect to be considered is that the LOSC allows for the incorporation of the IMO’s
treaties within its framework. For this reason, the LOSC is considered to be a
framework-type convention.494 In this regard,
The LOS Convention [LOSC] was designed to serve as unifying framework
for a growing number of more detailed international agreements on marine
environmental protection and the conservation and management of marine
resources.495
This meant that the LOSC left more detailed rules to be informed by complementary
agreements and policies to be developed such as those sponsored by IMO. This also
meant that the LOSC:
[i]ncorporates by reference the more detailed measures as they are
progressively developed and its framework obligations may be interpreted
and applied in light of this evolving body of law.496
Since IMO conventions for instance go through constant amendments in particular its
‘technical conventions’497 and their annexes in particular due to ‘rapidly-evolving
technology in the shipping world,’498 the LOSC drafters devised a mechanism for
these changes to be incorporated in its text as they were adopted by IMO. Some of
the most important complementary treaties adopted by the IMO were adopted to
prevent, reduce and control ship-borne pollution and dumping (MARPOL 73/78 and
the London Dumping Convention, respectively).499 The nature of a framework-type
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convention allows the LOSC to incorporate into its framework frequent changes and
updates, in particular those related to technical annexes of the IMO treaties.
In this regard, the LOSC is considered to be a ‘dynamic benchmark’500 because it
immediately incorporates into its text new rules and standards as soon as they enter
into force.501 Kimball argued that the legal repercussion of the incorporation into the
LOSC of the ‘generally accepted international rules and procedures’ as established in
IMO treaties such as MARPOL 73/78 and the London Dumping Convention, is that
these rules are binding on the LOSC’s parties even if they are not parties to the
above-referred treaties.502
In order to maintain a harmonious relationship with the LOSC, the complementary
IMO treaties or other regional agreements have to be consistent with the general
principles and objectives laid down in Part XII of the LOSC.503 The incorporation by
the LOSC of all previously adopted treaties also indicates that ‘the LOSC did not
take place in a vacuum, but rather against the backdrop of existing and continuing
concerns to regulate protection of the marine environment’.504 With regard to
cooperation, parties to the LOSC need to adhere to the provisions of the IMO
conventions. For instance, the London Dumping Convention stated the need for
regional cooperation to further its objectives.505 Within its framework, the London
Dumping Convention also emphasised the need for developing countries to resort to
international cooperation in order for them to mobilise enough ‘knowledge and
experience’ to prevent dumping in their marine environments.506
Similar to the London Dumping Convention,507 MARPOL 73/78 provided for
‘technical cooperation’ in terms of training of technical personnel, supply of
equipments, reception facilities and monitoring systems, facilitation of measures in
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the mitigation of pollution and scientific research.508 Compliance with IMO treaties
can be very costly in particular to developing countries. For instance, the acquisition
of reception facilities can prevent certain parties from complying with the terms of an
IMO treaty. For instance, certain countries, in particular developing countries, face
great difficult in implementing MARPOL 73/78 due to obstacles in having adequate
reception facilities for dirty ballast water, cargo residues and garbage for ships
calling at their ports.509 Given the technical complexity in implementing IMO
treaties, in particular its Annexes, qualified personnel with technical knowledge in
the matter are vital for their successful implementation. Cooperation thus is vital in
terms of sharing financial resources and expertise to implement the IMO treaties.510
Overall, the relationship between the LOSC and IMO’s complementary agreements
is harmonious.511 This harmonisation results in preventing the occurrence of
governance problems such as contradictions and overlapping of mandates.

4.4.2.1.2 Enforcement of Laws and Regulations for the Prevention, Control and
Prevention of Pollution of the Marine Environment
Enforcement was the second area to which the LOSC devoted some of its provisions
on cooperation for the control and prevention of pollution. The framework for
cooperation within the LOSC is enhanced by a provision which fostered cooperation
for the enforcement of applicable rules and standards for the protection and
preservation of the environment.512 The focus on enforcement indicates the
comprehensiveness of the framework established by the LOSC, which did not limit
itself to prescribe a general obligation to cooperate for the control and prevention of
pollution exclusively. The LOSC also required cooperation with regard to
enforcement measures. Accordingly, article 217(5) of the LOSC states that in the
event of a violation, ‘flag states conducting an investigation may request assistance
of any other state whose cooperation could be useful in clarifying the circumstances
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of the case’. It seems that the intention of the LOSC drafters in promoting
cooperation in the course of an investigation of a polluting violation was to increase
success in terms of implementation of its provisions.
In similar terms, MARPOL 73/78 prescribed cooperation for the detection of
violation and enforcement of its provisions by enlisting practical measures such as
monitoring, reporting and accumulating evidence.513 The LOSC initiated a trend that
would reinforce during the succeeding Post-LOSC period which is focus and
attention to enforcement to increase the levels of success of compliance with treaties.
It can be said that the LOSC period marked the end of a long period in ocean
governance of adoption of treaties to give place to a period of focus on enforcement
and compliance of treaties (Post-LOSC period). This trend reduces proliferation of
treaties in ocean governance.

4.4.2.1.3 Cooperation on Liability for the Prevention and Control of Pollution of the
Marine Environment
Lastly, the LOSC covered the area of liability in the event of marine pollution. With
regard to liability, LOSC prompted states to cooperate towards the implementation of
international law to assure ‘prompt and adequate compensation in respect of all
damage caused by pollution’.514 LOSC goes further and extends the scope of the
obligation to cooperate towards the enactment of new laws with the following
objectives: assessment of the responsibility and compensation for damage, and
settlement of related disputes and development of criteria and procedures for
payment of adequate compensation, such as compulsory insurance and compensation
funds.515 By requesting cooperation in the area of liability, the LOSC covered the
entire regulatory cycle from enactment of laws passing through enforcement until
compensation by means of liability. This indicates that the LOSC did not leave gaps
in the framework for cooperation regarding vessel-source pollution. This measure
also reduces the governance problems.
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In conclusion, the analysis of cooperation in the areas of control and prevention of
pollution of the marine environment indicates that IMO is the centralised agency
with competence for enacting complementary laws to the general principles
contained in the LOSC. The centralised role played by IMO and the incorporation of
IMO treaties by the LOSC (harmonisation) result in decreasing the levels of
proliferation and contradiction within ocean governance. This is because only one
agency is in charge of enacting the applicable law for the area of prevention of
vessel-source pollution. Moreover, the level of standardisation by having IMO
exclusively responsible for setting the generally accepted international rules and
procedures result in reducing contradiction within the system of ocean governance.
Thus IMO imprinted coherence to the system of ocean governance in its area of
competence. Hence, if the system of ocean governance has a strong, efficient and
centralised competent international organisation as vehicle for cooperation, it can
result in reducing the governance problems within the system.516

4.4.3 Cooperation and Marine Scientific Research
The science-based requirement present in several of the frameworks for cooperation
within the LOSC – in particular, in the area of conservation and management of
living marine resources, as seen before – resulted in creating demand for developing
countries to have expertise and equipment to produce the scientific information to
properly manage fisheries, for instance. Thus, well-elaborated provisions on
cooperation in the area of conservation and management of marine life generated the
need for cooperation to exchange scientific information in special to accommodate
the needs of developing countries. The LOSC drafters from both developing and
developed nations were aware of this problem, and provided for a framework for
cooperation to exchange scientific information, giving particular attention to the
needs of developing countries.517
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Accordingly, the LOSC devoted its entire part XIII to the subject of marine scientific
research. Marine scientific research is also associated with various subject areas
throughout the LOSC’s text, stemming from fisheries,518 pollution519 and for the
purpose of increasing scientific knowledge of the marine environment in itself.520 The
provision for marine scientific research in various areas of ocean governance is
evidence that the LOSC did not isolate marine scientific research but interconnected
marine scientific research to other areas. In this regard, article 244(2) reads as
follows:
For this purpose, States, both individually and in cooperation with other States and
with competent international organisations, shall actively promote the flow of
scientific data and information and the transfer of knowledge resulting from marine
scientific research, especially to developing States, as well as the strengthening of the
autonomous marine scientific research capabilities of developing States through,
inter alia, programmes to provide adequate education and training of their technical
and scientific personnel.
Within the LOSC, the framework for cooperation in the area of marine scientific
research is structured in a very similar way as the framework for cooperation for the
areas of conservation and management of marine life, and the protection and
preservation of the marine environment. This similarity has to do with the fact that
the LOSC has chosen common features present in other frameworks for cooperation
within its text such as: cooperation through competent international organisations,521
through the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements as the primary means
of cooperation.522
Two main objectives within the LOSC for the promotion of international cooperation
in the area of marine scientific research were the creation of favourable conditions
for marine scientific research523 and the publication and dissemination of the
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information and knowledge obtained.524 Similarly to the areas of fisheries when the
LOSC linked the need for the conservation measures to be informed by scientific
knowledge, the LOSC drafters intended for marine scientific knowledge to be share
between its parties with the objective of better managing the oceans by taking wellinformed decisions. Marine scientific knowledge was scarce among developing
countries which fostered the need to promote cooperation focusing on this particular
group of state parties. The next section will focus on cooperation for the
development and transfer of marine technology.

4.4.4 Cooperation and the Development and Transfer of Marine Technology
Similar to marine scientific research, the development and transfer of marine
technology has an entire section of the LOSC dedicated to it (Part XIV). The LOSC
prescribes that state parties should cooperate directly or through international
organisations to promote the development and transfer of marine technology.525 In
article 266(1), LOSC prescribes that state parties should cooperate ‘in accordance
with their capabilities’. This means that the differences in technological development
between state parties should be taken into consideration, in particular the differences
between developing and developed states.
To facilitate the process of cooperation in the development and transfer of marine
technology, LOSC emphasises the need for state parties to endeavour in the creation
of favourable economic and legal conditions.526 The rationale behind the provisions
on cooperation for the development and transfer of marine technology was ‘to
achieve a more equitable repartition of scientific skills and access to make use of
technologies, which to a large extent were dominated, by the industrialized states’.527
Article 266 of the LOSC prescribes that states and competent international
organisations shall cooperate to promote the development and transfer of marine
science and marine technology ‘on fair and reasonable terms and conditions’. This
524
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provision is followed by article 267, which emphasises the need for parties to pay
due regard to legitimate interests such as rights and duties of holders, suppliers and
recipients of marine technology. Article 266 and 267 were a result of a compromise
to achieve cooperation between two opposing groups during the negotiation process
of the LOSC. On the one hand, those states that advocated their need to have access
to technology, capabilities and knowledge,528 and on the other hand, those state
parties from the industrialised world that during negotiations advocated in favour of
the rights of their private enterprises and investors in this sector.529
The framework for cooperation for the transfer of marine technology within the
LOSC is comprehensive. For instance, among its basic objectives is the need for
cooperation to be exercised at all levels, particularly at the regional, sub-regional and
bilateral levels.530 Emphasis was given for those states that needed and requested
technical cooperation.531 Among the measures to achieve cooperation were the
undertaking of projects, promotion of joint ventures and other forms of bilateral and
multilateral cooperation.532 The LOSC also listed the need for ‘appropriate
international funding for ocean research and development’533 as a means to achieve
international cooperation for technology transfer. The LOSC endorses the
establishment of regional centres that result from coordination between states and
competent international organisations.534 Accordingly, the UN has established a
number of these regional centres of technological transfer in Asia, Africa, Latin
America and the Middle East, even though none of these centres are focused
exclusively on marine technology.535
Lastly, the LOSC introduces a provision requesting that competent international
organisations cooperate among themselves to further its objectives, as a means to
enhance cooperation in the transfer and development of marine technology, as well
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as marine scientific research.536 Examples of cooperating arrangements between
competent international organisations are abundant in ocean governance. The UN
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) has been proactive in fulfilling
the objectives of the LOSC in terms of the transfer of marine technology. For
instance, the IOC has implemented LOSC’s provisions through the establishment of
monitoring and observing program of the ocean called Global Ocean Observing
System (GOOS). Through international cooperation among various competent
international organisations, the main objective of GOOS is to provide ‘an operational
ocean observation capability for all of the world's nations’.537
Furthermore, the IOC,538 as the main sponsor agency, has promoted the transfer of
observation technologies, data and marine information to states that do not have
technological apparatuses necessary to predict rapid changes in the oceans for the
purpose of mitigating damages from natural hazards and pollution.539 International
cooperation among various oceanographic researchers and marine and coastal
industries under the sponsorship of GOOS have generated valuable oceanographic
products and services.540 Similar to the prevention and control of pollution in the
marine environment, in which IMO was chosen as the main vehicle for cooperation,
LOSC supports competent international organisations as the preferable means to
achieve cooperation in marine scientific research and technological transfer. For that
reason, cooperation through competent international organisations at regional and
global levels resulted in decreasing levels of contradiction within the system of ocean
governance. This is because cooperation through a centralised pool of competent
agencies working together to reach a common goal results in decreasing
contradiction and overlaps. The framework for cooperation for technological transfer
within the LOSC also imprinted coherence to the system of ocean governance in the
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sense that it brought together all concerned parties, such as the holders and suppliers,
and, on the opposite side, the recipients of marine technology.
In summary, this section has provided an overview of the framework for cooperation
in the LOSC, with particular focus on four major areas within ocean governance,
namely the conservation and management of marine life, protection and preservation
of the environment, and marine scientific research and technology transfer. The
analysis also shows the progress achieved by the LOSC in decreasing levels of
segmentation within the system of ocean governance as a result of its provisions on
the principle of cooperation. Below is an analysis of the relationship of the LOSC
and the principle of integration.

4.5 Principle of Integration and the LOSC
From a textual analysis, integration and the remaining principles and legal concepts
that constitute an ideal framework for effective ocean governance, namely ecosystem
and precautionary approaches are not expressly mandated in the LOSC with the same
richness of detail prescribed for the principle of cooperation. However, with regard
to integration, the LOSC demonstrates prima facie its integrative nature just by being
the by-product of a codification effort that was intended to assemble the entire law of
sea within one comprehensive legal treaty. As a codification effort of great
magnitude, UNCLOS III was successful in compiling within the LOSC text a wide,
diverse and yet interrelated range of ocean issues such as pollution,541 fisheries,542
marine scientific research,543 piracy544 and navigation.545 As seen in the introductory
chapter of this thesis, integration has been defined by the doctrine ‘as an effort to
ensure that links546 among issue-areas are not neglected in the making of policy
decisions’.547 Also, integration depends upon a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing
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from various subject areas, such as law, biology and economy to be put in practice.
By dealing with an enormous variety of issues within one instrument, the LOSC
promoted a shift in the governance of the oceans from an era of piecemeal
management of the sea to a more integrative and coherent approach to governance.
However, the concept of integration is not clear within the text of the LOSC; it is
instead implied in some of its provisions, as will be seen below.
For instance, the entire framework for the conservation and management of marine
life draws from various areas of human knowledge to provide substance and legal
context to its provisions. Accordingly, article 61(1) and (3) prescribed that in
determining TAC of the living resources within their EEZ, coastal states should take
into account not only the best scientific evidence available to them, but also ‘relevant
environmental and economic factors, including economic needs of coastal fishing
communities and the special requirements of developing states’.548 The expression of
an integrative nature in article 61(3) is supported by the request for ocean managers
to apply knowledge from various areas of human knowledge while determining the
TAC.
In the area of protection and preservation the marine environment, while prescribing
the obligation of states and international organisations to establish international rules
and standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment
from vessels,549 the LOSC has a provision that allows states to further restrict
navigation within their EEZs if special circumstances based on a range of factors
warranted such limitation.550 These factors are oceanographical and ecological
conditions, and traffic conditions within the area to be protected.551 This is a clear
indication that the LOSC introduced an element of integration by acknowledging the
need to consider oceanographical, ecological and traffic conditions while protecting
fragile marine ecosystems against the pervasive effects of navigation, for instance.
The consideration of several aspects from various areas has the potential to reduce
segmentation and overlaps in ocean governance.
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With regard to pollution, the LOSC states that in the event of a maritime casualty or
acts related to such a casualty, states have the right to take and enforce measures
beyond their territorial sea to protect their coastline or related interests, including
fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution, which may be reasonably sensitive to
major harmful consequences.552 Similarly, this provision indicates that the LOSC
embraced an integrated approach in linking the effects of pollution to the interests of
the fishing sector, two distinct but interconnected subject areas. Accordingly, article
221(1) states that in the event of a maritime casualty, coastal states could protect
their fishing interests beyond the limits of their territorial sea. Also, the LOSC
prescribes the use of routing systems to minimise the risk of accidents, ‘which might
cause pollution to the marine environment and to the related interests of coastal
states’.553 The allusion to ‘related interests’ indicates an integrated view.
Lastly, the LOSC introduced the concept of integration in an implicit manner with
regard to a specific category of states. The specific category of states are those that
by virtue of their geographical location, border enclosed and semi-enclosed seas.554 In
this regard, article 123 establishes an integrated framework in which the concepts of
cooperation, coordination and multi-sectoral management are present within a
comprehensive and integrated legal framework containing the following objectives:
protection and preservation of the marine environment, exploitation and conservation
of marine living resources, marine scientific research and coordination between
international organisations. All these areas of ocean governance are encompassed
within the legal spectrum of this unique provision (article 123). In this regard, article
123 epitomises the ideal provision to curb segmentation within the system of ocean
governance. Article 123 reads as follows:
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each
other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties
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under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly or through
an appropriate regional organisation:
(a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation
of the living resources of the sea;
(b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to
the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where
appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area;
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international
organisations to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions of this
article.
The rationale for the inclusion of all relevant sectors within one comprehensive
provision was the recognition that enclosed and semi-enclosed seas present common
and shared geographical features requiring an integrated and multi-sectoral approach
for their management. Furthermore, the unique geography of enclosed and semienclosed seas exposed them to shared pollution risks, such as transboundary
pollutants.555 As Gonçalves pointed out, common interests between states serve as
‘favourable conditions for the institutionalisation of regional cooperation’.556 For
instance, neighbouring states that share marine life that migrate across their
boundaries require cooperation for their management and exploitation. In addition,
states bordering enclosed and semi-enclosed seas often share common goals in terms
of economic development, protection of their common marine environment and their
natural resources.557
Moreover, there are advantages in terms of cost effectiveness for states that belong to
the same region in fostering coordination between their institutional apparatuses, in
particular for developing states that usually lack the adequate financial resources to
set up costly organisational arrangements. If coastal states within the same region
manage their oceans in a concerted manner, this joint effort is not only less costly but
555
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more efficient. The ideal would be if the entire system of ocean governance would
follow the rationale set forth by the case of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. It
remains to be investigated if this endeavour would be feasible from a legal and
policy perspective. Such analysis, however, falls beyond the scope of this thesis.
Within the LOSC, however, most issues are still dealt with separately within their
disciplinary confines and in isolation from one another. Consequently, interrelationships between the various areas such as marine pollution, navigation, and
conservation and management of marine life are not frequent. Article 123 and its
multi-sectoral integrated framework is an exception to the rule of sectoral
management of the ocean within the LOSC. This is despite the meaning of the third
preamble of the LOSC, which states that all ocean problems are interrelated and need
to be considered as a whole. In the following chapter we will see that, during the
Post-LOSC period, new ocean-related policies and treaties would increasingly
introduce more integrated approaches to their texts.558

4.6 Ecosystem Approach and the LOSC
Besides relying heavily on political boundaries to ascertain states parties’ rights and
obligations such as the 12 nm territorial sea559 and 200 nm of EEZ,560 the LOSC is
also based on another fundamental pillar of international maritime law that seems to
be in direct conflict with the tradition of human-made political boundaries in the
ocean. This is the recognition ‘of the interrelated nature of ocean problems and the
need for ocean problems to be considered as a whole’, as state in its preamble.561 The
concept of interrelatedness of ocean problems contained in the preamble of the
LOSC is in harmony with an ecosystem view of the oceans. In the preamble, it is
implicitly recognised that oceans are a single global system that comprises
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inextricable ecological linkages between its living resources and their habitats,
mineral and genetic resources, the mass of water, winds, currents, radiation and other
energy sources.562
Therefore, the LOSC is based upon two contradictory principles, namely the
establishment of political boundaries and an ecosystem view of the oceans, which by
its own nature conflicts with human-made boundaries. Boundaries, according to an
ecosystem approach, are defined by the ecological features of an ecosystem and not
by artificial and arbitrary lines. According to Juda, a question remains to be
answered: ‘to what extent can appropriate ecosystem concepts be applied in ocean
management efforts in a world marked by political and legal divisions?’563 The
answer points in the direction that there remains no doubt that the jurisdictional
divisions of ocean space can pose difficulties to ecosystem management.564
Despite this clear dichotomy between fundamental principles within its text, the
LOSC attempted to include a number of provisions within its text in which
ecosystem considerations were taken into account. The LOSC does this without
undermining rights conferred to states as a result of political divisions or boundaries.
Thus, it shows the level of compromise achieved by drafters and the limits of
consensus. The following analysis illustrates provisions within the LOSC in which
the ecosystem view informed a number of obligations in various areas such as
conservation and management of marine life and protection and preservation of the
marine environment.
Article 61(4) of the LOSC, for instance, recognises the interdependence of stocks
within the EEZs by prescribing that fishing and coastal states should take into
account the effects of fishing on species associated with or dependent upon harvested
species. Article 61(4) also indicates the need ‘to maintain or restore populations of
such associated or dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may
become seriously threatened’.565 The interrelationship between species associated
562
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with or dependent upon harvested species was also recognised for high seas areas in
identical terms.566 Also in the area of fisheries, the LOSC subjects the determination
of the MSY to the observance of several interrelated aspects of the marine
environment, such as fishing patterns, interdependence of stocks and rules adopted
by regional and/or international fisheries commissions.
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By incorporating the

concept of interdependence between species, the LOSC introduced an ecosystem
view.
An ecosystem view also entails the possibility of one sector of ocean governance
negatively affecting another. This is because the nature of the ocean problems is
multi-dimensional;568 therefore, ‘what happens in one place has implications
elsewhere’.

569

For instance, in the area of protection and preservation of the marine

environment, article 194(5) introduced an ecosystem view while indicating that
measures to curb pollution should be taken and due consideration should be given to
‘the protection and preservation of rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of
depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life’. By doing
so, article 194(5) acknowledged the complex process of interaction between the
ocean’s natural systems and marine pollution.
Furthermore, the definition of pollution introduced within the LOSC in its article
1(4) demonstrates a clear ecosystem view in which all the elements of the marine
ecosystem and its surroundings, including socio-economic conditions, are taken into
consideration along with living resources, habitats (i.e., estuaries), marine life in
general, human health, marine activities in general, fishing and other economic and
legitimate uses of the sea, quality of sea water and amenities.570
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Despite the fact that the LOSC did not expressly mandate the application of an
ecosystem approach, some of the above-referred provisions introduced an ecosystem
perspective to inform the obligation to conserve and manage marine life and to
protect and preserve the marine environment. The inclusion of ecosystem perspective
within the text of the LOSC constitutes great progress in terms of reducing the levels
of segmentation within ocean governance. The fact that an important treaty such as
the LOSC incorporated an ecosystem view in some of its provisions is indication of a
new trend towards a less segmented ocean governance, although as stated above, the
LOSC did not expressly endorse the ecosystem approach. Just by introducing the
ecosystem perspective, the LOSC has framed the discussions that would take place
during the succeeding period, the Post-LOSC, in which the need for more integrated
approaches to ocean governance would be emphasised more strongly.
In conclusion, in view of the notion of ecosystem (from the perspective of a whole
natural system) being incompatible with segmentation for legal and management
purposes (i.e. EEZs, territorial seas etc), there remains no doubt that by introducing
an ecosystem perspective to some of its provisions, the LOSC contributed positively
to a less fragmented system of ocean governance. However, at the time of the
adoption of the LOSC, the ecosystem approach was still evolving as a legal concept
in ocean governance. The ecosystem approach will be fully embraced and mandated
in various treaties adopted during the Post-LOSC period, which will be discussed in
the next chapter.

4.7 Preventive Approach and the LOSC
The last principle that complements the ideal framework for ocean governance is the
precautionary principle. As stated in the introductory chapter, the precautionary
principle was devised to address the scientific uncertainty resulting from certain
environmental risks. The main objective of introducing the precautionary principle in
ocean governance was to avoid irreversible damage to the marine environment and
its resources when there is scientific uncertainty around the risks posed by an
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activity.571 Despite its importance, the precautionary principle was not included in the
text of the LOSC. This is because the precautionary principle was a new legal
concept, which would be only introduced during the Post-LOSC period. At the time
of the negotiation and subsequent adoption of the LOSC, the only prevailing idea
was ‘prevention’ of ‘known’ environmental risks. ‘Prevention’ is similar to
‘precaution’ but distinct in that prevention is the avoidance of ‘known’ risks;
whereas, precaution is the avoidance of ‘unknown’ risks, among other differences.
The idea of taking any precaution against the ‘unknown’ consequence of
environmental practices was not incorporated by the LOSC drafters. The LOSC,
however, fully embraced within its text a preventive approach. With respect to
marine pollution, for instance, Principle 7 of the Declaration for Human
Development (Stockholm Declaration) prescribes as follows:
[s]tates shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by
substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living
resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea.
As a result of the influence of the outcomes of the UNCHE process such as Principle
7 of the Stockholm Declaration on the LOSC text, the notion of ‘prevention’ was
introduced, particularly in Part XII which deals with the protection and preservation
of the marine environment (marine pollution). Accordingly, article 194 states that
measures should be taken to prevent, reduce and control pollution. Article 194(3)(b),
while dealing with vessel-source pollution, ensured that measures taken to prevent
accidents and to address emergencies should also prevent intentional and
unintentional discharges.
The LOSC introduces two categories of preventive circumstances. Firstly, in its
article 195, the LOSC indicates that states should be aware that while taking
measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution, this operation could result in
transferring, directly or indirectly, the hazards and damages from one area to another,
or transform one type of pollution into another. Similarly, article 196 warns against
571
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the risk of intentional or accidental introduction of species, alien or new, to the
marine environment while state parties take measures to prevent, reduce and control
pollution resulting from the use of technologies under their jurisdiction and control.
The meaning of article 196, as well as of article 195, is prevention. These two new
circumstances regulated by the LOSC also indicated the influence of an ecosystem
approach. This is because article 195, for instance, implied that because of the
interrelated nature of the oceans in terms of biophysical features, at times, while
taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution, states result in transferring
pollutants to another area. This is evidence of the understanding that the ocean is an
indivisible natural realm and should be viewed as such by ocean managers. This
understanding is vital to reduce segmentation, overlaps and contradictions within
ocean governance.
Lastly, the preventive approach within the LOSC is complemented by the IMO
treaties that regulated various sources of pollution. As mentioned earlier, the
complementary nature of the IMO treaties is a direct result of the LOSC being a
framework-type convention that had incorporated into its regulatory regime various
IMO treaties on vessel-source marine pollution. Similar to the LOSC, the IMO
treaties on vessel-source marine pollution were greatly influenced by the principles
introduced by the UNCHE by means of incorporating a preventive approach within
their texts. Among the IMO treaties incorporated by the LOSC into its regulatory
regime are two treaties which clearly depicted the shift towards a more preventive
approach towards marine pollution caused by ships. These treaties are the London
Dumping Convention and MARPOL 73/78.
MARPOL 73/78 acknowledged in its preamble ‘the need to improve further the
prevention and control of marine pollution from ships, particularly oil tankers’.
During the negotiation process for MARPOL 73/78, negotiating parties were made
aware that the biggest threat for the marine environment was the negative effects of
operational discharges and not accidental pollution. Thus, the need to exert more
control over operational discharges paved the way for a more preventive approach
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within MARPOL 73/78.572 Moreover, the preventive nature of MARPOL 73/78 also
meant that there would be mechanisms to control pollution in zones called ‘special
areas’,573 where the discharge of pollutants was prohibited.
With regards to dumping, before the adoption of the London Dumping Convention,
there was no adequate regulatory regime to deal with dumping of matter other than
radioactive wastes. However, the dumping of radioactive wastes was regulated in
only one provision of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.574 The driving force for
the adoption of the London Dumping Convention was the realisation that the oceans
were being used as a dumping site not only for radioactive material but for many
other types of polluting matter.575 It was as if for a long time humankind enjoyed,
along with the freedoms of navigation and fishing on the high seas, the freedom to
pollute the marine environment, particularly dumping on the high seas.576
The indiscriminate dumping of various types of materials in the oceans was based on
the misleading belief that there was no limitation for what was assumed to be the
infinite capacity of absorption of the seas.577 This belief was banned from policy and
scientific realms upon the realisation of the negative effects of dumped materials to
the health of the marine environment. In this regard, there was recognition that a
preventive approach was needed to control dumping. Accordingly, the London
Dumping Convention set up a system of lists that determined which substances could
not be dumped at all (black list) and others that could be dumped contingent upon
granting of a special permit (grey list).578 During the Post-LOSC period, as it will be
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seen in the next chapter, the system of lists became more stringent, prohibiting all
forms of dumping.

4.8 The LOSC Period and its Contribution to Reducing Governance
Problems
The question posed at this stage of the analysis is whether the LOSC period
contributed to reducing the levels of segmentation within the system of ocean
governance. First, the LOSC period succeeded in giving coherence to the overall
governance system because it generated a successful codification effort, UNCLOS
III. This is relevant because two previous attempts to codify the system of ocean
governance during the Pre-LOSC period had failed (UNCLOS I and II). The direct
consequence of a unifying treaty such as the LOSC is that this consolidation of the
maritime custom and law of sea addresses proliferation and contradiction within the
system by putting together the body of ocean law into one treaty with clear guiding
principles.
Another aspect that favours the reduction of governance problems is that this
consolidation is harmonious in the sense that treaties that were later adopted to
complement the LOSC framework, often prescribing operational rules and
regulations to its main provisions, would not conflict with the LOSC. This is because
these treaties needed to harmonise with the general provisions of the LOSC.
Accordingly by virtue of its article 311, the LOSC shall not alter the rights and
obligations of state parties that arise from other agreements as long as these other
agreements are compatible with the LOSC. Thus, the LOSC is meant to prevail over
other agreements in which its parties are also signatories. This harmonisation
between the LOSC and any other agreements regulating ocean issues is beneficial in
terms of preventing contradictions within the global ocean governance system.
Similar harmonisation process was achieved between the LOSC and the IMO
treaties, as seen in prior section. This relevant because the IMO treaties were even
adopted before the LOSC.
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The LOSC period was also successful in settling a previously unresolved issue in
ocean governance related to the length of the territorial sea. The LOSC, the treaty,
determined the extent of the territorial sea to be out to 12 nm.579 The LOSC also
established a legal regime for the Area.580 Neither a harmonised position between
states about the breadth of the territorial sea nor a legal regime to govern the Area
existed before the adoption of the LOSC. This is yet another example of how the
LOSC period by virtue of its main outcome (the LOSC treaty) provided clarity and
consistency to the ocean governance system, including reducing any contradictory
claims made by states regarding the breadth of their territorial sea which were
disparate during the Pre-LOSC period.
With regards to the principles of international law, namely cooperation, integration,
ecosystem and preventive approaches, the LOSC introduced these concepts within its
provisions to varying degrees. That is, the principle of cooperation is found in several
of its provisions. However, the notion of integration, prevention, and ecosystem
considerations are found in some of its provisions. The LOSC dedicated most of its
provisions to the principle of cooperation. The other concepts have a marginal
presence in the LOSC text, but were nevertheless included, if not explicitly as
principles or approaches, but in an implicit manner, as it was demonstrated in the
analysis. Despite the degree to which these principles and concepts are found within
the LOSC, it can be stated that the LOSC contributed to decreasing levels of
segmentation within ocean governance by simply recognising these key concepts in
its text. Evidence for this assertion is discussed below.
It is a basic premise of this thesis that among the above-referenced principles,
cooperation is the principle that can best assist in reducing the levels of segmentation
within ocean governance. This is because cooperation implies the existence of
interdependence among interested parties that share common ocean problems. In
other words, it is more beneficial for parties to cooperate than to act in isolation,
given the interconnected and complex nature of ocean problems. In this regard, the
LOSC greatly contributed to decreasing segmentation because it promoted
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international cooperation in more than 70 provisions, which in turn required states to
fulfil their obligation to cooperate in various areas. Also, the endorsement by the
LOSC of cooperation contributed to consolidating its status as a principle of
international law, given the relevance of the LOSC for ocean governance.
The provisions on cooperation within the LOSC reflected a move towards shared
management and an acknowledgement of the common nature of marine resources
and uses. The detailed framework for cooperation introduced by the LOSC in several
areas is unprecedented in the historical evolution of ocean governance. The need for
clarity to achieve cooperation in terms of establishing specific requirements was
recognised before the adoption of the LOSC but they were never fulfilled. The
drafters of the LOSC adequately addressed this need by introducing clarity regarding
the means to achieve cooperation.
For example, the LOSC framework provided richness of details toward cooperation
and this was particularly evident in the areas of conservation and management of
marine life. Before the LOSC, several scattered, regional agreements prescribed
cooperation for the management and conservation of marine living resources. As
seen in previous chapter, the 1958 Convention on Fishing on the High Seas did not
provide much detail regarding the obligation to cooperate. The LOSC then
established a detailed framework for cooperation in the area of fisheries.
Also of relevance to avoid contradictions and segmentation within fisheries
governance is the fact that the LOSC possesses a large membership. This was a key
achievement for fisheries governance. This is because the LOSC has a membership
larger than any other regional fishery agreement.581 This also meant that the LOSC is
enforceable upon practically the entire international community, whereas regional
fisheries agreements only bind their parties. This fact gives more coherence to the
system as a whole and therefore reduces fragmentation.
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Another positive outcome that result from provisions that incorporated cooperation
in the area of fisheries is related to inclusion of all interested parties in a fisheries
cooperating agreement which included distant water fishing nations. Such concern of
inclusiveness of all interested parties was absent from the previous regime. By being
inclusive, the LOSC filled potential gaps that could otherwise undermine the success
of these cooperating agreements. Despite these advances, the LOSC did not address
directly the consequences for non-cooperation. The LOSC addressed this topic
indirectly by virtue of its Article 300 which stated that state parties should ‘in good
faith’ fulfil the obligations assumed under its terms. Even though good faith is of
vital importance for international relations, the exact nature of its content is
somewhat blurred and subjective. The International Whaling Commission (IWC) in
its Resolution 2001-1 aimed to clarify the meaning of good faith as requiring
‘fairness, reasonableness, integrity and honesty in international behaviour’. The
Commission also emphasized the ‘good faith obligations’ set out in the LOSC and
the United Nations Charter.582
Of course, being a subjective element of behaviour, presence or absence of
good faith can be difficult to prove. In the last analysis, good or bad faith can
only be found in the minds of individuals, in particular of those who happen
to have an influence on the conduct of foreign policy and, more specifically,
of those whose task it is to negotiate and implement international
conventions.583
Thus it remains difficult to prove lack of good faith in international relations. With
regard to the issue of effectiveness of international treaties, Lim and Elias pointed
out that the stability and effectiveness of treaties can not be guaranteed by ‘anything
that is inherent in the regulatory medium of the international treaty itself.’584 They
conclude that treaties are more efficient when political consensus already exists to
support their terms; thus the continued efficacy of a treaty is not a question of treaty
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law.585 Attention to non-cooperating actors will only become a part of international
and regional discussions during the Post-LOSC, as demonstrated in the next chapter.
The LOSC also recognised the importance of promoting cooperation at all levels of
governance

(local,

regional,

international).

Multi-level

cooperation

was

acknowledged by the LOSC. This meant that the international level of cooperation
would no longer suffice to govern marine resources. International agreements needed
to be complemented with regional agreements in order to strengthen their
effectiveness. In certain circumstances such as with enclosed and semi-enclosed seas,
the best scale to regulate marine resources and ocean uses is at the regional level.
The drafters of the LOSC, having been influenced by the outcomes of the UNCHE
process, embraced this understanding. This is evident in its provisions when
prescribing regional cooperation for the areas of fisheries (i.e., RFOs), preservation
of the marine environment, transfer of marine technology, and marine scientific
research in particular through the establishment of regional centres for these
activities. Regional cooperation closes governance gaps which in turn prevents
contradiction within ocean governance systems. From an institutional perspective,
the LOSC reduced contradictions by endorsing the work of competent international
organisations such as the IMO and the IOC. The LOSC recognised these competent
international

organisations

as

adequate forums

to

enact

and

implement

complementary laws in their respective areas.586 By centralising the enactment and
implementation of treaties within designated specialised agencies, the LOSC reduced
the possibility of contradiction and overlapping of mandates within ocean
governance, from an institutional viewpoint.
Another positive outcome of the LOSC was in the area of preservation and protection
of the marine environment. As stated earlier, because of its nature as a frameworktype convention,587 the LOSC could incorporate ‘by reference’ the contents of IMO
treaties within its text regarding ship-borne marine pollution.588 The ‘incorporation by
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reference’ of the IMO treaties gave more coherence to a system of ocean governance
that was characterised as fragmented and scattered before the LOSC.589 Before the
adoption of the LOSC, each of the IMO treaties had their own set of principles, rules,
and standards. They were operating in isolation. There was no broad framework that
incorporated all of IMO treaties under a single set of principles. The LOSC filled this
gap by setting up the general requirements for cooperation in the areas of
preservation and protection of the marine environment.
The LOSC also brought coherence to the system by requiring regional and
international treaties regulating pollution to harmonise their provisions with the
general principles prescribed in its Part XII (Protection and Preservation of the
Marine Environment).

590

The requirement to have the IMO treaties harmonising

with, as well as to be informed by the terms of the LOSC, resulted in decreasing
segmentation, overlaps, and contradictions within the system of ocean governance.
Thus, the terms of the IMO treaties needed to be harmonised with the general
principles set up by the LOSC. Harmonisation prevents the negative effects that
result from overlapping and contradicting treaties.
Another factor that contributed to reducing segmentation was the fact that the IMO
treaties and the LOSC text in its Part XII, had various provisions requiring states to
harmonise their policies, to consult between them, and to exchange information.591
These are practical measures that inform the obligation to cooperate, thus a move
towards reducing contradiction and wasteful duplication of efforts. The LOSC filled
another governance gap by prescribing cooperation in the area of enforcement
towards the preservation of the marine environment.592 This is a clear shift from the
trend of simply enacting laws prescribing obligations in the direction of a
comprehensive ocean governance system that regulates all phases of the management
cycle. That is, from the enactment of policies and laws to their implementation and

589

Churchill and Lowe pointed out that even though the intention of the LOSC was to protect the
marine environment by forcing non-parties of these IMO complementary agreements to abide by their
requirements, the pernicious consequence of such a measure was that the LOSC might result in
discouraging ratification of the complementary agreements, giving the false impression that
ratification is no longer necessary. Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 347.
590
LOSC, art. 197.
591
For instance, LOSC, arts. 194(1), 200, 202(b) and (c), 207(3) and 207(4).
592
LOSC, art. 217(5).

158

enforcement. Another positive aspect of prescribing enforcement measures such as
article 217(5), for example, which allows flag states while conducting investigation
to request assistance of ‘any other state’, was that the LOSC provided a framework
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment that had more legal
force than what was previously in place. Before the LOSC, flag states were the only
ones authorised to conduct investigations. Thus, the possibility to engage other states
‘whose cooperation could be useful in clarifying circumstances of the case’
strengthens the LOSC framework for cooperation.
By focusing on enforcement, the LOSC provided tenets that would be later further
advanced in discussions during the Post-LOSC period. As it will be demonstrated in
the next chapter, the Post-LOSC period is characterised by the realisation that there
was no longer a need for enacting new laws but instead, there was a need to focus on
enforcing and implementing the laws already in place. In this regard, the provisions
on the LOSC in the areas of enforcement and liability are steps in the right direction
towards increasing the levels of effectiveness within the system of ocean governance
through the enhancement of enforcement provisions.

4.9 Constraints within the System of Ocean Governance Prescribed by the
LOSC
Despite progress in reducing governance problems, the main outcome of the LOSC
period, the LOSC treaty, could be more effective if it was not for two major
constraints. The first is related to the manner in which the LOSC is structured. The
LOSC is heavily structured on the basis of a sectoral approach to governance. The
sectoral approach is sustained by two tenets namely artificial boundaries and a
system of regulation based on isolated sectors or subject-areas (fisheries,
preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific research, etc). In other
words, the system of governance espoused by LOSC is based on subject-areas which
were regulated in isolation one from another.
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4.9.1 The Prevailing Artificial Boundaries System and Its Problems to Ocean
Governance
Although the abolition of the system boundaries as endorsed by the LOSC to
ascertain rights and obligations such as EEZ, Territorial Sea and High Seas is
unfeasible, ocean governance needs to develop some mechanisms to overcome the
problems that arise from the resulting segmentation that this system of boundaries
causes to governance as whole. The LOSC did not present such mechanisms. These
mechanisms would be developed during the subsequent period, the Post-LOSC.
For instance, within the LOSC the area of conservation and management of marine
life is entirely based upon artificially made boundaries such as 200 nm of EEZ,
which defines the rights of coastal states over resources.
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By virtue of these

provisions, coastal states ended up gaining control over 90 per cent of the world
fisheries.594 Beyond the EEZs, the LOSC addressed the remaining 10 per cent of the
world fisheries, which are located on the high seas.595 Some of the provisions on the
LOSC to regulate fisheries would prove to be inadequate, in particular in regard to
highly migratory and straddling stocks. For instance, conservation measures adopted
by coastal states to manage and conserve resources within their EEZ were being
undermined by intensive fishing practices in the immediate adjacent high seas
areas.596 The underlying reason for this is the mobility of these resources. Thus,
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political boundaries are without consequences for marine life, in particular fish
stocks whose migratory patterns are variable and changeable.597
However, given that the international community continues to adopt treaties based on
the system of boundaries as established by the LOSC, the adoption of treaties which
consider the ecosystem reality is not a widespread practice in international relations.
This matter is further complicated because the LOSC prevails among other treaties
(which were adopted in the past and those that will be adopted). This indicates that
although the LOSC embraced some ecoystemic concepts in some of its provisions
such as interdependence of stocks, for instance, a more widespread adoption of an
ecosystem approach would require adjustment from its system of political boundaries
to accommodate ecoystemic features (i.e. mobility of marine life, geophysical
conformations).
Only the adoption of an agreement that could amend the provisions of the LOSC
could change this reality. This would be accomplished during the Post-LOSC period,
as it will be examined in the next chapter, in particular with the adoption of the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement would improve and
complement some of the LOSC provisions.
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement would provide adjustments to these management
problems that resulted from the system laid out in the LOSC. The new provisions
within the UN Fish Stocks to be adopted during the Post-LOSC period would attempt
to accommodate the ecosystem reality of the fisheries and the mobility of fish stocks.
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement would fully embrace an ecosystem approach
towards fisheries management. Thus, if oceans were managed as indivisible
management units, the outcome would be a decrease in the levels of segmentation.
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4.9.2 The Omission of Consequences for Non-Cooperation within the
Framework for Cooperation in the LOSC
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement would be also important to address another omission
from the LOSC text in regard to cooperation in the area of fisheries. Not until the
adoption of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in 1995, were there consequences in
terms of sanctions or consequences for those international actors which did not
participate or undermine the terms and conditions of conservation and management
agreements endorsed by the LOSC terms. This omission would prove to be one of
the great weaknesses within the framework for cooperation of the LOSC. Fisheries
governance was being undermined by nations that did not participate (by refusal) in
the cooperating agreements or were purposefully undermining the agreement in
which they were parties to obtain illegal advantages.
The fact that the LOSC would be later complemented by the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement shows that ocean governance is dynamic, subject to be constantly
evolving when issues and problems are recognised. However, the adjustments
introduced by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement would not take away all the difficulties
in managing resources because the above referred rigid system of boundaries as
established by the LOSC is still in place and valid. This system is binding including
on members of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The difficulties that the system of
boundaries causes to management of marine living resources in particular are real, if
not impossible, to overcome because the boundaries system is prevalent. Thus, the
fundamental shortcoming of the sectoral view based on political boundaries is that
the oceans and their marine living resources do not recognise political boundaries or
geographical criteria that delimit zonal spaces established by nations.598 This
mismatch between how ecosystem space and human-defined boundaries interact may
not be a problem that can be solved completely but needs to be acknowledged,
nevertheless.
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As suggested in the previous paragraphs, the ‘zonal approach’ makes little sense to
marine life that migrates across various artificially-created zones. This reality creates
great challenges towards their effective management and conservation.599 The ‘zonal
approach’ also make little sense if put against the guiding notion of the preamble of
the LOSC, which articulated the interrelatedness of ocean problems.600 The ‘zonal
approach’ does not assist in reducing levels of segmentation within ocean
governance. Tanaka argued that ‘the zonal approach is insufficient to resolve the
problems encountered in the management of ocean space’.601

4.9.3 The Sectoral-Approach within the LOSC and the Lack of Cross-sectoral
Cooperation
The entire system of ocean governance prescribed by the LOSC is structured under
the foundation of clusters or subject areas, perpetuating a system characterised by
some level of segmentation. This is because there are no provisions within the LOSC
that prescribe inter-sectoral or cross-sectoral cooperation among the diverse clusters
or subject areas regulated by the LOSC. The lack of recognition that there are links
between these various maritime sectors or subject-areas creates governance
problems. In particular, this lack of recognition indicates that an integrated approach
towards governance is difficult to apply because of the manner in which the LOSC
was structured. For instance, there are no provisions equipped with mechanisms to
regulate issues involving synergies and potential conflicts between sectors such as
fisheries and biodiversity. In this regard:
All fishing activity has some impact on ecosystems and biodiversity. In fact,
the dominant human-caused direct effect on fisheries ecosystems is fishing
itself. Overfishing affects marine habitats worldwide and has the potential to
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alter the functioning and state of marine ecosystems, particularly vulnerable
ecosystems, as well as the biodiversity associated with them.602
With regard to the absence of cross-sectoral considerations or synergism, Treves
addressed this issue from an institutional perspective. He pointed out that the LOSC
framers accepted as a given that the international community was equipped with an
organisational framework which permitted the fulfilment of a variety of tasks.603
These tasks included the IMO’s roles and responsibilities relative to vessel-source
pollution, the FAO’s roles and responsibilities relative to fisheries, etc. However,
Treves argued that the LOSC is not clear as to which competent international
organisation should deal with matters regarding two or more sectors or ‘fields’. In its
articles 2(1) and (2), Annex VIII,604 the LOSC simply prescribed:
Art.2 (1) - A list of experts shall be established and maintained in respect of
each of the fields of (1) fisheries, (2) protection and preservation of the
marine environment, (3) marine scientific research, and (4) navigation,
including pollution from vessels and by dumping.
Art.2 (2) - The lists of experts shall be drawn up and maintained, in the field
of fisheries by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations,
in the field of protection and preservation of the marine environment by the
United Nations Environment Programme, in the field of marine scientific
research by the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, in the field of
navigation, including pollution from vessels and by dumping, by the
International Maritime Organisation, or in each case by the appropriate
subsidiary body concerned to which such organisation, programme or
commission has delegated this function.
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The lack of cross-sectoral cooperation prevents consideration of interactions and
synergistic relationships605 between sectors. Instead, the various subject areas of
ocean governance are set up within the LOSC as isolated clusters. In this regard,
from an ecosystem perspective pollution can never be separated from fisheries or
navigation within the ocean realm. The isolated manner in which the provisions
within the LOSC were structure does not assist in solving an overlapping problem
involving pollutions and fisheries.
The notion that ‘what happens here has effects there’, remains a reality in ocean
space.606 For instance, the designation of a portion of the ocean as a ‘rare or fragile
ecosystem’ does not prevent such an area from being subjected to a pollution
incident when other sectors and uses overlap with such designation. In fact, within a
single portion of ocean space, various phenomena and potentially conflicting uses
occur at the same time. These phenomena include migrating fish stocks, shipping,
tourism, oil prospecting, and polluting incidents of an accidental or intentional nature
(e.g., ocean dumping). The ocean is a ‘messy’ management unit filled with interplays
at any given time and these overlapping sectors require laws and policies to devise
adequate mechanisms that take into consideration interactions and synergism
between sectors. The LOSC does not possess these mechanisms within its framework
because it did not fully embrace an ecosystem, cross-sectoral cooperating,
precautionary and integrated view of management.

4.9.4 The Dichotomy within the LOSC between the Persisting Sectoral View and
Interrelatedness of Ocean Problems
The LOSC text harbours two contradictory tenets by relying upon artificial
boundaries607 to define rights and obligations and by embracing an ecosystem notion
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that acknowledges all ocean problems as interrelated and need to be considered as a
whole. Despite progress made in terms of introducing (to a certain degree) the
principles of international law within its text, this fundamental contradiction within
the LOSC text results in reinforcing segmentation within the system of ocean
governance. This is because the interrelatedness of ocean issues is prescribed by a
perambulatory clause within the LOSC which is not as enforceable as the boundaries
system (‘zonal approach’). The boundaries system is supported by several provisions
with clear legal applicability and enforcement mechanisms in place. With regard to
this dichotomy, Tanaka pointed out that the LOSC ‘is a dialectic legal system
between the zonal and the integrated management approaches’.608 From an ecological
perspective, it is impractical to find a natural limit between the jurisdictional zones
established by law for the management of the oceans and its resources.609 In this
regard, Juda argues:
National jurisdiction in the oceans, while greatly expanded in the past halfcentury, still does not provide an adequate basis for fully effective ocean
management, and consequently, further change is to be anticipated.610
By doing so the LOSC does not fully acknowledge the interdependence of the oceans
and their living and non-living resources. Yet, the drafters of the LOSC could not
have gone further than what was achieved in terms of building consensus. The
compromise achieved was even considered remarkable for the time. Also, the idea of
total abolition of boundaries in ocean governance is an impossibility, as stated
earlier. However, Juda also states that the negative consequences of this apparent
‘paradox’ and the prevailing ‘zonal approach’ within the LOSC are attenuated by the
strong and frequent request for international cooperation within its text:
In a seeming paradox, just as national control is recognised over wide
offshore areas and substantial resources, the new law of the sea convention
also contains numerous references to the need for international cooperation,
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harmonisation of policies, and international organisations. While the
convention has acceded to the demands of coastal states that they control and
benefit from the resources off their coasts, the convention also recognises that
the full benefit to the coastal state cannot be achieve without international
cooperation, particularly in the realms of fisheries and environmental
protection.611
In addition, measures can be taken to overcome the difficulties that this dichotomy
within the system creates. In particular, new instruments including non-binding ones
can be adopted in which the principles of international law (cooperation, integration,
precautionary and integrated approaches) are prescribed to overcome the problems
caused by the dichotomy. As a consequence of the dichotomy, some level of
segmentation within the system persisted within ocean governance during the LOSC
period. However, the recognition of existing levels of segmentation prompted more
developments in ocean governance during the Post-LOSC. This will be examined
further in the next Chapter.

4.10 Conclusion
This chapter analysed the most ambitious ocean treaty ever adopted, the LOSC,
which covered a large variety of subjects in its provisions and had a large
membership. The LOSC changed the governance of the oceans from an era of
piecemeal management to a more coherent approach through regulating many uses of
the sea. The LOSC mandated the principle of cooperation in several of its provisions
and recognised the importance of ecosystem, preventive, and integrative approaches
towards ocean governance; if not expressly, this was done in an implied manner.
Despite being primarily a legal treatise on cooperation, the LOSC did not
significantly reduce the levels of segmentation in the system of ocean governance.
This was due to the absence of a more multi-sectoral or synergistic view of the ocean
and the prevailing rule of political boundaries to manage the oceans. In particular, the
absence of a multi-sectoral view indicates that the LOSC was still structured on the
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basis of sectoral management or distinct clusters, namely fisheries, navigation,
pollution, and marine scientific research. The prevailing rule of drawing political
boundaries was unable to fully address the unique, indivisible, ecosystem reality of
the oceans. Although the LOSC possessed ecosystem considerations within its text,
sectoral and zonal approaches prevailed. These conflicting foundations still posed
difficulties to the delivery of more efficient ocean governance. The following chapter
will analyse the ocean-related treaties and policies that followed the adoption of the
LOSC and discuss what measures have been taken to attempt to overcome the
dialectic conflict found within this Convention.
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CHAPTER 5 - LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR OCEAN GOVERNANCE
DURING THE POST- LOSC PERIOD

5.1 Introduction
This chapter is a continuation of the analyses of the evolution of the legal and policy
frameworks for ocean governance during the period after the adoption of United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). For the purpose of this thesis,
this period is known as the Post-LOSC period. The Post-LOSC period extends from
the adoption of LOSC in 1982 until the present. The principles of international law,
such as cooperation, integration, precautionary and ecosystem approaches, will serve
as analytical tools to depict the evolution of the legal and policy frameworks for
ocean governance during the Post-LOSC period. This chapter will demonstrate that
ocean-related legal and policy instruments enacted during the Post-LOSC period
contributed to reducing persisting governance problems (i.e., segmentation,
proliferation, overlaps and contradictions) within ocean governance. In addition, it
will be demonstrated that the Post-LOSC period is characterised by developments
such as the consolidation and strengthening of the ecosystem and precautionary
approaches and by increasing adoption of non-binding instruments, such as
programs, action plans and codes of conducts to regulate various ocean-areas. 612
Additionally, this chapter will comment on the two major conferences that occurred
during the Post-LOSC period, the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED), which took place in 1992, and the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (WSSD), convened in 2002. Chapter 5 concludes that
despite remarkable advances towards a more integrated, cooperating, precautionary
and ecosystem-based ocean governance during the Post-LOSC period, this period is
still marked by segmentation and other governance problems. In addition to the
above-referred governance problems, the Post-LOSC period is also plagued by new
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challenges such as lack of implementation and accountability,613 which pose
obstacles to the deliverance of effective ocean governance.

5.2 Post-LOSC Period
The Post-LOSC period is remarkable because the selected principles of international
law. It was during this period that the selected principles of international law
achieved their highest level of consolidation and maturity in international relations.
This indicates that the Post-LOSC period is characterised by a less segmented and
single used oriented approach towards ocean governance. This is because (as seen in
Chapter 1), the selected principles of international law are compatible with the
fundamental understanding that guides this thesis, which is that ‘the problems of
ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole’.614
Other remarkable characteristics of the period are the growing influence of non-state
actors in the governance of the oceans and focus on cross-sectoral issues. In fact, it
was during the Post-LOSC period that a stronger call for cross-sectoral management
in ocean governance surfaced. An ocean management approach that focuses crosssectoral issues exposes the limitation of segmentation within the system. A crosssectoral approach calls for the need to apply the selected principles of international
law. Of relevance for this period is the convening of two global conferences
(UNCED and WSSD) in which the principles of international law under analysis
were reaffirmed as tools for the sustainable development of the oceans. A detailed
analysis of these developments is provided below.
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5.3 United Nations Conference of Environment and Development (UNCED)
In 1983, one year after the adoption of the LOSC, the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) set up a commission known as the World Commission on
Environment and Development (WCED) ‘to recommend ways in which concern for
the environment may be translated into greater cooperation’.615 In 1987, the WCED
published a thorough report entitled Our Common Future in which the Commission
declared that the world was facing an environmental crisis. This report proposed a
‘pathway’ to foster cooperation in all areas, including environment and
development.616 The reinforcement by the WCED on strengthening cooperation
indicates that this principle has been sought as an avenue to correct environmental
problems since the Pre-LOSC period when the United Conference on Human
Development (UNCHE) also relied on cooperation for the solution of environmental
problems. The same endorsement of the principle of cooperation was present in the
provisions of the LOSC. Thus, the need for cooperation for the solution of
environmental problems (in particular ocean problems) has been common in legal
and policy instruments produced during all three analytical periods of this thesis.
In 1989, the state of affairs of the global environment, in particular the contamination
of ocean and seas, was alarming to the point that the UNGA expressed concern about
the ‘continuing degradation of the environment and the serious degradation of the
global life-support systems [oceans being considered one of the most important lifesupport systems]’.617 Moreover, the UNGA emphasised that should the continuing
degradation not be halted, the Earth would be faced with an ‘ecological
catastrophe’.618 The United Nations (UN), influenced by an atmosphere of
‘catastrophism’,619 decided to convene the United Nations Conference of
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. The purpose of UNCED was to
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address global environmental and developmental problems as well as to develop a
policy-framework to guide states in achieving the goal of sustainable development.620
The main outcomes of the UNCED were the Declaration on Environment and
Development (Rio Declaration), two international treaties, namely the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Convention on Biological
Diversity, and a non-binding instrument called Agenda 21 – the United Nations
Program of Action from Rio (Agenda 21). Agenda 21 is a practical blueprint for the
sustainable development.621 Of relevance for ocean governance is Chapter 17 of
Agenda 21, which stresses the need for the sustainable development of the oceans
and coastal areas.622 This chapter proceeds to analyse the introduction of the four
selected principles of international law within the context of the UNCED process, in
particular in its program of action, the Agenda 21.

5.3.1 Principle of Cooperation and Chapter 17 of Agenda 21
In 1989, the UNGA acknowledged efforts made by developed and developing
countries in terms of international cooperation for the protection of the environment
in general.623 The UNGA welcomed these efforts by stating that ‘there have been
encouraging developments in some important areas of environmental cooperation’.624
However, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 states that ‘despite all efforts to better manage
the oceans, current approaches have not always proved capable of achieving
sustainable development, as coastal resources are progressively being degraded in
many parts of the world’.625 That is the reason why the UNGA considered the
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UNCED a ‘unique opportunity for all nations to address environmental and
development issues in an integrated manner and to mobilize their political will to
solve environmental problems through international cooperation’.626 Chapter 17 of
Agenda 21 calls for new approaches to manage marine and coastal areas at national,
subregional, regional and global levels.627 International cooperation was considered
the best approach to better manage coasts and oceans.628 In this regard, Chapter 17
recommended cooperation in addressing ocean problems in seven program areas:
•

integrated management and sustainable development of coastal areas,
including EEZs;

•

marine environmental protection;

•

sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources of the high seas;

•

sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources under national
jurisdiction;

•

addressing of critical uncertainties in management of the marine environment
and climate change;

•

strengthening

of

international,

including

regional,

cooperation

and

coordination; and
•

sustainable development of small islands.629

The ‘new approach’ through international cooperation laid out by Chapter 17 of
Agenda 21 as the best avenue to solve persisting problems was in fact not ‘new’
given that since the Pre-LOSC period, the UN has been emphasising the need for
international cooperation ‘to protect and improve the human environment and to
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remedy and prevent its impairment’.630 Both global conferences – the UNCED in
1992 and the United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) in 1972
– and their policy documents even used the same language in the sense that the
UNCHE also called for ‘new approaches’631 towards governance of natural resources.
Despite several developments during the Pre-LOSC and LOSC periods, such as the
adoption of the LOSC, the reality was that there was still a need to strengthen
international cooperation in ocean governance. An analysis of the principle of
cooperation in regards to some of the program areas within Chapter 17 of Agenda 21
is now provided.

5.3.1.1 Integrated Management and Sustainable Development of Coastal Areas,
including Exclusive Economic Zones
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 defines the marine environment as ‘the oceans and all seas
and adjacent coastal areas’.632 Section 17.1 of Chapter 17, when defining the marine
environment, considers the oceans, all seas and adjacent coastal areas as integral
parts of the oceans. Chapter 17 also states that the oceans should be considered as a
‘whole that is an essential component of the global life-support system’.633 Chapter
17 made it clear that the continuum between ocean and coasts must be considered by
ocean managers. The proposed ‘new approach’ towards ocean management could not
conceive of the coasts as separate entities from the oceans.
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Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 calls for the international community to support and
supplement national efforts of coastal states to promote integrated management and
sustainable development of coastal and marine areas through ‘international
cooperation and coordination on a bilateral basis or within a subregional,
interregional, regional or global framework’.634 Thus, cooperation at a bilateral,
regional or international level was considered to be the means to achieve the
integrated ocean and coastal management. Chapter 17 asks for states to cooperate
among themselves in ‘the preparation of national guidelines for integrated coastal
zone management and development, drawing on existing experience’.635 Lastly,
because the lack of financial resources and expertise in the developing countries has
been a recurrent problem in ocean governance, Chapter 17 requests cooperation with
developing countries, in particular through subregional and regional mechanisms, to
improve their capacities to achieve integrated coastal and ocean management.636 As a
result of Agenda 21, the concept of integrated ocean and coastal management was
embraced in ocean governance as reflected in its incorporation in several
international agreements and in the practice of several international organisations
that develop guidelines to assist national governments in formulating and
implementing the concept.637

5.3.1.2 Marine Environmental Protection
In relation to marine environmental protection, many legal instruments were adopted
during the Pre-LOSC and LOSC periods in areas such as ship-borne pollution.638
However, there was one area of marine pollution that until the Post-LOSC period did
not have an international treaty regulating it: land-based sources of pollution. For
instance, provisions on the LOSC regulating land-based sources placed the
634
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responsibility to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment
from land-based sources on states individually.639 Thus, cooperation for the
prevention and control of marine pollution from land-based sources was not
promoted as emphatically by the LOSC in the same manner that its provisions did for
other areas such as prevention of vessel-source pollution and conservation and
management of living marine resources.640 The LOSC merely required states to take
into account ‘internationally agreed rules.’641 In regards to the provisions on the
LOSC on land-based pollution, Sands pointed out as follows:
[t]hey are of such generality that it is unlikely that they would provide more
than a framework against which future commitments can be developed, and
the quest for maximum flexibility significantly limits their normative value.642
The lack of a global agreement on land-based source of marine pollution goes against
the statement that ‘the protection of the marine environment is amongst the most
developed in the field of international environmental law.’643 Thus, the progress in
the field of marine environmental occurred which took place during the Pre-LOSC
period in particular,644 occurred irrespective of land-based sources of pollution. For
example, Sands argued that ‘evidence suggests that conventions such as MARPOL
73/78, the oil pollution liability conventions, and the dumping conventions have
positively contributed to protect the marine environment.’645 The above-referred
treaties which were sponsored by the IMO regulated vessel-source pollution and do
not refer to land-based sources. The difficulties associated with the adoption of a
global agreement on land-based source of pollution reside in the ‘multiplejurisdiction type’646 nature of this source of pollution, in particular because this type
of pollution is usually generated in areas within national jurisdiction whereas vessel639
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source occurs more frequently in international waters. Another aspect is that states
enjoy sovereignty over its land territory, internal waters and territorial sea.647 As a
consequence of the difficulties associated with the regulation of pollution within
areas of national jurisdiction, the issue of land-based source of pollution was
systematically excluded from the legal coverage of international agreements. The
land-based source of pollution exposes the difficulties in dealing with boundaries and
pollution in view of the fact that pollutants percolate beyond the areas of national
jurisdiction to negatively impact other states and the marine environment as a whole.
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 recognises this reality by expressly stating that ‘there is
currently no global scheme to address marine pollution from land-based sources’.648
The absence of a global regime to regulate land-based sources of pollution is a
recurring problem in ocean governance especially in view of the fact that land-based
sources contribute 70 per cent of marine pollution.649 In order to prevent, reduce and
control degradation of the marine environment from land-based sources, section
17.25 of Chapter 17 proposes cooperation in the following terms:
•

updating, strengthening and extending the Montreal Guidelines for the
Protection of the Marine Environment Against Land-Based Pollution
(Montreal Guidelines);650

•

assessing the effectiveness of existing regional agreements and action
plans;651

•

promoting the development of new regional agreements;

•

developing means of providing guidance on technologies to deal with the
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major types of pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources;
and
•

identifying additional steps requiring international cooperation.652

The focus given to land-based pollution by Agenda 21 coupled with the ‘failure in
implementing’ the 1985 Montreal Guidelines653 prompted UNEP yet again to adopt
years later another non-binding initiative called the Global Programme of Action for
the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities (GPA). The
GPA resulted from Agenda 21’s proposition of the adoption of initiatives including
the ‘establishment of a clearing-house for information on marine pollution control,
including processes and technologies to address marine pollution control, and
support for their transfer to developing and other countries with demonstrated
needs.’654Thus, higher representatives from 100 countries gathered in the conference
held in 1995 in Washington DC that adopted along with the program a Declaration,
which highlights the key points in the GPA.655 Overall, the GPA is a non-binding
mechanism which provides states with guidance on how they can implement their
obligations pursuant to the LOSC and regional agreements.656 This is because under
the LOSC the obligations of coastal states in curbing land-based pollution are
‘unqualified.’657 Thus, coastal states must adopt and enforce laws and regulations to
prevent, reduce, and control pollution from land-based sources.658 Regional
agreements reinforce the LOSC provisions,659 and the GPA serves as an international
policy framework.
The advantage of the GPA in relation to the 1985 Montreal Guidelines is that,
different from the latter, the GPA focused on a set of pollutants and did not
encompass all sources of marine pollution.660 In this regard the GPA focused on nine
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sources namely sewage, persistent organic pollutants (POPs), radioactivity, heavy
metals, oils (hydrocarbons), nutrients, sediment mobilisation, litter/plastics, and
physical alterations and destruction of habitats.661 In fact during the process of
preparation of the GPA, the 1985 Montreal Guidelines have been used as an ‘an
example of what not to do’.662 Other failures of the 1985 Montreal Guidelines that
were targeted by the GPA were absence of financial incentives, of substantial
institutional arrangements, no provision for capacity building, and vague
commitments.663 In spite of being another global effort ‘encompassing all the proper
buzzwords’, Kimball argues that the GPA had developed techniques to advance
practical actions.664 Such is the case of the systematic step-by-step approach for
determining priorities at regional and national levels.665 The GPA also suggested the
creation of a clearing house mechanism, which would provide information and
practical experience related to land-based activities to policy-makers and other
stakeholders.666 The GPA envisioned identifying institutional authorities to carry out
the tasks of management, including arrangements for inter-sectoral coordination;
legal and enforcement mechanisms; financial mechanisms; means to identify and
pursue research and data needs; arrangements for contingency planning, human
resources development, and public participation and awareness; and criteria for
evaluation.667
UNEP was given the task to serve as the secretariat of the GPA.668 However, all the
UN agencies are identified in the agreement as responsible for selected categories of
contaminants.

669

However, the GPA has been criticised for assigning the

management of some contaminants and substances that fall outside the ‘statutory
responsibilities’ of these agencies.670 Another shortcoming identified in regards to the
GPA is that it did not introduce some of the innovative mechanisms suggested by
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Agenda 21. For instance, there are not within GPA’s framework mechanisms such as
user fees and charges for pollution violations.671
Despite the advancements brought forth by the GPA, the program repeated the
traditionally known approach ‘of forbidding discharge or requiring prior
authorization of certain discharges’,672 without resolving the core issue which is the
multi-jurisdictional nature of land-based pollution.673 In this regard, Sands stressed
that:
The protection of the marine environment will only be possible through
integrating and regulating activities that are carried out on land.674
Sands argued that for land-based sources of pollution to be adequately addressed
there is a need to adopt a ‘cradle-to-grave’ approach.675 In this regard, a regional
agreement serves as a role model to be followed such as the 1991 Antarctica
Environmental Protocol’s annex on waste disposal introduced a ‘cradle-to-grave’
approach for wastes generated in Antarctica.676 According to Kimball, the most
successful scale to address land-based marine pollution is the regional level.677 The
success of the regional Antarctica Environmental Protocol is one the various
evidences that point in this direction. In view of this realisation, it has been suggested
for the GPA to establish linkages with the UNEP Regional Seas Program.678 In this
regard, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, while prescribing the ‘development of new
regional agreements’, indirectly endorses the Regional Seas Program (RSP)
sponsored by UNEP and reinforced the importance of regional cooperation to protect
the marine environment against pollution.
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Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 also addresses other sources of pollution and advocates
cooperation to better protect and preserve the marine environment,679 adding to it the
goal ‘to maintain and improve its life-support and productive capacities’.680 In
regards to ship-borne pollution, cooperation was required by means of establishing
‘regional oil/chemical-spill response centres and/or in cooperation with relevant
subregional, regional or global intergovernmental organisations and, where
appropriate,

industry-based

organisations’.681

Chapter

17

of

Agenda

21

acknowledged that much had been done in terms of adopting legal instruments at the
international level to prevent and control vessel-source pollution in particular during
the Pre-LOSC period. Thus, during the Post-LOSC period attention should be given
to regional cooperation in the area of prevention of vessel-source pollution. This is
indication that Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 embraced the multi-layered (local, regional
and international) perspective towards ocean governance. The various levels of
governance need to complement each another. The importance given to the various
layers of governance became much more evident during the Post-LOSC period. The
direct result of linking the various levels of governance is reduction in duplication of
efforts, contradictions and overlaps within the system of ocean governance. Another
advantage is that by combining regional and international initiatives as recommended
by Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, there is also less competition for funds between the
several programs, agencies and other organisations involved with promoting regional
and international cooperation.
Other activities in which cooperation was emphasised were:
•

monitoring marine pollution from ships, especially from illegal discharges
(e.g., aerial surveillance);

•

enforcing more rigorously the discharge provisions within the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from the Ships (MARPOL
73/78);682
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•

supporting international organisations, whether subregional, regional or
global, to provide training in all pertinent areas to marine protection,
including identifying training needs through surveys; and

•

introducing marine environmental protection into the school curriculum and
training for oil- and chemical-spill response among other measures.683

5.3.1.3 Sustainable Use and Conservation of Marine Living Resources of the High
Seas
The LOSC provided for a well-elaborated legal framework to regulate the use and
conservation of marine living resources of the high seas, by prescribing several
provisions on cooperation for high seas fisheries.684 However, Chapter 17 of Agenda
21 considers the LOSC framework for cooperation in the area of marine living
resources of the high seas to be ‘inadequate’.685 In this regard, Treves also considered
these provisions to be ‘puzzling, and in need to be more elaborated and
expanded’.686According to section 17.45 of Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, the inadequacy
of the LOSC framework is evident in the fact that high seas marine living resources
were being ‘overutilised’ in many ocean areas. Section 17.45 also points out the lack
of sufficient cooperation between states as one of the major factors contributing to
overfishing of the high seas resources.687
Five years after the convening of the UNCED, a new treaty would be adopted to
address the inadequacy of the LOSC framework for cooperation regarding marine
living resources of the high seas. This new treaty is known as the Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of
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Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks
Agreement), which will be addressed below.
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 emphasises that cooperation at bilateral, subregional,
regional and global levels is essential in particular for highly migratory species and
straddling stocks.688 Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 also emphasises the need to foster links
between regional and global initiatives in the area of fisheries in connection with
pollution. In this regard, states should ensure cooperation and coordination between
subregional, regional and global intergovernmental Regional Fisheries Organisations
(RFOs), in particular, those with mandates on areas of enclosed and semi-enclosed
seas (eg, the UNEP Regional Sea Program).689 By endorsing cross-sectoral
cooperation between RFOs and UNEP-RSP, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 also indicates
an integrated view towards governance while considering fisheries and protection
against pollution initiatives together.
Among other recommendations, section 17.61 includes that ‘states with an interest in
a high seas fishery regulated by an existing subregional and/or regional high seas
fisheries organisation of which they are not members should be encouraged to join
that organisation, where appropriate’.690 Section 17.61 signals to a new trend in ocean
governance during the Post-LOSC period that is addressing the consequences of noncooperating or non-member states of a cooperating agreement. The previous legal
regime established by the LOSC did not devote much attention to the consequences
of the non-parties or non-cooperating states. As will be shown below, during the
Post-LOSC period it was recognised that one of the major causes for the
ineffectiveness of several fisheries agreements was that their conservation measures
were being jeopardised by states that were not bound by the regulatory terms of these
agreements or by those that although being bound operate against the objectives of
the agreement (non-cooperating).
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5.3.1.4 Sustainable Use and Conservation of Marine Living Resources under
National Jurisdiction
Another area in which Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 emphasised the need for cooperation
was sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources under areas of
national jurisdiction. The importance of this area is paramount for ocean governance
given that 95 per cent of the world marine catches, including fish and shellfish,
originated under national jurisdiction.691 Up to the time of the convening of the
UNCED in 1992, harvesting of marine living resources under areas of national
jurisdiction had increased fivefold in the past four decades,692 signalling the risk of
overfishing.693 Moreover, marine living resources under areas of national jurisdiction
‘provide an important source of protein in many countries and their use is often of
major importance to local communities and indigenous people.’694 Chapter 17 of
Agenda 21 recognises the rights and obligations set forth by the LOSC in the area of
conservation and utilisation of marine living resources of the exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) and other areas under national jurisdiction.695 Of relevance for
cooperation is section 17.77 of Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, which highlights the needs
of developing countries in order to sustainably conserve resources under their
jurisdiction:
the ability of developing countries to fulfil the above objectives are dependent
upon their capabilities, including the financial, scientific and technological
means at their disposal. Adequate financial, scientific and technological
cooperation should be provided to support action by them to implement these
objectives.696
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Cooperation for financial, scientific and technological resources is particularly
important for Pacific Island States697 which comprise the richest area in fishery
resources on Earth. The need to foster cooperation financial, scientific and
technological resources for the Pacific Island States is particularly important in view
of the fact that these states, which occupy only 93,500 sq km of land territory, are
responsible to conserve and manage resources within an area comprised of 27
million sq km of EEZ.698 These states are usually referred as ‘small island developing
states’ (SIDS).699 However, it has been noted that SIDS should be referred to as
‘large-ocean island developing states’,700 given the extensive areas of EEZ
surrounding them. Thus, cooperation for financial, scientific and technological
resources is vital in view of the scarcity of these resources along with weak
institutional arrangements.701
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 reinforces the need for states ‘through bilateral and/or
multilateral cooperation and with the support, as appropriate of international
organisations, whether subregional, regional or global’,702 to strengthen management,
enforcement and surveillance capabilities, among other measures.703 The addition of
‘enforcement and surveillance capabilities measures’ suggests the beginning of a
new trend during the Post-LOSC period in regards to strengthening cooperation in
the area of enforcement. For instance, during the third Global Meeting of Regional
Seas Conventions and Action Plans (third Meeting of RSP),704 the need for
compliance and enforcement has been considered to be among ‘the most critical
problems hindering the implementation of the conventions and action plans.’705 Also
in this regard, two decades after the adoption of Agenda 21 during the third meeting
of
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(UNICPOLOS) in 2002, the need for greater commitment towards implementation
and enforcement was reinforced. Participants at UNICPOLOS III emphasised that:
International agreements and programs of action alone will not improve the
status of the marine environment. It is essential that they are implemented and
enforced to achieve the required goals.706

5.3.2 Principle of Integration and Chapter 17 of Agenda 21
The main theme of the UNCED process was ‘sustainable development’, which, by its
nature, is a concept that embodies integration. This is because ‘sustainable
development’ aims to promote economic development in an environmentally
sustainable way. In this regard, Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration states:
In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall
constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be
considered in isolation from it.707
Agenda 21 incorporated the ideal of ‘integration’ in terms of proposing economic
development harmonised with protection of the environment. In particular to ocean
governance, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 indicates an integrated nature in its opening
statement, which reads:
to pursue the protection and sustainable development of the marine and
coastal environment and its resources, there is a need for new approaches to
marine and coastal area management and development, at the national,
subregional, regional and global levels.708
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Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 qualifies ‘the new approaches’ as ‘integrated in content’.709
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 does not define ‘integration’, but listed several measures
towards a more integrated approach. In common between these measures is the effort
to ensure that links among different areas within ocean governance are not neglected
in the policy decision-making process.710 This is because ‘integration’ depends upon
a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing from various subject-areas such as law,
biology and economy.
Examples of the integrative approach proposed by Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 are ‘to
provide for an integrated policy and decision-making process, including all involved
sectors, to promote compatibility and a balance of uses’;711 and ‘to develop socioeconomic and environmental indicators’.712 In regards to program-area ‘protection of
the marine environment’, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 urges states to ‘integrate
protection of the marine environment into relevant general environmental, social and
economic development policies’.713 An integrated approach in the prevention of
pollution is important because degradation of the marine environment is a result of
activities from several sectors, such as shipping and other sea-based sources, as well
as land-based sources such as ‘human settlements, land use, construction of coastal
infrastructure, agriculture, forestry, urban development, tourism and industry’.714
Another integrative measure introduced by Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 is the
recommendation that states ‘develop economic incentives’, for instance ‘to apply
clean technologies and other means consistent with the internalisation of
environmental costs, such as the polluter pays principle,715 to avoid degradation of the
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marine environment’.716 Similar to the goal of ‘sustainable development’, integrative
measures such as the ‘polluter pays principle’ and others listed above exhibit an
integrated nature by merging environmental with economic measures.717 It is
noteworthy that the polluter pays principle, however, has a more practical and
enforceable nature than ‘sustainable development’, the application of which is
difficult given that the concept fails ‘to give a criteria for determining the parameters
and the ultimate objective of this integration of development and environment’.718
Similar to the principle of sustainable development, the polluter pays principle was
included in the Rio Declaration (Principle 16). The practicality of the polluter pays
principle stems from the fact for instance that it allocates the costs of pollution on
those that caused it whereas the sustainable development principle does not provide
for a clear criterion for its application.719 Sustainable development, although
integrated in its nature, serves as merely an ideal to be pursued. Conversely, the
polluter pays principle can be applied through taxation, charges, liability methods.720

5.3.3 Ecosystem-Approach and Chapter 17 of Agenda 21
The preamble of the Rio Declaration recognised ‘the integral and interdependent
nature of the Earth’. Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration goes further to require that
states should ‘cooperate to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of
the Earth's ecosystem’. In the same token, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 defines the
marine environment as ‘the oceans and all seas and adjacent coastal areas’.721 From
an ecosystem view, oceans and coasts are a continuum. Chapter 17 of Agenda 21
recognises this reality. Thus, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 does not support the notion of
separation between coastal and marine areas. In this regard, Vallejo states:
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[C]oastal and oceanic systems are closely interconnected through biophysical,
functional and socio-economic linkages. The nature of marine ecosystems
inevitably links the nearshore environments with those of offshore
environments.722
In addition, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 states that the marine environment ‘forms an
integrated whole that is an essential component of the global life-support system’. 723
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 while acknowledging the indivisible nature of the oceanic
system, imprints an ecosystem view of ocean governance. Chapter 17 of Agenda 21
also expresses an ecosystem view in the area of high seas fisheries by requiring the
following measures: emphasis should be given to ‘multi-species management and
other approaches that take into account the relationships among species, especially in
addressing depleted species, but also in identifying the potential of underutilised or
unutilised populations’.724
In addition, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 acknowledges that ‘problems extend beyond
fisheries’.725 It also addresses the problem of growing degradation of coastal
ecosystems,726 such as coral reefs, and other marine and coastal habitats, such as
mangroves and estuaries.727 The degradation of these coastal ecosystems is
troublesome, given that these are among ‘the most highly diverse, integrated and
productive of the Earth's ecosystems’.728 The destruction of productive coastal
ecosystems can have negative repercussions on fisheries given that these systems
serve as breeding areas for several fisheries species. While highlighting the high rates
of coastal ecosystem destruction, Chapter 17 acknowledges an ecosystem view
because all components of the marine environment are considered, not only the
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marine portion, but also valuable coastal ecosystems. Chapter 17 seeks to raise
awareness for the need to protect ‘neglected’ components of the marine ecosystem,
which did not receive much attention from legislators (coral reefs and other marine
and coastal habitats, such as mangroves and estuaries).

5.3.4 Precautionary Approach and Chapter 17 of Agenda 21
The UNCED process formally introduced the precautionary approach in
environmental governance by means of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which
states:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Principle 15 laid the rationale for the application of the precautionary approach while
emphasising in its second part that ‘where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’. Regarding the oceans
in particular, Chapter 17, in its introductory section, states that to pursue the
protection of the marine and coastal environment and its resources, there is a need for
‘new approaches’ in terms of management of resources. These ‘new approaches’
were described as ‘precautionary and anticipatory in ambit’.729 For instance, in
regards to the area of ‘integrated management and sustainable development of
coastal areas and the marine environment under their national jurisdiction’, section
17.5 of Chapter 17 translates the precautionary approach into practical terms by
proposing the application of ‘preventive and precautionary approaches in project
planning and implementation, including prior assessment and systematic observation
of the impacts of major projects’.730 Thus, risk analysis of the negative impacts of
major projects is a means to apply the precautionary approach.
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Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 also endorsed the application of a precautionary approach
in the area of marine pollution.731 While endorsing a precautionary approach to deal
with marine pollution, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 also recognises the inadequacy of
the prevailing reactive approach in dealing with pollution. A reactive approach is
characterised by taking measures after a polluting episode had occurred.732 Section
17.21 of Agenda 21 supports a ‘precautionary and anticipatory’ approach over a
reactive approach. The proposed shift in paradigm in dealing with marine pollution
from a reactive nature to a more precautionary was often included within oceanrelated policy and legal instruments adopted during the Post-LOSC.

Table 5.1. The UNCED Process and Principles of International Law.
UNCED
Cooperation
Principle

7

Integration
Rio

Principle

Declaration;

Declaration

Agenda 21, 17.1 (a) to

21, 17.1.

4

Ecosystem

Prevention

Considerations

Rio

Agenda

Principle
Declaration

15

Rio

Agenda

21,

17.1;

17.45; 17.73

(g); 17.10

5.3.5 Final Observations on the UNCED Process
In conclusion, the UNCED process, in particular its Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, gives
new direction to ocean governance. The four selected principles of international law
were part of the main outcomes of the UNCED process – Agenda 21 and Rio
Declaration. The Agenda 21 included in its text all the selected principles of
international law cooperation, integration, ecosystem and precautionary approaches.
In particular regard to cooperation, Agenda 21 stresses that international cooperation
was vital to solve global ocean problems.733
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Another positive outcome of the UNCED process is that it pinpointed inadequacies
and failures within the system of ocean governance, such as the regulatory gap to
address land-based sources of marine pollution,734 the inadequacy of the management
of high seas fisheries in some areas where these resources are overutilised735 and the
adverse effects of the multiplicity of international organisations including UN
agencies and programs.736 As it will be shown below, these problems could be greatly
reduced if the selected principles of international law were adopted. Overall, another
major achievement of the UNCED process was that it sent the message to the
international community that ‘current approaches had proven ineffective as coastal
resources and associated marine environment are progressively being degraded in
many parts of the world’.737 Only through adoption of the recommendations found in
Agenda 21, could the current progressive degradation of the marine environment be
halted. Principles can only have some degree of practicability if introduced in the
international or even national law of states. Since principles serve as guidance for
treaties, the natural course of events is that these principles would be introduced in
future treaties regulating several issues in ocean governance. The analysis now
focuses on legal advancements during the Post-LOSC period to complement the
policy advancements introduced by the outcomes of UNCED process (Agenda 21
and Rio Declaration).

5.4 Legal Advancements in Fisheries Issues during the Post-LOSC Period
After the convening of the UNCED, several policy and legal instruments were
adopted such as the GPA program for land-based sources of pollution discussed
above. Some of the principles of international law endorsed by Agenda 21 were
introduced in several of the policy and legal instruments adopted during the PostLOSC period. These new policy and legal instruments also introduced some
groundbreaking measures. For instance, the most significant trend found in the new
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treaties adopted during the Post-LOSC period is the exclusion of non-parties from
the benefits of cooperating agreements, such as the case of high seas fisheries.
Accordingly, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement by virtue of its article 8(4), excludes
non-members of RFOs or arrangements or those parties which do not agree to apply
the conservation and management measures established from fishing in their
regulatory fishing areas.738 Another legal novelty is the growing emphasis on
inspecting and boarding provisions by non-flag states, as will be demonstrated
below. These new policy and legal instruments emerged as a result of the need to
improve the legal framework for ocean governance and address some of its
inadequacies. In particular, to provide more regulatory push to the provisions on
cooperation. It was realised during the Post-LOSC period that proscribing the means
and requirements for cooperation in a particular area was no longer sufficient to
achieve implementation. There was a need to establish penalties for those that refuse
or undermine the conditions of a cooperating agreement.
It must be highlighted that despite the adoption of new policy and legal instruments,
the LOSC continues to be the most significant treaty in ocean governance. Thus,
most of the new treaties adopted during the Post-LOSC period prescribe the
obligation for their provisions to be applied in a manner consistent with the rights,
jurisdiction and duties set by the LOSC.739 Another characteristic of these new
treaties adopted in the aftermath of the UNCED, is that most of them incorporated
within their legal framework all four selected principles for efficient ocean
governance. A brief analysis of selected legal instruments adopted after the UNCED
process follows.
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5.4.1 UN Fish Stocks Agreement
As stated above, Agenda 21 stressed the need to enhance the legal framework of the
LOSC. In particular, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 identifies the inadequacy in the
provisions of the LOSC regarding highly migratory and straddling stocks.740
Accordingly, section 17.50 of Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 recommended that states
convene a global conference, which would have among other objectives:
the identification and assessment of existing problems related to the
conservation and management of such fish stocks [highly migratory and
straddling stocks], and consider means of improving cooperation on fisheries
among States, and formulate appropriate recommendations.
This recommendation, coupled with the concerns by both distant water fishing
nations (DWFN) and coastal states, generated the necessary ‘political impetus’
within the international community for the adoption of a new agreement.741 The
UNGA seconded Agenda 21’s recommendation742 and by virtue of its Resolution
47/192 of 22/12/92 called all members of the international community to ‘strengthen
their cooperation in the conservation and management of marine living resources’.
According to Treves, the proposed conference resulted in having the provisions of
the LOSC on straddling stocks and highly migratory fish stocks ‘more elaborated and
expanded’.743
The conference was convened in August 1995 and is known as the Conference on the
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN
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Fish Stocks Conference). The UN Fish Stocks Conference had as its outcome a
binding instrument known as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The UN Fish Stocks
Agreement was not intended to supersede the LOSC, but to complement its terms, in
particular to redress some of its inadequacies. As stated earlier, this is because the
LOSC in 1995 was (and still is) the most relevant treaty within ocean governance.
Therefore, any implementing agreement to the LOSC needs to be consistent with its
rights and obligations. In this regard, Article 4 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
states:
Nothing in this Agreement [UN Fish Stocks Agreement] shall prejudice the
rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under the Convention [LOSC]. This
Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner
consistent with the Convention.744
The changes contained in the provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
significantly improved the framework for cooperation that had been established by
the LOSC in 1982. One of the catalysts that prompted these changes was the
excessive fishing conducted by vessels from DWFNs in the adjacent high seas areas
to coastal states, which resulted in overfishing. Due to their migratory nature,
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks may be available simultaneously within
and beyond the EEZ or these stocks may be found mainly outside areas of national
jurisdiction at one time and inside national jurisdiction at another time.745 A case in
point is the dispute between Canada and Spain, in which Canadian fishery authority
boarded a Spanish-registered fishing vessel (under European Union flag), the Estai,
on the high seas and arrested its crew.746 Canada claimed that Spanish ship was
illegally overfishing just outside Canada's declared 200 nm EEZ (at least 18 miles
beyond Canada’s EEZ).747 The incident, also known by the press as ‘Turbot War’,
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created a diplomatic confrontation between Canada and the EU. Canada argued that:
[a] deep interdependence links fisheries management within waters under
coastal jurisdiction to the superjacent ocean space beyond. No matter how
effective fishing measures are when implemented and enforced within
jurisdictional waters, failure to comply with such measures outside those
waters, on the high seas, renders such internal measures futile in the case of
straddling stocks.748
Thus, these complex mobility patterns of fisheries resources made some of the
provisions within the LOSC framework inadequate to regulate straddling and highly
migratory fish stocks. For instance, conservation measures adopted by coastal states
to manage and conserve resources within their EEZ were being undermined by
intensive fishing practices in the immediately adjacent high seas areas.749
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement addressed the relationship between measures
adopted by the coastal states for the management and conservation of straddling and
highly migratory fish stocks found in areas under national jurisdiction and the
measures to be applied to high seas areas, including an area beyond and adjacent to
coastal states’ EEZs. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement devised a compatibility
criterion in the following terms:
Conservation and management measures established for the high seas and
those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in
order to ensure conservation and management of the straddling fish stocks
and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety. To this end, coastal States
and States fishing on the high seas have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of
achieving compatible measures in respect of such stocks.750
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In this regard, the LOSC had simply stated that: both coastal states and DWFNs
should agree upon these measures without providing for a criterion to guide
negotiations between them. Conversely, by virtue of article 7(2) of the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement, states would have to cooperate to fulfil the compatibility
criterion. This new criterion would prevent conservation measures established for
areas under national jurisdiction to be undermined as a result of overfishing
conducted in adjacent high seas areas. But the most innovative provision within the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement is the imposition of legal consequences for states or
fishing entities that do not engage in cooperation for the conservation and
management of the straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. The UN Fish Stocks
Agreement intended to strengthen compliance through precluding non-cooperating
states or those that do not agree to apply the conservation and management measures
established by a RFO from the benefits accrued from fishing for these resources.751 In
this regard, Article 8(4) reads:
Only those States which are members of such an organisation or participants in
such an arrangement, or which agree to apply the conservation and
management measures established by such organisation or arrangement, shall
have access to the fishery resources to which those measures apply.
Furthermore, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement prescribed three avenues to achieve
cooperation, namely states would cooperate directly, through RFOs or through the
adoption of fisheries arrangements.752 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement imposed the
obligation to cooperate on all states, even on those that do not participate in any of
the above-referred cooperating arrangements. In this regard, Article 17(1) of the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement states:

A State which is not a member of a subregional or regional fisheries
management organisation or is not a participant in a subregional or regional
fisheries management arrangement, and which does not otherwise agree to
apply the conservation and management measures established by such
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organisation or arrangement, is not discharged from the obligation to
cooperate, in accordance with the Convention [LOSC] and this Agreement
[UN Fish Stocks Agreement], in the conservation and management of the
relevant straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.

Articles 8(4) and 17(1) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement raise some controversy
among scholars and lawmakers who argued that these articles violate the
international customary rule of pacta tertius, which implies that states can only be
bound by laws they have expressly consented to themselves.753 Although controversy
has swirled around these provisions, they prevailed as rules of international law, and
there has been no direct challenge to their status. Most importantly for the main
argument of this thesis is that by reinforcing the LOSC framework for cooperation,
the provisions within the UN Fish Stocks Agreement contributed to reducing the
governance failures. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement assisted in reducing
proliferation and segmentation in the sense that its provisions created incentives for
parties to participate in cooperation. Although the incentive was in the form of a type
of sanction for non-participation, the outcome of its application is that parties would
be less inclined to act in isolation. Thus, these provisions serve as a deterrent for
those that were benefiting from non-cooperating behaviour.
Another groundbreaking provision within the UN Fish Stocks Agreement that
fostered compliance with cooperation provisions allows for the boarding and
inspecting of fishing vessels by non-flag states within the area of competence of an
RFO regardless of whether the inspected party is a member of the concerned RFO. In
this regard, Article 21(1) and (2) reads:
In any high seas area covered by a subregional or regional fisheries
management organisation or arrangement, a State Party which is a member of
such organisation or a participant in such arrangement may, through its duly
authorized inspectors, board and inspect, in accordance with paragraph 2,
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fishing vessels flying the flag of another State Party to this Agreement,
whether or not such State Party is also a member of the organisation or a
participant in the arrangement, for the purpose of ensuring compliance with
conservation and management measures for straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks established by that organisation or arrangement.754
The flag state of the inspected vessel, however, needs to be party to the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement.755 Article 21(1) and (2) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is
evidence of a new trend in ocean governance during the Post-LOSC period: the
enhancement of cooperating mechanisms to promote more efficiency in terms of
compliance and enforcement. Article 21(1) and (2) also reinforce the role of RFOs as
vehicles for cooperation. This is because despite the refusal of some states to belong
to a RFO and be bound by its regulatory powers, RFOs’ authorised inspectors can
exert authority over these non-cooperating parties. The new boarding and inspecting
provisions introduced by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement can benefit many states that
are unable to enforce treaties in view of the lack of equipment, such as patrol boats
and trained personnel among other factors. This meant that members of a RFO could
share resources such as boats for boarding and inspecting and personnel. Another
innovative feature introduced by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is also related to the
area of compliance and enforcement, more specifically to the application of sanctions
in case of violation to its provisions.756 This measure will also considerably strength
the applicability of the principle of cooperation.
Despite being a treaty on cooperation par excellence, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
also incorporated other principles of international law analysed in this thesis. For
instance, Article 5 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement lists the principles for the
fulfilment of conserving and managing straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
fish stocks. Among the general principles are the duty to cooperate, the ecosystem
approach and the precautionary principle.757 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement refers to
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the precautionary principle as ‘precautionary approach’.758 In addition, the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement introduced in several of its provisions references to the
precautionary principle; the most of any international legal document.759 According
to Freestone, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement did not introduce ‘the most extreme
application’ of the precautionary approach in the sense that the Agreement does not
prescribe an immediate cessation of fishing operations until scientific data permitting
further fishing is available.760 This is because such formulation would have been
politically unacceptable to fishing states at the time of its negotiation. However, the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement requires states to be more cautious when information is
uncertain, unreliable or inadequate or in the absence of adequate scientific
information.761 By doing so, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement ‘creates a presumption in
favour of conservation.’762
This was the first time that ‘precaution’ was specifically mentioned in an
international fishery agreement, or applied to straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks.763 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement adopted an ecosystem
approach while prescribing that states should cooperate in the adoption of
conservation measures that take into account the interdependence of stocks,764 the
impacts of fishing on target stocks and associated species and species belonging to
the same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the target stocks765 and the
protection of marine biodiversity,766 among other ecosystem considerations. The
principle of integration was also incorporated within the text of the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement by virtue of many of its provisions. In this regard, the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement listed the following integrated measures: conservation measures should
be qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors;767 to promote the
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assessment of the impacts of fishing, other human activities and environmental
factors;768 consideration for the interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers,769 among
others.
In conclusion, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is a model treaty not only because it
expanded some of the provisions of the LOSC for cooperation in the area of
conservation and management of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks, but because it expressly embraced principles of international law (i.e.,
ecosystem approach, precautionary approach and integration). In this regard, the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement departed from a strictly segmented approach towards the
management and conservation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks by giving due regard in its provisions to the uniqueness of the migratory
patterns of these stocks and adjusting the provisions on cooperation accordingly.
LOSC provisions were deemed inadequate because they considered that these stocks
could be neatly confined when migrating through boundaries (i.e. high seas and
EEZs) but in reality these resources can be found in and out at any given moment
which complicates the application of conservation and management measures. The
UN Fish Stocks Agreement demonstrated that ocean governance is in constant
evolution in the sense that even its most important treaty, the LOSC, was showing
signs of being obsolete for the new challenges, thus requiring amendments to achieve
higher levels of implementation.

5.5 Other Legal Advances in Ocean Governance during the Post-LOSC
Period

Following the trend initiated by the adoption of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement,
various other bindings instruments were adopted during the Post-LOSC period which
introduced similar advancements to those contained in the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement. Among these advancements are mechanisms for cooperation for
boarding of ships by non-flag states in the area of maritime security.
768
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201

In the mid-1990s, the problem of re-flagging of fishing vessels to avoid regulatory
measures for the conservation and management of fishing resources on the high seas
was given great attention by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in
particular by its Committee of Fisheries (COFI). Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 identifies
the problem of ‘vessel re-flagging to escape controls’770 as one of the greatest failures
in fisheries governance, undermining the success of conservation and management
measures of high seas fisheries. Accordingly, Agenda 21 recommends that states take
effective action to deter re-flagging of vessels by their nationals as a means of
avoiding compliance with applicable conservation and management rules for fishing
activities on the high seas.
At the same time that the UN Fish Stocks Agreement was being negotiated in 1995,
the FAO adopted another binding instrument known as the Agreement to Promote
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing
Vessels771 on the High Seas (FAO Compliance Agreement).772 The FAO Compliance
Agreement was adopted to address problems arising from poor implementation on
the part of flag states in fulfilling their responsibilities with respect to fishing vessels
entitled to fly their flags. The adoption of the FAO Compliance Agreement is
indication of a trend within the Post-LOSC period of focusing on compliance,
implementation and enforcement of treaties as opposed to adopting new laws.
Article V of the FAO Compliance Agreement773 was drafted in almost synonymous
terms with article 218 of the LOSC which introduced the concept of port state
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control to matters related to pollution from vessels.774 The scope of article 218 of
LOSC, however, is broader than article V of the Compliance Agreement, because it
encompasses enforcement jurisdiction by granting port states with the discretion to
‘institute proceedings’.775 Article V of the Compliance Agreement only grants port
states with the right to undertake investigatory action providing that port and flag
states have concluded arrangements on how those investigatory measures would be
undertaken.
Another factor that contributes to limiting the application of port state control as an
effective tool to eliminate over-exploitation of fishing resources is the fact that
parties to the Compliance Agreement can exempt vessels under 24 metres from its
scope of application.776 According to Tupou, this limitation is a as a major obstacle to
the effective implementation of the port state regime under Compliance
Agreement.777
The FAO Compliance Agreement provides for requirements on the legal content of
the obligation to cooperate. In this regard, the FAO Compliance Agreement requires
its parties to exchange information and reporting, including evidentiary material, in
the event of vessels flying the flag of states parties that have been found in
contravention to conservation and management measures.778 Secondly, cooperation
was sought in regards to measures applied in ports in the event of a vessel that is
deemed to have violated international conservation and management measures being
voluntarily at a party’s port (other than its flag state). With basis on ‘reasonable
grounds’, the port state should cooperate in notifying the flag state about the
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contravening activity.779 Similar to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement,780 the FAO
Compliance Agreement addressed the issue of non-parties by imposing the
obligation on its parties to take measures to prevent non-parties from undermining
the effectiveness of international conservation and management measures. In this
regard, Article VIII (2) of the FAO Compliance Agreement states:
The Parties shall cooperate in a manner consistent with this Agreement and
with international law to the end that fishing vessels entitled to fly the flags of
non Parties do not engage in activities that undermine the effectiveness of
international conservation and management measures.781
Despite the adoption of the FAO Compliance Agreement, the practice of re-flagging
persisted, consequently undermining the international obligations in place.782 In 2003,
at its annual meeting on the law of the sea, the UNGA discussed the issue of reflagging, arriving at the following conclusion:
At the root of far too many of these problems is the unwillingness or lack of
capacity of certain States, especially flag States, to fulfill their international
legal obligations. It is essential to reinforce the control of flag States over their
vessels. Indeed, it might now be time to engage in defining the crucial term
‘genuine link’ to ensure that States do not register any vessels unless they have
a truly effective means of enforcing upon them all the relevant international
rules and standards.783
Despite persisting problems with re-flagging, international community has been
forthcoming about solving the problem. Evidence of this effort is the creation of a
FAO/IMO Ad Hod Working Group to work more effectively on flag control of
fishing vessels and port state control of such vessels.784
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5.6 Legal Advancements in Other Areas of Ocean Governance during the
Post-LOSC Period
The innovative provisions introduced in ocean governance during the Post-LOSC
period were not limited to the area of fisheries governance. The area of safety of
navigation, and other areas, such as protection of marine biodiversity, also evolved
during the Post-LOSC period in terms of adoption of amendments or new laws to
overcome some of the inadequacies that were stalling their objectives. For instance,
the International Maritime Organization (IMO)785 Maritime Safety Committee (IMOMSC) received proposals to amend previously adopted instruments that aimed to
suppress unlawful activities against the safety of navigation and security of
crewmembers.
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The objective was to increase their effectiveness and amend their

texts to address new threats which were not addressed by LOSC.
Amendments were proposed to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) and the Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf (SUA Protocol on Fixed Platforms).787 The SUA Convention does
not have provisions on assisting the flag state in suppressing maritime terrorism.788
For that reason, the amendments to the SUA Convention were embodied in a new
protocol, known as the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention. The amendments
include new offences such as maritime terrorism and provisions on shipboarding.789
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In regard to shipboarding, the new protocol introduced provisions which followed
the same trend initiated by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.790 For instance, Article 8
of the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention provides for a mechanism of
cooperation for boarding of ships by non-flag states upon the condition that prior
authorisation had been given by the flag state791 for the boarding of the suspect
ship.792 This provision faced opposition from some states even before its formal
adoption by IMO.793 This is because, based on the principle of flag state jurisdiction,
some states argued that the boarding by another state on the high seas should take
place only in exceptional circumstances.794
Despite the controversy, it is argued that the new provisions on shipboarding by nonflag states have improved cooperation in particular regard to enforcement of
international rules on the high seas. With regard to this issue, Dupuy and Vignes
stated that effective means of cooperation are necessary to ensure safety of
navigation given the absence of an ‘international police’ on the vast areas of high
seas to enforce the applicable treaties.795 These new provisions, in particular the ones
allowing shipboarding by non-flag states, had an impact on traditional principles in
international law, such as the principle of exclusivity of flag state jurisdiction. The
benefits of Article 8 of the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention (boarding by nonflag states) is twofold. Firstly, the groundbreaking provisions on shipboarding served
to provide more legal force to the principle of cooperation in this case in the area of
maritime security. As a result of this provision, non-parties or non-cooperating states
would suffer consequences for non-cooperating or undermining the provisions of the
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treaty. By strengthening cooperation, the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention
reduces governance problems. Secondly, the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention
served to fill a gap in ocean governance which is proper legal instruments to deal
with the threat of increasing maritime terrorism. Other improvements in ocean
governance were introduced by non-binding instruments and they will be addressed
below.

5.7 Policy Advancements in Ocean Governance during the Post-LOSC
Period
As pointed out in the introduction of this chapter, the Post-LOSC period is
characterised by an increase in the number of non-binding instruments, such as
programs, action plans and codes of conduct adopted to regulate various ocean areas.
The traditional practice in ocean governance has been the adoption of treaties. For a
number of reasons that are outside the scope of this thesis, implementation of these
treaties has been unsatisfactory.796 The adoption of treaties contributed to the
preference to adopt non-binding instruments to compensate for the poor levels of
implementation of international treaties.797 The non-binding policy instruments
present advantages in relation to the formal binding instruments (e.g., treaties). One
of the reasons is that treaties are a product of time-consuming and politically-charged
processes, whereas the adoption of non-binding instruments is much simpler. In this
regard, it has been pointed out the advantages on adopting non-binding instruments
for the IMO, as follows:
It is this practical value, which makes the non-treaty instruments of IMO
more effective than conventions in assisting the peaceful conduct of
international activities. Guidelines which are widely accepted and voluntarily
put into force may lead to more positive and significant results than a treaty
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which is not ratified and applied or is ratified and applied by only a few
States.798
The above-mentioned example refers to IMO, but it could be applied to any
specialised agency within the UN which is confronted with poor levels of
implementation of their treaties. However, there is no consensus in respect to the
advantages of adopting policy instruments in ocean governance as opposed to the
adoption of formal binding instruments. During one of the sessions at the UNGA, for
example, it was argued that non-binding instruments adopted during the Post-LOSC
period added more complexity to the system of ocean governance resulting in
proliferation of instruments.799 The lack of synergy among these instruments was also
pointed out as a negative outcome.800 Of relevance to this thesis is to point out that
the adoption of non-binding instruments indicates a new trend in ocean governance.
Also, similar to many treaties adopted during the Post-LOSC period, policy
instruments also contributed to the advancement of ocean governance. These policy
instruments have also introduced innovative measures. Below is a brief overview of
the most significant non-binding instruments adopted during the Post-LOSC period;
the provisions of which assisted in overcoming some of the inadequacies within
ocean governance and contributed to reduce governance failures.

5.7.1 Fisheries Policy Instruments
In 1995, the FAO adopted a non-binding instrument known as the Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries (FAO Code of Conduct).801 Similar to the UN Fish Stock
Agreement and the FAO Compliance Agreement, the FAO Code of Conduct did not
discharge non-members of RFOs and non-participants of fisheries arrangements from
the duty to cooperate in the conservation and management of concerned fisheries
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resources.802 Non-members and non-participants were encouraged to implement
measures adopted by the referred organisation or arrangement.803
Before the adoption of the FAO Code of Conduct, there was a need for new
approaches in the area of conservation and management of marine living resources.
In particular, there was a need for market-related measures as a result of
developments in the fishing sector such as modernisation of fishing fleets which
turned this sector into a ‘market-driven and dynamic sector’.804 The absence of more
market-oriented measures within the previous legal instruments adopted by the FAO
was one of the reasons for the adoption of the FAO Code of Conduct.
The FAO Code of Conduct embraced an integrated approach towards fishery
governance while combining under the same instrument conservation and marketrelated measures to be applied to the entire production chain, from the capture
through processing to the trade of fishing resources. The FAO Code of Conduct’s
main goal was to establish principles for responsible fishing by incorporating a
multidisciplinary approach (integrated approach). In this regard, the FAO Code of
Conduct expressly listed among its main objectives the consideration of various
aspects of fishing activities, namely biological, technological, economic, social
environmental and commercial aspects.805 In terms of cooperation, the FAO Code of
Conduct in article 6 listed cooperation806 among the set of general principles to guide
the management of responsible fisheries, including sustainable development,807
ecosystem approach808 and precautionary approach.809 The FAO Code of Conduct
incorporated all four principles for effective and ‘principled’ ocean governance.
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Following the same trend, in 2001 the FAO adopted another non-binding instrument
to specifically deter the growing problem of illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing (IUU fishing), known as the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter
and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU). The IPOAIUU is part of the framework of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries.810 In the same terms as the above-mentioned instruments, IPOA-IUU also
did not exempt non-parties of the RFOs from the obligation to cooperate in deterring
IUU fishing. For instance, non-parties should ensure that fishing vessels flying their
flag do not undermine conservation and management measures in place.811 Besides
fisheries, other areas in ocean governance also introduced new advancements in the
area of policy, as demonstrated below.

5.7.2 Policy Instruments and Navigation
The IMO launched the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS
Code) during the Conference of Contracting Governments of the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), in December 2002. The main
purpose of the ISPS is to:
establish an international framework involving cooperation between
Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and
the shipping and port industries to detect/assess security threats and take
preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port
facilities used in international trade’.812
The ISPS Code has two parts: part A and part B. Part A is mandatory813 and part B is
recommendatory (non-binding). Part A contains security measures to be adopted by
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governments, port authorities and shipping industry.814 The voluntary part (part B)
comprises guidelines on how to put the mandatory measures in practice.815 The ISPS
Code strongly promotes cooperation among countries through extending port state
control so states can assist each other in addressing ‘security threats and take
preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used
in international trade’.816 In extending port state control to reinforce cooperation in
the area of maritime security, the ISPS Code goes further than article 218 of the
LOSC, which regulated port state jurisdiction solely for the purpose of curbing
discharges of pollutants from ships.
In addition to guaranteeing safety of ports, port state jurisdiction also has been
extended more recently for the purpose of combating IUU fishing. In this regard,
substandard fishing ships have been denied access to ports by means of non-binding
memorandum of understanding (MOU) adopted between interested states. This
development is evidence of the beginning of a trend of building linkages between
sectors. In this case the linkage is established between control of substandard fishing
ships and port state control; a long needed link between fishing activities and ports.
Another significant policy instrument which affects the navigation sector that was
adopted by IMO during the Post-LOSC period was the 1991 Guidelines for the
Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (1991 PSSA
Guidelines). PSSAs were created to protect vulnerable marine ecosystems from the
negative effect of intense shipping activities.817 Of relevance for this thesis is the fact
that the IMO chose to regulate PSSAs through a non-binding instrument (guidelines),
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thus avoiding the complications associated with adopting a treaty.818 The 1991 PSSA
Guidelines were superseded in 2005 by the Revised Guidelines for the Identification
and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (Revised PSSA Guidelines) by
virtue of IMO Resolution A.982 (24) of 06/02/06. The Revised PSSA Guidelines
provided that PSSAs could be designated in areas of the high seas, ‘if protective
measures are deemed necessary for that area’.819 The prospect of including areas of
high seas within the protective scope of PSSAs generated controversy at IMO
Assembly,820 due to the non-binding nature of these guidelines. It was argued that a
non-binding instrument lacks the strong binding force of a treaty to be able to impose
any measures on high areas.821 Those who supported the Revised PSSA Guidelines
argued that the proposal for designating PSSAs is not exempted from the IMO’s
scrutiny. In other words, proposing states must provide supporting scientific and
socio-economic arguments to justify the size of the proposed area to be designated as
a PSSA.822 The final decision rests with IMO, which assesses whether the size is
adequate while evaluating identified needs for the selection of a site.823 IMO is the
sole institution with the competence to designate a PSSA. This controversy is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
However, the choice of adoption a non-binding document indicates a trend within the
Post-LOSC period for such instruments as opposed to the traditional practice of
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adopting treaties. Secondly, similar to many policy and legal instruments adopted
during the Post-LOSC period, the Revised PSSA Guidelines consider overlapping
aspects of ocean issues. In this case, the effects of navigation intersecting with the
need to protect and conserve fragile marine ecosystems which are located near or
within navigating routes. Thus, the Revised PSSA Guidelines have an integrated,
ecosystem and cross-sectoral nature. In sum, a particular ocean problem (i.e.
protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems) was treated holistically and not in a
segmented fashion. While dealing with an ocean problem in a holistic fashion, ocean
managers and law makers indicate that the two main characteristics of ocean
problems namely their multi-dimensional and interrelated natures were taken in
regard. When the multi-dimensional and interrelated natures of ocean problems are
considered in particular through the adoption of the selected principles of
international law, the outcome is a decrease in governance problems. Essentially,
governance problems arise when linkages among the various ocean sectors are
ignored.

5.8 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)
Despite the above-referred developments, in 2001 the UNGA recognised the
existence of major constraints hindering the implementation of Agenda 21,824 and the
need to identify them. In view of this, the UNGA decided to undergo a ten-year
review of progress achieved in the implementation of the outcomes of the UNCED
process. The review process also had the objective to reinvigorate the global
commitment towards sustainable development.825 The World Summit on Sustainable
Development (WSSD) was held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002. It is
noteworthy that the main objective of the WSSD process was to address
implementation. This also reinforces the claim that the Post-LOSC period
emphasises the need for implementation and enforcement of policy and legal
instruments already adopted as opposed to adopting new instruments.
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Accordingly, the WSSD process was not concerned with either the adoption of new
non-binding instruments (declarations, plans of actions, etc) or new treaties. The
three major outcomes from the WSSD were: Plan of Implementation of the WSSD
(JPOI), the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg
Declaration) and the Partnerships initiatives.826 JPOI is the only outcome of the
WSSD process that has a binding legal nature. The Johannesburg Declaration stated
that the ‘global environment continues to suffer’.827 The continuing degradation of
the global environment was resulting in loss of biodiversity, depletion of fish stocks,
adverse effects of climate change, natural disaster and marine pollution, among other
problems.828
The UNGA, however, was incisive in reaffirming that during the WSSD process the
Agenda 21 and Rio Declaration ‘should not be renegotiated’.829 The purpose of the
ten-year review process in Johannesburg should be ‘to identify measures for the
further implementation of Agenda 21 and other outcomes of the UNCED, including
sources of funding’.830 In particular regard to ocean governance, this meant that the
WSSD process needed to identify measures to further implement Chapter 17 of
Agenda 21. The WSSD process focused its program on action-oriented decisions
within the framework of Agenda 21 to tackle new challenges and foster opportunities
for sustainable development.831 The action-oriented decisions within the WSSD
process were informed by three of the four principles of international law under
analysis, namely cooperation, integration and ecosystem-approach. WSSD was silent
in regards to the precautionary approach, even though the WSSD endorses many
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instruments that incorporated the precautionary approach within their texts, such as
the outcomes of the UNCED (Agenda 21 and Rio Declaration).

5.8.1 Cooperation and the WSSD
All three outcomes of the WSSD process, namely JPOI, Johannesburg Declaration
and Partnerships initiatives, relied on international cooperation to foster
implementation of ocean-related policy and legal instruments. Similar to what
occurred at other global conferences (i.e. UNCHE, UNCLOS III, and UNCED),
cooperation is sought as the solution for environmental problems (in particular ocean
problems). The UNEP Governing Council declared that the WSSD process would
provide an opportunity for strengthening cooperation, which was ‘urgently required
to address the challenges of sustainable development in the twenty-first century’.832
More importantly, during the WSSD, non-traditional forms of cooperation were
being devised to foster implementation of Agenda 21. These non-traditional forms
refer in particular to the participation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in
view of the fact that the WSSD process produced ‘a plan of action recognising civil
society organisations as more than just advocacy groups to influence governments
but as genuine partners in implementing Agenda 21 and other initiatives’.833 JPOI
stated the need to improve and strengthen cooperation at all levels for the effective
implementation of Agenda 21 and the JPOI. Thus, JPOI embraced the multi-level
nature of governance including the participation of NGOs in the process.
JPOI placed special emphasis on regional cooperation while stating in its section
30(f), that there was a need to ‘strengthen regional cooperation and coordination
between the relevant regional organisations and programs, the regional seas
programs of the UNEP, regional fisheries management organisations and other,
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regional science, health and development organisations’.834 This meant that the JPOI
recognised the need for inter-sectoral cooperation between the various regional
cooperating arrangements in the above-referred areas. This is another indication that
during the Post-LOSC period, there was an emphasis on the need to build linkages
between the various sectors within ocean governance.
Another indication that the WSSD strongly reinforced cooperation as a means to
overcome the challenges in ocean governance was the invitation for states to accede
and ratify previously adopted ocean-related policies835 and legal instruments.836 By
inviting states to accede or ratify these instruments, JPOI indirectly reinforced
international cooperation by virtue of the fact that treaties and policy documents,
such as LOSC and Agenda 21, based most of their provisions on cooperation.
However, this invitation to accede and ratify instruments reveals the complexities of
governance, given while some states need to implement some instruments, other
states had not even ratified or acceded to important treaties such as the LOSC. The
system of governance is not cohesive given the differences between its participants
in terms of technical capability, economic resources etc. Also, to enhance
cooperation in ocean governance, JPOI proposed concrete actions with a timeline for
their execution in the following areas: cross-sectoral aspects, fisheries, biodiversity,
marine pollution and science and observation.837 This was the first time that goals
with a set schedule for their fulfilment were set in a global policy instrument. The
evolution of ocean governance proceeds with the aspects of an integrated ocean
governance introduced during the WSSD process.
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5.8.2 Integration and the WSSD
The principle of integration was at the forefront of the WSSD’s agenda. This is
because the WSSD agenda was committed to addressing several interconnected and
yet diverse issues, such as eradication of poverty, protection of the environment,
including the marine environment; and institutional reform. In addition, the UNGA
had mandated the WSSD with the task to renew political commitment towards
achieving a sustainable development; a goal set ten years before with the adoption of
Agenda 21.838 And, as pointed out before in this chapter, by including ‘sustainable
development’ among its goals is also a sign that the WSSD process had embraced an
integrated approach because ‘sustainable development’ entails the harmonisation
between the goals of environmental conservation and economic development.
In particular regard to ocean governance, the renewed commitment of the WSSD
process to implement Agenda 21 is indication that the process adopted an integrated
approach because the Agenda 21 has an integrated nature. For instance, JPOI
emphasised that the oceans, seas, islands and coastal areas form an integrated and
essential component of the Earth’s ecosystem and are critical for global food security
and for sustaining economic prosperity.839 By doing so, JPOI clearly merged
ecological and socio-economical goals. In another indication of its integrated nature,
JPOI linked the pernicious effects of economic subsidies to the growing problem of
IUU fishing and over-capacity of fishing fleets. In this regard, the JPOI requested the
international community to make efforts to eliminate these negative subsidies and to
assist the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in improving positive fisheries subsidies
that are vital for the survival of small fisheries, in particular those located in
developing countries.840 JPOI specifically addressed the need for states at the national
level to adopt an integrated approach as follows:
Promote integrated, multidisciplinary and multisectoral coastal and ocean
management at the national level and encourage and assist coastal States in
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developing
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integrated

coastal

management.841
JPOI is evidence that the WSSD was influenced by the trend initiated during the
Post-LOSC period of enacting policy and legal instruments that have an integrated
nature by encompassing multi-sectoral issues within their scope.

5.8.3 Ecosystem-Approach and the WSSD
JPOI defined the oceans, seas, islands and coastal areas as integrated and essential
components of the Earth’s ecosystem.842 Like its predecessor Agenda 21, JPOI
considered the oceans as an integral part of the Earth’s ecosystem, which in turn is
considered to be an indivisible, interconnected whole. JPOI expressly mandated the
adoption of an ecosystem approach in the area of fisheries ,843 for instance, by
endorsing the terms of the Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries in the
Marine Ecosystem (Reykjavik Declaration).844 The Reykjavik Declaration was
adopted in 2001 during the Reykjavik Conference on Responsible Fisheries in the
Marine Ecosystem with the goal to incorporate ecosystem considerations into
fisheries management.845 According to the Reykjavik Declaration, ‘ecosystem
considerations’ should be understood as:
[M]ore effective conservation of the ecosystem and sustainable use and an
increased attention to interactions, such as predator-prey relationships, among
different stocks and species of marine living resources; furthermore that it
entails an understanding of the impact of human activities on the
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ecosystem,846 including the possible structural distortions they can cause in
the ecosystem,847
As far as other sectors of ocean governance, there was no requirement for the
application of an ecosystem approach within JPOI.

5.8.4 Cross-Sectoral Issues and the WSSD
One of the most relevant novelties introduced by the WSSD process was the
emphasis on cross-sectoral issues. It has been argued in this thesis that the nature of
ocean problems charcterised by being interrelated and multi-dimensional requires
that cross-sectoral issues are taken into regard. By doing so, the negative effects of
segmentation and proliferation in ocean governance would be reduced. Despite
evidence of the lack of implementation of the outcomes of the UNCED, including
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 which prompted the convening of the WSSD, ocean issues
almost were not originally included in the agenda of discussion of WSSD process.848
At the time, the belief was that ocean issues were settled with the adoption of the
LOSC and its complementary policies and agreements.849 Interest groups comprised
mostly by non-governmental actors while trying to influence the organisers of the
WSSD process stated as follows in regards to the legal framework for ocean
governance:
[n]ot being sufficiently implemented and enforced and also in view of the
evidence of the continuing depletion of the world’s fish stocks and the
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increasing degradation of the marine environment, with their disastrous
economic and social repercussions.850
The efforts and political pressure exerted by several interest groups were responsible
for the inclusion of ocean affairs in the WSSD’s agenda.851 This resulted in the
inclusion of Chapter IV (pars. 30-36) in the JPOI on oceans, seas, islands and coastal
areas, as well as Chapter VII on Small Island Developing States (SIDS). The abovereferred discussion points to two assertions. First, the interest groups convince the
WSSD organisers that the LOSC was not the ‘end of the road’.852 This justifies the
need to address ocean issues during the WSSD as opposed to the view of those who
argued that the LOSC had settled most of the issues in ocean governance. Secondly,
the persisting governance failures were not a result of lack of implementation only,
but also a lack of cross-sectoral linkages among the various sectors of ocean
governance at all levels of governance (national, regional and global). In supporting
this view, Töpfer and Hindman pointed out that the main purpose of the WSSD
process was to devise ways to integrate the various legal and policy instruments in
ocean governance, given that these instruments were still functioning as ‘independent
mechanisms’.853 In this regard, Töpfer and Hindman pointed out the following:
The real test for the WSSD in the area of marine and coastal environment was
for it to gather the elements of existing instruments and plans of action in a
coherent and integrated fashion and promote their full and vigorous
implementation so that they would be more than lofty statements of goals.
Integration, coordination and implementation were the key elements of
success.854
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In pursuing this goal, the JPOI reinforced the need for all ocean policies and
programs to be applied in an integrated, multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary
fashion.855 Hence, there was a need to create linkages among them. As pointed out
before, at the national level, JPOI reinforced the need for all ocean policies and
programs to be designed in an integrated, multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary
manner.856 The WSSD process emphasised the need for not only legal and policy
instruments to incorporate cross-sectoral issues, but for agencies and programs to
cooperate with each other despite having diverse, but related, mandates (inter-agency
cooperation).

5.8.5 Final Considerations on the WSSD Process
Besides the above-referred advancements, the WSSD process introduced other
measures that positively impacted ocean governance. For instance, the WSSD
process devised a mechanism to prevent its outcomes from being taken as mere
rhetoric. By doing so the WSSD process was trying to avoid its outcomes from being
plagued by poor implementation as occurred with Agenda 21. The mechanism
devised to imprint more effectiveness to its JPOI was to impose a time-limit for
concrete actions to enhance cooperation in ocean governance in the following areas:
fisheries,857 biodiversity,858 marine pollution859 and global reporting and marine
environment assessment,860 among other sectors.
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From an institutional perspective, WSSD required ocean-mandated agencies to build
linkages among the various competent organisations, bodies and other institutional
mechanisms. In this regard, the JPOI required the creation of an inter-agency
coordinating mechanism to streamline the policies and various programs and
agencies with an ocean mandate within the UN system.861 This command was later
implemented by the UN which resulted in the establishment of a mechanism to foster
inter-agency or institutional cooperation in ocean issues named the Oceans and
Coastal Areas Network (UN-OCEANS).862 JPOI also requested RFOs to cooperate
with the UNEP-Regional Sea Program, for instance, as well as with marine science
related programs, such as those responsible for ocean observing and monitoring.863
This recommendation indicates the commitment to inter-sectoral cooperation
advocated during the WSSD process.
One of the most important outcomes of the WSSD process was the creation of
partnerships among all major groups for the formulation, decision-making and
implementation of projects.864 During WSSD, an extensive range of partnerships was
built among countries, international organisations, civil society, private sector and
other stakeholders that voluntarily agreed to join forces. The ‘partnership approach’,
the third outcome of the WSSD, was specially conceived for the WSSD process865 as
an attempt to foster coordination and cooperation among a wide range of
stakeholders.866 Partners must fulfil the agreed-upon requirements with regards to
timetables, targets, monitoring arrangements, implementation and funding.
According to Hale and Mauzerall:
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Partnerships might represent a better investment of development resources
than traditional forms of cooperation’.867
In referring to partnerships, the World Resources Institute stated the following:
The Summit [WSSD] will be remembered not for the treaties, the
commitments, or the declarations it produced, but for the first stirrings of a
new way of governing the global commons – the beginnings of a shift from
the stiff formal waltz of traditional diplomacy to the jazzier dance of
improvisational solution-oriented partnerships, that may include nongovernment organisations, willing governments and other stakeholders.868
Finally, the WSSD process reflects a change of paradigm in environmental
governance. This is because the Johannesburg Declaration was the first international
declaration to emphasise the need for accountability.869 Another measure introduced
by the WSSD process that reflects a shift in the governance of natural resources is
related to the need to promote monitoring in regard to progress achieved towards the
goal of sustainable development at regular intervals.870 The political leaders and
ocean managers at the WSSD understood that it is not sufficient to launch programs
and implement them, but there is a need to evaluate how they have been
implemented, as well as the level of success in their implementation. These measures
indicate that there remains little to be regulated and a lot to be successfully
implemented in ocean governance. According to the WSSD outcomes, the era of
enactment of policy and legal instruments has been replaced with the need for
implementation, compliance and accountability.
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5.9 The Post-LOSC Period and its Contribution to Reducing the
Governance Problems
It is argued in this thesis that principles of international law such as cooperation,
integration, precautionary and ecosystem approaches, indirectly support the notion
that ocean problems should be viewed from a perspective that recognises their
interrelated and multi-dimensional natures. By doing so these principles contribute to
reducing governance problems characterised in particular by segmentation. The most
significant indication that the Post-LOSC period has contributed to decreasing the
levels of contradictions, overlaps, and segmentation within the system of ocean
governance is the fact that most of the instruments adopted during this period
included all principles of international law in their texts. Once ocean-related treaties
and policy instruments recognise the unique characteristics of the oceans as
interrelated and multi-dimensional, the direct result is a reduction in governance
problems.
This is because a given ocean problem is best addressed if due regard is given to the
linkages between components of the ecosystem. These linkages include, for instance,
the relationships between marine living resources and the impact of pollutants on
them (ecosystem approach), and between disciplinary sectors such as economics and
ecology (integrated approach). When ocean managers are aware of the interrelated
and multi-dimensional nature of ocean problems, they incorporate a more
precautionary approach in their management decisions. That is, an approach that
takes into account a level of risk of harm to the human and natural environments and
does not postpone conservation measures on the basis of absence of scientific
certainty about the risks. Similarly, an ocean problem is best addressed if its solution
results in cooperation that recognises linkages among the diverse by interrelated subsystems (i.e pollution-fisheries; navigation-protection; protection-tourism). The
cross-sectoral cooperation assists in reducing governance problems. Overall, if the
above-referred principles of ocean governance are introduced in legal and policy
instruments, the direct outcome is more holistic instruments which acknowledge the
linkages between issues, which results in decreasing segmentation. Another positive
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outcome that result from the adoption of more holistic instruments is the decrease in
proliferation because there will not be a need for sectoral instruments to be adopted.
As previously demonstrated, during the Pre-LOSC and LOSC periods, the selected
principles were introduced in various ocean-related policies and treaties as guiding
principles for ocean governance. During the Post-LOSC period, these principles were
further consolidated by treaties and policies which more clearly provided procedural
norms for the implementation of these principles. This is to say that during the PreLOSC period, the principles served as ‘ideals’ to be pursued. However, the PreLOSC period did not provide for means to apply the principles. This indicates that
during that period the political discussion regarding the need for a paradigm shift in
ocean governance was just being initiated in particular as a result of the convening of
the UNCHE. The selected principles were in their ‘infancy’ during the Pre-LOSC.
Subsequently, during the LOSC period, however, much was said about cooperation
but the other three principles were not emphasised as much. Despite this, all four
principles continued to evolve at least to some degree until their full consolidation
during the Post-LOSC period.
During the Post-LOSC period all four principles were consistently included in most
of the policy and legal instruments that were adopted and provided with practical
legal mechanisms to apply them. For example, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement listed
the following integrated measures: conservation measures should be qualified by
relevant environmental and economic factors.871 By doing so, the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement demonstrated that it has embraced the principle of integration in a
practical fashion, not merely in hortatory manner. Article V of the FAO Compliance
Agreement introduced a preventive nature while granting the right to port states to
investigate fishing boats which were suspect of over-fishing. In regards to the
precautionary approach, the FAO Code of Conduct expressly commands its parties to
take account of the best scientific evidence available in the management of fisheries.
However, in the ‘absence of adequate scientific information’, parties should not use
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it ‘as a reason for postponing or failing to take measures to conserve target species,
associated or dependent species and non-target species and their environment.’872
Furthermore, the principle of cooperation, for instance, was strengthened by new
measures adopted during the Post-LOSC period. These measures comprise
groundbreaking shipboarding provisions, the exclusion of non cooperating parties
from benefiting from a fisheries arrangement, for instance. Other advances
introduced during the Post-LOSC period to reduce the governance problems are
discussed below.

5.9.1 Improvements in the Principle of Cooperation during the Post-LOSC
Period
As discussed earlier in this chapter, during the Post-LOSC period, cooperation was
increasingly strengthened by provisions such as article 8(4) of UN Fish Stocks
Agreement. This article prevented non-cooperating actors from accruing benefits that
resulted from cooperating agreements in which they were not parties or if they were
signatories, they were undermining its terms. Another provision that strengthened the
principle of cooperation was article 17(1) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. This
article also obligates states to cooperate despite the fact they chose to not join a
RFOs. Similarly, Article VIII (2) of the FAO Compliance Agreement is an example
of another article that strengthened cooperation while preventing non-parties from
undermining the effectiveness of conservation and management measures. Similar
progress was achieved in the area of maritime security with provisions that allowed
for boarding of ships by non-flag states in the event of these ships being suspect of
involvement with maritime terrorism, with the requirement of given prior
authorisation by the flag state (art. 8 of the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention).
As argued in this and in previous chapters, cooperation is the opposite of acting
unilaterally. If a non-cooperating party acts in a manner that undermines the
conservation and management measures of an existing cooperating agreement, it
872
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creates governance problems within the system as a whole. Moreover, if a noncooperating party does not become a member of a RFO, in an attempt to bypass the
costs and obligations resulting from membership, these actions result in them acting
in isolation. This situation can also result in parties of a cooperating agreement
having their fair share of marine living resources usurped by non-members which
undermine the agreed upon conservation measures. This situation is counter
productive to ocean governance and results in failures within the system.
That is the underlying reason for the new legal instruments adopted during the PostLOSC period to obligate even non-parties to cooperate. These provisions generated
controversy because they challenged the custom of international law that suggests
that states can only be bound by laws they have expressly consented to themselves,
which is known as the rule of pacta tertius. Up to today, these provisions still stand
and have not been legally challenged. This is indication of a positive development
within ocean governance because international community is choosing to strengthen
cooperation for the collective good instead of protecting individual interests of states
which are not willing to participate in cooperation. In other words, it can be argued
that during the Post-LOSC period, the international community weakened the rule of
pacta tertius in favour of the need to strengthen cooperation in view of the
recognition that without it, cooperating agreements could be easily undermined.
In terms of reducing governance problems, the principle of cooperation is beneficial
for ocean governance in reducing proliferation, for instance. That is, once states build
strong cooperating agreements, such as those supported by regional commissions or
by means of treaties that possess large membership, such as the LOSC, chances are
that the number of smaller treaties will be reduced. This is because strong
cooperating agreements with wide membership reduce the need for small-scale
agreements to be adopted. These bilateral or piecemeal agreements only reflect the
interests of two states. This circumstance creates further proliferation of other treaties
and agreements. Treaties such as the LOSC with large memberships or regional
cooperating arrangements such as Regional Sea Program’s protocol or a RFO
regulating a certain fish stock have the potential to forge consensus between
interested parties, thus reducing the possibilities of them acting in isolation and
overloading the ocean governance system even more.
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Moreover, by extending the obligation to cooperate to non-cooperating parties, these
new provisions went further towards expanding the reach of cooperation to include
even those who might purposefully tried to bypass the obligation to cooperate by not
becoming a member of a RFO or not signing an agreement. Thus, the incentives to
engage in cooperation are greater than to not cooperate. The likelihood is greater that
states will refrain from acting in an isolationist and self-interested manner.

5.9.2 Consideration to Cross-Sectoral Issues
More than ever during the evolution of ocean governance, cross-sectoral issues were
the focus of attention during the Post-LOSC period. This trend started with the
UNCED process in 1992. By virtue of its policy outcome, Agenda 21, it was
recognised that to pursue the protection and sustainable development of the marine
and coastal environment and its resources, there was a need for new approaches that
were ‘integrated in content’.873 Integration implies consideration for cross-sectoral
issues, once the relationship of the various sectors is taken into regard, cross-sectoral
issues are also considered. Moreover, the WSSD process in 2002 stated in its JPOI
that to ensure sustainable development of the oceans, the following was required:
[i]ntegrated,

multidisciplinary

and

multisectoral

coastal

and

ocean

management at the national level and encourage and assist coastal States in
developing

ocean

policies

and

mechanisms

on

integrated

coastal

management;874
Various initiatives adopted during the Post-LOSC period included an integrated,
multidisciplinary and multisectoral approach. Examples of such initiatives are the
1991 PSSA Guidelines, the IPOA-IUU, and the FAO Code of Conduct. As discussed
in earlier chapters, the principle of integration requires consideration of the multidimensional and inter-related nature of ocean problems. This means that no longer
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can an ocean problem can be solved based on its ecological implications alone.
Consideration towards the economic, social, and ecosystem aspects is necessary if
integration is to be embraced. For instance, market-related measures such as catch
documentation schemes that identify the origin of the harvested fish were applied
during the Post-LOSC period to combat fisheries problems such as illegal,
unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU fishing).875
In another example, during the first meeting of UNICPOLOS participants linked the
importance of combating ocean problems to the pursuit of goals such as food
security, sustainable economic prosperity, the well-being of present and future
generations, the protection of public health, and the elimination of poverty. 876 In this
regard, UNICPOLOS I stated that ocean governance needed to be guided by an
approach that presented the following characteristics:
Integrated, bringing together the many different economic sectors involved,
management approaches addressing all aspects of ecosystems, including the
whole

hydrological

cycle

and

riverbasin

management

for

whole

catchments.877
The analysis of cross-sectoral issues through application of integration and
ecosystem-approaches promoted effective collaboration between ocean sectors that
traditionally would be operating in a segmented manner. For example, port state
measures which were traditionally applied for safety and polluting episodes, started
to be applied to curb over-fishing. The same integrated nature is present in the
proposal to create institutional linkages or joint working groups between RFOs
(fisheries) and UNEP/RSP (regional approach towards pollution). Thus, the analysis
of cross-sectoral issues results in the avoidance of duplicating and contracting
policies and agreements within ocean governance as a whole.
Another positive outcome resulting from cross-sectoral considerations was the
streamlining of ocean activities. In this regard, it was suggested at UNCPOLOS II
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that there was a need to undertake a global assessment of marine pollution and the
destruction of marine habitat that also takes into account their impact on public
health, food security, biodiversity and marine ecosystem health, and marine
ecosystem services.878 Such an endeavour would require several agencies to be
involved such as UNEP, World Health Organization (WHO), IMO, FAO,
International

Atomic

Energy

Agency

(IAEA),

United

Nations

Industrial

Development Organization (UNIDO), and World Meteorological Organization
(WMO).879 If such an assessment came to fruition, the outcome would potentially
lead to the streamlining of ocean activities relative to marine pollution. Examples of
cross-sectoral issues that gained attention during the Post-LOSC period include:
-

the impact of submarine groundwater discharge and its impacts on coastal
zones;880

-

the impact of genetically engineered fish with the potential to become
invasive species that could wipe out entire populations of wild fish stocks;881

-

the impact of navigation in ecologically sensitive areas;882

-

the impact of activities in the international seabed area as a potential source
of contamination of the marine environment;883 and

-

the impact of fishery subsidies and their possible negative effects on the
conservation of marine living resources.884

5.9.3 The Need to Build Partnerships with Financial Organisations
During the Post-LOSC period, the international community realised that the
persistent degradation of natural resources including marine environment could be a
result of inadequate funding, lack of cohesion between planning and budgeting
activities, and the absence of financial incentives to promote conservation and
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sustainable use of the marine environment. In this regard, Agenda 21 stated the
following:
[T]here has to be an effective link between substantive action and financial
support, and this requires close and effective cooperation and exchange of
information between the United Nations system and the multilateral financial
institutions for the follow-up of Agenda 21 within the institutional
arrangement.885
The need to address ocean issues by taking into account financial aspects was
emphasised during the Post-LOSC period, more than in previous periods. For
instance, the LOSC did not provide for any financial mechanism to support its
implementation. However, during the Post-LOSC period, the weak links between
cooperating initiatives and the sources of funding to support these initiatives was
frequently emphasised. This issue is pertinent for the principle of cooperation
because it could be the case that more positive outcomes could be achieved if there
were provisions within cooperating agreements that established partnerships with
international financial organisations and multilateral and bilateral donors.886
In particular regard to oceans, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 highlighted the need for
adequate financial, scientific, and technological cooperation to support action and to
implement conservation and sustainable use of marine living resources, particularly
for developing nations.887 In addition, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 recommended that
states ‘develop economic incentives’, such as the polluter pays principle to assist
with the task of preserving and sustainably using the oceans.888 It was also during the
Post-LOSC period that UNEP decided to strengthen its program against land-base
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source of pollution (GPA) through the identification of financial mechanisms.

889

As

pointed out earlier in this chapter, UNEP’s objective was to avoid repeating the poor
performance of the 1985 Montreal Guidelines which was compromised, at least in
part, by the absence of financial incentives.890 In this regard, participants during
UNICPOLOS I stressed the importance of joining efforts, thus promoting integration
and cooperation, with investments sources towards the prevention of marine
pollution:
An invitation for the World Bank and UNEP to bring together as part of their
review of the 1995 UNEP GPA/LBA, representatives of private sector
financial institutions, international financial institutions and multilateral and
bilateral donors to review possible steps to involve them in the
implementation of the 1995 UNEP GPA/LBA.891
Thus, the emphasis on the need to include financial organisations as partners in
cooperating agreements was a step in the right direction towards avoiding
governance failures. During the Post-LOSC period, ocean managers and law makers
came to realise that governance systems fail when they plan and adopt rules without
linking the objectives of these instruments to a source of financing. During the PostLOSC the need for international community to foster the link between planning and
budgeting of initiatives became more noticeable. If links between planning and
financing were fostered that would result in less segmentation.
Moreover, the utilisation of market-based measures such as the ones proposed in
IPOA-IUU, or the application of polluter-pay principle as additional tools to assist in
protecting and preserving the marine environment, are indications not only that
financial mechanisms assist in implementing laws by also are indications of a more
integrated and holistic approach towards ocean governance. These initiatives,
launched during the Post-LOSC period are a result of a process of evolution in which
new initiatives were devised to overcome the failures or absences from previous
periods.
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5.9.4 The Importance of Cooperation in the Area of Enforcement and
Compliance
It was also during the Post-LOSC period that another aspect of the principle of
cooperation was strengthened. That is, the need to develop mechanisms to enhance
cooperation in the areas of enforcement and compliance. The Pre-LOSC and LOSC
periods served to primarily prescribe cooperation in many of the treaties and policies
adopted during these periods. The Post-LOSC period, however, focused attention
towards the need to reinforce compliance and enforcement of these instruments. For
instance, it has been suggested the creation of a network of contacts between
enforcement authorities and capacity-building experts to investigate and prosecute
growing incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea.892 Also, regional cooperation
through joint patrols has also proved to be a deterrent to pirates and other
offenders.893 It has been proposed that capacity-building and the sharing of law
enforcement resources and corresponding expenses could be addressed within the
framework of regional agreements to be built by interested parties.894
In relation to land-based pollution, for example, it has been stressed that one of the
weaknesses of the UNEP GPA/LBA is the absence of cooperation in terms of
compliance mechanisms within its framework, such as ‘user fees and charges for
pollution violations.’895 Given that the great majority of marine pollution originates
from land-based sources, it was pointed out during the Post-LOSC period that there
was a need to develop cooperation towards the creation of effective mechanisms
including independent monitoring and surveillance. The lack of support for measures
to control land-based pollution indicates that either those laws and measures have not
been enforced properly or they are inadequate. Most likely the laws in place have not
been properly enforced.
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In the area of fisheries, it has been pointed out that the major cause of IUU fishing is
the failure by many states to fulfil their flag state obligations and allowing illegal
fishing to develop into an organised criminal activity.896 In view of this deficiency,
FAO and partners (RFOs and concerned states among them)897 have been working to
improve cooperation in the area of compliance through further strengthening of
monitoring, control, and surveillance networks to combat IUU fishing.898
In the areas of safety of navigation and the protection of the marine environment,
there has been a need for flag states and the shipping industry to share
responsibilities for implementing and enforcing relevant international rules and
standards.899 This need arose from problems related to the ineffectiveness and
unwillingness of some flag states to implement safety measures and standards to
prevent, control, and reduce pollution. This exemplifies the importance of focus on
enforcement in view of the fact that there are adequate laws in place but states are
failing to comply with them.
The Johannesburg Declaration also emphasised the need for compliance and for
greater accountability.900 In this regard, the WSSD process proposed monitoring as a
means to achieve sustainable development goals at regular intervals.901 According to
the WSSD outcomes, the era of enacting policy and legal instruments has been
replaced with the need for implementation, compliance, and accountability. The
Johannesburg Declaration is a reflection of the new trend in ocean governance that
took place during the Post-LOSC in which emphasis is given to compliance and
accountability as means to increase efficiency. This is to say that the enacting treaty
is as important as finding means to ensure that parties are complying with them.
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5.10 Conclusion
This chapter examined several policy and legal instruments adopted during the PostLOSC period with the objective of verifying whether these instruments have
contributed to decreasing governance failures. The chapter highlighted that during
the Post-LOSC period, and likewise in previous periods, international cooperation
continues to be mandated for solving governance problems. It was shown that the
framework for cooperation within the LOSC was enhanced by groundbreaking
provisions introduced by new agreements and policy instruments during the PostLOSC period. Among the most innovative measures are those that prevented noncooperating states from reaping the same benefits as cooperating states in the area of
fisheries. This was done by virtue of the adoption of the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement.902 Other groundbreaking provisions were also introduced regarding
shipboarding by non-flag states in the areas of port security, fisheries to combat IUU
fishing, and marine pollution.
It was also demonstrated that the Post-LOSC period witnessed the inclusion of all
four principles of international law in several of its treaties and ocean policies.
Cooperation, integration, ecosystem approaches and precautionary approaches were
introduced or strengthened more frequently than they were in treaties and ocean
policies adopted during the Pre-LOSC and LOSC periods. This chapter also
demonstrated there was a recognition of the need for integrated, multidisciplinary,
and multisectoral ocean governance during the Post-LOSC period. A paradigm shift
was identified in the area of marine pollution, from a reactive approach to a more
preventive and precautionary approach.903 However, despite progress during the PostLOSC period towards inclusion of all four principles of cooperation, integration,
precautionary and ecosystem approaches in some of its treaties, a lack of consistent
implementation and accountability pose obstacles for efficient ocean governance.
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CHAPTER 6 - INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR OCEAN
GOVERNANCE

6.1 Introduction
This Chapter analyses the historical evolution of the institutional framework904 for
ocean governance. In this thesis, ‘institutional framework’ is taken to mean all
agencies, organisations and programs with ocean mandates.905 The focus of this
chapter will be mainly on institutional arrangements created and sponsored by the
United Nations (UN). This chapter supports the argument that the institutional
framework for ocean governance is affected by the same governance problems that
plague its legal framework, as discussed in previous chapters. These problems
consist of uncoordinated proliferation of institutions and a sectoral view towards
ocean management. Given the great number of ocean-mandated institutions and in
order to facilitate the analysis, this chapter is divided into four parts. The first section
focuses on institutional arrangements set up during the period prior to the adoption of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), or the Pre-LOSC
period, which covers institutions created before 1982. It will be demonstrated that the
Pre-LOSC period is characterised by the creation of major ocean-related
organisations, in particular under the umbrella of the UN.906 The second section
addresses the institutional framework for ocean governance that resulted from the
adoption of the LOSC. The third section addresses the Post-LOSC period and its
prevailing trend towards more informal, flexible, time-bound and multi-stakeholders
arrangements; in particular, a more noticeable involvement of non-state entities,
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known as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The discussion addresses the
contributions made by the institutional framework for ocean governance towards
reducing governance problems, in particular, the contributions that took place during
the Post-LOSC period. Among these contributions are: formations of joint initiatives
to address cross-sectoral issues and the inclusion of the principles of international
law in their practices while carrying out their ocean-related mandates.
The last section discusses the persisting problems which various institutions,
organisations and bodies within ocean governance are confronted with in executing
their mandates, such as segmentation, lack of multi-sectoral and multi-level
approaches, absence of an overarching global oceans organisation to coordinate the
various ocean-mandated agencies, lack of accountability, transparency and
implementation, and persisting lack of technical and financial resources. The chapter
concludes that because of these persisting problems, the institutional framework for
ocean governance needs to coordinate efforts between its several ocean-mandated
organisations in order to be more effective in the deliverance of a more efficient
ocean governance.

6.2 Institutional Framework for Ocean Governance during the Pre-LOSC
Period
For many centuries, the institutional framework for ocean governance was
characterised by ad-hoc institutional arrangements to solve specific ocean problems.
For instance, during the 17th century, a private enterprise known as the Dutch East
India Company hired Hugo Grotius as a ‘paid council’907 to write a treatise to argue
in favour of the lawfulness of the Dutch gaining possession of the prize from
captured Portuguese ships.908 By virtue of the work of this private enterprise, whose
main activity was maritime trade, a custom of international maritime law known as
‘freedom of the seas’ was consolidated. The practical result of the treatise written by
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Hugo Grotius was to open the commerce with East Indies to the Dutch and other
governments, thus rejecting Portugal’s claim of exclusivity sustained.909
During the 19th century, with more disputes over marine resources, ad-hoc
commissions were set up to serve as the main forum for dispute resolution in the area
of conservation and management of marine living resources. For instance, the
commissions established between France and Great Britain were created to
implement bilateral treaties to regulate fisheries between the British and French
governments.910 Thus, dispute over resources triggered the creation of the first
commissions mandated with the obligation to foster cooperation between parties.
Although during the 19th century, ‘cooperation’ was at its most rudimentary stage,
this principle was not even being referred as such in the text of the signed treaties.
With the decline of fisheries stocks, some nations decided to undertake ‘systematic
assessments of the state of marine fisheries’ in particular as a result of the realisation
that fish stocks were not inexhaustible as advocated by the supporters of the Grotius
doctrine of ‘freedom of the seas’.911 This realisation led to the establishment of the
International Council for Exploration of the Seas (ICES) in 1902. ICES was the first
scientific body responsible for promoting, encouraging and organising research and
investigation for the study of the ocean, especially its living resources, and to
disseminate the results.912 This trend of setting up ad-hoc institutional arrangements
with ocean mandates continued until the creation of UN in 1945,913 when several
permanent agencies, programs and other organisations with ocean mandates were set
up under the overarching authority of the UN.
The centralised position of the UN in ocean governance is the reason why the
analysis of the institutional framework in this thesis will mainly focus on institutional
arrangements set up by the UN in fulfilling its global mandate to put forward an
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agenda for environmental issues, including ocean issues, at the international level.914
The UN has a leadership role in ocean governance and possesses a global mandate in
environmental law-making in general.915 The UN is a complex system of
organisations, which comprises a range of different bodies with diverse levels of
autonomy.916 The so-called ‘United Nations family’ consists of the UN Secretariat, its
programs and funds and the specialised agencies.917 A detailed depiction of the
functions of the main UN bodies, organs and programs with oceans as part of their
mandates follows.

6.2.1 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)918
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is the most prominent deliberative
body of the UN system.919 All the 192 member-nations of the UN participate in the
discussions that take place at the UNGA.920 To assist in fulfilling its mandate, the
UNGA comprises three main organs: the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Security Council (SC). All these
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organs have deliberated on ocean issues.921 The UNGA performs two main functions
that are relevant to ocean governance. The first is related to overseeing the activities
of various specialised agencies which possess ocean mandates. The second main task
is the annual discussion on ocean and the law of the sea, based on issues brought
before the UNGA by the annual Report of the Secretary General on Oceans and Law
of the Sea (SG Report).

6.2.1.1 Supervision Role
In regards to the supervision role exercised by the UNGA over various specialised
agencies with ocean mandates, UNGA is assisted by the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC).922 This means that the activities of all UN specialised agencies
are coordinated by the UNGA through its ECOSOC to which specialised agencies
and programs need to report.923 Within the hierarchy of the UN, these agencies and
programs have fewer powers than the UNGA.924 However, the superiority of the
UNGA over specialised agencies and other bodies is only ‘in theory’ because in
practical terms, the autonomy enjoyed by the specialised agencies with ocean
mandates makes it extremely difficult for ECOSOC to oversee and coordinate their
activities.925 As will be explored later, this is because specialised agencies enjoy
complete autonomy in matters relating to their own rules, membership, staff and
budget.926
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The UNGA’s overseeing function is also weakened by the fact that the chosen
method used by the UNGA/ECOSOC to supervise the performance of its specialised
agencies is merely through analysis of reports generated by the specialised agencies
themselves.927 Thus, the privileged position of the UNGA is not fully accomplished
as a result of the autonomy enjoyed by specialised agencies. Further, the reporting
system set up by the UNGA weakens the its overseeing role in the sense that the
specialised agencies prepare and submit the reports. The overarching role to be
played by the UNGA is compromised. This fact poses challenges to the objective of
having the Assembly as the most suitable organ within the UN system to foster
international cooperation and coordination in ocean governance. On the autonomy of
the specialised agencies, Wolfrum and Matz argued that:
Differently from treaties, which do not have independence from the will and
interest of the member states, the UN specialized agencies have legal
personality in international law, including the ability to enter into
international treaties.928
The autonomy enjoyed by the specialised agencies poses difficulties for the UNGA
in the exercise of its supervisory role in terms of giving coherence to the system of
ocean governance. On the other hand, UN funds and programs, such as the United
Nations Environment Program (UNEP), are less autonomous. For instance, UNEP is
funded by voluntary contributions from governments and trust funds and has its
budget supplemented by the UN.929 Programs such as UNEP depend heavily on
donors to ensure their efficiency, which at times leaves UNGA without much
leverage over UNEP.
For the management of the oceans to be performed in a coordinated and coherent
manner, various agencies and programs need to either be part of a structure with a
more influential overseeing UNGA or various agencies and programs need to
develop inter-agency cooperation between them to overcome that lack of coherency
in the entire system of governance. That is the reason why many suggestions raised
927
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during UN meetings reinforced the need for granting more powers to the UNGA over
the work of its specialised agencies.930 There is also a need to devise other
mechanisms to control and assess the performance of its specialised agencies besides
reports submitted by the agencies themselves.

6.2.1.2 Annual Discussion on Ocean and the Law of the Sea
Regarding ocean affairs, the other main function of the UNGA is to sponsor the
annual discussion on ocean and the law of the sea based on issues brought before it
by the annual SG Report. This is because with the entry into force of the LOSC in
1994, the UNGA ‘assumed the role of overseeing’ developments relating to the
LOSC and ocean affairs in general.931 Also, as a result of the adoption in 1995 of the
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN
Fish Stocks Agreement), the UNGA became responsible for overseeing its
implementation.
Accordingly, UNGA undertakes an annual review of ocean developments and
presents its findings under a consolidated agenda item titled ‘oceans and the law of
the sea’.932 This reviewing function on the implementation of the LOSC, for instance,
corresponds to the same task carried out by meetings of states’ parties of
international agreements. The LOSC is a rare exception in the sense that its meeting
of states’ parties only deals with administrative and budgetary issues,933 resulting in
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UNGA being required to carry out the monitoring function of the implementation of
the LOSC.934
Another outcome of these annual meetings is that recommendations are made to all
UN member states by means of ocean-related resolutions. UNGA resolutions are
non-binding, although they have an almost binding nature, given the nearly universal
membership of the UNGA.935 This circumstance confers the UNGA resolutions with
‘incomparable political weight’.936 Among the most significant ocean-related
resolutions adopted by the UNGA is UNGA resolution A/RES/55/8 of 30/10/00,
which was adopted to reduce large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing and fisheries bycatch, and UNGA resolution A/RES/49/116 of 19/12/94, which was adopted to
regulate unauthorised fishing in zones of national jurisdiction and its impact on the
marine living resources of the world's oceans and seas. The implementation of the
UNGA resolutions is also overseen by the UNGA.
Another relevant aspect of the UNGA’s annual ocean meeting is that all UN
members, including those which have not acceded to the LOSC, can participate in
the discussions placing ocean issues in the centre of attention of the international
community. Even though ocean issues are given top priority in the UN agenda, some
criticism has been raised in regards to the short amount of time given for discussions
on this matter at the UNGA’s annual sessions.937 In addition, it has been argued that
the UNGA needs to engage in ‘further in-depth policy-oriented deliberations’ when
discussing ocean issues at its annual assembly.
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6.2.2 Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS)
The Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) is a division of
the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), which is comprised within the UN Secretariat.939
DOALOS also serves as the secretariat of the LOSC.940 Among DOALOS’s main
objectives are ‘to promote a better understanding of the Convention [LOSC] and the
related Agreements,941 their wider acceptance, uniform and consistent application and
effective implementation.’942 In fulfilling this task, DOALOS also attempts to gather
information on legislative measures undertaken by states’ parties in implementing
the LOSC.943 For instance, in 2003 DOALOS circulated a questionnaire to all states,
both parties and non-parties, requesting information with regard to law-of-the-searelated issues.944 The effectiveness of this method is disputed given that not many
states have replied to the survey.945
Another function of DOALOS is to disseminate through its website information on
oceans, marine affairs and the law of the sea.946 DOALOS reports annually to the
UNGA on matters related to the law of the sea in general and the LOSC treaty in
particular. DOALOS also has an advisory role for states in regards to implementation
of the LOSC. Furthermore, DOALOS officials make recommendations to the UNGA
and other intergovernmental forums in view of ‘promoting a better understanding of
the Convention [LOSC]’.947
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In 1999, DOALOS was given another function as a result of the persistent problems
of lack of coordination and cooperation at the intergovernmental and inter-agency
levels within the UN system for ocean governance. Accordingly, DOALOS
sponsored meetings948 of the United Nations Open-Ended Informal Consultative
Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS). As will be seen,
UNICPOLOS was created by UNGA to enhance coordination and cooperation
within the UN system of ocean governance. Lastly, as part of its functions, DOALOS
provides educational and capacity building programs to promote better understanding
on law of the sea matters.949

6.2.3 International Court of Justice (ICJ)
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the UN. It
was established in June 1945 by the Charter of the UN, and began its activities in
April 1946.950 The ICJ has the same membership as the UN as a whole,951 or 192
member states.952 Besides being the main judicial organ to settle legal disputes in
which UN member states are interested parties, the ICJ can also provide advisory
opinions on legal matters upon request of the UNGA, the Security Council953 or
specialised agencies.954 In regards to ocean-related legal disputes before the ICJ, the
court has been playing an important role, particularly in solving disputes related to
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maritime delimitation,955 fisheries956 and other ocean-related matters, such as nuclear
tests at sea,957 sovereignty over rocks and958 navigational rights between states.959 The
docket of cases before the ICJ on maritime delimitation is by far the most extensive
if compared with other international courts.

6.2.4 Ocean-Mandated UN Specialised Agencies, Bodies and Programs
Metaphorically, if the UN as a whole is considered the ‘body’, the specialised
agencies would be its ‘organs’. Specialised agencies are vital for the functioning of
the UN system, especially in areas that require expertise and specialisation, such as
the various sectors within ocean governance, namely navigation, fisheries, marine
scientific research, protection and preservation of the marine environment and
prevention and control of marine pollution.960 Specialised agencies serve as
subsidiary bodies to the UNGA and are linked to the UN by virtue of special
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agreements.961 There are 14 UN agencies with oceans as part of their
responsibilities.962
•

International Maritime Organization (IMO) (shipping);

•

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (fisheries),

•

United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) (protection and preservation
of the marine environment);

•

United

Nations

Educational,

Scientific

and

Cultural

Organisation

(UNESCO)/ Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) (marine
science);
•

International Labour Organisation (ILO) (maritime labour);

•

International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (marine communications);

•

International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO) (ocean hydrography);

•

World Health Organisation (WHO) (water quality surveillance in beaches),

•

World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) (weather forecast),

•

International Maritime Satellite Organisations (INMARSAT) (maritime
satellite systems);

•

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (technical assistance);

•

International Institute for the Unification of Private Trade Law (UNIDROIT)
(commercial maritime law); International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
(maritime transport of radioactive waste);

•

World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) (maritime tourism); and

•

World Trade Organisation (fisheries subsidies)

The most relevant specialised agencies within the UN with ocean mandates are the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO) and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC). These
specialised agencies are responsible for the areas of fisheries, navigation and shipborne pollution and marine scientific research, respectively. These areas comprise
the bulk of ocean governance in terms of number of treaties adopted whose
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implementation fall within the mandates of the FAO, IMO and IOC. For that reason,
these agencies will be the main focus of this chapter.963 Another reason for not
analysing all of UN specialised agencies with ocean as part of their mandate is the
impracticality of discussing 14 specialised agencies. The chapter also will examine
the mandate of a UN program (i.e., UNEP). The UNEP is of particular importance
for this thesis because this program is mandated with the prevention of marine
pollution, mainly at the regional level.

6.2.4.1 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is one of the earliest created
specialised agencies within the UN system. Its creation dates back to 1946, almost
coinciding with the creation of the UN itself. The FAO was originally tasked with the
mission to ‘institutionalise international cooperation in the field of nutrition and
agriculture’.964 The FAO’s Constitution lists among its functions the following:
‘collecting, analysing, interpreting and disseminating information relating to
nutrition, food and agriculture (including fisheries and marine products) in order to
promote national and international action and to provide technical assistance’.965
FAO is also committed to applying an ecosystem approach to fisheries management
by means, for instance, of considering the effects of fishery activities on the marine
ecosystem as a whole.966
FAO has, since its inception, fostered cooperation for the management and
conservation of marine living resources, in particular fisheries, through regional
fisheries organisations (RFOs). Pursuant to article VI of the FAO Constitution,
regional commissions (or RFOs) can be created ‘to advise on the formulation and to
implement policy as well as to coordinate their implementation’. Moreover,
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according to article XIV of its Constitution, RFOs may have the power to adopt
potentially binding measures.967 As a result, since 1948, FAO serves as the secretariat
for several RFOs responsible for managing stocks such as tuna and whales.968
FAO comprises three main organs, namely the Conference, the Council and the
Director-General. The primary organ is the Conference, the membership of which
consists of 191 member states.969 FAO has eight departments in its structure. Among
them is the Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture, its main function being to
promote ‘the long-term sustainable development and utilisation of the world’s
fisheries and aquaculture’.970 The Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture adopted
an integrated approach to governance while promoting sustainable fisheries as a
means to alleviate poverty by generating national income and to increase
international and national trade.971 The Fisheries and Aquaculture Department
provides, at the request of members, technical assistance in all aspects of fisheries
and aquaculture management and development.972
In addition to its main organs (conference and council) and departments, FAO
established a number of subsidiary bodies, such as commissions and committees to
deal with its diverse mandate. Of relevance for ocean governance is its Committee of
Fisheries (COFI). COFI was established by the FAO conference in 1965 to review
the work of the FAO regarding aquaculture and fisheries in order to identify
problems and find solutions in their mandated areas.973
Since its inception, the FAO was focused on increasing productivity of agricultural
resources (including fisheries) aiming at food security.974 For more than 50 years,
FAO’s approach to fisheries resources was characterised by short-term economic and
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social benefits in their use.975 Consequently, COFI has put forward the agency’s
policy of increasing productivity.976 However, with the decline in fisheries resources
at global level, this approach changed and FAO committed itself, especially through
COFI, to promote long-term sustainability of fishery resources, shifting focus from
high productivity to conservation by adopting a ‘conservation-oriented approach’.977
The outcomes of COFI’s sessions are usually in the form of ‘recommendations
addressed to governments, RFOs, NGOs, fish workers, FAO and the international
community’.978 COFI also plays a key role in the adoption of both binding and nonbinding agreements when they are being negotiated.979
FAO has numerous active partnership arrangements with other specialised agencies,
programs and funds of the UN system,980 in particular to solve cross-sectoral
problems that affect fisheries. For instance, FAO through COFI has been
discussing981 in collaboration with other agencies the external factors affecting
sustainable fisheries, such as pollution from land-based sources, cooperation in
exchanging information on global trends and status reporting in fisheries, criteria for
listing commercially exploited aquatic resources within the framework of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES) and ecosystem-based management in fisheries.982 Other examples of
partnerships between FAO and other UN agencies is the Aquatic Science and
Fisheries Abstracts, which is part of the Aquatic Science and Fisheries System
(ASFIS) jointly managed by FAO, IOC/UNESCO, UNEP and the DOALOS.983 The
main purpose of ASFIS is to provide a largely used global service for dissemination
of fisheries statistic data. In terms of coordination between FAO and other
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organisations outside the UN, the FAO Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture is
mandated with the obligation to foster partnerships between FAO and ‘national and
international institutions, academia, the private sector and civil society’.984
FAO has a complex structure, which is reflected in its heavily bureaucratic
arrangement. For instance, in terms of personnel, FAO employs almost 3,600 staff.985
In comparison with other specialised agencies, such as IMO,986 FAO is one of the
largest specialised agencies within the UN system. Most recently, FAO is undergoing
administrative reforms to alleviate pressure from its budget by adopting several
measures. Among the proposed measures is the transfer of staff from its headquarters
in Rome to the field987 and an increase in the use of experts from developing
countries and countries with economies in transition.988 FAO faces constant criticism
regarding its lack of focus since it shares its budget between diverse areas of interest
ranging from agriculture to forestry to fisheries.989 The criticism originates from
developed nations, which are its main donors.990 In this regard:
What was criticized, on the one hand, was that FAO seemed to adopt
programs and allocate financial resources rather according to the principle
ofgiving everyone a slice of the cake than pursuing a well-planned, coherent
and thus efficient overall program.991
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6.2.4.2 International Maritime Organization (IMO)
The IMO was established in 1948 by a convention signed in Geneva.992 IMO was
originally called the International Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO).
Later, the organisation changed its name to International Maritime Organization.993
IMO’s primary purpose was to ‘provide machinery for cooperation among
governments in technical matters concerning international shipping and maritime
security’.994
Different from FAO, whose mandate since its inception was multi-purpose (i.e.,
agriculture, forestry and fisheries), IMO is mainly focused on regulation of
international shipping, which makes it one of the most ‘specialised’ agencies within
the UN system. As a result of a growing number of oil spill accidents involving large
oil takers in the late 1960s,995 IMO had its mandate extended in 1975 to include
among its purposes ‘the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships’,
pursuant to an amendment to Article 1 of its constituent instrument.996 As a result of
its extended mandate, IMO adopted a series of treaties on safety of navigation.997
Currently, IMO is mandated to adopt the highest standards in matters of international
shipping, facilitating adoption of general standards regarding maritime safety and
security, safeguarding efficiency of navigation and preventing and controlling marine
pollution from vessels.998 IMO enjoys a standard-setting role within the entire
international community for the above-referred matters.999
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Presently, IMO has 169 member states,1000 which represent more than 90 per cent of
the world’s merchant fleet from all regions of the world.1001 IMO comprises two main
governing bodies, the Assembly and the Council.1002 The IMO council has 40
member states from all regions of the world on an equitable geographic basis from
the states with the largest interest in providing international shipping to those with
the largest interest in international seaborne trade and others with special interests in
maritime transport or navigation.1003 The Council by virtue of powers conferred by
the Assembly is responsible to oversee the work of the IMO as a whole, including
coordinating the activities of all the IMO bodies.1004 Among other functions, the IMO
council can enter into agreements to regulate the relationship of IMO with other
organisations.1005
The IMO assembly is the ‘highest governing body of the organisation’1006 and is open
to all member states of IMO.1007 IMO has its headquarters in London, England. The
Assembly is responsible for approving the work program, voting on the budget and
determining the financial arrangements of the IMO. The IMO assembly also elects
the Council.1008 Most of the IMO’s technical activities are carried out in a number of
committees and sub-committees open to all its member states.1009 There are five main
committees, namely the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), Marine Environment
Protection Committee (MEPC), Legal Committee,1010 Technical Cooperation
Committee1011 and Facilitation Committee.1012 The two most important committees
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are the MSC and MEPC.1013 MSC is considered to be the ‘highest technical body’ of
IMO and has all IMO member states in its membership.1014 MSC’s primary function
is to ‘consider any matters regarding aids to navigation, construction and equipment
of vessels, manning from a safety standpoint, among other matters directly affecting
maritime safety’.1015
MEPC also comprises all IMO member states and has the main task of considering
matters related to ‘prevention and control of pollution from ships’.1016 MEPC is also
tasked with the analysis ‘of adoption and amendment of conventions and other
regulations and measures to ensure their enforcement’.1017 In general, all committees
and sub-committees are also responsible for updating legislation or developing and
adopting new regulations.1018 The committees’ meetings are attended by maritime
experts from member governments, together with those from interested
intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations.1019 IMO has been efficiently
carrying out its mandate by adopting some 40 conventions and 800 codes and
recommendations.1020 IMO also assists states to implement international standards
prescribed by its various treaties through national laws and regulations.
In terms of cooperation and building partnerships with other agencies and
organisations within and outside the UN, IMO does not have an extensive record.
However, IMO addressed cooperation in regards to the technical aspects of its
treaties and recommendations by virtue of its Technical Cooperation Committee, its
main purpose being to build partnerships with the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), to foster IMO projects, among other initiatives.1021 Cross-sectoral
considerations are not the main concern of IMO’s agenda, as is evident from the
language used by IMO to refer to the competencies and functions of its committees.
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While describing its committees’ functions, IMO complements the description with a
statement in which it limits the committees’ functions to the scope of IMO’s
mandate. For instance, the MEPC is responsible for matters related to ‘pollution from
ships’ ‘within the scope of the IMO’,1022 similarly while describing the function of the
MSC, IMO stated that the MSC is in charge of matters related to ‘maritime safety’ in
general ‘within the scope of the IMO’.1023 Despite the care in protecting its mandate
and limiting its activities to issues related to navigation, IMO has been developing
partnerships with other agencies and bodies. For instance, IMO developed a
partnership with representatives of the shipping industry and environmental NGOs
along with the secretariat of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention) to address
the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and their disposal.1024
IMO has also been responsive to new challenges in ocean governance such as the
realisation of the pervasive effects of ballast water from ships on the marine
environment. In addition, the United Nations Program of Action from Rio (Agenda
21)1025 recommended IMO to further develop regulatory measures to address
degradation of the marine environment, including in respect to sensitive areas and
regulation of air and ballast-water pollution from ships to prevent the spread of nonindigenous organisms.1026 Although, it has taken almost 12 years for the IMO to
adopt rules relating to the discharge of ballast water. In February of 2004, the IMO
adopted the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’
Ballast Water and Sediments (Ballast Water Convention).
Agenda 21 also invited IMO to build a partnership with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) in regards to another cross-sectoral issue, namely ‘the
carriage of irradiated nuclear fuel in flasks on board ships’.1027 A criticism raised
against the IMO is the neglect on the part of IMO’s member states in regards to non-
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implementation and non-compliance with existing conventions and standards,
especially by flag states, many of which are members of the IMO council.1028 Lack
of implementation of existing international safety rules and regulations by flag states
results in shipping accidents with loss of life and/or pollution.1029 It is generally
agreed these problems arise from the ineffectiveness and unwillingness of some flag
states to implement safety measures and standards to prevent, control and reduce
pollution.1030 In addressing this problem, IMO set up in 1993 a sub-committee called
Sub-committee on Flag State Implementation whose main duty is to ‘identify
measures necessary to ensure effective and consistent global implementation of IMO
instruments, paying particular attention to the special difficulties faced by developing
countries’.1031

6.2.4.3 Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC)
The third core UN ocean-related permanent body is the Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission (IOC), which was created in 1960 and it was tasked
with the following mandate:
To promote international cooperation and coordinate programs in marine
research, services, observation systems, hazard mitigation and capacity
development in order to learn more and better manage the nature and
resources of the ocean and coastal areas.1032
According to its statute, IOC is also responsible for fostering cooperation in the area
of capacity building and marine scientific research.1033 The main objective of IOC is
‘to apply that knowledge for the improvement, management, sustainable
development and protection of the marine environment and the decision-making
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process of its Member States’.1034 Most recently, IOC has focused on the effects of
climate change for the global ocean, in particular, on sea-level rise for small island
developing states and coastal cities.1035
The IOC has 138 member states.1036 The main IOC bodies are the Assembly,
Executive Council (40 seats) and Secretariat. IOC is not a specialised agency per se,
thus it does not enjoy the same level of autonomy in executing its mandate as FAO
and IMO do. This is because IOC was created under the umbrella of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).1037 UNESCO
is of one of the oldest UN specialised organisations; its creation dates to 1945.1038
UNESCO’s main objective is to promote ‘peace, the eradication of poverty,
sustainable development and intercultural dialogue through education, the sciences,
culture, communication and information.’1039 In 1960 during the 11th Session of
UNESCO’s Governing Council, IOC was established along with an Office of
Oceanography attached to the Department of Natural Sciences of UNESCO to
provide secretariat support to IOC.1040
Article 11(1) of its statute mandated IOC with the obligation to cooperate with other
agencies ‘whose interests and activities are related to its purpose’, resulting in a good
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record of inter-agency cooperation1041 (e.g. its partnership with the Group of Experts
on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP) whose ‘reports have
provided invaluable information on the state of the marine environment).’1042 Also,
given IOC’s recognised leadership in ocean climate science, IOC was invited to join
efforts with the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) to research climate
change, assess its effects, and provide monitoring and early warning, in particular to
assist the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
process in this regard.1043
In regards to the LOSC, IOC in conjunction with UNEP plays a decisive role in
assisting some UN state members, in particular developing states from Africa, with
the understanding of the process of demarcation of the outer limits of their
continental shelf.1044 Some of the activities conducted by the IOC/UNEP initiative
are: ‘several awareness-raising and information-sharing activities, providing
guidance on the process to be followed and assisting member states in identifying
consultants to conduct the necessary studies’.1045 Also, because knowledge about the
oceans is still scarce, IOC through its Advisory Body of Experts on the Law of the
Sea (ABE-LOS) attempts to assist in the implementation of Part XIII (Marine
Scientific Research) of LOSC by promoting the development of marine scientific
research.1046
Although the IOC was created under the umbrella of UNESCO, according to Article
1(1) of the IOC Statute, IOC enjoys ‘functional autonomy’ within the UNESCO.
IOC’s functional autonomy, however, is limited to ‘defining and implementing its
program of action according
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to its stated purposes and functions’.1047 IOC still needs to subject its program of
action to the General Conference of UNESCO, which will or will not approve such
programs based on the budgetary availability.1048 Similarly, for states to become
members of IOC, they need to notify the Director-General of UNESCO of their
intention to join IOC.1049 UNESCO is also in charge of determining personnel for
IOC’s Secretariat.1050 IOC needs the endorsement by UNESCO’s General Conference
even to effectuate changes in its statute.

1051

Thus, the work of IOC is limited by its

lack of autonomy from UNESCO. IOC is the last of three main relevant specialised
agencies within the UN which have relevance for ocean governance by virtue of
being mandated with the core areas namely fisheries (FAO), navigation and vesselsource pollution (IMO) and marine scientific research (UNESCO/IOC). Below the
focus is on a UN program set up by the UN to promote marine pollution prevention
in particular at regional level.

6.2.4.4 United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)
The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was the only institutional
outcome of the United Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE), which
convened in 1972. At the time there was an ‘urgent’ need for the establishment of an
institutional arrangement within the UN system responsible for ‘the protection and
improvement of the environment’.1052 In view of this need, UNEP was created to act
as a coordinating mechanism with the mission to protect and improve the
environment.1053 UNEP was originally created to coordinate activities of the various
organs and bodies within the UN system, ‘rather than initiate action itself’.1054
Despite not originally being set up to initiate action, UNEP focuses on the promotion
of regional and sub-regional cooperation for the protection and preservation of the
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marine environment and the elimination of land-based marine pollution at the
international level, as will be addressed below. UNEP can also be credited for
assisting in the process of ‘greening’ some specialised agencies such as the World
Bank,1055 developing international ‘soft law’ guidelines1056 and providing assistance,
in particular to developing countries, in drafting national environmental
legislation.1057
LOSC in its Annex VIII listed UNEP as the competent international agency
responsible for the protection and preservation of the marine environment.1058 In
conjunction with IMO, FAO and IOC, UNEP forms the core of the UN institutional
arrangement for ocean governance. This is because along with protection and
preservation of the marine environment, navigation, fisheries and marine scientific
research are the main areas of ocean governance.
UNEP’s main body is the Governing Council (GC), which includes 58 members
elected by the UNGA for a three-year term, on the basis of equitable geographic
distribution.1059 The UNEP/GC reports annually to the UNGA through ECOSOC,
which transmits to the UNGA comments on the report as it deems necessary.1060
UNEP is headed by the Executive Director who is elected by the UNGA based on
nomination by the UN Secretary-General for a four-year term.1061
By mandating UNEP with the protection of the marine environment, the UN did not
create a specialised agency to deal with this issue, but established a program that has
the status of a subsidiary body. As a subsidiary body, UNEP does not enjoy the
autonomy that specialised agencies have in terms of having their own budgets and
legal personality to adopt treaties, for instance. As pointed out before, UNEP does
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not even have the autonomy to choose members for its highest governing body, its
Governing Council. Instead, members are elected by the UNGA. Also, UNEP mostly
depends on voluntary contributions paid towards an environment fund.1062 Despite
lacking autonomy, UNEP played an important role within the UN as a result of being
the only body within the entire UN system whose mandate is focused specifically on
environmental issues.1063 Since its inception, UNEP focused on protecting and
preserving the marine environment against pollution from most sources, with the
exception of ship-borne pollution, which falls within IMO’s mandate, and
radioactive wastes, which pertains to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

6.2.4.4.1 Regional Seas Program
In regards to one of its main functions, the promotion of regional and sub-regional
cooperation for protection and preservation of the marine environment, UNEP
launched in 1974 a program, known as the Regional Seas Program (RSP),1064 which
fostered the adoption of binding instruments at the regional level to address marine
pollution.1065 The RSP is based on ‘an assumption that regional approach to ocean
management is in most cases the most effective’.1066 Furthermore, the RSP’s binding
conventions are usually accompanied by associated protocols and action plans.1067
There are several binding protocols regulating marine pollution from all sources in

1062

UNGA Resolution, 2997 (XXVII), of 15/12/72.
Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 53.
1064
‘Since its initiation in 1974, the RSP has expanded and covers the marine environment of more
than 140 world’s coastal countries’. SG Report, A/57/57 of 07/03/02, para. 446, pages 58-59.
1065
From an institutional perspective, each regional sea program is administered by Regional
Coordination Units (RCUs), which are made of governments and institutions of the participating
countries. The RCUs, with the assistance of Regional Activity Centres (RACs), are responsible for the
implementation of the RSPs and other aspects of their respective regional action plans such as such as
marine emergencies, information management and pollution monitoring. RSP Website.
http://www.unepageorg/regionalseas/About/default.aspage Accessed on 7/01/08.
1066
SG Report, A/57/57 of 07/03/02, para.445, page72. According to the GPA/LBA Website: ‘The
GPA is designed to be a source of conceptual and practical guidance to be drawn upon by national
and/or regional authorities for devising and implementing sustained action to prevent, reduce, control
and/or eliminate marine degradation from land-based activities. The GPA aims at preventing the
degradation of the marine environment from land-based activities by facilitating the duty of States to
preserve and protect the marine environment.’ GPA/LBA Website.
http://www.gpa.unepageorg/content.html?id=181&ln=6. Accessed on 17/06/10.
1067
http://www.unepageorg/regionalseas/About/default.asp, accessed 15/06/06.
1063

261

many regions.1068 Even though the RSPs have a similar approach, each one of them
was designed by their own participating governments and institutions with the
objective of addressing regional challenges more adequately.1069

6.2.4.4.2 Global Program of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment
from Land-Based Activities
UNEP also took leadership in tackling the problem of land-based sources of marine
pollution. With that in view, UNEP launched in 1995 a global program known as the
Global Program of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from LandBased Activities (GPA/LBA).1070 GPA/LBA is a non-binding policy instrument the
main objective of which is the elimination of land-based marine pollution resulting
from ‘contaminants, physical alteration and point and non-point sources of pollution,
which adversely affect such areas as critical habitats, habitats of endangered species
and protection of ecosystem components such as breeding and feeding grounds.’1071
GPA/LBA is a platform for international cooperation. It also focuses on integration
because it is built upon the inclusion of all interested economic sectors in addressing
land-based marine pollution. GPA/LBA also sought the support of donors to finance
national programs of action for the protection of the marine environment from landbased sources of pollution in clear evidence that the program adopted a multi-level
approach.1072
Other marine-related programs developed by UNEP are the Earthwatch Program
(assessment and monitoring),1073 the Global Plan of Action for the Conservation,
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Protection and Utilisation of Marine Mammals (MMAP)1074 and the Barbados
Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing
States.1075 UNEP has been criticised in the international arena for its poor
performance in executing its mandate, in particular with regard to its role as
coordinating mechanism.1076 In view of criticism towards its performance, it has been
suggested that UNEP be elevated to a level of specialised agency.1077 However, a
consensus has not been reached mainly due to the resistance of developed states
(major donors) with the resulting ‘increase in costs and the political implication of
creating more bureaucratization within the UN’.1078
In view of the above-referred organisations, the Pre-LOSC period is characterised
from an institutional viewpoint as a period of intense bureaucratisation. The bulk of
the UN agencies, bodies and programs with ocean as part to their mandates were
created during the Pre-LOSC period. By doing so, the UN has chosen the path of
specialisation while creating agencies with specialised mandates. This fact has
reinforced segmentation within ocean governance in the sense that from its inception
the UN set up its institutional arrangements in a piecemeal manner. Hinds points out
that the intention of the founders of the UN was that the specialised agencies would
serve as ‘international clearing houses of information in their speciality and as a
means to advance international standardisation in certain subjects of international
concern.’1079 Thus, during the Pre-LOSC period the negative effects of specialisation
were not considered to be counterproductive for the founders of the UN. In this
regard,
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[t]he ‘Founding Fathers’ of the system decided that the system should be
polycentric with connected but essentially separate organisations. [T]he
dangers and disadvantages of having one monolithic organisation were
considered to outweigh the dangers and disadvantages of having a dispersed
network. So the various Specialised Agencies were set up as separate
institutions, each with its own membership, intergovernmental institution,
budget, staff, Executive Head and policies.1080
In fact, the system of specialisation has its advantages such as the handling of issues
by experts with specialised knowledge on issues as diverse as fisheries, pollution,
and marine scientific research. Thus, a level of specialisation is necessary for the
well functioning of the system. However, as will be shown below, given its
interconnected and multi-dimensional nature, which was not as evident to ocean
managers and law makers during the Pre-LOSC period, inter-agency cooperation or
cross-sectoral cooperation among diverse agencies and programs is vital for ocean
governance. As the evolution of the institutional framework for ocean governance
progresses along the decades in particular with the introduction of more ecosystem
and integrated approaches to their mandates, more common efforts such as
establishing joint commissions or task forces to pool the resources and expertise to
solve a multi-dimensional ocean problem will take place. Despite the sectoral
approach adopted by the UN while establishing the FAO, IMO, IOC and UNEP, it is
noteworthy that all agencies and program had cooperation as part of their mandate.
This fact shows the importance of cooperation for ocean governance. However,
during the Pre-LOSC period cooperation was mainly limited to the confines of the
subject matters regulated by the various specialised agencies. The following section
will analyse the institutional framework during the period of the negotiation and
subsequent entering into force of the LOSC.
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6.3 Institutional Framework for Ocean Governance during the LOSC
Period
In terms of uses such as navigation, pollution, conservation and management of
marine living resources, the LOSC incorporated into its framework the myriad of
existing international organisations with competence in these areas (i.e., FAO, IMO,
IOC and UNEP). Accordingly, LOSC listed FAO as the competent international
organisation to deal with fisheries, UNEP with competence on the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, IMO with competence on navigation and
vessel-source pollution, including dumping, and IOC as the organisation with
competence on marine scientific research.1081 The advantage of this process of
incorporation is that the LOSC’s drafters based the LOSC institutional arrangements
on an already ‘highly organised international community’.1082 Treves points out:
The Convention [LOSC] seems to accept as a given that the international
community is equipped with an organisational framework which permits the
fulfilment of a variety of tasks.1083
Another advantage of the incorporation process is that by avoiding the creation of
new institutions to deal with the various ocean uses, LOSC took into account costeffectiveness concerns.1084 Another clear advantage of the process of incorporating an
already well established institutional framework for ocean governance is that the
LOSC avoided the governance failures that result from proliferation of institutions
and the damaging consequence of overlapping of functions and competition for
already scarce funds. However, during the negotiation process and adoption of the
LOSC, new unregulated ocean uses had emerged. Thus, there was a need to create
new institutions. Among the new uses incorporated by the LOSC were exploitation
of offshore oil and gas deposits, waste disposal, military uses, submarine cables and
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pipelines and construction of artificial islands, structures, platforms and deep seabed
mining for manganese nodules, among others.1085 It was within a scenario of
intensification of ocean uses1086 that LOSC established three new institutions,
namely: the International Seabed Authority (ISA), the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS). Given that ISA, ITLOS and CLCS are not relevant for the main selected
areas of ocean governance in this thesis, only a brief overview of their functions
follows.

6.3.1 International Seabed Authority (ISA)
Among the above-mentioned new uses was deep seabed mining for manganese
nodules, which did not fall within the mandate of any existing organisation. This
generated the need to set up an organisation to regulate deep seabed mining.
Accordingly, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) was set up in Kingston,
Jamaica, in 1994, upon the entry into force of the LOSC.1087 ISA was ‘established as
the organisation through which States Parties shall organise and control activities in
the Area,1088 particularly with a view to administering the resources of the Area, and
to promote and encourage the conduct of marine scientific research in the
international area’.1089 ISA is also mandated with maintaining ‘a central data
repository relating to marine resources and the marine environment, geological
investigations’.1090
Given that ‘no state, business entity or individual could rightfully appropriate’1091 the
mineral resources to be found in the international seabed area by virtue of the regime
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of ‘common heritage’1092 imposed by the LOSC, ISA was invested with the authority
to act on the behalf of the entire international community in deliberating on issues
related to the recovering of minerals found in the Area, including the granting of
authorisation for the exploitation of minerals to be found.1093 However, ISA does not
possess total control over the Area because many other uses, such as pipeline and
cable laying and scientific research, which are unrelated to exploitation of the deep
seabed minerals, can be carried out without prior authorisation of ISA by virtue of
Articles 112, 143 and 256 of the LOSC.1094
There has been criticism that ISA is underused.1095 For instance, ISA only initiated its
activities of issuing contracts for exploration of polymetallic nodules 20 years after
the adoption of the LOSC.1096 In addition, aspirations for commercial wealth to be
obtained from the exploitation of the deep seabed nodules seem ‘unlikely’ to come to
fruition in the manner in which it was originally envisioned by the drafters of the
LOSC.1097 Despite the initial enthusiasm with the discovery of valuable minerals in
the area, their exploitation has proven not to be as economically viable as expected in
the 1960s.1098 ISA’s work has been important, however, in gathering knowledge and
developing expertise through its databases and training programs on the deep seabed
environment and its exploitation.1099

6.3.2 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
The LOSC offered a new choice of procedure to the international system for
settlement of disputes concerning application and interpretation of its provisions.
Until the adoption of the LOSC, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was the main
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international court with competence to resolve disputes between parties concerning
the interpretation or application of international law in general. In its part XV, LOSC
established a specialised international court1100 to deal with disputes related to
application and interpretation of its provisions. This specialised court was called the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). ITLOS was set up in 1996 in
Hamburg, Germany,1101 to solve law-of-the-sea-related disputes if involved parties
chose ITLOS as their choice of procedure.1102 This is because LOSC listed
additionally the ICJ, arbitral tribunals and special arbitral tribunals as alternatives
choices of procedure.1103 Special arbitral tribunals may only deal with disputes
concerning four areas, including protection and preservation of the marine
environment, navigation, pollution from vessels and dumping. The members of the
special arbitral tribunals are selected from lists of experts, maintained by FAO,
UNEP, IOC and IMO for the four areas of expertise.1104
Being a specialised international court means that ITLOS is ‘open to all states, but
limited in its subject matter jurisdiction’.1105 That means that ITLOS has broad
competence to deliberate on disputes concerning every subject area within the
LOSC, with the exception of disputes involving coastal states’ rights over fisheries in
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in regards to their discretionary powers for
determining total allowable catch, their harvest capacity, allocation of surpluses and
conditions for conservation and management of the resources.1106 These issues need
to be submitted to conciliation.1107 Moreover, there are a number of issues that are
expressly exempt from the compulsory dispute settlement, including military
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activities.1108 To date, 18 cases have been submitted to ITLOS.1109 The majority of the
cases refer to the prompt release of arrested vessels and their crews.1110
The proposal for the creation of ITLOS received criticisms by some scholars and
members of international courts, such as ICJ, based on the argument that ITLOS
would be infringing upon the jurisdiction of ICJ.1111 According to the criticism raised,
ICJ is open for all, like ITLOS, but has an unlimited subject matter jurisdiction,1112
which means that for some scholars, ICJ has dealt extensively with the law of the sea
in the past and should continue to do so in the future.

1113

In this regard, Judge Oda

from the ICJ states:
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is to be established as a
new judicial organ with comprehensive jurisdiction over all aspects of the law
of the sea, I personally still have some reservations. It should not be
overlooked that the law of the sea has been, and always will be, an integral
part of international law as a whole. The law of the sea must be interpreted in
the light of the uniform development of jurisprudence in the international
community and must not be dealt with in a fragmentary manner. [T]he rule of
law based upon the uniform development of jurisprudence will be best
structured by way of strengthening the role of the International Court of
Justice, not by dispersing the judicial function of the international community
among various scattered organs.1114
Despite the controversy generated by the creation of ITLOS and the potential for
overlaps between ICJ and ITLOS, it has been argued that specialised international
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courts, such as ITLOS, are more efficient.1115 This assumption is based on the level of
efficiency showed by regional international courts set up by the European Union
(EU), namely the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg and the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg.1116 Likewise ITLOS, ECHR and
ECJ are specialised in that their competencies and limited to the specific subject
matter of related international agreements. The high level of efficiency of the ECJ
and ECHR is attributed to their limited scope in terms of competence and therefore,
is an argument in favour of ITLOS.1117 For these reasons, specialised international
courts have been chosen as the preferable means to settle disputes.1118

6.3.3 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS)
The LOSC provided that the continental shelf of a coastal state is a natural
prolongation of its land territory which usually extends to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.1119
However, when a coastal state is located on a broad continental margin, and that
margin extends beyond 200 nm from its relevant baselines, LOSC provides that the
coastal state may be able to assert rights over that part of the continental shelf beyond
the 200 nm that forms part of its natural prolongation.1120 The drafters of the LOSC
decided to create a special body in the form a commission (LOSC, Annex II) to
analyse data and other material submitted by parties in order to have recognised the
outer limits of their continental shelves in areas which extend beyond 200 nm.
The drafters might have assumed that there was no body within the UN with
technical capacity for this task.

Thus, the Commission on the Limits of the

Continental Shelf (CLCS) was set up in 1997 to examine submissions of parties to
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the LOSC on matters related to the outer limits of their continental shelf.1121
Basically, CLCS has two main functions. First, CLCS has ‘to consider the data and
other material submitted by coastal states concerning the outer limits of the
continental shelf in areas where those limits extend beyond 200 nm, and to make
recommendations’.1122 Secondly, CLCS has to provide scientific and technical advice,
if requested by the coastal state concerned during the preparation of the data for
submission.’1123 CLCS comprises 21 members1124 serving in their personal capacity on
an equitable geographic basis.1125 Members of CLCS are experts in the field of
geology, geophysics or hydrography.1126 CLCS guides its work by a set of Rules of
Procedure (CLCS/40).1127 DOALOS provides the secretariat to CLCS.1128
The CLCS’s recommendations on the outer limits of states’ continental shelves are
final and binding on all states.1129 If a coastal state disagrees with CLCS’s
recommendations, the coastal state’s only resort is to submit another proposal.
Moreover, without the concurrent will of the CLCS and of the coastal state, no
internationally opposable outer limits of the shelf can be established.1130 Schofield
and Arsana point out that the CLCS is not a legal body and it does not therefore
adjudicate on submissions. Instead, the CLCS serves as a technical body to assist
states in their submissions. That is why after the CLCS makes its recommendations,
the coastal state can establish limits that are ‘final and binding’.1131 The perception by
many that the CLCS is a ‘guardian against excessive national claims over the
international seabed beyond national jurisdiction’, is ill conceived given that the
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CLCS mainly acts as a partner in assisting submitting states ‘to confirm their
sovereign rights over the maximum area of outer continental shelf possible.’1132
Given the high costs involved in gathering technical studies on the outer limits of the
continental shelf, a fund1133 has been set up to assist particular developing states to
cover the expenses incurred from ‘conducting initial desktop studies and project
planning and preparing the final submission documents to CLCS’.1134 However,
CLCS is open to provide technical guidance if requested by any countries in regards
to the preparation of submissions regardless if the party that requested CLCS’s
technical assistance is a developed or a developing country.1135 DOALOS is
responsible for managing the fund and examining the request for funds from states
that manifest interest in submitting the extension of their continental shelf to
CLCS.1136 DOALOS is assisted by an independent panel while examining all
applications for funds and recommends the amount of financial assistance to be
given.1137

6.3.4 Concluding Remarks on Institutions Established by LOSC
From the above-referred discussion, the LOSC period is characterised by the
continuation of the trend of segmentation initiated during the Pre-LOSC.
Segmentation is characterised for instance in the fact that a specialised agency (ISA)
was specifically created to handle matters related to a particular geographic area with
the oceans (the Area). Also, segmentation is evident through the creation a
specialised international court responsible exclusively to solve disputes regarding the
law of the sea. This is problematic when the law of the sea is integrant of the body of
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international law in general and there was already an international court with
competence to judge such matters (ICJ). Although, the argued advantage of
specialised international courts can not be ignored, there is a clear overlap between
ICJ and ITLOS. Finally, the UN has numerous bodies including within the realm of
IOC comprised by oceanographers, marine biologists, cartographers, geographers
etc. but the LOSC’s drafters felt the need to create yet another technical body to
provide technical capacity in matters concerning the outer limits of the continental
shelf. Despite, the inexistence of any criticism on the creation of the CLCS, the
creation of yet another organ places more strain on the UN budget. That might be the
reason why a special fund maintained by private donors was created to make possible
submissions from developing countries. In conclusion, the above-referred three
institutions, that resulted from the entry into the LOSC (i.e., ISA, ITLOS and CLCS),
are the last permanent bodies to be established under the umbrella of the UN. The
Post-LOSC period ends the trend of creation of permanent bodies. As will be seen
below, the Post-LOSC period is characterised mainly by a trend of setting up more
informal institutional arrangements in ocean governance, among other trends.

6.4 Institutional Framework for Ocean Governance during the PostLOSC Period
The Post-LOSC period is characterised by two major trends. First, the Post-LOSC
period is marked by non-creation of formal new institutional arrangements.
Secondly, and most importantly, during the Post-LOSC period, non-state actors such
as NGOs gained more recognition as legitimate agents in the process of governing
the oceans. According to Sands, NGOs can be classified in six categories: scientific
community, non-profit environmental groups and associations, private companies
and business related advocacy groups, legal organisations, academic community and
individuals.1138
During the Post-LOSC period the driving force for the recognition of the role of
NGOs as important partners in the process of governing the oceans were the two
1138
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major global conferences, namely the United Nations Conference of Environment
and Development (UNCED), held in 1992, and the World Summit on Sustainable
Development (WSSD), which took place in 2002. As seen in previous sections of
this chapter, ocean governance is more practiced by state actors directly or through
formal international organisations or institutions, mostly under the leadership of the
UN.1139
During the UNCED process, Agenda 21 recognised that the UN was uniquely
positioned to promote the sustainable development of the oceans given ‘its multisectoral capacity and the extensive experience of a number of specialised agencies in
various spheres of international cooperation in the field of environment and
development’.1140 The UNCED process also acknowledged that NGOs possess ‘wellestablished and diverse experience, expertise and capacity in fields which will be of
particular importance to the implementation and review of environmentally sound
and socially responsible sustainable development’.1141 Accordingly, Agenda 21
recommends the UN system, including its intergovernmental organisations, consult
with NGOs in order ‘to review and evaluate the implementation of Agenda 21 at all
levels and promote their contribution to it’.1142 Agenda 21 requests that NGOs have
access to reports and other information produced by the UN system.1143 It also
requests the UNGA ‘to examine ways of enhancing the involvement of NGOs within
the UN system’.1144 Moreover, the UNCED process proposed to involve NGOs in all
phases of governance cycle such as policy-design, decision-making, implementation
and evaluation at the individual agency level and in inter-agency discussions.1145 This
means that international law has not yet developed a mechanism to fully involve in a
formal manner the activities of NGOs in ocean governance. That is the reason why
the Agenda 21 proposed to the UN system that it ‘designs open and effective means
to achieve the participation of non-governmental organisations’.1146
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Among other obstacles that NGOs face in gaining more influence within ocean
governance is the fact that the UN specialised agencies need, for instance, to amend
their constituent instruments, which are treaties, to include NGOs formally in their
decision-making process.1147 This task proves to be highly complicated and
cumbersome. Besides acknowledging the obstacles to the recognition of NGOs as
legitimate partners in ocean governance, the doctrine of international maritime law
argued that although not subjects of international law, and not having the ability to
enter into agreements as means of expressing their own will,1148 NGOs do perform
functions in the sphere of public international law.1149 For that reason, NGOs are
considered to be ‘legitimate expressions of the opinion of civil society’.1150 In this
regard:
Effective structures of cooperation in international environmental law cannot,
however, be limited to cooperation between recognized subjects of
international law. Because of the growing influence of organs and sub-organs
of international environmental treaties and NGOs, such restriction would be
inappropriate.1151
The role played by NGOs is still very limited as evidenced by the fact that some
NGOs have only observer status during assemblies and meetings.1152 The UNGA is
attempting to change that reality by encouraging the participation of NGOs in its
deliberations on oceans and the law of the sea.1153 However, several initiatives
comprised of autonomous, non-governmental civil society organisations have been
developed, for example to implement market based initiatives such as ecolabeling
and certification programs to ensure sustainable practices.1154 NGOs have further
participated in the process of policy-making in ocean governance as a result of the
1147
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convening of the WSSD in 2002, by means of the partnerships initiative launched
during the summit.

6.4.1 Partnerships Initiatives
In 2002, the WSSD process proposed an enhanced ‘participation of and effective
involvement of civil society and other relevant stakeholders in the implementation of
Agenda 21, as well as promoting transparency and broad public participation’.1155 To
make that possible, WSSD recommended the establishment of a system of
partnerships initiatives.1156 The partnerships initiatives are aimed at fostering nontraditional forms of cooperation in the process of implementation of Agenda 21.1157
The objective of the WSSD is for NGOs to be ‘more than just advocacy groups to
influence governments, but genuine partners in implementation of Agenda 21 and
other initiatives’.1158 In attempting to bridge the gap between policy-making and
implementation, the partnerships were meant to engage partners from all major
groups in the formulation, decision-making and implementation phases of
projects.1159
Partners must fulfil agreed requirements with regard to timetables, targets,
monitoring arrangements, implementation and funding. Nevertheless, partnerships
must be complementary to binding instruments.1160 This means that the participants of
the WSSD process did not intend for partnerships to ‘substitute strong commitments
by governments’.1161 Among other requirements, partnerships must be of a voluntary
nature, they must endeavour to engage all major actors (in particular, private-sector
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actors), they must add new value if built on ongoing initiatives,1162 they must have an
integrated approach, as well as an international nature (global, regional or
subregional coverage), they should have clear objectives, targets and timeframes and
they must establish internal monitoring system to assess progress in implementation
(accountability).1163
During the WSSD discussions, many participants raised concerns that the
partnerships would merely redirect existing funds, not being able to generate new
sources of funding, particularly from the private sector.1164 Also in regard to funds, it
was argued that even if partnerships succeed in creating new sources of funds, these
‘satellite funds outside the UN system’ would end up weakening the UN system.1165
Despite the controversy surrounding the reliance upon non-state actors as new
partners in the process of governing the oceans, it is clear that non-state actors
represent an innovative way to forge cooperation among all sectors of society, in
particular, partnerships that can gather private business and NGOs that are not
usually directly involved in the traditional process of cooperation through the
adoption of agreements.1166
According to Hale and Mauzerall, ‘partnerships might represent a better investment
of development resources than traditional forms of cooperation’.1167 For instance, the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)1168 recognised
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that although ‘IMO has the primary responsibility to regulate shipping from the point
of view of maritime safety, safety of navigation and prevention and control of marine
pollution from the ship, much can be done by governments, international
organisations and other players’.1169 Based on that, OECD decided to work with the
shipping industry and develop incentives for responsible shipowners, to encourage
them to comply with standards and to eliminate the non-market competition resulting
from substandard ships.1170 The push towards including NGOs as partners in the
process of governing the ocean is the last significant development in terms of
institutional framework for ocean governance. Since 2002, NGOs have attempted to
get more involved in the policy-making process and other phases of the process of
governing. There is, however, a concern in regards to proliferation given that the
number of NGOs has been mushrooming in past years in particular after the
convening of the UNCED and WSSD. Evidence of this trend is the great number of
partnerships created during the WSSD process between governments, NGOs, the
UN, intergovernmental organisations and others.1171 The concern is that partnerships
would merely redirect existing funds, not being able to generate new sources of
funding, particularly from the private sector.1172 Also in regard to funds, it has been
argued that even if partnerships succeed in creating new sources of funds, these
‘satellite funds outside the UN system’ would end up weakening the UN. 1173
Partnerships represent an innovative way to forge cooperation among all sectors of
society in particular those that bring together private business and governments
and/or intergovernmental bodies within and outside the UN which are not usually
directly involved in the traditional process of cooperation through the adoption of
agreements.
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In conclusion, the institutional framework for ocean governance during the PostLOSC period is characterised by the non-creation of new organisations and the
reliance upon NGOs as partners in the management of the oceans. These two
characteristics indicate that during the Post-LOSC period, proliferation of institutions
within an already overloaded system was not an issue. The reliance on NGOs in the
management of the ocean favours cooperation in the sense that cooperation is
benefited when all interested stakeholders are involved in the process of devising a
cooperating agreement. During the Post-LOSC period, NGOs were more
emphatically recognised as legitimate partners with real interests in the process of
governing the oceans. Whenever more actors are involved in the process of
cooperation, the outcome is a decrease in segmentation within ocean governance.
Moreover, at last the expertise and level of involvement that the NGOs bring to
negotiations were embraced by ocean managers and law makers. This fact might be a
result of the convening of both global conferences, UNCED and WSSD, which
greatly promoted the participation of NGOs in ocean governance. The involvement
of all interested actors is but one factor that assists in reducing segmentation in ocean
governance. The reality is that the entire system was traditionally designed as
discussed before to be segmented and oriented to primarily state actors as legitimate
players in the governance process. As evidence of the prominence of state actors is
the fact that most of the ocean governance decisions originate from the UN and its
specialised agencies which are characterised by being multi-state actors. These
bodies, agencies and programs are structured in a segmented manner thus
perpetuating the problem within ocean governance.
In view of this reality, during the Post-LOSC period, the international community
started to devise institutional arrangements to overcome segmentation. Among the
most significant steps forward taken during this period was, as will be argued below,
the formation of joint initiatives to address cross-sectoral issues. More than in the
two previous periods (Pre-LOSC and LOSC), several institutional arrangements set
up during the Post-LOSC period embraced the understanding that ocean problems
are interrelated and multi-dimensional which made them foster partnerships with
other organisations to deal with issues involving more than one mandated area. This
understanding influenced the practice of the main bodies, agencies and programs
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within ocean governance as evidenced by the application of the principles of
international law in their operations.

6.5 The Institutional Framework for Ocean Governance and its
Contribution to Reducing the Governance Problems
During the Pre-LOSC period, a system of governance was idealistically set up within
the UN to make the system work more efficiently. This period is characterised by
proliferation of organisations. Moreover, most of the organisations set up during the
Pre-LOSC period have single issue mandates, thus they created the trend towards
segmentation from an institutional perspective. Before the convening of the UNCHE
which took place in 1972, the UNGA raised awareness of the problems resulting
from a segmented institutional system while stating that:
[i]n order to avoid the overlapping and duplication of programs and gaps in
competence, a full review of the existing activities of the organisations in the
United Nations system relating to seas and oceans may be urgently
required.1174
The UNCHE process performed this review to a certain extent. As a result of the
review, the UNEP was created, however, problems persisted in part due to the
inability of UNEP to foster coordination within the entire system. During the LOSC
period, there was not much done to remedy the situation. In fact, during the LOSC
period and as a result of adopting its corresponding treaty (i.e. LOSC), more
institutions were set up (i.e. ITLOS, ISA, and CLCS). Thus, from an institutional
standpoint, the LOSC period is irrelevant in terms of contribution to reducing
governance problems. The Post-LOSC period is a period characterised by an
increasing perception of failures within the system and a search for solutions. It was
during the Post-LOSC period that more inventive and creative solutions for the
governance problems in terms of institutional changes were devised. Thus, the
analysis will focus on measures taken during the Post-LOSC period to address
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governance problems. This is done to provide an up-to-date overview of institutional
framework for ocean governance in the present and its contribution to solve
governance problems.

6.5.1 Formation of Joint Efforts to Address Cross-Sectoral Issues
Inter-agency cooperation through the creation of joint commissions is not a novelty
in ocean governance. However, this type of institutional arrangement was more
frequently utilised during the Post-LOSC period in view of the increasing perception
for the need to develop inter-agency cooperation and coordination. These types of
institutional arrangements are ideal to deal with ocean problems because of the
interrelated and multi-dimensional nature of these which require at times more than
one organisation to solve them. Thus, joint commissions require organisations to
cooperate with other institutions to solve interrelated and multi-dimensional
problems such as IUU fishing, failure of flag state implementation regarding safety
measures and standards to prevent, control and reduce pollution, and marine
pollution affecting fishing areas. In common between these problems is the fact they
cut across the mandated areas of several organisations.
During the Post-LOSC period, the international community became more aware that
solutions to this type of problem required organisations to operate beyond their
mandates and join efforts with other institutions to achieve common goals. For
instance, the issue of safety of navigation pertains to the competence of the IMO. In
this regard, the IMO adopted two instruments that thoroughly regulated this issue,
namely the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), in
particular its Chapter V, and the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea (COLREG). Despite being an effective measure towards achieving a common
solution for a problem, treaties alone do not guarantee that a problem will be solved.
Most recently, IMO had to join efforts with the International Hydrographic
Organisation (IHO) to be assist in the implementation of its treaties.1175
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This is because some coastal states, particularly developing states, lack resources to
fulfil their treaty obligations such as publicising any known danger to navigation
within their territorial sea.1176 To prevent accidents, IMO decided to work closely
with the IHO to help promote navigational safety in the waters of these coastal
states.1177 The IHO and other relevant international organisations can provide
assistance in enhancing the hydrographic capability of states, particularly of
developing countries.1178 In this regard, IMO also joined efforts with the Global
Environment Fund (GEF) in executing a project in the East Asian Sea that aimed to
develop a regional network of electronic navigational charts to enhance navigational
safety and environmental management in general.1179 FAO and IMO joined efforts
(cooperation) in addressing flag and port state responsibilities in the context of
solving problems related to IUU fishing.1180
It is noteworthy that the IMO joined efforts with a financial agency, the GEF. During
the Post-LOSC period, more frequent collaborations were fostered between relevant
UN ocean mandated organisations and sources of funds such as the World Bank.
Much attention has been given by the international community and the UN, in
particular, to building cooperating efforts with financial institutions. Financial
institutions were ‘the missing link’ in previous cooperating initiatives. For example,
during discussions within the UN on proposals for the creation of new mechanisms
for coordination, participants highlighted the need to involve financial institutions:
[I]t should include all UN departments, funds, programs and agencies and
international financial institutions that are often involved in issues relating to
oceans and seas.1181
Inter-agency cooperation does not only occur between organisations that are part of
the UN. For instance, FAO reached out to RFOs that were not sponsored by the FAO
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to help address inefficiencies faced by these regional organisations.1182 Among the
difficulties facing the various RFOs are: issues arisen from relating to the
competences of the RFOs, overlap between RFOs, financial arrangements and the
problems that many ‘relatively weak coastal states’ face in enforcing fisheries
regulations in extended areas of national jurisdiction.1183 In 1999 the FAO Committee
of Fisheries (COFI) arranged a meeting between FAO and non-FAO regional
fisheries bodies, and with other organisations dealing with fisheries issues.1184 This
meeting addressed issues such as: the need to adjust their mandates, structures and
policies to address the challenges facing world fisheries, and the involvement of
stakeholders in fisheries management.1185
The IMO work closely with with flag states to build cooperation in particular those
states that had not complied with their treaty obligations and had not implemented
international standards pertaining to these obligations regarding safety measures and
standards to prevent, control and reduce pollution. To address this failure and foster
implementation of treaty obligations, the IMO involved flag states and port states in
the inspection of ships and the investigation of casualties at sea. By doing so, the
IMO contributed towards the development of a more harmonised global regime of
port state control activities through regional memoranda of understanding (MOU).
These MOU addressed specifically port state control and focused on the training of
port state control officers, assistance to port state control committees, and promoting
the exchange of information between flag states and port states.1186 The IMO aimed
to strengthen a flag state’s implementation by consulting other organisations. This
effort by IMO helped it to assess the need for introducing international procedures
and requirements to deal with issues related to ship’s registration and the transfer of
flag.1187 The objective was to prevent the registration of ‘phantom’ ships and to invite
governments to exhaust all means available to them to obtain evidence ‘that a ship
previously registered under another State’s flag has been deleted from the register, or
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that the consent to the transfer of the ship has been obtained from that State’s
register.’1188
Sometimes organisations go beyond the scope of their mandates in order to fully
address persistent ocean problems. The IMO’s Legal Committee, for instance, had to
coordinate law reform with other UN agencies, such as the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).1189 The IMO and UNCTAD
worked together through a joint working group to revise the rules relating to
maritime liens and mortgages.1190 In this regard, the IMO- UNCTAD joing working
group had to reconcile differences in approach of the the Common Law and Civil
Law traditions in relation to maritime liens and mortgages and the arrest of ships.1191
Moreover, the IMO went beyond its mandate by joining efforts with the FAO to
strengthen flag state implementation of treaty obligations in the area of fisheries. The
position of the IMO is that ‘even though measures relating to fisheries fall outside its
competence’, there were many safety and environmental protection issues relating to
IUU fishing which concerns the IMO’s mandate. The IMO also recognised that the
transfer of ships was another problem contributing to IUU fishing.1192 This
recognition is evidence that organisations such as the IMO became more open
towards looking beyond their mandated tasks in order to address ocean problems and
governance failures by building cross-sectoral cooperation. Regarding the duty of
flag states to exercise effective control over ships flying their flag, including fishing
vessels, the UNGA invited the IMO to gather all interested sectors to study, examine
and clarify the role of the ‘genuine link’ in relation to the duty of flag states to
exercise effective control over ships flying their flag, including fishing vessels.1193
In another example of joint effort to address cross-sectoral issues, the IMO has also
joined efforts with the ILO and the secretariat of the Basel Convention on the
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Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
(Basel Convention),1194 to address the issue of ship recycling. This is an important
issue because an increase the number of ships which need to be recycled as a result
of the introduction of stricter regulations in relation to ship construction.1195 In
addition to these factors, the high costs make the renewal of shipping fleets more
difficult. The outcome of the effort exerted by these organisations was the adoption
of joint, non-binding Guidelines on Ship Recycling (November 2003). A working
group was also established to consider mechanisms to jointly implement the
Guidelines.1196 As mentioned earlier, one characteristic of the Post-LOSC period was
the participation of interested groups in ocean governance such as NGOs. In this
regard, during the annual meeting on the law of the sea at the UNGA, some
representatives of the ship industry sector complained that they were not part of the
cooperation efforts between the IMO, ILO and Basel Convention and urged the IMO
to ‘refrain from considering in making the Guidelines mandatory’.1197 The complaint
from the private sector is a sign that governance can only be made successful with
the inclusion of all interested actors. The request from the shipping industry to
participate in decision making processes also indicates that NGOs have acquired a
significant status in ocean governance. However, IMO only allows NGOs to
participate as observers.1198
In addition to navigational safety, IUU fishing, flag state obligations, and ship
recycling, Other examples of inter-agency cooperation that have formed to solve
cross-cutting issues include the:
-

IOC and the IMO established a joint commission to implement an integrated
ocean observing and data management system to support maritime safety,
global climate studies, and marine environmental protection;1199
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-

UN-DOALOS has jointly developed capacity building program known as the
Train-Sea-Coast Program with UNDP and IOI (International Ocean
Institute);1200

-

FAO in collaboration with the DOALOS, is responsible for administering a
fund to assist developing countries in implementing the 1995 Fish Stocks
Agreement;1201

-

FAO, ICSU (International Council for Science), UNESCO, UNEP, and
WMO jointly sponsored the Global Terrestrial Observing System (GTOS)
which can localise and quantify land-based activities affecting the oceans and
coastal areas;1202

-

FAO, IOC/UNESCO, UNEP, and UN-DOALOS maintain the largest global
fisheries database known as ASFA (Aquatic Science and Fisheries
Abstracts);1203

-

IOC works closely with an inter-agency Group of Experts on the Scientific
Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP) whose reports have provided
invaluable information on the state of the marine environment;1204 and

-

IMO and UNEP are engaged in addressing pollution in Eastern Africa1205
specifically regarding the management of garbage and land-based sources of
marine pollution, dumping, discharges from ships (e.g. ballast water), and
lack of capacity to address these issues, and coordination between
countries.1206
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6.5.2 Incorporation of the Principles of International Law in the Practice of
Ocean-Mandated Organisations
It was during the Post-LOSC period that UN ocean-mandated specialised agencies
initiated a trend to further to apply the principles of international law to their
activities and adjust their mandates accordingly. This was an indirect endorsement
that the principles of cooperation, ecosystem and precautionary approaches, and
integration could assist in decreasing governance failures (i.e., segmentation and
proliferation). For example, for 50 years the international approach towards fisheries
was very efficient in putting forward its mandate of promoting higher production
levels in the fishing sector. From a segmented perspective, this approach was
successful in achieving short-term economic and social benefits resulting from the
exploitation of fisheries resources.1207
However, this approach’s success resulted in current levels of fishery resource
scarcity worldwide.1208 The FAO recognised this and changed its course, engaging
instead in promoting long-term sustainability of fishery resources rather than
focusing only on short-term economic and social benefits. From 1994, FAO also
focused on cross-sectoral priorities between its various mandated sectors
(agriculture, forestry and fisheries) and prioritised ‘environment and sustainable
development’.1209 The application of the concept of ‘sustainable development’ was
part of an ‘integrated development strategy, harmonising agricultural and nutricional
with ecological concerns.’1210
This change in approach also also indicates that the FAO started to apply an
ecosystem approach towards fisheries management.1211 The ecosystem-approach in
fisheries means that each fish stock or species is not considered in isolation within
the marine environment. This approach strives to take into account a multi-species
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management whereby the interaction between fish stocks is also considered.1212 An
ecosystem approach towards fisheries management also recognises that both landbased and sea-based sources of pollution can affect marine living resources and their
productivity.1213 In this regard:
[F]ishery management should include not only measures to regulate fishing
activities, but also measures to promote the reduction and elimination of
pollution and degradation of critical habitats from non-fisheries activities in the
marine environment.1214 The ecosystem approach, as a cross-cutting concept,
may be extended to other aspects of ocean governance in view of the
multisectoral nature of marine activities.1215
In applying the ecosystem approach to fisheries governance, the FAO has adopted
binding and voluntary instruments. These include: the UN Fish Stocks Agreement,
the FAO Compliance Agreement, and the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
and its related international plans of action. All these instruments endorsed the
ecosystem approach. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement, for instance, endorsed
ecosystem approach through its provisions on compatibility of conservation and
management measures.1216 In this respect, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement reached a
compromise between diverging interest of distant water fishing states (DWFS) and
coastal states at the time of negotiations. The result was that the introduction of
ecosystem management in the fisheries of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks
not under a nationalised administration of the high seas or under an international
regime interfering with national jurisdiction.1217
In addition, these instruments also relied on cooperation between nations and
precautionary and integrated approaches to solve fisheries problems in a broader
context. In this regard, in 1999 the FAO/COFI met with non-FAO and FAO RFOs to
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address inefficiencies in dealing with fisheries issues faced by them and other
organisations. This meeting concluded that there was a need to: apply the
precautionary approach; involve stakeholders in fisheries management, and adjust
their mandates, structures, and policies to address these challenges.1218 These
measures provide further confirmation that the four principles of international law
were increasingly recognised as important by FAO, its RFOs and non-FAO RFOs.1219
Moreover, the Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries jointly adopted by the
FAO and the Government of Iceland in October 2001 also incorporated all four
selected principles of international law. The Reykjavik Declaration also stressed the
need for including mechanisms for reducing excessive fishing efforts towads more
sustainable fishing levels. The Declaration emphasised the need for a more integrated
approach to prevent non-fishing activities from having adverse effects on the marine
ecosystem in general and fisheries in particular.1220In this regard:
[t]he Reykjavik Declaration stressed that in addition to the immediate
application of the precautionary approach, it was important to advance the
scientific basis for incorporating ecosystem considerations into fisheries
management, building on existing and future scientific knowledge. It also
urged the international community to strengthen international cooperation
with a view to supporting developing countries in incorporating ecosystem
considerations into fisheries management.1221
The above-mentioned binding and non-binding instruments instructed the FAO and
regional bodies to guide their operations on the basis of the principles of international
law. Despite some progress in this area, it has been reported that developing
countries have been encountering difficulties in implementing these binding and nonbinding fisheries instruments. This is often due to various constraints such as:
inadequate institutional and technical capacity; inadequate funding; lack of
information and inadequate access to information; inadequate participation of all
1218
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stakeholders; inappropriate legislative framework; and socio-economic implications
of reducing fishing effort in the short-term.1222 These states also reported having
difficulty in implementing the precautionary approach in particular.1223
Another example of the introduction of the principles of international law to the
practice of the specialised agencies within the UN occurred with the IMO’s Marine
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) which is responsible for with
prevention and control of pollution from ships.1224 In particular, the MEPC is
concerned with the adoption and amendment of conventions and other regulations
and measures to ensure their enforcement1225 The MEPC through its Sub-Committee
on the Safety of Navigation deliberates on issues such as proposals to designate
particularly sensitive areas (PSSA).1226 These PSSAs can, in certain cases, disrupt
navigation if proposed in areas near to channels of international navigation.1227 The
PSSAs are also proposed when states wish to designate these areas within their
EEZ.1228
Of relevance for the discussion in this section, is that the IMO applies an integrated
approach when deliberating on proposed PSSAs. That is, PSSAs are designated
based on their significance for ecological, socio-economic, or scientific reasons and
their vulnerability to be damaged by international shipping activities. The proposal
for a PSSA must indicate how the area is vulnerable to damage from international
shipping activities, and must propose navigational and safety measures within the
competence of IMO to protect the area in question.1229 In order to have an area
designated as a PSSA, only one of the three criteria (ecological, socio-economic, or
scientific) needs to be met.1230
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In regards to UNEP, there have been proposals to imprint a more integrated approach
by developing cooperation between its Regional Seas Program and RFOs.1231 The
UNEP demonstrated greater integration through its global program against landbased sources of pollution (i.e. GPA/LBA). The GPA/LBA resulted from the
attention gained in the 1990s to the costs at national level of deteriorating coastal
conditions.1232 The UNCED process supported the adoption of the GPA/LBA by
UNEP. The GPA/LBA is based on regional and national initiatives with international
support.1233 The GPA/LBA has the potential to improve regional cooperation,
including strengthening the regional seas conventions and protocols.1234 Thus, if
multi-level cooperation is fostered between UNEP RSPs and the GPA/LBA much
progress could be achieved in curbing land-based sources of marine pollution.1235 It
would also benefit integration in view of the fact that two government levels
(regional and international) would synchronise their policies and approaches 1236
towards curbing land-based sources of pollution. In this regard it has been proposed
at the UNGA that a meeting between GPA and all UNEP regional seas programs
should be convened to foster coordination and develop a joint strategic approach.1237
Also, the GPA/LBA aims to bring stakeholders together from different sectors, both
public and private, to address common problems.1238 The GPA/LBA stressed the need
for international cooperation and for concerted action at the national level to address
marine pollution from land-based sources by linking several issue-ares as responsible
for land-based source of pollution. In this regard:
[T]he causative relationship between poverty, human health, unsustainable
consumption and production patterns, poorly managed social and economic
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development, and environmental degradation must be emphasised when
implementing the Global Programme of Action.1239
In regards to the area of marine scientific research, the IOC has incorporated an
integrated approach through joining efforts with the IMO to develop integrated ocean
and data management systems to support maritime safety, global climate studies, and
marine environmental protection.1240 Thus, the trend of incorporating integrated
approaches in the practice of ocean mandated international organisation is
consolidated and it should produce positive outcomes. In regards to the difficulties of
applying integrative approaches to management, it has been stated as follows:
[T]he challenges of developing and applying integrated ocean management
cannot be overstated. In most cases, the limiting factor is capacity, but in
many cases, the obstacles are at the conceptual or political level. Yet the
imperatives of an integrated management approach are so overwhelming that
in spite of the daunting problems of full integration, there is a growing
movement towards achieving some degree of integration.1241
Although the push towards a more integrated ocean governance framework is a
reality during the Post-LOSC period, there are still numerous challenges. These will
be discussed in the following section.

6.5.3 New Cross-sectoral Challenges to the Institutional Framework for Ocean
Governance
As stated in previous chapters, ocean governance is based on a foundation of
political boundaries or jurisdictional zones to ascertain national sovereignty over
portions of the oceans and their resources therein. For instance, the LOSC
distinguishes five basic categories of maritime areas: internal waters, territorial seas,
archipelagic waters, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and high seas. Moreover, the
1239
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LOSC establishes other regimes concerning other maritime areas such as the
contiguous zone (Article 33), the continental shelf (Part VI) and the Area1242 (Part
XI).1243 Political boundaries or jurisdictional zones make perfect sense from a legal
perspective because they provide clarity regarding the rights and obligations of states
associated to certain ocean areas and resources therein. Nevertheless, from an
ecological perspective, the system of political boundaries or jurisdictional zones
presents inadequacies because ecosystem boundaries often do not match humanmade boundaries. In this regard, neither fish nor pollution will respect human-made
boundaries.1244
As pointed out in previous chapters, there is a dichotomy in the legal framework of
ocean governance in the sense that this system is ‘marked by political and legal
divisions’1245 and also incorporated ecosystem concepts (such as ecosystem approach,
integration, large marine ecosystems approach, and cross-sectoral cooperation) to be
applied in ocean management. The same dichotomy plagues its institutional
counterpart, the legal framework for ocean governance. This is because the
institutional framework is organised in segmented parts comprising for instance
specialised agencies, bodies and programs with specific mandates. The political
boundaries served to ascertain the limits of rights and obligations in a treaty whereas
the mandates as enshrined in their constituent instruments and constitutions served to
limit the competence of the institutions. Due to the culture of specialisation within
the UN, these mandates are often dedicated to a single purpose, thus encompassing
one speciality.
In order to manage ocean problems that are inherently interrelated and multidimensional, institutions need to be equipped with the means to manage crosssectoral issues. Thus there is a need for a holistic approach towards governing the
oceans. A holistic approach can be defined as having cooperation, integration,
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precautionary and ecosystem approaches in its foundation. A holistic approach
towards ocean governance needs to be expressed not only in the text of treaties but in
the institutional apparatuses that govern the oceans. These institutional apparatuses
are responsible for treaty implementation, treaty making and other functions.
During the Post-LOSC period, the need for a more holistic approach towards ocean
management from an institutional perspective was made more apparent. New
challenges surfaced which defied the existing traditional, segmented, institutional
framework. These new challenges required innovative institutional solutions in order
to adequately address them. For instance, a specialised agency with a single purpose
mandate would not be able to effectively solve an issue that cuts across the mandates
of many different agencies and interacts with other ocean-related issues.
For example, major portions of the EEZs fall within the jurisdiction of developing
countries which often do not possess the capability or resources to inspect ships
passing through their EEZs. The result is that these countries have repeatedly
expressed concern when radioactive and hazardous materials and wastes transit along
their coastal routes or navigable waterways.1246 Although freedom of navigation is
guaranteed in the EEZ,1247coastal states and developing countries in particular, are not
satisfied with the status quo in view of the risk of serious and irreversible damage in
the event of a polluting accident.
This issue is controversial because it challenges a crystallised and universally
accepted principle of international law, that is, freedom of navigation. To deal with
this issue, the question to be posed is which institution within the institutional
framework of ocean governance is the competent international organisation
mandated to deal with it? With regard to this, Treves pointed that the provisions of
the LOSC on competent international organisations did not suffice to clarify which
would be competent organisation to to deal with matters regarding two or more of
the fields.1248 The issue of limiting the transit of radioactive and hazardous materials
within EEZ of coastal states issue touches upon the mandates of two specialised
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agencies within the UN: the IMO which governs over issues related to navigation,
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with competence over the
creation, movement, and disposal of radioactive materials. Some states have taken
unilateral measures, thus disrupting the state of affairs in Ocean Govenance, and
have prohibited the transit of ships that carry such cargoes in their EEZs.1249 In
reaction to this, UNICPOLOS stated that:
[c]ollective, multilateral solutions had to be found to protect the marine
environment without disturbing the delicate balance of interests as reflected
in UNCLOS [LOSC].1250
Many of the provisions of the LOSC are self-regulated which indicates that these
provisions do not need an institution per se to be responsible for their
implementation.1251 The absence of an institution for cross-sectoral issues such as the
transit of radioactive materials within the EEZ of coastal states is troublesome. The
issue becomes even more complex in view of the fact that in their defence, the
coastal states have been proposing the designation of marine protected areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction to protect their coasts. These areas have the
potential to impede freedom of navigation in the high seas.1252 Another question to
be posed is which organisation would be responsible for designating and managing
the proposed ‘international marine protected areas’ if permitted?1253 At present, the
institutional framework of ocean governance is not equipped to handle such an issue.
The disruption of the fine balance between rights and obligations that was achieved
by the LOSC also occurred in the aftermath of the accident involving the oil tanker
Prestige.1254 As a reaction to this oil spill, some European states started to prohibit the
transiting of single-hulled tankers through their territorial seas and EEZs, and denied
entry of such vessels into their ports.1255 Such measures violated provisions of the
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LOSC, which guarantees the freedom of navigation. Officials from the European
states defended their actions to take ‘provisional unilateral actions’ by arguing that
such measures were taken on a precautionary basis as a legitimate right to protect
their coasts from pollution.1256 These states argued that since the LOSC did not
address the consequences of non-compliance by flag states, they felt entitled to deal
with the issue unilaterally. Therefore, these states adopted unilateral measures by
arguing that:
[t]he general international law of State responsibility allowed the taking of
counter-measures proportional to the wrongful act, justifying therefore the
use of unilateral action, even though it was not the best alternative.1257
Under the LOSC, states by themselves cannot unilaterally impose restrictions on
navigation. Only the IMO has the competence and power restrict navigation and
must do so via an international treaty. This discussion illustrates how the current
institutional framework for ocean governance is challenged when cross-sectoral
issues involving the mandates of more than one organisation, or in cases when an
issue surfaces and there is no organisation with a clear mandate to address it. There
are no clear mechanisms for coordination across organisations in order to address
these cross-sectoral issues. Treves pointed out that the LOSC text implied, although
not directly, that the best avenue to address cross-sectoral issues or his words ‘cases
straddling the compentence of various competent international organisations’ is to
foster consultation between these organisations.1258
Another issue that is challenging the institutional framework for ocean governance is
marine biodiversity found on the seabed of international waters. That is, there is
currently a lack of clarity on which organisation has competence to deal with this
new use of the oceans. According to article 5 of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) states are obliged to cooperate in view of the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. The
secretariat of the CBD is responsible for its implementation. However, there has been
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some controversy related to whether the CBD is the primary authority to address this
issue.1259 Some argue that all marine resources on the seabed beyond national
jurisdiction, including marine biodiversity constitutes common heritage of mankind.
Therefore, it should be dealt with within the context of the legal regime for the Area
in part XI of the LOSC, given ‘the symbiotic relationship of the biodiversity with the
deep seabed and its resources.’1260 If marine biodiversity, including bioprospecting, in
areas beyond national jurisdiction is interpreted in this way, it would result in the
ISA taking the lead on this issue, not the secretariat of the CBD. In this regard, the
Report of the Fifth UNICPOLOS states that:
[t]here was a legal lacuna with respect of the regime governing deep sea
biodiversity. While the convention [LOSC] had provisions for marine
scientific research, it was silent with regard to bioprospecting. Given the
symbiotic relationship between the biodiversity and non-living resources in
the Area and the fact that the Authority already had a clear mandate with
respect to seabed minerals, it should be considered as a possible forum where
matters related to bioprospecting of other resources could be examined.1261
This issue is complex and far from settled. There are other issues that challenge the
institutional framework of ocean governance in the sense that there is no institution
with a clear mandate to address them or there is a need to create a joint effort because
these issues involve more than one mandated area. Examples of issues which might
involve two or more organisations given their cross-sectoral nature follow:
-

Repeated acts of piracy and armed robbery committed in the territorial sea of
coastal states and in international straits (in particular in developing
countries). These acts threaten the rights of innocent passage and transit
passage and, in archipelagic waters, the passage through archipelagic sea
lanes, as ensured by the LOSC. Action is required by a number of
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stakeholders such as: affected states, business sectors such as chambers of
shipping, maritime insurance industries and trade unions, and the IMO.1262
-

IUU fishing which can occur even in the territorial states of certain African
states. The international community already has mandatory and binding
instruments to ensure responsible fisheries and to combat IUU fishing. The
problem is that the coastal states concerned do not have the means to combat
the problem that is, enforcing these mandatory and binding instruments.
Action is required by a number of stakeholders such as: affected states in
particular their Fisheries Ministries, the FAO, and RFOs.1263

-

States which fish on the high seas of regions where no regional fisheries
arrangements are in place. Action that is required includes: the UNGA and
FAO working together with fishing states active in these areas, to put in place
arrangements for the effective implementation of Part VII of LOSC, and the
1995 Fish Stocks Agreement.1264

The above issues demonstrate how the multi-dimensional and interrelated nature of
ocean problems became much more apparent during the Post-LOSC period, and how
the existing institutional framework for ocean governance has been challenged.
These cross-sectoral issues invited the UN ocean-related apparatuses and other
organisations outside the UN, to deal with these issues that do not fall neatly within
their mandates but are nevertheless connected directly or indirectly to them. The
emergence of these issues exemplifies the constant evolution of ocean governance
from both a legal and institutional perspectives. The solutions for these problems
could take on such forms as a joint commission or a working group or a yet-to-becreated new organisation. The latter avenue might not be so popular given the risk of
adding even more layers of bureaucracy to an already overloaded system which was
built based on a great number of sectoral organisations which proliferated over time.
In this regard, attention to cross-sectoral issues has the potential to create synergies
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within the existing system of ocean governance and provides for opportunities for
organisations to join efforts. This trend towards considering issues from a crosssectoral perspective helps to prevent the negative effects of proliferation and
overcome the limitations inherent to segmentation. The discussion now centres on
the persisting problems within the institutional framework for ocean governance.

6.6 Persisting Problems within the Institutional Framework for Ocean
Governance
Despite a well-developed institutional framework for ocean governance within the
UN where several agencies have ocean-related issues as part of their mandates, and
despite advancements brought forth by the two major conferences (i.e., UNCED and
WSSD) for the policy-making process, ocean governance is still confronted with
persisting problems from an institutional standpoint. Among these problems are
segmentation, lack of multi-sectoral and multi-level approaches, and absence of an
overarching global oceans organisation, lack of accountability and lack of technical
and financial resources.

6.6.1 Segmentation within Institutional Ocean Governance
The UN followed the path of specialisation when setting up its institutional
framework, which comprises more than 14 specialised agencies1265 with oceans as
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part of their responsibilities.1266 Specialisation signifies each of the various agencies;
bodies and programs have their mandates confined within a specific area of
expertise.1267 There are undeniable advantages to the system of specialisation, which
is also known as ‘division of labour’.1268 Among the advantages is the fact that
specialised agencies provide for high-level expertise and efficiency in their subject
areas.1269
The UN did not really have any other option than choosing the path of specialisation.
This is because there is no other way of governing apart from assigning specific tasks
to different organs that deal with particular issues according to ‘the scope of the
powers and functions granted to each one’.1270 In the case of the UN, for instance,
during the period between 1945 and 1970, when the UN was being structured, there
was a need to assign issues to competent international organisations. As a result,
specialised agencies and programs such as FAO, IMO, IOC and UNEP were set up
to regulate their respective subject areas. However, most recently, in particular as a
result of the convening of the two major conferences during the Post-LOSC period,
namely UNCED and WSSD, there was realisation that the path of specialisation or
‘sectorialism’ followed by the UN ‘has made coordination difficult’.1271
Notwithstanding the fact that most specialised agencies and programs within the UN,
such as FAO, IMO, IOC and UNEP, have the duty to cooperate included in their
mandates.
‘Sectorialism’, or specialisation, is a by-product of the segmented view of ocean
governance. In this regard, Borgese and Saigal pointed out that:
[t]he culture of specialisation within ocean governance perpetuates the failure
of designing sector-specific solutions for multi-dimensional problems such is
the nature of ocean problems.1272

1266

Allison, “Big Laws, Small Catches,” 941.
Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 69; Keckes, Global Maritime
Programmes, 103.
1268
Kiss and Shelton, International Environmental Law, 84.
1269
Kiss and Shelton, International Environmental Law, 84.
1270
Kiss and Shelton, International Environmental Law, 84.
1271
Birnie and Boyle, International Environmental Law and the Environment, 69.
1272
Borgese and Saigal, “Managerial Implications,” 11.
1267

300

This means that the trend of establishing sector-specific treaties in ocean governance
was mirrored by its institutional arrangements, which are equally sectorally oriented,
thus increasing segmentation within the system and posing difficulties to
coordination.1273

Segmentation

results

in

sector-specific

institutions

not

communicating with each other and not having a coherent and integrated approach to
deal with ocean problems. These institutions operate within their clusters. Agenda 21
emphasised the need to strengthen institutional cooperation among the various
agencies as a way to overcome the negative effects of segmentation. Accordingly,
Agenda 21 states as follows:
[T]here are numerous national and international, including regional,
institutions, both within and outside the United Nations system, with
competence in marine issues, and there is a need to improve coordination and
strengthen links among them.1274
Segmentation may also result in another governance failure: overlap of functions
between agencies. This is because although the UN agencies, programs and bodies
were created under the umbrella of the UN, the absence of linkages among these
agencies creates the potential for overlaps of functions.1275 In this regard:
The resulting fragmented, sectoral, often overlapping, and poorly coordinated
programs considerably diminish their potentially synergistic overall effect
and impact. This, in turn, leads to certain waste of scarce financial
resources.1276
For instance, resistance towards working from a cross-sectoral perspective as
evidenced in the manner in which IMO defends its mandate, by resisting to get
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involved in solving cross-sectoral ocean issues needs to be overcome for the UN to
fix its governance problems. In another instance, as one of the measures for the
implementation of the GPA/LBA, UNGA called upon IMO to develop a clearinghouse mechanism for oils and litter.1277 However, IMO did not follow UNGA’s
resolution based on the assumption that IMO is mandated to protect the marine
environment only from ship-based activities. 1278 IMO’s stand is troublesome because
land-based sources of pollution account for 70 per cent of the total pollutants found
in the marine environment.1279 At times, organisations within the UN structure pose
obstacles in building inter-agency cooperation as a result of defending their mandates
in strict terms. IMO failed to build inter-agency cooperation in the area of land-based
pollution, this is despite IMO’s good record on building cross-sectoral cooperation in
other areas as mentioned before. IMO is just an example among various other
organisations within the UN that at times chose to act in isolation. In this regard,
Keckes pointed out:
With few admirable exceptions, in spite of all appearances and nice words
about cooperation and collaboration, in most instances each agency is
basically pursuing its own program independently, jealously defending its
‘mandate’ and guarding against ‘encroachment’ of others on its turf.1280

6.6.2 Lack of Multi-Sectoral and Multi-Level Approaches to Ocean Governance
In close relation with the previously described problem of segmentation is the
absence of multi-sectoral and multi-level approaches to ocean governance. This is
because segmentation within the institutional framework for ocean governance
implies that agencies and programs act in isolation within their sectoral areas and are
confined to a single management level, namely national, regional or international,
thus without multi-sectoral and multi-level approaches.
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Agenda 21 identifies this problem while stating the need for an ‘integrated and multisectoral approach to marine issues to be pursued at all levels’.1281 The UNGA also
identifies the lack of multi-sectoral and multi-level approaches in ocean
governance.1282 Moreover, the UNGA urged parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
‘to consider the national, subregional, regional and global implementation of the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement’ in a demonstration that for the successful implementation of
the Agreement, all levels of governance need to be involved.1283
Lack of multi-sectoral and multi-level approaches in ocean governance is
inextricably connected to lack of overall cooperation and coordination among the
various institutions within the UN. In this regard:
[T]he lack of coordination and cooperation in addressing ocean issues, which
call for a cross-sectoral response at all levels, starting at the national level,
has prevented the emergence of more efficient and results-orientated ocean
governance.1284
The more agencies involved in ocean governance in a sectoral manner, the greater
the need to elicit cooperation and coordination between them across all sectors and at
all levels. There is a need for the UN ocean-mandated agencies and programs to
adjust their mandates to facilitate the consideration of cross-sectoral issues by
building inter-agency cooperation at all levels of governance.1285
Another aspect is that due to the interrelated nature of ocean problems, due regard
must be given to ‘cumulative and interactive’ effects of isolated impacts from one
sector of ocean governance to another.1286 The analysis of the cumulative effects of
one sector to other is part of a multi-sectoral approach. This is because, similar to the
various integrants of the ocean ecosystem, such as currents, fisheries and habitats, in
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which one integrant of the marine environment impacts the other, the various marine
sectors, such as navigation, fisheries, tourism and others, also impact one another.
The analsysis of cumulative and interactive effects of one sector on to other has not
been frequently adopted in the practice of the UN ocean mandated organisations.
Agenda 211287 recommends participant nations of the UNCED summit to put in
practice a multi-sectoral perspective.1288 For instance, it is of relevance for fostering a
multi-sectoral approach towards ocean governance to conduct an analysis of the
implications of pollution on fisheries. Accordingly, during a meeting at the UN it
was proposed that formal linkages be established between RFOs and the UNEP
Regional Seas Programs.1289 Other linkages that are proposed among the various
sectors are, for instance, the relationship between trade measures and the combat of
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing), the conflicts between
marine tourism (e.g., diving industry) and preservation of the marine environment,
the implications of the establishment of particularly sensitive sea areas (PSSA) on
the high seas and the universal freedom of navigation. These are just a few among
numerous other spill-overs between sectors within ocean governance. Because the
possibilities of cross-sectoral linkages involving ocean issues are numerous, this
circumstance poses a challenge for policy-makers and their institutions.
One of the pervasive effects of not coordinating the various levels of governance,
such as national, regional and international, is that invariably there is a potential for
the occurrence of competition for funds and duplication of efforts.1290 In order to
avoid this problem, there is a need for global programs to be supported by regional
components for their successful implementation. This is one aspect of multi-level
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cooperation that also benefits management by harmonising policies and approaches.
This approach was recommended by Agenda 21 as one to be pursued ‘at all
levels’.1291 For instance, the UNEP’s GPA/LBA,1292 which is an international program
to combat land-based source of pollution, has not yet established an effective
cooperating relationship with its regional counterpart, the UNEP Regional Sea
Programs (RSP), which is mandated to be the regional partner for the implementation
of the GPA/LBA.1293 During recent discussions at the United Nations Informal
Consultative Process on Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS),
member states of the UNEP emphasised the need for the GPA/LBA to use
UNEP/RSP as a vehicle for implementing the GPA/LBA.1294

6.6.3 Absence of an Overarching Global Oceans Organisation
Many scholars and policy analysts have attributed as one of the main causes for the
governance problems in ocean governance the absence of an overarching global
institution with oversight and control over the various sectoral and disconnected
bodies, programs and agencies.1295 Although the UNGA has an overarching role
within the UN in terms of ocean governance, UNGA does not possess adequate
powers to streamline the activities of the various bodies, programs and agencies with
ocean mandates due to the high level of autonomy enjoyed by most of these
agencies. As seen before, the intention of the founding fathers of the UN was for the
system to be decentralised. With the realisation of the difficulties in coordinating a
disperse system of ocean governance, there has been a call for the creation of a
centralising agency with enough powers to coordinate and control the work of the
various ocean-mandated specialised agencies.
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The issue of the need for a ‘lead agency for ocean affairs’ has been under discussion
within the UN for decades, but remains unresolved.1296 The high level of autonomy
enjoyed by the UN agencies contributed to impeding the designation of a single
agency with leadership over ocean matters that could centralise and streamline the
work of the various organisations.1297 With the adoption of the LOSC in 1982, it was
thought that because the LOSC regulated several ocean uses, it would prompt the
creation of a super-agency with oversight in the entire system of ocean governance.
There have been proposals for the creation of such an agency. For instance, Borgese
suggested the creation of a Committee of the Whole under the UNGA authority,
which would perform a coherent and integrating role. The proposed Committee of
the Whole would be comprised by representatives of the Regional Seas Programs,
the specialised agencies of the UN system with ocean-related mandates, and NGOs.
This Committee of the Whole would be a ‘sort of Ocean Assembly of the United
Nations.1298 In this regard:
Only a universal body can fulfil the requirement to generate an integrated
ocean policy, and wield the authority to charge existing mechanisms with the
implementation.1299
Kullenberg also supported the need for a global body to shape ocean policy and
decision making, which can ensure proper cross-references and linkages and avoid
the creation of conflicting agreements and situations.1300 This global organism should
specially established close relationship with the World Trade Organisation
(WTO).1301 There have been successful instances of national governments, such as
the Republic of Korea, which created a super-agency that integrates within its
mandate all marine affairs and fisheries and their administrations under the umbrella
of one super-agency.1302 However, at the level of the UN system, a global ocean
organisation with a broad mandate to regulate and carry out all the ocean issues dealt
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with by the LOSC was never set up.

1303

Despite UNGA and ECOSOC having some

power over the UN agencies, they are still unable to exert direct control over UN
agencies’ activities and eliminate duplication of efforts and overlaps.1304 One of the
major obstacles for the UNGA to exercise a more centralised and streamlined role is
the fact that the various UN ocean-mandated specialised agencies1305 primarily have
to respond to the authority of their own governing bodies pursuant to their
constituent instruments.1306 This results in ‘internal governance problems within the
UN system’1307 due to the fact that these agencies are fully autonomous to set their
own policy goals within their mandates and to administer their budgets without any
sort of control from a hierarchic superior organ such as ECOSOC or the UNGA.
Without a strong hand from supervisory organs, the specialised agencies operate
independently. According to Keckes, the root cause for the absence of a lead ocean
agency within the UN is ‘[t]he consequence of sectoral views about oceans
prevailing at the time when these organisations were established and their programs
defined’.1308 The lack of an overarching agency to function as the lead agency in
ocean governance results in increasing the level of segmentation within the system.
In this regard, there is a need for ‘some body to oversee that the parts belong to a
cohesive whole and that there are no duplicate or overlapping parts’.1309
Various suggestions have been made in view of solving the problem of absence of an
overarching agency within ocean governance. Among the suggestions is the creation
of Ocean Assembly, similar to the UNGA that would meet periodically solely to
discuss ocean affairs.1310 Another proposal was to reinforce the mandate of the UN
Trusteeship Council, which since the end of the Cold War has been ineffective and
obsolete so as to mandate the Trusteeship Council with the management of the
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‘common areas’ such as oceans, air and outer space.1311 Lastly, the establishment of a
high-level intergovernmental conference through the UNGA and the establishment of
a standing UN Commission on Ocean Affairs was also suggested.1312 This is because
within the structure of the UNGA, there are a number of subsidiary organs such as
commissions,1313 committees, boards, councils and panels, working groups and
others.1314 A problem with these suggestions is that the creation of yet another body
would add another layer of bureacracy to the already overloaded institutional
framework for ocean governance. Another issue related to the creation of a
permanent body is the resulting costs of such an initiative,1315 in particular in view of
the fact that due to its major budgetary problems, the UN has adopted a zero-growth
budget policy.1316

6.6.4 Lack of Accountability, Transparency and Implementation
At the time of the convening of the WSSD in 2002, the assessment of the state of
affairs in Ocean Goverance based on the number of treaties and international
organisations set up was that the levels of accountability and implementation were
deemed to be ‘unacceptable’.1317WSSD, while emphasising the absence of
accountability and implementation in ocean governance, pushed for ‘more effective,
democratic and accountable international and multilateral institutions’.1318 For
instance, while setting up the guidelines for the partnership initiatives launched
during the WSSD process, the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)
listed accountability as one of the guiding practices for the elaboration of

1311

Corell, “Oversight of the Implementation,” 341.
Corell, “Oversight of the Implementation,” 341.
1313
Among the commissions are those related to the following issues: disarmament, international civil
service, international law, international trade law, conciliation for Palestine, peacebuilding and UN
Security Council Resolutions and advisory. UNGA Website,
http://www.un.org/ga/commissions.shtml. Accessed on 17/06/10.
1314
UNGA Website, http://www.un.org/ga/commissions.shtml. Accessed on 17/06/10.
1315
Corell, “Oversight of the Implementation,” 341.
1316
The UN zero growth budget policy has been facing criticism from developing nations, based on
the argument that the zero growth budget policy ‘severely restricts the capacity of the Organisation
[UN] to implement its activities.’ UN Website. Dept of Public Information.
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gaab3927.doc.htm. Accessed on 05/06/10.
1317
Hinds, “Oceans Governance,” 350.
1318
Johannesburg Declaration, para. 31.
1312

308

partnerships. The WSSD process stated that partnerships must establish internal
monitoring systems to assess progress in implementation and accountability. 1319
Lack of accountability is also directly related to the poor levels of implementation,
since one problem thrives from the other. In regards to lack of implementation, it has
been argued that ‘international agreements and programs of action alone will not
improve the status of the marine environment. It is essential that they are
implemented and enforced to achieve the required goals’.1320 The reality is that few
treaties contain serious enforcement provisions. In most cases, the only effective
mechanism for compliance with treaty obligations comes from ‘peer pressure or the
threat of public exposure.’1321 Moreover, in regards to implementation as opposed to
enacting laws, it has been said that ‘there needs to be more commitment to this less
glamorous task [implementation]’.1322 In this regard:
[C]onventions, agreements, resolutions, guidelines and plans of action are
only as good as they are effectively implemented, at the global, regional or
national level, as appropriate.1323
For instance, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement strengthened the role of the RFOs by
extending their powers to exclude states that do not agree in applying the agreed
conservation and management measures from accruing the benefits derived from the
management of fisheries resources within areas of high seas under the coverage of
the concerned RFO.1324 Despite UN Fish Stocks Agreement provisions strengthening
the role of RFO, it is believed that many existing RFOs are still deficient in terms of
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their mandates because of poor levels of implementation and inadequate powers to
enforce the provisions of their agreements.1325 In this regard:
the failure by States to accept and implement relevant international
instruments, a lack of willingness by those States to delegate sufficient
responsibility to regional bodies and the lack of effective enforcement of
management measures at both national and regional levels.1326
It also was pointed out that the weakness in the mandates of some RFOs is a result of
the absence of ‘rewards or punishments to induce ocean exploiters to keep their takes
within the range of what is sustainable’.1327 Lack of implementation, in particular of
the relevant LOSC provisions and failure by flag states to control their fishing
vessels, were identified by delegates during UNICPOLOS as major factors
contributing to problems such as illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU
fishing).1328
In regards to accountability, there needs to be more transparency in terms of access
to information about levels of implementation and enforcement achieved by the
various agencies and programs with ocean mandates.1329 It is well documented that
the UN has not been ‘effective in assessing, reviewing, and monitoring either the
effects of its programs or compliance with prescribed measures’.1330 In this regard:
Scrutiny has been left mainly to autonomous treaty bodies and NGOs, which
have performed the task efficiently in several areas, but their activities are
necessarily issue-oriented: they cannot themselves carry out the required
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reforms to remedy the whole range of weaknesses in the system, especially
the coordinative failures.1331
When the UN exercises its overseeing power in ocean matters it is through its
UNGA, whose only resource to evaluate and assess the work of the various UN
bodies, organisations and programs with ocean mandates is by means of performance
reports that are submitted by the UN bodies, organisations and the programs
themselves to the scrutiny of the UNGA/ECOSOC.1332 That is the reason why Corell
stressed that UNGA is limited in its efforts to coordinate the implementation of the
global regime for ocean governance basically relying solely on ‘exhortation and
moral persuasion’.1333
During recent UNICPOLOS meetings, delegates suggested to the UN for it to
establish mechanisms of cooperation1334 for ocean issues based on principles of
continuity, regularity and accountability.1335 Other suggestions during UNICPOLOS
invited UNGA to recommend international organisations to assist countries in
implementing international treaties sponsored by them.1336 Such a move has, for
example, been successfully taken by IMO in assisting flag states1337 to meet their
obligations under the LOSC.1338 This is because during the Post-LOSC period,
shipping accidents and loss of life or pollution were perceived as the result of
ineffective flag state implementation and enforcement’ and not a result of
‘inadequate’ legislation at the global level.1339 Among the measures proposed to assist
implementation are:
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•

preparation and publishing of periodic evaluations of progress;

•

training of personnel from developing countries in enforcement techniques;
and

•

technical cooperation and financial assistance.1340

To complement its assistance to flag states, IMO was invited to develop systems of
evaluation to measure levels of compliance with its conventions and protocols.1341
These measures have the potential to increase both the level of implementation and
accountability because states might improve their compliance levels through being
under constant scrutiny as a result of these evaluations.
There has also been a call for independent audits, such as the one conducted on the
Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection
(GESAMP).1342 GESAMP was evaluated by an independent team in order ‘to make it
more effective, more inclusive and more responsive to emerging problems and to the
needs of policy and decision makers’.1343 GESAMP’s reaction to the final report of
the evaluation was very positive, despite the fact that to solve most of the highlighted
problems, substantial financial resources were required.1344 The positive outcomes of
having organisations assessed by independent auditing bodies need to be taken into
account. A problem with independent audits is that they can be a costly undertaking.
At the regional level, lack of accountability is also a reality as exemplified in the
resistance of RFOs to have their performance assessed by the UN or FAO. This is
because attempts by FAO to establish ‘indicators to assess performance’ to evaluate
the work of the RFOs and how effective they have been in undertaking their
mandates encountered opposition ‘on the account that it was a difficult and
politically sensitive task which should be conducted by the member countries
1340
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themselves’.1345 In this regard it has been argued that the partial success of some
RFOs in implementing their legal framework for the conservation of fisheries
resources is due to their ‘inability to enforce their regulatory measures, even vis-a-vis
their own members’.1346
According to a proposition made to UNGA, there is a need to make the UNEP
Regional Seas Program accountable through ‘the development of shared goals and
timetables’.1347 In this regard, the legal and institutional framework of the
Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Sustainable Development of the
Marine and Coastal Environment of the Northeast Pacific (Antigua Convention)1348
of 2002 has been hailed as exemplary because it is the first UNEP RSP agreement ‘to
integrate the implementation of GPA within its framework’.1349
In assisting with the lack of accountability in ocean governance, there have been
some recommendations for international organisations ‘to further develop ideas to
devise means to increase the financial costs to owners and operators for noncompliance with duties and obligations prescribed in international instruments’.1350
During a UNICPOLOS meeting, the need for the application of effective sanctions
for infractions in response to violation of international instruments was reinforced by
some delegations.1351
In conclusion, UNGA stated in 1991 that ‘the socio-economic goals of the UN
including the goal of sustainable development would remain unachievable in the
absence of political will on the parts of states’.1352 Thus, the UNGA linked the
achievement of the UN’s socio-economic goals, including the goal of sustainable
1345
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development, to the presence of political will on the part of states, as a
requirement.1353 By analogy, the same argument can be made for accountability,
transparency and implementation in ocean governance. That is to say that
accountability, transparency and implementation can only be achieved in ocean
governance through the political will of states.

6.6.5 Lack of Technical and Financial Resources
The last, and probably most difficult, challenge to be overcome in ocean governance
is related to the lack of technical and financial resources to implement UN oceanrelated policy and legal frameworks. For instance, during the third Global Meeting of
the UNEP Regional Seas Conventions and Action Plans, held in Monaco in
November 2000, participants concluded ‘that the most critical problem hindering the
implementation of the conventions and action plans was the financial constraints’.1354
The lack of technical and financial resources also hampers international cooperation
in ocean governance. This is because, among other reasons, many countries still lack
the financial and technical resources to ratify existing treaties.1355 In this regard:
‘[S]ome countries decline to sign and ratify for reasons of substance, but then
added that ‘a far greater number simply lack the necessary expertise and
resources, especially when national legislation is needed to give force to
international instruments.’1356
Since the Pre-LOSC period, UNGA has stressed the lack of adequate ‘financial and
technical resources for international environmental cooperation’.1357 Thus, the lack of
technical and financial resources has been an ever-present problem in ocean
governance whose solution must be regarded as a top priority. Lack of technical and
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financial resources is particularly challenging for three areas of ocean governance:
capacity building, marine scientific research and transfer of marine technology. In
fact, the LOSC drafters, conscious of the need for capacity building and transfer of
marine technology, in particular in developing countries, adopted an extensive
number of provisions (Parts XIII and XIV of the LOSC) prescribing the need to
foster cooperation in these areas. In this regard:
The framers of UNCLOS [LOSC] were keenly aware of the need for
capacity-building, especially in the absence of any fund or assistance program
embedded in the Convention [LOSC] itself.1358
The LOSC drafters’ emphasis on capacity building is important for ocean
governance because there is a need for ‘the development of the necessary personnel
and technical capabilities, in particular in developing states’.1359 Special attention to
the needs of developing countries for technical and financial resources is even more
important given that ‘a substantial portion of the world’s ocean fell under the
national jurisdiction of developing countries’.1360 As a result, developing countries’
duty to protect their ocean resources is disproportional in comparison with their
insufficient availability of technical and financial resources to carry out this duty.
In trying to address this inadequacy, there are several provisions within the LOSC
that imposed the duty to cooperate on developed countries in view of promoting
‘capacity-building and the transfer of technology under fair and reasonable terms and
conditions’.1361 However, the LOSC provisions did not bring forth instruments or
means for the allocation of adequate financial resources to fund and implement its
provisions. The absence of financial mechanisms or provision of funds to implement
ocean governance compromises the system’s efficiency. The LOSC, being an
integrator treaty in the sense that it regulates various areas within ocean governance,

1358

SG Report, A/57/57 of 07/03/02, para. 573, page 89.
Annick de Marffy, “Ocean Governance: A Process in the Right Direction for the Effective
Management of the Oceans Ocean” in Ocean Yearbook 18, eds. Aldo Chircop and Moira McConnell
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 187.
1360
Report of the Second UNICPOLOS, A/56/121 of 22/06/01, para. 155, page 31.
1361
Report of the Third UNICPOLOS, A/57/80 of 02/07/02, para. 55, page 19; De Marffy, “Ocean
Governance,” 187.
1359

315

should have provided for financial mechanisms to put forward its objectives. Agenda
21 clearly states the need for a link to be established between the UN system and
multilateral financial institutions to finance the implementation of Agenda 21. In this
regard:1362
[T]here has to be an effective link between substantive action and financial
support, and this requires close and effective cooperation and exchange of
information between the United Nations system and the multilateral financial
institutions for the follow-up of Agenda 21 within the institutional
arrangement.1363
During WSSD, the issue of lack of technical and financial resources was still at the
centre of the agenda of discussions, given the persistent lack of technical and
financial resources to implement the two major policy and legal instruments for
ocean governance, namely Agenda 21 and LOSC. Moreover, WSSD regarded the
need for improved capacity-building efforts to assist developing countries as one of
its priorities for action along with greater cooperation among the various relevant
programs and organisations and increased integration on how these ocean issues
should be dealt with.1364
It seems that the continuing lack of adequate financial resources to fund the
implementation of ocean policies and projects is a result of a structural problem
within the UN. One of the reasons for this structural problem is the absence of
coordination between the planning of ocean programs and the allocation of budget
within the scope of each ocean-mandated agency and program.1365 For this
coordination to take place, the mandates of the UN ocean-related agencies should be
aligned with resources across several budgets.1366 This move towards integrating the
planning and budgeting cycle would also prevent the duplication of efforts in the
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sense that it would ‘avoid fund areas that are already adequately resourced’.1367 The
solution of lack of financial resources to prevent marine pollution could be found, for
instance, in bringing together ‘the World Bank and UNEP, representatives of private
sector financial institutions, international financial institutions and multilateral and
bilateral donors’.1368 These are the persistent problems plaguing ocean governance
from an institutional viewpoint. In an attempt to overcome some of these problems,
the UN created a series of coordinating mechanisms, which will analysed in the
following chapter.

6.7. Conclusion
The chapter analysed the historical evolution of the institutional framework for ocean
governance during the Pre-LOSC, LOSC and Post-LOSC periods. The chapter
concluded that despite the duty to cooperate being stipulated in the mandates of
many of the UN ocean-mandated agencies and programs, the segmented and sectoral
manner, among other factors in which the governance system is structured, requires
more levels of inter-agency cooperation and coordination between the various
bodies, agencies and programs. Because ocean problems are of an interconnected and
multi-dimensional nature, there is a need to address problems in a coordinated
fashion so as to overcome the segmentation resulting from the system of
specialisation in which the UN ocean-mandated institutions were structured. The
various ocean-mandated bodies, agencies and programs are operating as isolated
clusters, confined to their mandates. The Chapter identified areas in which had been
some progress in decreasing the governance problems. Those areas are: formations
of joint initiatives to address cross-sectoral issues and the inclusion of the principles
of international in their practices while carrying out their ocean-related mandates.
Furthermore, the chapter identified five major persisting problems impeding the
effective cooperation between the numerous institutions and ultimately the
deliverance of effective ocean governance. The challenges are segmentation, lack of
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multi-sectoral and multi-level approaches, absence of an overarching global oceans
organisation to coordinate the various ocean-mandated agencies, lack of
accountability, transparency and implementation and persisting lack of technical and
financial resources. It emerged from the discussion that as a result of the convening
of the two major global conferences (UNCED and WSSD) during the Post-LOSC
period, a stronger call for inter-agency cooperation and coordination among the
various UN bodies, agencies and programs has surfaced. On the basis of the
problems faced by the institutional framework for ocean governance, the chapter
concludes that there is a need for coordination of efforts between its several oceanmandated organisations in order for them to be more effective. In response to these
problems, the UN set up several coordinating mechanisms. The various coordinating
mechanisms set up by the UN to address the identified persistent problems will be
analysed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7 - COORDINATING MECHANISMS AND OCEAN
GOVERNANCE
7.1 Introduction
The range and diversity of international organisations dealing with ocean governance
points to one problem: the difficulty of coordinating and ensuring consistency within
such a diffuse system.1369 This chapter considers attempts made by the United
Nations (UN), over the last three decades, to coordinate its ocean-related bodies,
specialised agencies and programs. This chapter focuses on selected coordinating
mechanisms set up by the UN during the three analytical time periods, namely the
Pre-LOSC, the LOSC, and the Post-LOSC periods. It will be shown that one of the
main objectives of the coordinating mechanisms was to streamline the work of the
major UN intergovernmental bodies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and other specialised
agencies and programs dealing with ocean issues. By setting up the coordinating
mechanisms, the UN attempted to overcome the governance failures resulting from
persisting problems within the institutional framework for ocean governance,
identified in the previous chapter.1370
Among those problems was the segmented and sectoral manner in which the UN
system for ocean governance was embedded. The ingrained segmentation within the
institutional framework for ocean governance, coupled with the absence of an oceanmandated super-agency with adequate powers to oversee and coordinate the work of
the various agencies and programs, further hampers the achievement of inter-agency
cooperation. In addition, the coordination mechanisms set up by the UN lack in many
instances adequate powers to exert change and promote inter-agency cooperation.
This chapter will discuss the various coordinating mechanisms established by the UN
to address the identified governance problems. It will also highlight the difficulties
1369
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encountered by the various coordinating mechanisms in building inter-agency
cooperation and promoting coherency within the diffuse system of ocean
governance. The chapter concludes that these mechanisms achieved some level of
success in overcoming segmentation and preventing proliferation of institutions
within the system. However, due to persisting structural problems the levels of
success to be achieved will remain moderate. The persisting structural problems are
twofold. Firstly, the engrained culture of division of labour or specialisation with the
UN system for ocean governance which generates segmentation. Secondly, the
various UN agencies, bodies and programs are not equipped to deal with crosssectoral issues. Thus, the reality makes the task of inter-agency cooperation
mandated to the coordinating mechanisms almost unfeasible. The chapter concludes
if the coordinate mechanisms were to be more effective they would need to be
provided with adequate powers. Besides a stronger mandate for the coordinating
mechanisms, there is a need to instil a culture of cross-sectoral issues within the UN
system for ocean governance which would greatly strengthen the work performed by
the coordinating mechanisms.

7.2 Coordinating Mechanisms Established during the Pre-LOSC Period
Institutional cooperation refers to two aspects of cooperation: firstly, cooperation of
states in the work of international organisations and secondly, cooperation between
different institutions.1371 This chapter will focus on the second form of cooperation
which is also referred to as inter-agency cooperation and coordination.1372 In this
regard,
The coordination of the activities of international environmental organisations
through enhanced cooperation is a particularly important development with
respect to efforts to prevent overlapping competences and activities. Without
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the coordination that results from enhanced cooperation, the significant
problems that result from conflicts between international agreements finds its
equivalence in the overlap of and conflict between activities of international
environmental organisations.1373
As seen in the previous chapter, some of the various UN ocean-related agencies,
bodies and programs have cooperation with other organisations as part of their
mandates. To assist its various UN ocean-related agencies, bodies and programs, the
UN mandated some of its supervisory bodies with the task to promote inter-agency
cooperation. The main objective of these supervisory bodies was to achieve more
coherence in its system of ocean governance to avoid the above referred problems of
overlapping of mandates, conflicts between organisations and duplication of efforts.
This is necessary because the UN system of ocean governance is highly decentralised
and segmentation.1374 Although decentralisation and segmentation are inevitable,
there is a need for building interconnections between the institutions to diminish the
negative effects of fragmentation within the system.1375 Two of the most significant
supervisory bodies within the UN are the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The UNGA and ECOSC have
among their duties the promotion of inter-agency cooperation between the various
UN

ocean-related

organisations.1376

Other

organisations

with

inter-agency

cooperation as part of their mandates created during the Pre-LOSC are the
Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) and the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP). A brief description of each one of these coordinating
mechanisms follows.
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7.2 1 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is not a coordinating mechanism per
se. As seen in the previous chapter, the UNGA is the most prominent deliberative
body of the UN. In fact, UNGA is considered the top-deliberating organ within the
UN.1377 The UNGA is also tasked with the promotion of cooperation within the UN
system.1378 According to a resolution adopted by the Commission on Sustainable
Development (CSD)1379 in 1999, the UNGA is the ‘appropriate body to provide the
coordination that is needed to ensure an integrated approach is taken to all aspects of
ocean issues, at both the intergovernmental and inter-agency levels’.1380 This is
because the UNGA is not only the top-deliberating organ within the UN structure but
it also has an extensive membership which consists of all member of the UN as a
whole. The extensive membership of the UNGA is supposed to assist in the
promotion of cooperation within the UN system, given that the 192 member-nations
of the UN take part in discussions at the UNGA Assembly.1381 The fact that the
UNGA is tasked with the promotion of cooperation within the UN system highlights
the relevance of cooperation as a guiding principle within the UN system.
However, as pointed out in the previous chapter, the UNGA does not enjoy unlimited
powers over its members and, in particular, over its specialised agencies. Its authority
is exercised more on the basis of ‘exhortation and moral persuasion’.1382 Basically,
the autonomous UN bodies and programs respond to their governing bodies by force
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of constituent instruments, which creates various ‘lines of authority’ and results in
internal conflicts and disparities or ‘internal governance’ problems within the UN.1383
As a result, the UNGA is faced with obstacles while attempting to promote interagency cooperation. The problem of the limitation of power of the UNGA is
compounded by the fact that the UN ocean-mandated specialised agencies and
programs operate mostly on the basis of their autonomous mandates. Also, the
sectoral manner in which agencies were set up, as analysed in Chapter 6, is not
conducive to inter-sectoral, multi-level and inter-disciplinary approaches, which are
prerequisites for inter-agency cooperation.
There has been no clear guidance on how to fix the lack of powers of the UNGA for
the purpose of increasing inter-agency cooperation within the system of ocean
governance. During the United Nations Conference of Environment and
Development (UNCED) in 1992, participants of the conference, while adopting
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, simply reinforced the prominence of the UNGA as the
main UN organ with competence to oversee the entire functioning of the system of
ocean governance as well the UNGA’s responsibility to strengthen coordination at
the intergovernmental level of general marine and coastal issues.1384

7.2.2 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
The UNGA has tasked the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with the
responsibility to promote inter-agency cooperation. Similar to the UNGA, the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)1385 was created in 1946. For many decades
after its creation, the ECOSOC was limited to economic and social issues. During the
first decades since its inception, concerns with cooperation in ocean governance were
absent from ECOSOC’s deliberations. This would change, in particular during the
years that preceded the convening of the United Nations Conference on Human
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Environment (UNCHE) in 1972, as a result of the increasing concern about pressing
environmental problems and existing governance problems within the UN system,
such as ‘overlapping and duplication of programmes and gaps in competence’.1386
The ECOSOC executes its mandate through consultations among the various
specialised agencies. Based on these consultations, ECOSOC recommends required
actions to the UNGA.1387 The ECOSOC attempts to promote coherence between the
UN specialised agencies at an inter-agency level. The various UN specialised
agencies are required to report to ECOSOC on past activities and their program
operations for the subsequent year. The ECOSOC then compiles the information and
presents it to the regular session of the UNGA.1388
In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) process, by virtue
of its JPOI stated the following on ECOSOC’s role:
reaffirmed the Council [ECOSOC] as the central mechanism for the
coordination of the UN system and its specialised agencies and supervision of
subsidiary bodies, in particular its functional commissions, and to promote
the

implementation

of

Agenda

21

by

strengthening

system-wide

coordination.1389
To improve the work of ECOSOC in promoting inter-agency cooperation within the
UN system, the JPOI recommended the ECOSOC to increase its role ‘in overseeing
system-wide coordination and to balanced integration of economic, social and
environmental aspects of UN policies and programs aimed at promoting sustainable
development’.1390
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7.2.3 Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC)
Soon after the creation of ECOSOC in 1946, the council accepted a proposal to
create an ad hoc committee of coordination to assist it in the promotion of interagency cooperation within the UN system. As a result, the Administrative Committee
on Coordination (ACC) was created to assist ECOSOC with increasing cooperation
between the UN and its specialised agencies.1391
In 1992, Agenda 21 recommended the ACC to improve cooperation between ‘all
heads of agencies and institutions of the UN and multilateral financial
institutions’.1392 In view of the many persisting governance problems associated with
the lack of inter-agency coordination, Agenda 21 also recommended the UN
Secretary-General ‘revitalize the functioning of the Committee [ACC]’.1393 Among
other recommendations within Agenda 21 to strengthen the role of ACC was to
propose that all heads of agencies and institutions within the UN system cooperate
with the UN Secretary-General ‘in making ACC work effectively’.1394 Moreover,
Agenda 21 suggested ACC create a taskforce responsible for enhancing coordination
in the implementation of Agenda 21. This task would be later known as Inter-agency
Committee on Sustainable Development (IACSD), and will be analysed below
among other coordinating mechanisms, which were set up during the Post-LOSC
period.

7.2.4 The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)
The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was the main institutional
outcome of the UNCHE process in 1972. UNEP has among its main purposes the
implementation of principle 25 of the Declaration on Human Environment
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(Stockholm Declaration), which called for states ‘to ensure that international
organisations play a coordinated, efficient and dynamic role for the protection and
improvement of the environment’.1395 Among other UNEP purposes is ‘to provide
general policy guidance for the direction and coordination of environmental
programs within the UN system and to influence other agencies to promote a crosssectoral and cross-disciplinary view while developing their programs’.1396 The
Governing Council (GC)1397 is the UNEP’s highest governing body whose role is to
provide policy-guidance for the coordination of environmental activities.
In regards to inter-agency cooperation, the UNCED mandated UNEP with ‘comanagerial functions’ to manage the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in
collaboration with UNDP and World Bank.1398 The GEF assists developing countries
by funding projects and programs that protect the global environment (including
international waters and persistent organic pollutants).1399 Agenda 21 tasked UNEP
with the coordination of the growing number of environmental treaties and their
secretariats.1400 Among other tasks assigned to UNEP by the UNCED process are to
promote cooperation on policy-making, monitoring and assessment, development of
international environmental law, environmental impact assessment and auditing,
dissemination of information and promotion of regional and sub-regional
cooperation.1401
The first director of UNEP observed that UNEP’s role was to ‘remind others of, and
help them to take into account all the systems, interactions and ramifications implied
in their work’.1402 Furthermore, the executive director of UNEP pointed out that it
was the lack of a cross-sectoral, cross-disciplinary view that led to many
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environmental problems.1403 This understanding was the driving force for the creation
of UNEP. In this regard, UNEP represented a significant step forward since for the
first time, a UN body was taking up the task to improve cross-sectoral and crossdisciplinary cooperation.
UNEP, on the other hand, is not limited by any specific mandate area. In fact, the
motivation behind the creation of UNEP was the promotion of inter-agency
cooperation in itself. In that sense, UNEP since its inception was encouraged to
address issues that cross over various subject areas. As a result of this goal, all the
projects launched by UNEP had a cross-sectoral and cross-disciplinary component.
Among these projects are the Global Program of Action for the Protection of the
Marine Environment from Land-based Activities (GPA/LBA);1404 the Regional Seas
Program;1405 the Earthwatch Program;1406 the Global Plan of Action for the
Conservation, Protection and Utilization of Marine Mammals (MMAP); and the
Barbados Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island
Developing States.
Over the years, UNEP faced criticism because of its poor performance in fostering
cooperation among the UN environmental agencies and programs.1407 As mentioned
in the previous chapter, within the UN structure UNEP does not enjoy adequate
authoritative powers over the various ocean-related agencies. In addition, UNEP has
the status of a subsidiary body. That is to say that UNEP does not enjoy the same
level of autonomy as the specialised agencies (i.e., FAO, IMO, etc.) in terms of
having its own budget and juridical personality to enter into treaties.
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Under these circumstances, the impact of UNEP in fostering inter-agency
cooperation has been weakened. On the other hand, attempts to transform UNEP into
a more powerful body, such as a specialised agency, failed.1408 The underlying reason
for the resistance could be related to the excessive costs involved in setting up yet
another costly specialised agency, as well as adding more levels of bureaucratisation
to an already overloaded UN institutional scenario. Among the benefits that could be
accrued by UNEP if it performed a more autonomous role are that it could enhance
its standing within the UN; it could secure its own funding without being exclusively
dependent upon voluntary contributions and the UN and its political influence could
be enhanced.1409
During the Pre-LOSC period, the UN set up the above-referred coordinating
mechanisms which indicate that the system relied on creation of organisations as
solution for lack of inter-agency cooperation. That may have contributed to establish
a pattern within the UN which resulted in negative consequences to the system. This
is because the proliferation of agencies (even if they are created to foster cooperation
between) adds more complexity and bureaucratisation to a system already
overloaded. A case in point is the creation of two coordinating mechanisms under the
auspices the UNGA, namely ECOSOC and later with the convening of the UNCHE
in 1972, UNEP. This can generate duplication of efforts, dispute for funding,
overlapping, etc. The proliferation is increased during the Post-LOSC period, as it
will be seen below, when the ECOSOC creates yet another mechanism for
coordination (Commission on Sustainable Development – CSD), as result of the
convening of the UNCED in 1992. To increase even further proliferation, the ACC
also added another layer to the complex institutional arrangement for ocean
governance within the UN. This culture of creation of organisations to promote
cooperation within the UN has been most recently (2000 and ahead) put to a test.
Accordingly, Schreuer touched upon this problem that over time many organisations
have been created to facilitate international cooperation and stated as follows:
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In spite of their usefulness, the creation of organisations to enhance
cooperation should not be an end in itself. At times, creation of yet another
institution or body looks like an escape from substantive forms.1410
As the chapter unfolds, Schreuer’s assertion will be exposed in view of the fact that it
will be demonstrated that the coordinating mechanisms created by the UN were set
within a system embedded in segmentation in which agencies, bodies and programs
are not used to inter-agency communication and cross-sectoral issues, for instance. It
will also be demonstrated that the devised coordinating mechanisms at times overlap
with one other or create more bureaucratisation within the system. Most importantly,
as the Pre-LOSC period already exposed, the coordinating mechanisms within the
UN lacked adequate powers to imprint inter-agency cooperation within the system.
Despite the fact that the UNGA is the most important deliberative organ within the
UN, it has insufficient powers to obligate the UN specialised agencies with ocean
mandates to coordinate their activities when needed. The UNGA draws its power
from moral persuasion as seen before than from mandated powers. Similar problem
occurs from the UNEP, which is only a program, thus not having power to obligate
specialised agencies such as IMO and FAO to cooperate. This is because IMO and
FAO were set up by treaties and have a ‘will’ of their own based on the members. In
this regard, it has been said:
International mechanisms for coordination are weak sometimes even
symbolic than operational in nature.1411

7.3 Coordinating Mechanisms Established During the LOSC Period
After the adoption of the LOSC in 1982, the UN did not set up any coordinating
mechanisms.
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Thus, to discuss the coordinating mechanisms set up during the LOSC period is to
highlight the absence of such mechanisms as shown below. This fact might be
related to a general perception by the international community at the time that the
LOSC, being an integrator treaty that regulated various ocean uses, would naturally
result in fostering inter-agency cooperation through competent international
organisations simply carrying out their mandates. In other words, it seems that the
understanding at the time was that cooperation would naturally result from the
process of implementation of LOSC provisions on cooperation. Most of the LOSC
provisions on institutional cooperation refer to cooperation within their competent
areas. For instance, in the area of fisheries, Article 64 establishes cooperation in the
following terms:
the coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for the
highly migratory species listed in Annex I shall cooperate directly or through
appropriate international organisations with a view to ensuring conservation
and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such species
throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic
zone.1412
In regards to marine pollution caused by vessels, States’ parties are required to act
through the IMO, which is the competent international organisation1413 with
competence ‘to establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended
practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution from vessels’.1414
The

LOSC

also

prescribed

cooperation

between

competent

international

organisations in regards to the area of transfer of marine technology1415 and marine
scientific research.1416 While prescribing coordination between international programs
in the field of transfer of marine technology, Article 272 of the LOSC required states
to ensure that competent international organisations coordinate their activities at
regional and global levels. By doing this, the LOSC text expressly highlighted the
importance of a multi-level approaches to ocean governance. Also in this regard,
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Article 278 expressly requested ‘cooperation among international organisations’ in
the following terms:
The competent international organisations referred to in this Part [Part XIV]
and in Part XIII [ meaning transfer of marine scientific research and marine
scientific research, respectively] shall take all appropriate measures to ensure,
either directly or in close cooperation among themselves, the effective
discharge of their functions and responsibilities under this Part.1417
What seems to be absent from the LOSC institutional framework is a coordinating
mechanism that would consider ocean problems from the perspective of its preamble,
namely ‘the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be
considered as a whole’.1418 This is because the nature of ocean problems is
interconnected, thus requiring provisions to promote a cross-sectoral and cross-level
cooperation. In this regard, Kullenberg points out the need for an inter-agency
mechanism to be established dedicated specifically to cooperation in relation to the
LOSC.1419 Kullenberg also asserts that the problem is even more intensified by the
fact that the LOSC neither provided for an institution to oversee the work of the
existing organisations nor established an inter-agency mechanism dedicated
specifically to cooperation in relation to LOSC.1420 In this regard,
There is no inter-agency mechanism dedicated specifically to cooperation in
relation to the LOS Convention. This is unfortunate, since the Convention
[LOSC] aims at integration and the international organisations are as
sectorialised as the national governments.
The same understanding is shared by other scholars such as Wolfrum and Matz.1421 In
regards to the lack of cross-sectoral cooperation within the LOSC, Treves argues that

1417

LOSC, art. 278.
LOSC, preamble.
1419
Gunnar Kullenberg, “Global International Organisations and the Implementation of the Law of the
Sea Convention,” in Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century, eds. D. Vidas and W. Østreng
(Netherlands: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 1999), 351.
1420
Kullenberg, “Global International Organisations,” 351.
1421
Rüdiger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Berlin: Springer,
2003), 176.
1418

331

it is absent from the LOSC’s text clarification on which organisation would be
mandated to regulate issues that spill over sectoral boundaries, such as ‘issues
regarding two or more of the fields in Article 2 of Annex VIII.’1422 By doing so,
Treves is referring to issues that involve a combination of areas of competence
between IMO, FAO, IOC and UNEP, namely vessel source of pollution, fisheries,
marine scientific research and marine protection, respectively.1423 The lack of an
inter-agency mechanism devoted specifically to cooperation in relation to the LOSC
brought to the forefront of the debate for reform within the UN the need for a global
body to shape ocean policy and decision making, which could ensure proper crossreferences and linkages and avoid the creation of conflicting agreements and
situations.1424
Despite the absence of a coordinating mechanism to deal with the issues pertinent to
the LOSC, in particular the promotion of cooperation within the various sectors
(fisheries, marine protection, marine scientific research, etc.), there were two
instruments within the UN system that promoted cooperation in the areas of
competence of the LOSC. Such instruments are the Secretary-General Report on
Oceans and Law of the Sea (SG Report) and the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA). An analysis of the contribution of the SG Report and the UNGA in terms
of fostering cooperation in all pertinent areas within the LOSC follows.

7.3.1 Secretary-General Report on Oceans and Law of the Sea (SG Report)
Two years after the adoption of the LOSC, the UN Secretary-General (SG) initiated
the publication of an annual report on the law of the sea, also known as the
Secretary-General Report on Oceans and Law of the Sea (SG Report), which consists
of a review of the work of the UN as whole in the field of ocean affairs. Despite the
fact that the report is not of an institutional body, it imprinted a level of coherence to
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ocean governance by simply pooling together in a single document the work of the
various ocean-related agencies and programs. Since 1996, the report included a
section specifically related to ‘international cooperation and coordination’1425 in
ocean affairs. However, the impact of the SG report in terms of fostering more interagency cooperation between UN agencies, bodies and programs in ocean governance
is yet to be seen. To date, no study has been conducted to evaluate the SG report on
promoting inter-agency cooperation. It may be that the main contribution introduced
by the SG report to ocean governance is due to its informative nature. Another issue
that prevents the SG report from having an impact on the system of ocean
governance is the absence of critical context. The SG report simply lists the activities
performed by the various bodies, agencies and programs with ocean-mandates and
does not assess the efficiency of the system as a whole, in particular in regards to
inter-agency cooperation. Only years later after the adoption of the LOSC, the
UNGA by virtue of its Resolution A/Res/54/33 of 24/11/99 started to request the
Secretary-General to work with the heads of relevant organisations of the UN, to
include in his annual comprehensive reports suggestions to enhance coordination and
cooperation and achieve better integration in ocean affairs, and also to make this
report available in advance of the consultative process. This request would culminate
in the creation of yet another mechanism for coordination (United Nations Openended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea UNICPOLOS), as will be shown below.

7.3.2 UNGA and the LOSC Period
Upon the entering into force of the LOSC in 1994, the role of the UNGA was
expanded to coordinate all affairs related to the LOSC and ocean affairs in
general.1426 In performing this task, the UNGA undertakes annual discussions on
ocean issues, which are informed by the SG report on ocean affairs. These reviews
are complemented by reviews carried out by the various ocean-related organisations
or ‘competent organisations’ as the LOSC refers to them, highlighting their
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contributions towards cooperation and coordination in ocean affairs.1427 As a result of
these annual discussions, recommendations are made to all UN member states by
means of ocean-related resolutions. Even though the UNGA’s resolutions are not
legally binding upon governments, they carry the ‘weight of world opinion, as well
as the moral authority of the world community’.1428
Some criticism has been raised in regards to the absence of an integrated, multisectoral and multi-level view on ocean issues during the UNGA annual reviews.1429
The absence of integrated multi-sectoral and multi-level perspectives at the UNGA
annual reviews reinforces a pattern of fragmentation within the system of ocean
governance. This is because during the UNGA annual reviews, each agency devotes
its presentation time to highlight and discuss issues that are related exclusively to its
mandate. Part of this problem is related to the fact that the absence of an integrated,
multi-sectoral and multi-level view is also evident in the SG Report, which informs
the discussions during the UNGA sessions on the law of the sea. The fragmentation
at the annual discussions is a direct result of the fact that within the report, each
section is devoted to enlist the accomplishments of single sectoral agencies and
programs without regard to the needed links to be established between them. Since
the UNGA annual reviews are basically informed by the content brought forth by the
SG Report on Oceans and Law of the Sea, the segmentation problem persists
unaltered in ocean governance.

7.4 Coordinating Mechanisms Established during the Post- LOSC Period
The Post-LOSC period witnessed an intensified focus on cooperation in the area of
ocean governance as a result of the convening of both the UNCED in 1992 and the
WSSD process, one decade later. During the Post-LOSC period there is more
evidence of the reactive manner in which coordinating mechanisms are created,
given that after the convening of the two conferences, several coordinating
mechanisms were set. Among the main coordinating mechanisms are the
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Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), the Inter-agency Committee on
Sustainable Development (IACSD), the Subcommittee on Ocean and Coastal Areas
(SOCA), the Chief Executives Board (CEB), the United Nations Informal and Openended Consultative Process (UNICPOLOS) and most recently, the Oceans and
Coastal Areas Network (UN-OCEANS). The creation of several coordinating
mechanisms indicates that the UN was still adopting the path of creation of
organisations to solve the lack of inter-agency cooperation among its various oceanrelated agencies, bodies and programs. The outcome of this institutional practice
(which persists since Pre-LOSC) is proliferation which in turn causes duplication of
efforts, more bureaucratisation, overlapping of mandates, convoluted and timeconsuming reporting system and waste of already scarce resources (competition for
funds). For instance, this is the case of the overlap between the Commission of
Sustainable Development (CSD) and UNEP, as will be shown below.

7.4.1 Coordinating Mechanisms Set Up after the UNCED Process
In 1992 at the UNCED, it was stated in the preamble of the Declaration on
Environment and Development (Rio Declaration) that the goal of the conference was
to create new levels of cooperation among states, key sectors of societies and the
people. Moreover, Agenda 21 listed as one of the objectives to be pursued by the UN
system the encouragement of interaction and cooperation between the UN system
and other intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations.1430
The focus on cooperation among institutions indicates that during the UNCED, there
was recognition of the challenges faced by institutions within the UN system for
ocean governance. These challenges have been previously identified by the World
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED).1431 In its 1987 report, Our
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Common Future,1432 the WCED stated that international and national organisations
needed to go through a change in order for them to properly address the
environmental and developmental challenges faced by humankind, including ocean
problems. The objective of sustainable development and the integrated nature of
environment/development challenges, including oceans, pose difficulties for national
and international institutions that were created on a basis of narrow concerns and in a
fragmented manner.1433 The drafters of Our Common Future went further to state as
follows:
Yet most of the institutions facing those challenges tend to be independent,
fragmented, working to relatively narrow mandate with closed decision
processes. [T]here is a growing need for effective international cooperation to
manage ecological and economic interdependence. Yet at the same time,
confidence in international organisations is diminishing and support for them
dwindling.1434
In addressing the lack of inter-agency cooperation pointed out by Our Common
Future, the UNCED process outlined in its Chapter 38 of Agenda 21 practical steps
to be taken by states and in particular organisations that are part of the UN system to
increase inter-agency cooperation.1435 At the same time that Agenda 21
acknowledged the benefits of specialisation through division of labour between
various agencies, programs and funds of the UN system, it also recommended
communication between them.1436 In this regard, Chapter 38 listed among its specific
objectives the establishment of effective cooperation and exchange of information
between the UN organs, organisations, programs and the multilateral financial
bodies.1437
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In regard to ocean governance, Agenda 21 links the achievement of coastal and
marine sustainable development to the adoption of ‘new approaches’ in managing the
oceans and coasts.1438 Agenda 21 states that the new approaches would have to ensure
that an integrated, multi-sectoral and multi-level approach would be adopted.1439 In
fulfilling this objective, Agenda 21 ‘encouraged interaction and cooperation between
the United Nations system and other intergovernmental and non-governmental at
subregional, regional and global levels in the field of environment and
development’.1440 Moreover, Agenda 21 in its Chapter 17, which deals with ocean
issues, highlights that in view of the numerous ocean-mandated organisations, within
and outside the UN system, ‘there was a need to improve coordination and
strengthen links among them’.1441 As a result of the adoption of Agenda 21 during the
UNCED, a number of new coordinating mechanisms were set up. An analysis of the
main coordinating mechanisms follows.

7.4.1.1 Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)
The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was created in the aftermath of
the UNCED process and was mandated with overseeing the implementation of
Agenda 21 within the entire UN governance system.1442 Thus, the CSD was not
mandated to foster cooperation per se. But, because Agenda 21 is a blueprint for
cooperation and informs the modus operandi of the CSD, there remains no doubt that
the Commission’s actions would target the promotion of inter-agency cooperation.
The CSD is regarded as a key intergovernmental coordinating mechanism and
political forum to promote the Agenda 21 implementation due to its mandate,
composition and methods of work.1443 In addition, within the UN structure, the CSD
is part of ECOSOC, which, as seen before, is tasked to set up commissions in
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economic and social fields including the environment, to assist it in undertaking its
coordinating functions.1444
The creation of the CSD was a result of a compromise achieved during the UNCED
between two opposing forces. Prior to the convening of UNCED, there was not
enough political support for the creation of a supranational environmental and
development agency with a lead role in all aspects of environment and development,
including oceans.1445 Furthermore, there was not enough support to assign the lead
role to one of the existing agencies.1446 During the UNCED, however, an agreement
was reached for the creation of the CSD to serve with limited powers and to address
the lack of coordination within the system of environmental governance, including
oceans and coasts.
The CSD consists of 53 state members elected by ECOSOC for a period of three
years.1447 In addition, representatives of non-member states of the CSD have observer
status. The ECOSOC periodically reviews the work of the CSD.1448 After its annual
meetings, the CSD invites ministers to provide the political support for its decisions.
In regards to ocean issues,1449 the CSD supplements the UNGA annual review on
ocean affairs by providing recommendations and assessing progress made in
sustainable oceans development every five years.1450 To date, the CSD has
comprehensively addressed ocean issues in its 4th, 5th and 7th sessions. The CSD
concluded as follows:
Whether building on existing arrangements or trying to do anything new, a
more integrated approach is required to all legal, economic, social and
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environmental aspects of oceans and seas, both at intergovernmental level and
inter-agency level.1451
In this regard, the 4th and 7th sessions of CSD have emphasised the need for
international cooperation and coordination in the following terms:1452
The Commission [CSD] urges relevant institutions, whether national, regional
or global, to enhance collaboration with each other, taking into account their
respective mandates with a view to providing coordinated approaches,
avoiding duplication of effort, enhancing effective functioning of existing
organisations, and ensuring better access to and broadening the dissemination
of information.1453
The CSD analyses and evaluates the content of the reports sent by all relevant
organs, organisations, programs and institutions of the UN system dealing with
various environmental and developmental issues. The CSD also receives and
analyses inputs from governments and competent NGOs, including the scientific and
the private sectors, in the context of the overall implementation of Agenda 21.
The creation of the CSD added more complexity to the system of environmental
governance within the UN. This is because the CSD’s functions compete with those
of other coordinating mechanisms created as a result of the UNCED process such as
the Inter-agency Committee on Sustainable Development (IACSD).1454 But most
importantly, the creation of the CSD resulted in ‘diluting UNEP’s influence within
the UN system’.1455 This is because UNEP was set up to coordinate the work of the
various environmental related agencies within the UN. The same task was assigned
to the CSD in the aftermath of the UNCED since its main goal was to coordinate the
work of the agencies responsible for implementing Agenda 21. Given that Agenda 21
mandated the CSD to deal with the challenges faced by the environment in
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connection with development, the CSD will necessarily deal with issues that fall
within the UNEP’s mandate, resulting in the work of UNEP being ‘diluted’1456 by the
CSD. In this regard:
In general, it is not desirable to assign similar competencies to two different
institutions in order to avoid uncertainty in regards to areas of competence
and the contradictions resulting therefrom.1457
It might be possible that because of the overlap of functions with UNEP, the CSD
results in being a forum with no powers, few resources and limited influence. 1458
Thus, the CSD lacks the appropriate powers to evaluate agencies’ performances and
continuously review their policies, programs and budgets.1459 Another aspect that
equally weakens the role of both coordinating mechanisms (UNEP and CSD) is that
an UNGA decision created the UNEP and an ECOSOC decision set up the CSD
which means that they were not founded by an international treaty which would have
conferred on them the status of an international organisation.1460 Having a status of
international organisation resulting from being set up by a treaty would provide more
powers for both mechanisms.
In order to confer more power to these mechanisms, the CSD, in particular, could
greatly benefit from a system of review through cross-checking the information
provided by governments in their national reports on activities purportedly
undertaken to implement Agenda 21. Currently, the CSD does not possess resources
or power to verify if information provided by governments in their reports is
accurate. In this regard, Mabudafhasi identifies the creation of underfunded, and
often ineffective, institutions as one of the persisting problems in implementing
Agenda 21.1461
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As a result of the convening of the WSSD in 2002, the functions of the CSD were
enlarged by the additional mandate of providing policy guidance to follow up the
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI) at the local, national, regional and
international levels. Section 145 of JPOI emphasised that the ‘functions and
mandate’1462 of CSD needs to be ‘strengthened and enhanced’.1463 The JPOI went
further to state that the enhanced role of the CSD should include ‘reviewing and
monitoring progress in the implementation of Agenda 21 and fostering coherence of
implementation, initiatives and partnerships’.1464 Among the suggestions listed by
JPOI to enhance the functions of the CSD were a focus on more cross-sectoral
aspects of specific sectoral issues and better integration of policies,1465 to limit the
number of themes addressed at each session of the CSD1466 and identification of
constraints

in

the

implementation

of

Agenda

21,

including

producing

recommendations to overcome these constraints.1467

7.4.1.2 Inter-Agency Committee on Sustainable Development (IACSD)
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 recommended the creation of another new coordinating
mechanism. As a result of the Agenda 21 recommendation, the UN created the InterAgency Committee on Sustainable Development (IACSD)1468 to be incorporated into
the existing Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) under the direct
leadership of the Secretary-General.1469 The IACSD’s main task was ‘ensuring
effective monitoring, coordination and supervision of the involvement of the UN
system in the follow-up to the UNCED’.1470 The IACSD would function as a special
task force within the structure of ACC to oversee the implementation of Agenda
21.1471 Besides coordinating the work of the UN agencies involved in the
implementation of Agenda 21, the IACSD was required to report to the CSD on the
1462
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progress achieved. The IACSD convenes two annual meetings, the final deliberations
of which are reported to the ACC.1472 The IACSD’s meetings are open to all
interested programs, agencies and organisations of the UN system that are members
or participants of ACC.1473
The mandate of IACSD was to identify gaps and constraints affecting the UN system
in regards to the outcomes of UNCED and to formulate recommendations to ACC on
how to strengthen cooperation and coordination in implementing Agenda 21.1474
Thus, the IACSD functions as an advisory body to the ACC to ensure effective
system-wide cooperation and coordination in the implementation of Agenda 21. The
ACC continued to be the highest inter-agency body within the UN system, headed by
the Secretary-General. All agencies and programs involved in implementing Agenda
21 were expected to cooperate with the IACSD in ensuring successful
implementation of Agenda 21. To effectively implement such a broad mandate, the
IACSD appointed for each of the subject-areas of Agenda 21 a designated agency as
a task manager. Since its establishment in 1993, the IACSD relied on the
decentralised allocation of coordination activities, taking advantage of the expertise
of the task managers nominated by their organisations. According to IACSD,1475 the
use of formal and informal inter-agency arrangements (e.g., ACC subcommittees,
inter-agency groups, task forces and networks) has produced good results because
otherwise agencies would not have exchanged information and undertaken joint
activities. In this regard:
The use of formal and informal inter-agency arrangements such as ACC
subcommittees, inter-agency groups, task forces and networks were also seen
to contribute to productive results. Such an approach was particularly useful
in those areas of cooperation where a large number of United Nations
organisations and agencies have strong intergovernmental mandates and
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established programs, and where no single lead agency could be identified.
The latter included such areas as oceans and coastal areas.1476
The IACSD task manager prepares one report of the thematic cluster consisting of
two parts namely a factual part, which assesses the progress achieved and an
analytical part providing a more detailed policy analysis and strategic approaches
applied. The factual part of the review would be presented to the Secretary-General
during sessions of the IACSD for information only. The analytical part is used for the
preparation of the main policy report of the Secretary-General. However, the
analytical part cannot be used in full for the Secretary-General main policy report.
The task managers would submit the factual and analytical parts of the report to the
Division of Sustainable Development (DSD). A table with an overview of the
various clusters within IACSD follows:

Table 7.1. Task forces within IACSD and corresponding Chapter of Agenda 21.
CHAPTER OF
AGENDA 21
17

CLUSTER

TASK
MANAGER (S)
SOCA1477

1-Oceans and seas
2-Decision-making structures and institutions
for sustainable development
Integrating environment and development into
8
DESA1478
decision-making
National mechanisms and international cooperation
37
UNDP
for capacity-building
Information for decision-making
40
DESA, UNEP
Science
35
UNESCO
International legal instruments and mechanisms
39
DESA, UNEP
International institutional arrangements
38
DESA
Source: Adapted from Report of IACSD, ACC/2000/12, at its 16th Meeting, Annex V, p. 17-18.

The IACSD could not identify one single agency to be responsible for the
implementation of Chapter 17 on ocean and coasts with expertise and an adequate
mandate to coordinate the entire system of ocean governance. This is because there
were numerous agencies and programs with ocean mandates, such as the FAO, IMO
and UNEP, among others. The lack of an overarching ocean-mandated institution
1476
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resulted in the IACSD setting up another institutional arrangement to specifically
deal with the implementation of Chapter 17 of Agenda 21. Hence, the Subcommittee
on Ocean and Coastal Areas (SOCA) was created.

7.4.1.3 Subcommittee on Ocean and Coastal Areas (SOCA)
The Subcommittee on Ocean and Coastal Areas (SOCA) was assigned the role as
task-manager within the structure of the ACC/IACSD for the purpose of
implementing Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, giving special attention to the need to
improve coordination. ACC-SOCA was set up in 1993 by the ACC, based upon a
proposal made by the IACSD.1479
The following agencies were brought together to fulfil ACC/SOCA’s mandate: the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC), which serves as the
secretariat, the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, (DOALOS),
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNEP, United Nations Industrial
Development Organisation (UNIDO), United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), IMO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organisation (UNESCO), World Health Organisation (WHO), World Meteorological
Organisation (WMO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International
Telecommunication Union (ITU); Economic Commission for Africa ECA and the
World Bank.1480 All these agencies, bodies and programs report directly to SOCA.
The functions and mandate of SOCA are to:
-

monitor and review progress in the implementation of the seven program
areas in Chapter 17 and report to IACSD; 1481
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-

create proposals to IACSD or other bodies in order to facilitate and enhance
the effectiveness of cooperation and coordination in the implementation of
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, including financial means of implementation;

-

promote joint activities and programming for the implementation of Chapter
17 of Agenda 21; and

-

facilitate the coordination of activities of the UN system relating to Chapter
17 of Agenda 21, among other functions.1482

SOCA meets once a year and by a complex procedure, prepares its report for
IACSD, which channels it, through ACC, to the CSD that then sends it to
ECOSOC.1483 Finally, the report is sent to the UNGA. SOCA clearly has a
cumbersome and overly bureaucratic reporting system.
In view of the lack of significant progress in achieving inter-agency cooperation by
means of channelling reports through the main coordinating organs, SOCA decided
to incorporate other vehicles into its strategy to enhance cooperation. Thus, SOCA
launched a series of joint initiatives, such as the development of UN Atlas of the
Oceans which has the objective to bring together existing marine scientific
knowledge

through

partnership

among

several

agencies,1484

assistance

in

implementing the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-based Activities (GPA/LBA) and assistance to the Global
International Waters Assessment (GIWA).1485 In 1999, the CSD identified the need
to improve the effectiveness of SOCA. In response to CSD’s recommendation,
SOCA adopted the following measures: annual briefings for delegations during
sessions of the CSD, development of an ACC-SOCA website and production of an
ACC-SOCA brochure.1486
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In 2000 the IACSD while assessing the work of its sub-committees such as SOCA
stated that their creation resulted in positive outcomes.1487 However, despite the
positive assessment given by IACSD on the work of its sub-committees, the ACC
was reviewing the efficiency of its mechanisms to improve coordination, including
reviewing the performance of the SOCA.

ACC concluded in November 2001 that

all existing subsidiary bodies should be dismantled by the end of the year 2001, and
that future inter-agency support requirements of HLCP would best be handled
through ‘ad hoc, time-bound, task-oriented arrangements, using a lead agency
approach, or by addressing requests to existing inter-agency networks or expert
groups.’1488 In this regard:
In doing so ACC has decided to move away from the concept of permanent
subsidiary bodies with fixed periodicity of meetings and rigid reporting
requirements, and, instead, to rely increasingly on ad hoc, time-bound and
task-oriented coordination arrangements.1489
The IACSD was also dismantled along with SOCA.1490 Several UN member states
showed their dissatisfaction with the abolition of ACC-SOCA, especially in light of
the recommendation of UNGA resolution 56/12 of 28/22/01, which requested the
work of the ACC-SOCA be improved. States also noted that explanations on the
dismantling of ACC-SOCA included in the Secretary-General’s report were not
satisfactory.1491 The driving force for the dismantling of the SOCA was the decision
by ACC to reform its ‘working methods’ by establishing ‘more informal and flexible
mechanisms rather than formal subsidiaries bodies’ such as SOCA.1492
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A number of problems can be identified as the cause for the low inter-agency level of
coordination achieved by ACC and, in particular, ACC-SOCA. Reviews undertaken
by CSD, ACC-SOCA secretariat itself and during the UNICPOLOS identified the
following shortcomings: the modality of operation within the ACC structure was too
rigid; there was a lack of transparency and responsiveness of the ACC-SOCA and a
lack of coherence between reviews and assessments by the ACC and the SG
report;1493 the ACC-SOCA did not interact with some of the most important structures
and programmes for oceans and coasts that are not part of the UN;1494 the report
system between ACC and other UN bodies was complex and time-consuming;
agencies spent too much time in reporting and those reports usually used a ‘sanitized
language which hid more than revealed’;1495 the passage through the three
intermediate reporting steps (ACC-SOCA, IACSD, CSD) was fruitless and it
resulted only in recommendations with little impact on the work of agencies;1496 ACC
dealt with many technical issues and reviewed numerous reports from the standing
bodies, thus diverting from its main purpose of coordinating the work of UN
agencies;1497 ACC failed to identify areas where activities have achieved success. It
has not also identified areas in which little or no progress has been achieved,
particularly with regard to cross-sectoral areas, such as oceans and coasts. Thus,
ACC lacked strong monitoring capacity of its subsidiary bodies.1498
During UNICPOLOS,1499 the former chairman of ACC-SOCA1500 justified the poor
performance of SOCA as resulting from practical problems. The following obstacles
were deemed as responsible for the poor performance of ACC-SOCA: inadequate
financial and human resources, lack of permanent support staff, lack of technical
coordination by ACC-SOCA since it had no executive power to make decisions,
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rigidity of the administrative and budgetary procedures of the UN agencies and
bodies and the need to respect hierarchical structure. The dismantling of ACC-SOCA
and the overlap between CSD and UNEP points to two conclusions. The first is that
the UN has increased proliferation while trying to enhance cooperation between its
bodies, agencies and programs. Thus, the creation of new mechanisms mandated
with the task of coordination has added more complexity to system of ocean
governance which is already overloaded. The ultimate dismantling of ACC-SOCA is
evidence that by creating under-funded and weak mechanisms the UN will not be
able to improve its levels of inter-agency cooperation. Thus, the creation of more
institutions presents budgetary and institutional difficulties. Secondly, the overlap of
CSD and UNEP demonstrated that the UN is devising solutions for enhancing in a
reactive manner without proper planning. This is because UNEP is a result of the
UNCHE process (1972) and the CSD, the most important outcome from the UNCED
(1992) in terms of institution.
The pressure from participants in both conferences resulted in the creation of both
coordinating mechanisms (UNEP and CSD). For instance, the UNCED rejected
proposal for reinstituting UNEP’s Coordination Board or establishing an
Intergovernmental Standing Committee in a supervisory role. Instead, proposals were
made for the establishment of a CSD whose purpose was the implementation of
Agenda 21.1501 According to Birnie and Boyle these responsibilities are significant
and wide-ranging but also vague and over-broad.1502 The CSD is a permanent forum
for discussion. However, it has no power, limited resources and little influence.1503
With limited time available to it, and little continuity of membership, none of it
independent, the CSD has not chosen to review either the performance of individual
countries or the implementation and effectiveness of environmental treaties, nor does
it have any procedure for doing so.1504 Its deliberations have remained entirely within
the confines of policy recommendations.1505 Another problem resulting from the
overlap between UNEP and CSD is that it shows that the UN at that point had not yet
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found the path to better enhance inter-agency cooperation. The solutions found to
solve the problem added more complexity to the system.

7.4.2 Chief Executives Board (CEB)
With the dismantling of the IACSD and SOCA in 2001,1506 the UN created the United
Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) to replace the
former ACC in 2002. Similar to the ACC, CEB comprises the heads of all
organisations. Its main purpose is to foster coordination and cooperation within the
UN system. The Secretary-General chairs the CEB, which meets twice a year. CEB
is comprised of two high-level committees: High-level Committee on Program
(HLCP), which is responsible for substantive program areas and the High-level
Committee on Management (HLCM), which is responsible for the strategic
management of the organisations. The IACSD was replaced by the two above
mentioned high-level committees HLCP and HLCM.1507
The advance brought forth by CEB is that it increased the number of member
organisations in relation to the former ACC.1508 From its original composition (UN,
ILO, FAO and UNESCO), CEB now comprises 28 member organisations, including
UN funds and programs as well as specialised agencies, WTO and Bretton Woods
institutions.1509 Also, CEB decided to adopt a completely different strategy to foster
inter-agency cooperation from the one used by ACC. As opposed to ACC, CEB
decided to dismantle all ‘permanent subsidiary bodies with fixed periodicity of
meetings and rigid reporting requirements’.1510
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The dismantling of permanent subsidiary bodies is the reason why the CEB
dismantled the IACSD, consequently causing the SOCA to cease to exist.1511 As a
result of dismantling ACC’s permanent subsidiary bodies, the CEB aimed to
increasingly

rely

on

‘ad-hoc,

time-bound

and

task-oriented

coordination

arrangements’.1512 The CEB endorsed the use of a new approach, emphasising the
need for implementation and greater integration on the follow-up programs and
actions, while pointing out the need for transactional costs for coordination and for
taking into account past experiences of coordinating mechanisms. This new approach
was adopted by CEB despite doubts raised during the third meeting of UNICPOLOS
in regards to the efficacy of such ad-hoc arrangements in dealing with ocean issues.
During UNICPOLOS, some delegates pointed to the absence of studies on the
efficacy of this strategy.1513
The CEB complemented its new strategy with the formation of ‘flexible networks of
experts’ particularly involved in cross-sectoral issues.1514 These ‘flexible networks of
experts’ would complement the work of high-level committees and the ad-hoc, timebound and task-oriented initiatives.1515 Over the course of years the HLCP/CEB
covered a broad range of issues, including those related to globalisation and the
Millennium Development Goals,1516 to the detriment of more specific issues such as
ocean issues.1517 As a result of the lack of attention to ocean issues in particular, the
need for the creation of an inter-agency and intergovernmental cooperation in ocean
governance became the central subject in many forums, in particular at the 4th and 7th
sessions of the CSD1518 and UNICPOLOS.1519
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During the UNICPOLOS IV meeting, it was mentioned that it would have been more
prudent to have maintained SOCA functioning until another coordinating mechanism
for ocean issues was set up within the CEB structure.1520 In view of the lack of
success of the CEB/HLCP in carrying out inter-agency function in ocean governance
in the aftermath of the dismantling of ACC/SOCA, the international community
invited the UN Secretary-General to establish an ‘effective, transparent and regular
inter-agency coordinating mechanism on ocean and coastal issues within the United
Nations system’.1521 Pursuant to the referred UNGA resolution, the CEB, through its
HLCP, initiated a process of creating proposal on the new inter-agency coordinating
mechanism to be set up, which would be known as Oceans and Coastal Areas
Network or UN-OCEANS.

7.4.3 Oceans and Coastal Areas Network (UN-OCEANS)
After the dissolution of SOCA in 2001, the UN programs and agencies that
participated in SOCA agreed to continue to meet independently, on several
occasions, outside the previous formal structure. The various secretariat bodies and
UN programs and agencies also continued to exercise the role of lead agencies.1522
This fact proved that the dismantling of SOCA left an institutional gap that needed to
be filled through the establishment of another institutional apparatus that could
perform similar functions in respect to strengthening cooperation of UN activities
related to oceans and coastal areas, among other activities. In addition, UNICPOLOS
III and IV, and the JPOI1523 recommended to the UNGA the establishment of a new
inter-agency coordinating mechanism for issues relating to oceans and coastal areas.
Accordingly, the UNGA established in 2003 a new inter-agency mechanism, known
as the Oceans and Coastal Areas Network (UN-OCEANS). The UNGA decided that
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the new mechanism should have a clear mandate and be based on principles of
continuity, regularity and accountability.1524 Pursuant to this orientation, the UNOCEANS was formed and consists of relevant programs, bodies and specialised
agencies of the UN system, secretariats of financial institutions, such as the World
Bank, secretariats of the relevant UN global environmental conventions,1525 as well as
the International Seabed Authority (ISA).1526 During UNICPOLOS V, participants
welcomed the importance of participation of institutions that did not take part in the
former SOCA, in particular the secretariats of financial institutions, such as the
World Bank.1527 The UN-OCEANS is mandated to perform many tasks, including to:
-

strengthen coordination and cooperation of UN activities related to oceans
and coastal areas;

-

review the relevant programs and activities of the UN system, especially with
regard to implementing Agenda 21 and the JPOI;

-

identify emerging issues in need for joint actions; establishing task forces to
address emerging issues;

-

promote the integrated management of oceans at the international level;

-

facilitate, as appropriate, the inputs to the annual SG Report on oceans and
the law of the sea; and

-

promote the coherence of UN system activities on oceans and coastal areas
with the mandates of the UNGA, and the priorities of the Millennium
Declaration, the JPOI and of governing bodies of all members of UNOCEANS.1528

Some doubts were raised even before the establishment of the UN-OCEANS. For
instance, during UNICPOLOS III, participants raised concerns in regard to the
effectiveness of ‘ad hoc arrangements’ or task forces. Delegates, while expressing
disagreement with the dismantling of SOCA, stressed that to achieve coordination, a
permanent body is necessary. According to some of the participants during
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UNICPOLOS III, an inter-agency mechanism to be efficient needed a permanent
body, regular meetings and most importantly, should be empowered with authority to
coordinate autonomous agencies and bodies.1529
The UN-OCEANS initiated its activities and hosted its first meeting in 2005.1530 The
UN-OCEANS has been carrying out its mandate through ad hoc task forces open to
the participation of NGOs and other international actors pursuant to fixed terms of
reference for that particular task.1531 It is expected that these task forces fall under the
command of a lead institution, which ‘will foster collaboration around existing joint
activities as well as new emerging activities UN-OCEANS will identify’.1532 UNOCEANS has launched the following task forces:
-

task force on post-tsunami response;

-

task force on establishing a regular process for global assessment of the
marine environment;

-

task force on biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (in
conjunction with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its
Jakarta Mandate on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine and
Coastal Biological Diversity (Jakarta Mandate); and

-

task force on a global program of action for the protection of the marine
environment from land-based activities (GPA-LBA) in conjunction with
UNEP.1533

From its onset, the UN-OCEANS faced enormous challenges. The main challenge
was the lack of support for the establishment of more flexible, time-bounded and
task-oriented coordinating mechanisms, as previously mentioned. There was still the
strong belief among some members of the international community that the most
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efficient way to promote inter-agency cooperation is through ‘permanent subsidiary
bodies with fixed periodicity of meetings and rigid reporting requirements’.1534
Furthermore, to date, the UN-OCEANS remains solely focused on the establishment
of task forces for particular purposes; thus it is unable to promote inter-agency
cooperation in a broad sense. In fairness to the task forces initiatives, it must be said
that task forces under the UN-OCEANS umbrella do foster inter-agency cooperation
by pooling together agencies whose mandates relate to a particular issue. For
instance, in the case of the prevention of natural disasters (i.e., tsunami), the related
task force involves the participation of the following agencies: UNEP / GPA, FAO,
World Bank, WMO, IMO, UNDP, UN-DOALOS. There remains no doubt that such
initiatives improve cooperation. However, the task force approach runs the risk of
creating more fragmentation by creating micro-integrated systems, dealing with
specific issues within the bigger system of ocean governance.
There is still a need for the UN to devise a coordinating mechanism responsible for
bringing together all the parts of the whole system of ocean governance. The creation
of isolated clusters of agencies through task forces to deal with cross-sectoral issues
does not seem to address the structural failure of lack of cooperation within the entire
system of ocean governance. This is because it is still absent from the entire system
of ocean governance an all-encompassing coordinating mechanism or body with
sufficient powers to promote inter-agency cooperation between the several bodies,
agencies, and programs with ocean mandates. Another inadequacy that persists is the
unfortunate overlapping between CSD and UNEP and the confusion that their similar
coordinating functions create within the system. In addition to these issues, it
remains unclear which agency has adequate powers to promote inter-agency
cooperation between the several specialised agencies such as IMO, FAO and IOC.
The fact that these agencies were founded by treaties and enjoy great autonomy in
executing their mandates poses difficulties for coordinating efforts within the UN.
The UNGA has only moral authoritative power over these agencies, thus lacking
legal authority to impose any major structural change. Participants at UNICPOLOS
and members of the HLCP elaborated on a number of suggestions to enhance the
work of the newly established UN-OCEANS, as follows:
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a) Strengthening the Role of the World Bank
b) Regular Reviewing and Harmonisation Processes
c) Adding Analytical Content to its Work
d) Enhancing Transparency
e) Increase Relationship between the LOSC and Agenda 21
f) Reducing Operational Costs
g) Strengthening Capacity-Building Efforts in Developing Countries
a) Strengthening the Role of the World Bank
The participation of the World Bank and other financial institutions within the
structure of UN-OCEANS could assist in fostering inter-agency cooperation in the
context of ocean governance. With that mind, it has been suggested that the World
Bank could assess the potential for an effective coordination of the planningbudgeting cycle to move towards the joint design and implementation of activities in
collaboration with various agencies and programs, in particular the UN-OCEANS.
The required adjustments in the planning and budgeting cycles of agencies and
programs would be obtained by aligning mandates with resources across several
budgets.1535
b) Regular Reviewing and Harmonisation Processes
The UN-OCEANS should undertake regular reviews and harmonisation on ocean
issues involving the core participating institutions and work plans of the relevant
participating institutions in view of avoiding gaps, inconsistencies and duplication of
work.1536 Nevertheless, the major obstacle in implementing this suggestion rests in
the inadequate authority of the UN-OCEANS in exerting influence upon the
governing bodies of the various autonomous UN agencies and programs.
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c) Adding Analytical Content to its Work
As seen above, the UN-OCEANS is tasked to review the relevant activities within
the UN system in implementing Agenda 21 and the JPOI and to promote coherence
within the UN system for oceans and coastal areas. With that mind and also to
facilitate the inputs to the annual SG Report on oceans and the law of the sea, it has
been recommended that the UN-OCEANS should assess challenges, progress and
gaps to avoid performing reviews that lack analytical content; that is, reviews that do
not focus on problems to be solved. The work of the UN-OCEANS should provide a
more detailed policy analysis. It should also address existing and emerging
challenges for joint activities. By doing so, it could be expected that the UNOCEANS would identify and suggest the elimination of duplications, redundant
outputs and overlaps in planning and implementation.1537
d) Enhancing Transparency
While recommending the establishment of the new coordinating mechanism (UNOCEANS) the UNGA determined that it should be based on transparency.1538 The
UNGA was attempting to avoid the re-occurrence of one of the main shortcomings of
the former SOCA, which was the lack of transparency. This shortcoming might have
contributed to the lack of support for the work program of SOCA and ultimately to
its dismantling. In order to avoid lack of transparency, UNICPOLOS suggested even
before its establishment that UN-OCEANS1539 conduct its work with transparency,
undertake an open dialogue with non-UN system actors and establish transparent
communication with all partners.1540 In addition, UN-OCEANS should give
opportunities to governments, NGOs and private sector to express their views.1541
In 2009, eight years after its inception, UN-OCEANS still lacked transparency. The
UN-OCEANS’ deputy coordinator recognised that its website needed updates on the
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activities performed by this organisation.1542 This statement was a response to
concerns made by delegations during UNICPOLOS X on the lack of transparency, in
particular ‘with reference to the difficulties in accessing UN-OCEANS reports’.1543
e) Increase Relationship between the LOSC and Agenda 21
As noted before, the LOSC and Agenda 21 inform the work of various coordinating
mechanisms, including the UN-OCEANS. In fact, one of the functions assigned to
UN-OCEANS is to review the work of the various ocean-mandated organisations in
regard to the implementation of LOSC, Agenda 21 and JPOI.1544 In this regard, the
CEB suggested that the work of the UN-OCEANS should focus on enhancing the
relationship between the LOSC and Agenda 21 by identifying grey areas that need to
be addressed and reviewing programs and activities. 1545
f) Reducing Operational Costs
The idea of creating an informal, flexible, time-bound and task-oriented mechanism
such as UN-OCEANS had a twofold purpose. Primarily it was expected that a
change in approach from permanent coordinating mechanisms to this new informal
and flexible approach would yield more positive results in terms of inter-agency
cooperation. Secondly, the UN-OCEANS was created within a context of ‘zero
growth’ policy1546 within the UN in regards to its budget expenses; thus, the new
mechanism should make use of the least costly means in undertaking its functions,
such as intensive use of electronic communication, including the use of a website for
exchanging information. It was also suggested that UN-OCEANS convene meetings
in conjunction with other related meetings and establish written agreements among
heads of agencies or responsible managers in order to reduce the high costs of
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coordination. Finally, it was suggested that UN-OCEANS attempt to avoid parallel
processes and duplicate reporting.1547
g) Strengthening Capacity-Building Efforts in Developing Countries
During the UNICPOLOS X meeting in 2009, various delegates pointed out persisting
problems within the activities and tasks performed by UN-OCEANS. During that
meeting it was emphatically expressed that in regards to capacity building, for
instance, ‘UN-OCEANS and its members should be more active and visible in
regions where the volume of ocean activities was very high, particularly in
developing States.’1548 In response to this criticism, the UN-OCEANS deputy
coordinator admitted the following:
There was no overarching strategy among UN-OCEANS members in terms
of their capacity-building activities. The evaluation of impacts was
undertaken at the level of individual programmes, in the context of resultbased frameworks, but that at the level of UN-OCEANS no such exercise had
been conducted.1549
The prevailing fragmentation within the UN system for ocean governance results
mostly from the system working at ‘the level of individual programs’.1550 This
assertion indicates how complex it is to achieve inter-agency cooperation within the
UN system for ocean governance.

7.4.3.1Current Developments at UN-OCEANS
As far as the above-referred suggestions are concerned, most of them remain
ineffective as of June 2011. This is because, similar to other coordinating
mechanisms (i.e. ACC/SOCA), the UN-OCEANS is not succeeding in promoting
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overall cooperation between the various ocean mandated bodies, agencies and
programs within the UN. Once again, the problem of inadequate power to exert
influence upon the governing bodies still poses difficulties to the fulfillment of the
task of the UN-OCEANS. In this regard:
At the same time, it was highlighted that the lack of resources and different
priorities, as well as the need to obtain mandates from the respective
governing bodies constituted major challenges for the operation of the Task
Force in general.1551
Also in terms of incorporating the above-listed suggestions, UN-OCEANS to this
date has been unable to do so. This is a result of the lack of resources which affects
the operations of UN-OCEANS, among other problems. This means that the World
Bank and other financial institutions have not been assisting the UN-OCEANS with
the funds for its task forces. There is a need to explore other options for financing for
the UN-OCEANS. Another issue that hampers the success of the UN-OCEANS is
the engrained segmentation within the system for ocean governance within the UN.
Accordingly, the report of activities performed by the UN- OCEANS resembles the
SG Report where the several participating agencies use the opportunity to inform of
the sectoral activities performed by the agencies. Hence, IOC informs participants
about the publication of technical guidelines on Marine Spatial Planning.1552 UNEP
draws attention to a recent publication addressing ocean acidification and blue
carbon (marine litter).1553 FAO invites participants to rejoice with the recent
ratification by Russia of the “Agreement on Port State Measures to prevent, deter and
eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing”.1554 The list goes on with GEF,
DOALOS, UNDP, WMO, and IAEA.1555 All of them participated at the UNOCEANS and dedicated most of the time to inform about their sectoral activities.
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Obviously, these agencies mentioned ocean problems which by their nature
(interrelated and multi-dimensional) require a certain level of cooperation for their
solutions. IUU fishing, ocean acidification, marine litter are all ocean problems
characterised by their interrelated and multi-dimensional natures. However, what is
clear from the report of the UN-OCEANS is that an all-encompassing general
solution for the structural problem of lack of inter-agency cooperation within the UN
as whole in terms of governance of the oceans is still absent.
It is important to highlight that UN-OCEANS has been able to develop inter-agency
cooperation solely at the level of its task forces. For instance, IOC/UNESCO has
been working in cooperation with CBD, UNEP, and FAO to further strengthen
collaboration and coordination among UN organisations dealing with marine
protected areas, especially to promote the accomplishment of the targets set by the
WSSD. The same occurs with the cluster of agencies to deal with the UN-OCEANS
other task forces: post-tsunami response, biodiversity in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, global assessment of the marine environment and land-based activities
(GPA-LBA). However, the most troublesome problem blocking the success of the
UN-OCEANS is its self-proclaimed lack of visibility within the UN as whole.1556 The
participants during the 8th Meeting of UN-OCEANS agreed and proposed several
actions to be taken among which the following were adopted:
[t]he necessity to strengthen the structure of UN-Oceans and to raise its
profile and visibility, it was thus proposed to explore the possibility of having
a UN-Oceans Goodwill Ambassador.1557
Sadly, the UN-OCEANS has been slowly becoming irrelevant in terms of being able
to promote an overhaul within the system of ocean governance to enhance interagency cooperation. Another issue posing difficulties to the UN-OCEANS is that it
has not been able to streamline its own coordination given that part of its activities is
conducted by DOALOS, at the UN Headquarter in New York City, and the other part
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stem from the IOC headquarters in Paris.1558 This system was known as ‘distributed
secretariat’1559 to be established between the agencies and programs which participate
in the UN-OCEANS. The idea failed and has now the UN-OCEANS terms of
reference is under a process of being reviewed. This was done in order to decrease
the financial and human resource requirements for providing secretariat support;
functions were divided into an Organizing Secretariat and an Implementing
Secretariat. However, this working method has proven to be difficult to implement in
practice. The inefficiencies resulting from UN bodies, agencies and programs being
‘scattered’ around the globe has been argued by Hinds to prove the point of the
difficulties within the UN to establish inter-agency cooperation. In this regard:
Thus, the three specialised agencies (FAO, IMO, UNESCO/IOC) and the
program (UNEP) responsible for global maritime/marine policy making
processes are scattered among capitals of the globe (Rome, London, Paris and
Nairobi) with weak coordination linkages within the UN system. The global
fragmentation of responsibilities together with their autonomous mandates
has served as the basis from which these agencies have successfully resisted
attempts to coordinate and/or consolidate their respective programs.1560
However, there has been a coordinating mechanism within ocean governance that
has gaining increased visibility in view of the fact that it was initially proposed for
three years and since its inception in 1999 it has been continued and progressively
gaining attention within the system. That is the United Nations Open-Ended Informal
Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS).
UNICPOLOS is the object of analysis in the section below.
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7.4.4 United Nations Open-Ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and
the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS)
It might be the case that the most significant coordination mechanism established
during the Post-LOSC is not a body or organisation per se but an annual meeting in
which the main focus is to develop inter-agency cooperation between the various
ocean-related bodies and programs. This coordinating mechanism is known as the
United Nations Open-Ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law
of the Sea (UNICPOLOS). An overview of UNICPOLOS follows.
Given the poor performance of the coordinating mechanisms (i.e., UNEP, ACC,
IACSD and CSD), which were created in the aftermath of the two major global
environmental conferences UNCHE and UNCED, in 1999, the UNGA decided to
adopt another approach in addressing the overall lack of coordination and
cooperation in ocean governance. The new approach was to avoid reliance on
permanent coordinating bodies such as ACC, CSD and UNEP and instead to
establish ‘an open-ended informal consultative process in order to facilitate in an
effective and constructive manner, its own review of overall developments in ocean
affairs’.1561 In 2000, the UNGA established the UNICPOLOS process to facilitate its
annual review on ocean issues. The primary focus of UNICPOLOS is ‘to identify
areas where coordination and cooperation at intergovernmental and inter-agency
levels should be enhanced’.1562 According to UNGA, the establishment of
UNICPOLOS was also motivated by the ‘overall lack of coordination and
cooperation in addressing ocean issues, which prevented more efficient and resultsoriented ocean governance’.1563 UNICPOLOS was directed to avoid the creation of
new institutional arrangements.1564 Its primary purpose was to rely on existing
arrangements. The underlying reason for reliance upon existing institutional
arrangements was twofold, namely to avoid duplication of efforts1565 and not to incur
more costs as a result of the creation of new bodies.
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Discussions at UNICPOLOS are based on the following documents: Annual Report
of the Secretary-General on Oceans and Law of the Sea (SG Report), written
submissions by states and international organisations and recommendations from the
CSD. Moreover, the legal framework within which the discussions at UNICPOLOS
take place is provided by the LOSC, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21; Decision 7/1 of the
CSD and the JPOI, which was adopted during WSSD in Johannesburg in 2002.
Being an informal arrangement, UNICPOLOS was designed to be open to the
participation of all UN member states and representatives of civil society in general.
Its participants also included members of the specialised agencies and parties to the
LOSC. Other participants comprise organisations formally invited to attend the
UNGA sessions as observers, intergovernmental organisations related to ocean
affairs and major groups as identified in Agenda 21.
UNICPOLOS meetings1566 are organised by the UN Secretary-General who arranges
for support to be provided by the DOALOS in cooperation with other departments of
the UN secretariat, such as the Division of Sustainable Development of the
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), resulting in inter-secretariat
coordination.1567 As a result of UNICPOLOS’ recommendations, the UNGA
incorporates some of them in its resolutions. Initially, UNICPOLOS was to be
convened during a three-year trial period subject upon assessment to have its
mandate renewed. Given its relative success in bringing all the above-mentioned
participants from various sectors together, UNICPOLOS had its mandate renewed to
convene more meetings.
To date, 11 UNICPOLOS meetings have been convened (from 2000 to 2010). Over
these years, UNICPOLOS has introduced positive changes in the system of ocean
governance. For instance, UNICPOLOS served as a ‘response to states’ concerns
about coordination’.1568 For the last three decades, major conferences have been
convened in which the main focus of attention was the identification of problems
resulting

from
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UNICPOLOS therefore represented an opportunity to move forward in the direction
of finding solutions for the identified problems. It was also pointed out that
discussions at UNICPOLOS helped improve ‘the oceans affairs culture’ at the level
of the agencies as well as at the UN level as a whole.1569 Moreover, UNICPOLOS
greatly enhanced the annual review of the UNGA on ocean affairs, by deepening
debates on ocean-issues and devoting more time for discussion of issues that require
cooperation.1570 In this regard, UNICPOLOS attempted to solve the problem of the
limited amount of time given to ocean issues at the annual meetings of the UNGA.
By assisting the annual review of the UNGA on ocean affairs, UNICPOLOS also
increased the synergies between the SG Report and the deliberations at the
UNGA.1571 This is because the SG Report is one of the basic documents to inform
discussions during UNICPOLOS and also serves to inform deliberations during the
UNGA annual review on ocean and law of the sea. Likewise, there were concerns
expressed during the UN global conferences,1572 and participants at UNICPOLOS
stressed the need for international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, to
engage in the process of enhancing cooperation.1573 The UNICPOLOS process also
reinforced the importance of an integrated, multi-sectoral and multi-level approach in
the formulation of ocean policies.

7.4.4.1. Review of the Progress Achieved by UNICPOLOS Meetings
UNICPOLOS had its outcomes scrutinised most recently with the convening of its
10th meeting in 2009, the main topic of which was ‘discussions on the
implementation of the outcomes of the Consultative Process, including a review of
its achievements and shortcomings in its first nine meetings’.1574 During
UNICPOLOS X, a number of participants stated that UNICPOLOS has ‘exceeded
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initial expectations’.1575 In affirming UNICPOLOS successes, participants indicated
that the UNICPOLOS process ‘had a re-invigorating effect on the debates of the
General Assembly [UNGA] on oceans and the law of the sea, which had become
more focused’.1576 Another positive outcome from the UNICPOLOS process is the
fact that some of its recommendations had been incorporated by the UNGA, which
created new trends by introducing them in its resolutions.1577 Other positive aspects of
UNICPOLOS are:
-

discussions at UNICPOLOS served to save ‘time and effort’ during
consultations of ocean-related topics;

-

UNICPOLOS ‘has helped to identify the limits of consensus in regards to
what could be achieved during UNICPOLOS meetings’;

-

UNICPOLOS provided participants and the international community in
general with in-depth analysis on selected topics related to ocean and law of
the sea;1578

-

UNICPOLOS assisted the work of the UNGA on updating its resolutions to
reflect current trends;1579

-

discussions during UNICPOLOS meetings had a multi-sectoral dimension
given that its meetings discussed issues from an environmental and socioeconomic perspectives;1580

-

UNICPOLOS brought to the attention of its participants ‘emerging oceanrelated challenges’, thus laying the foundation for international action in
addressing these challenges.1581
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-

several delegations pointed out that UNICPOLOS had increased their
knowledge on oceans issues and assisted them in understanding the barriers
to ocean-related policies;1582 and

-

according to some participants, discussions during UNICPOLOS increased
their understanding of ‘the ways in which cooperation and coordination at the
intergovernmental and interagency levels should be enhanced.’1583

At the level of specialised agencies, such as FAO, the UNICPOLOS discussion on
fisheries issues assisted with the adoption of the International Plan of Action to
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU
Fishing) in 2001 and is currently assisting with the ongoing negotiations to adopt a
binding agreement on port state measures.1584 Also in the area of fisheries,
discussions at UNICPOLOS led to the adoption of the UNGA resolution 61/105 of 6
March 2007 concerning the impacts of bottom fisheries on vulnerable marine
ecosystems, consequently prompting FAO to adopt the FAO International Guidelines
for the Management of Deep-sea Fisheries in the High Seas (FAO International
Guidelines).1585 In terms of institutional outcome, discussions during UNICPOLOS
have resulted in the formation of an Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to
study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological
diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction.1586

7.4.4.2 Shortcomings within the UNICPOLOS Process
Despite the positive outcomes resulting from UNICPOLOS in raising awareness on
the need for cooperation at intergovernmental and inter-agency levels, a number of
issues have the potential to undermine the objectives of the UNICPOLOS process if
not properly addressed. An account of the perceived shortcomings follows.
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a) Absence of Sustainable Development Perspective
As a result of the evaluation process of the UNICPOLOS meetings, some delegates
pointed out that although UNICPOLOS discussion are informed by Agenda 21,
absent from its discussions was the concept of ‘sustainable development’, in
particular the social dimension of the concept. As an example, delegates emphasised
that although fisheries issues were thoroughly covered by the UNICPOLOS process,
little attention was given to socio-economic considerations in regards to fisheries. In
this regard, some delegates concluded that UNICPOLOS discussions had been
‘poorly integrated’.1587
b) Lack of Attention for the Needs of Developing States
According to some delegates, the UNICPOLOS process did not address properly the
issue of ‘enhancing cooperation and coordination on capacity-building and transfer
of technology’ in particular regard to developing countries.1588 Similarly, some
delegates pointed out that even though the issue of illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing (IUU fishing) had been extensively discussed during
UNICPOLOS meetings, UNICPOLOS failed to address the corresponding issue of
‘lack of capacity for monitoring, control and surveillance of activities of fishing
vessels in developing countries’.1589
c) Selection of Topics for Discussion during Future Meetings
Over the years, UNICPOLOS has addressed a vast array of issues.1590 At every
meeting, participants select the topics for discussion in the subsequent UNICPOLOS
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meeting. The decision on which topics must be selected is difficult to reach given the
large number of suggested topics. The absence of clear criteria to select the issues to
be discussed during UNICPOLOS meetings has resulted in the excessive
diversification of issues for discussion. The UNICPOLOS mandate is clear while
stating that the issues to be introduced for discussions are ‘those to be considered by
the General Assembly [UNGA], with an emphasis on identifying areas where
coordination and cooperation at the intergovernmental and inter-agency levels should
be enhanced’.1591 However, given the absence of clear criteria for selection of themes
for discussion during UNICPOLOS, participants ended up including issues that
mostly fall within their mandates, thus diverting from the main purpose of the
UNICPOLOS process. For instance, during the UNICPOLOS II, the issue of piracy
and armed robbery monopolised discussions. At UNICPOLOS II, delegates insisted
on discussing the problems arising from hijacking of a vessel in connection with
jurisdictional issues. Discussions centered on the event of the LOSC not been ratified
by a coastal states raising doubts about which treaty would be applicable. In
particular, when the state concerned was not a party to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA
Convention)1592 and there was no provision in national legislation on piracy.1593 The
discussion of the topic of piracy and robbery at sea during UNICPOLOS II resulted
in several delegates pointing out that in taking up issues that by their very nature fell
within the competence of specific forums such as IMO in this case of piracy,
UNICPOLOS could be diverting from its mandate.1594 In this regard, it was pointed
out:
The Consultative Process [UNICPOLOS] should address issues of piracy
mainly from the perspective of cooperation and coordination and that the
relevant organisations should deal with specifics.1595
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Furthermore, the selection of the topic of piracy and armed robbery raised another
criticism during UNICPOLOS II based on the assumption that those incidents are
geographically limited to certain areas,1596 thus the relevance of this issue in terms of
improving cooperation at inter-agency and intergovernmental levels in ocean
governance is debatable. In this regard, it could be speculated that the interested
groups in combating piracy and armed robbery are countries involved with the
shipping industry, consequently they could have ‘lobbied’ for the selection of the
focus-area. Another regrettable diversion of UNICPOLOS purpose is the fact that
many delegations use its debates to discuss issues relating to the implementation of
the LOSC. These delegates argued that since the LOSC serves as the legal
framework for UNICPOLOS, the discussion of issues related to its implementation is
justifiable.1597 The UNICPOLOS meetings were also used to discuss other issues the
relevance of which for inter-agency and intergovernmental cooperation in a broad
sense is arguable such as transboundary movement of radioactive material 1598 and
genetically engineered fish.1599 In regards to the issue of trans-boundary movement of
radioactive material, it was argued during the UNICPOLOS III that UNICPOLOS
was not the appropriate forum for such debates.1600
In an attempt to prevent UNICPOLOS being diverted from its main purpose, the UN
Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs stated that in future UNICPOLOS
meetings emphasis should be given to identify areas where cooperation at the
intergovernmental and inter-agency levels can be improved.1601 Many delegates,
mindful of the continuing diversion of topics, suggested that the consensus report
emerging from UNICPOLOS discussions should be restricted to broad elements and
themes.1602 It was suggested that the meetings should avoid duplication of work and
engaging in debates that fall beyond the mandate of UNICPOLOS.1603 For
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UNICPOLOS

meetings

to

focus

on

‘areas

where

cooperation

at

the

intergovernmental and inter-agency levels can be improved’, an account of the
linkages between sectors and the interrelationships between the competent agencies
dealing with particular issues must be given due regard so that solutions for the
problem of lack of inter-agency and intergovernmental cooperation can be devised.
The lack of criteria in determining which topics should be chosen for discussion
during UNICPOLOS meetings will require from future meetings more focus on
identifying areas where cooperation within the UN system should be enhanced.1604 As
part of the focus on issues that are significant for cooperation within ocean
governance, more attention should be given to the analysis of existing coordinating
mechanisms aiming at strengthening their roles and bettering their performance. The
controversy surrounding the selection of topics for discussion within UNICPOLOS
points to the difficulty in having a clear idea which are the subjects to be chosen that
can foster cooperation at inter-agency and intergovernmental levels. Participants and
the UNICPOLOS Secretariat have not yet developed a clear-cut criterion on how to
choose the issues for discussion to the detriment of the clarity of purpose of process.
d) Repetition of Topics for Discussion during UNICPOLOS
Another issue that needs to be addressed so the success of UNICPOLOS is not
undermined is the constant repetition of discussion of topics that were addressed in
previous meetings. For instance, during UNICPOLOS III, delegates used the
available time for discussion of issues that were already discussed during
UNICPOLOS I and II, such as strengthening national and regional capacity to use
advanced science and technology, facilitating availability of scientific data,
strengthening regional governance by increasing coordination among regional seas
and fisheries organisations, and IUU fishing and piracy and other crimes at sea. This
continuing cycle of repetitive discussions resulted in some delegates strongly
stressing ‘the importance of the efficient use of time, the avoidance of generalities
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and repetition of previous statements. They called for a focused debate on the
subjects and the formulation of concrete recommendations’.1605
This problem of repetition of topics persisted during all UNICPOLOS meetings.
During the UNICPOLOS review of progress in 2009, participants of the
UNICPOLOS X highlighted the need to avoid repetition of discussion of topics
already settled in past meetings or at the level of UNGA resolutions. In this regard,
the FAO representative before the UNICPOLOS urged participants to discuss
fisheries issues with the goal to increase cooperation, but to not re-discuss issues
already agreed upon, such as the definition of IUU fishing, for instance.1606
e) Simplistic Solutions for the Lack of Inter-Agency and Intergovernmental
Cooperation
In regard to the ability of formulating concrete recommendations, UNICPOLOS
meetings fall short of the original expectation that the consultative process meetings
would result in effectively determining the ways in which inter-agency and
intergovernmental cooperation could be improved. It is regrettable that on many
occasions, simplistic solutions presented regarding the problem of the lack of interagency and intergovernmental cooperation at the UN level as whole. For instance, a
delegate suggested that ‘to enhance cooperation and avoid duplication, a catalogue or
inventory of the work being undertaken by all competent international organisations
would be invaluable’.1607 Such a measure, although well intended, is beset by
oversimplification, since it does not address the root causes of the lack of
cooperation within the system. If implemented, it would not result in any effective
change within the UN system. Other suggested oversimplified solutions are: all
heads and executive directors need to point out to their staff the importance of crosssectoral coordination1608 and ocean-mandated organisations need to undertake joint
meetings, rely on websites, and publicise directories of specialists to improve interagency cooperation in the area of marine- scientific research.1609
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f) Forum for Agencies to Advertise their Actions and Programs
In addition to the repetition of topics already discussed at previous meetings and the
simplistic suggestions offered during discussions, UNICPOLOS meetings also
served as a channel for specialised agencies to advertise their past actions.
Participants, for instance, spent part of the discussions during UNICPOLOS I
emphasising the significance of the work performed by FAO for instance in the
fishery area and simply called for the work to be continued.1610 Moreover, during
UNICPOLOS IV, IMO used most of the time for discussions to cover a number of
measures taken to ensure safety of navigation and flag state implementation.1611
Again during UNICPOLOS V, both representatives of FAO and IMO used a great
deal of time for simply listing their organisations’ efforts in addressing IUU fishing,
in the case of FAO, and flag state implementation and piracy and armed robbery at
sea, in the case of IMO. At various occasions, the meetings were converted into a
forum for international organisations and specialised agencies to report on the
progress made on their respective mandated areas. This practice could be deemed as
a misuse of the effort to enhance inter-agency and intergovernmental coordination.
g) Lack of Mechanisms to Evaluate the UNICPOLOS Meetings
The lack of mechanisms to evaluate the UNICPOLOS meetings can be pointed out as
another shortcoming of the UNICPOLOS process. In fact, up until its 9th meeting in
2008, there has been no evaluation on the progress achieved in regards to issues
discussed at previous UNICPOLOS meetings. An evaluation mechanism was once
suggested, however, it encountered opposition by those who argued that the
‘effectiveness and utility of the consultative process should be assessed’ by the
UNGA pursuant to its resolution 54/33 and not by the process itself.1612 Regrettably,
at the time delegates did not realise the advantages of a self-evaluation process. The
self-evaluation process could greatly enhance the effectiveness of UNICPOLOS as
well as help the UNGA’s evaluation. The resistance towards an evaluation process of
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UNICPOLOS would be overcome in 2009 by virtue of the 10th meeting of
UNICPOLOS whose topics for discussion were ‘implementation of the outcomes of
the Consultative Process [UNICPOLOS], including a review of its achievements and
shortcomings in its first nine meetings’.1613It has been suggested during UNICPOLOS
meetings the need for the UNGA to request competent agencies to report back on
measures taken within their particular mandates in regards to promoting cooperation
since the last UNICPOLOS meeting.1614 It remains to be seen if UN agencies will
follow through this recommendation given that it is not mandatory. As mentioned
before, the UNGA’s authority over UN agencies, bodies and programs is weakened
by these organisations’ autonomous mandates; there is not much that UNGA can do.
According to Hinds, the specialised agencies being autonomous bodies, they are not
bound by UN recommendations.1615
h) Lack of Multi-Level and Multi-Sectoral Perspectives within the UNICPOLOS
Process
During discussions, some participants noted that UNICPOLOS needs to incorporate
multi-level perspectives into its meetings, in particular, in regard to regional
cooperation. In this regard, it was suggested that regional coordinating mechanisms
should provide inputs to the substantive discussions and participate in the
implementation of its results.1616 It was also pointed out that the lack of regional
cooperation considerations within the UNICPOLOS process was, to a certain extent,
related to flaws and gaps found in the SG report. This is because the SG report,
which serves as the main document to inform UNICPOLOS discussions, rarely
addresses regional cooperation. Consequently, the flaws and gaps found in the SG
report are reflected in the UNICPOLOS process. It can be concluded that the lack of
cross-sectoral or multi-sectoral considerations is a result of the absence of such
considerations in the SG report. For instance, the SG report fails to address
relationships between issues such as transport-fisheries, fisheries-habitat protection,
fisheries-land-based pollutants and fisheries- marine environment.1617 As a result,
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UNICPOLOS meetings also fail in discussing cross-sectoral issues, which are crucial
to enhance cooperation.

7.4.4.3 Final Assessment on the UNICPOLOS Process
As much as the review of achievements and shortcomings of its first nine meetings
during the UNICPOLOS X session served to shed light on the positive outcomes of
the UNICPOLOS process, the evaluation process also showed mixed opinions by the
various delegates that participated in review process. It is remarkable that the
divergence of positions between those who proclaim advancements introduced by
UNICPOLOS and those who do not feel the same enthusiasm. For instance, while
several delegates considered that UNICPOLOS had ‘fulfilled its intended function by
providing a forum for broader and more in-depth discussion on selected topics’; 1618
other delegates, in particular from developing states, stated that it is regrettable that
issues such as capacity building transfer of technology and financing, the main areas
of interest for developing countries, received little attention during UNICPOLOS
sessions, and consequently only a small portion of these issues were incorporated
into UNGA resolutions.1619 In this regard, however, some delegates pointed out that
the incorporation by the UNGA of issues discussed during UNICPOLOS into its
resolutions should not be taken as the only ‘measure of success’ of the UNICPOLOS
process.1620 Similar to other initiatives to improve cooperation, UNICPOLOS does
not possess adequate powers to interfere in the mandates of competent international
organisations given its nature of simply being an informative and informal meeting.
As a result, the effectiveness of UNICPOLOS will depend on the willingness of
states and international organisations alike to incorporate the suggestions produced
during the meetings and forwarded to the UNGA in order to improve inter-agency
and intergovernmental cooperation.
Based on these discussions, Table 7.2 summarises the major coordinating
mechanisms involved in developing inter-agency cooperation within the UN system
1618
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for ocean governance. This list illustrates the complexities of finding a successful
coordinating arrangement to increase inter-agency cooperation.

Table 7.2. Coordinating Mechanisms for Ocean Governance established by UN.
COORDINATING MECHANISMS FOR OCEAN GOVERNANCE ESTABLISHED BY UN
Coordinating Mechanism
Year of Creation
Outcomes/Problems
Insufficient power to coordinate specialised
UNGA
1942
agencies
ECOSOC
1942
Entrapped in a complex reporting system
Under-funded and lacking adequate powers to
UNEP
1972
coordinate specialised agencies
ACC/SOCA
1992
Dismantled in 1999
CSD
1992
Overlapping functions with UNEP
UN-OCEANS
2001
Lack of visibility
Mixed Reviews; Increased awareness for the
UNICPOLOS
2000
need to inter-agency cooperation within the
UN.

7.5 Conclusion
This chapter analysed the coordinating mechanisms set up by the UN during the PreLOSC, LOSC and Post-LOSC periods, and concludes that despite the positive
outcomes brought forth by these coordinating mechanisms, they still fall short in
effectively delivering cooperation and promoting coherency within the system of
ocean governance. Furthermore, the chapter identified that the main reason for the
little success of these coordinating mechanisms is related to the fact that these
mechanisms do not possess adequate powers to exert effective influence over the
numerous autonomous UN bodies and programs with ocean-related mandates. For
instance, UNGA resolutions to foster cooperation are non-binding; UNEP does have
a status of specialised agency, which could provide this program with more powers;
CSD is a mere commission within the ECOSOC structure. Moreover, the
sectorialism of the UN’s specialised agencies and the great number of autonomous
programs and governing bodies have made cooperation extremely difficult,
especially due to the limited control of the UNGA over them. On the other hand,
coordinating mechanisms, such as the ACC, ECOSOC, CSD and UNEP, have not
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yet been given sufficient authority to have a radical impact on this fragmented
system.
It also emerged from the discussions that the need to improve cooperation through
the creation of coordinating mechanisms has been perceived since the Pre-LOSC
period in particular as a result of the convening of the UNCHE. The need continued
to be emphasised until the Post-LOSC period with the convening of the two major
global conferences, namely UNCED and WSSD. Thus, the problems of lack of interagency cooperation within the UN system for ocean governance are recurrent and
difficult to solve. At times, the reactive nature in which these mechanisms were
created after the convening of these conferences resulted in overlapping mandates,
such as the case of the CSD (1992) the mandate of which overlapped with the
previously set up UNEP (1972).
It was demonstrated that despite the numerous benefits introduced by the new
coordinating mechanisms set up during the Post-LOSC period, namely UNICPOLOS
and UN-OCEANS, there are a number of shortcomings with the potential to
undermine the success of these initiatives. For instance, UNICPOLOS, apart from its
informal nature, has lost its primary purpose in promoting inter-agency and
intergovernmental cooperation due to excessive diversification of topics for
discussion, waste of time and resources and repetition of topics already discussed in
previous meetings, among others shortcomings. In view of the identified
shortcomings, the chapter went on to propose a series of recommendations so that
newly created coordinating mechanisms (UNICPOLOS and UN-OCEANS) avoid
perpetuating these mistakes and successfully implement their mandates towards
inter-agency and intergovernmental cooperation within ocean governance. The
chapter also highlighted that the lack of inter-agency and intergovernmental
cooperation within ocean governance is a direct result of the lack of involvement of
multilateral financial organisations in the process of governing the oceans in the
context of the UN system. This is because the coordinating mechanisms set up within
the UN have been unable to engage financial institutions in the follow-up process,
thus perpetuating the vicious cycle of identification of problems without devising
adequate financial means to solve them. Effective cooperation between the UN
bodies and multilateral financial organisations is absent from the cycle of budgeting
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and planning and implementing policies within ocean governance.1621 Finally, the
chapter concludes that the success of UNICPOLOS, UN-OCEANS and other
coordinating mechanisms will depend on the willingness of states and international
organisations alike to incorporate the suggestions produced during the meetings and
forwarded to the UNGA in order to improve inter-agency and intergovernmental
cooperation.
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CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSION

8.1 Final Analysis of the Scope and Evolution of Ocean Governance
It has been argued that the evolution of ocean governance through the Pre-LOSC,
LOSC and Post-LOSC periods was marked by the inclusion of the principles of
international law. These principles – cooperation, integration, precautionary and
ecosystem approaches – have contributed to decreasing governance problems within
the system. What remains to be discussed is to what degree governance problems
were reduced. This section of this concluding chapter aims to provide the final
analysis in this regard. Firstly, it should be stated that there is no measure to precisely
indicate the level of reduction of governance problems. The analysis in this thesis
showed that in the absence of principles, the problems existed. After the adoption of
the principles and their inclusion in ocean related policies and law, these problems
persisted but their influence was reduced. Thus, this analysis can be discussed in
qualitative terms.
However, there remains one key obstacle limiting the further reduction of
governance problems. This concerns the prevalence of a dichotomy in ocean
governance between the widespread approach towards single use and sectoral ocean
management, and new approaches that support more integrated, cooperating,
ecosystem and precautionary approaches toward ocean governance. This will also be
discussed in more detail in the sections below.

8.1.1 The Evolution of the Legal Framework for Ocean Governance during PreLOSC, LOSC and Post-LOSC Periods
As discussed in previous chapters, the first part of the Pre-LOSC period, which lasted
for almost five centuries, is charaterised by the absence of regulation in relation to
ocean uses and its resources. The first period is also marked by great efforts from the
maritime powers of the time to draw human-made lines over large portions of the
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oceans to ensure national appropriation of maritime spaces. Later, these lines would
shrink and be limited to surrounding areas of the nations’ coasts, i.e. belts of sea.
This belt of sea area would become known as the territorial sea. This trend of
drawing lines to ascertain control and delimit national jurisdiction would be the
principal foundation upon which the entire system of ocean governance was built.
The line-drawing system favours segmentation and imposes challenges to more
cooperating, ecosystem, integrated and precautionary approaches of governance.
Below, the discussion presents concluding remarks on the main developments in
ocean governance regarding these main subject-areas: conservation and management
of marine living resources, protection and preservation of the marine environment (in
particular marine pollution), and marine scientific research.

8.1.1.1 Marine Living Resources
In terms of patterns of use of marine living resources, the first part of the Pre-LOSC
period is characterised by unrestricted exploitation of these resources, particularly
fisheries. This pattern of use was based on the notion that resources were
inexhaustible, as sustained by the freedom of the seas doctrine. With the first signs of
over-exploitation of fisheries resources, the first regulations were set up in the form
of bilateral treaties and commissions. These were the first steps towards building
cooperation with the objective to promote rational use of these resources, although
not expressly indicated. At that time, cooperation was also used to deflect conflicts
over resources that were surfacing. During the course of the evolution of ocean
governance from the 15th century until the present, long held misconceptions about
ocean management are replaced by more structured governance systems. A common
misconception of the time was that marine living resources were inexhaustible.
These more structured governance systems used cooperation as the primary means to
achieve common objectives.
However, as was shown in Chapter 4, it was during the LOSC period that fisheries
governance evolved considerably through the creation of regional fisheries
organisations (RFOs), as endorseed by the LOSC. Under the overarching guidance of
the principles enshrined in the LOSC and bound by its provisions, the RFOs gained
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more efficiency and legitimacy in ocean governance. For example, before the
adoption of the LOSC, fisheries governance was comprised of scattered treaties and
RFOs sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and by non-FAO
RFOs. The adoption of the LOSC and its reliance upon cooperation reduced
segmentation and proliferation. That is, in order to adhere to the terms of the LOSC,
states had to cooperate when participating in these regional arrangements. The
provisions of the LOSC reduced segmentation because the terms of the LOSC were
binding on member states.
During the Post-LOSC period, fisheries governance in particular advanced even
more due to the inclusion of the other three principles of international law. Several
fishery-related policies and legal instruments included provisions related to
integration, ecosystem and precautionary approaches. This is because the
international community gave greater consideration to cross-sectoral issues during
the Post-LOSC period. This is an indication that the principles of cooperation,
integration, ecosystem and precautionary approaches were being embraced within
some ocean related treaties and policies.
Examples of cross-sectoral fisheries related measures adopted during this period
include: market-based measures to curb illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing
(IUU fishing); consideration of the impact of pollution on fisheries; curbing negative
economic subsidies to reduce the number of fishing vessels; and the incorporation of
ecosystem considerations in fisheries management such as inter-dependence between
stocks. Because all of these issues affecting fisheries required a cross-sectoral
analysis, the incorporation of these principles reduced the negative effects resulting
from segmentation. Moreover, to combat multi-dimensional and interrelated
problems such as IUU fishing, it is necessary to involve all sectors which are
affected. That is the reason why the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter
and Eliminate IUU fishing (IPOA-IUU) relied on market-based measures, such as
catch documentation schemes, to identify the origin of the harvested fish. The IPOAIUU also included port state measures to control landings of fish.1622 On the other
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hand, if one intended to address IUU fishing from a limited and segmented
perspective, one would likely disregard ‘linkages between sectoral management
initiatives’.1623 Regarding the application of an integrated approach, the SG Report of
the IPOA-IUU stated that:
[t]he integrated approach adopted by the Plan of Action [IPOA-IUU], if
applied in good faith, may close the loopholes that in the past have hampered
the international community in the prevention, deterrence and elimination of
IUU fishing.1624

8.1.1.2 Marine Pollution
Regarding marine pollution, it was demonstrated in previous chapters that ocean
governance evolved from a total lack of regulation during the Pre-LOSC period
based on the misconception of the infinite absorption capacity of the seas.1625 From
the lack of regulation, the system evolved to include restrictions and a more
conservation-focused view of the oceans. During the Pre-LOSC period, ocean
managers applied a strictly segmented view when dealing with marine pollutants. At
that time, there was little awareness that eliminating pollution from one area could
result in transferring that same pollution to another area. To illustrate this point, if the
solution for marine pollution from land-based sources was found in dumping these
pollutants into the sea, it only resulted in transferring the pollution to another area.
Although dealt with by two different international agencies (i.e. IMO1626 and GPALBA/UNEP1627), dumping and marine pollution from land-based sources are closely
interconnected. In this regard, the SG Report stated that the:
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[c]ontrol of pollution of the marine environment by dumping is very much
dependent on finding solutions to land-based sources of marine pollution and
proper waste management in general.1628
The multi-dimensional and interrelated nature of this problem required a more
cooperating, ecosystem, preventive and precautionary approach towards the
prevention, control and elimination of marine pollution.
During the Pre-LOSC period, the international community adopted a more integrated
approach towards marine pollution. Principle 7 of the Declaration of the United
Nations on Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), adopted at the United
Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) in 1972, stated that it was
necessary for:
[a]ll states to take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by
substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living
resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea.1629
Principle 7 encompassed within its meaning various uses of the seas, including
elements of the marine and human environments such as human health and other
legitimate uses of the sea. This too provides more evidence of a more integrated view
towards management of marine pollution. Integration would be implemented in the
context of the Regional Seas Program (RSP), which was launched by the United
Nations Environmental Program’s (UNEP) in 1974. The RSP developed
comprehensive frameworks for regional cooperation to address all aspects and
sources of marine pollution. This evolution towards a more preventive approach is
evidenced from the systems of lists adopted by the Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter (London Dumping
Convention). During the Pre-LOSC period, these lists determined which substances
could not be dumped at all (black list) and others that could be dumped contingent

1628
1629

SG Report, A/57/57 of 07/03/02, para. 356, page 60.
Stockholm Declaration, Principles 7.

382

upon granting of a special permit (grey list).1630 In view of persistent degradation of
the marine environment resulting from pollution, 1631 during the Post-LOSC period,
the system of lists became more stringent, prohibiting all forms of dumping. This
approach reduced segmentation by associating the goal of elimination of marine
pollution with the preservation and protection of the marine environment. Other
advances towards reducing segmentation in the area of marine pollution included
proposals during recent UN-hosted meetings such as the United Nations Open-ended
Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS)
which have been taking place since the year 2000. These meetings sought to
strengthen regional cooperation between RFOs (fisheries), UNEP/RSP (regional
approach towards pollution) and other regional management bodies. These other
regional bodies included scientific and technical advisory bodies, and regional
marine science organisations such as those under the authority of Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission (IOC).1632
For instance, the report from the second meeting of the UNICPOLOS process stated
that the purpose for strengthening regional cooperation between RFOs, UNEP/RSP
and other regional bodies was to promote ‘a more effective use of the available
resources, particularly by the avoidance of duplication.’1633 The recommendation to
avoid duplication of efforts has yet to take place but it is a step in the right direction
towards a more integrated approach to ocean governance.

8.1.1.3 Marine Scientific Research and Transfer of Marine Technology
In the area of marine scientific research and the transfer of marine technology, the
evolution towards a more cooperating approach to these areas was prompted by the
LOSC which prescribed cooperation to accommodate the needs of developing
countries. This was a result of the inclusion of newly independent countries which

1630

Lawrence Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management: The Evolution of Ocean
Governance (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 185.
1631
Stockholm Declaration, Proclamation 3.
1632
Report of the Second United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and
the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS), A/56/121 of 22/06/01, para. 6, page 5.
1633
Report of the Second UNICPOLOS, A/56/121 of 22/06/01, para. 7, page 5.

383

became members of the UN in the 1970s. These new members consisted mostly of
developing states. As a result of these new members participating in the negotiating
process and adoption of the LOSC, they became parties to the LOSC.1634
These developing states did not always possess adequate expertise and equipment to
produce scientific information necessary for properly managing ocean uses and
resources. Instead of relying on piecemeal initiatives sponsored by competent
international organisations such as the IOC, the LOSC proposed a joint effort
between developed and developing countries. Thus, cooperation was sought ‘to
actively promote the flow of scientific data and information and the transfer of
knowledge resulting from marine scientific research, especially to developing
states.’1635
Article 244(2) of the LOSC intended to create a connection between the needs of
developing countries and the resources of the developed ones. During the latter
portion of the Post-LOSC period, the discussion focused on the need to ensure a
more ‘inter-sectoral research approach’ towards governance.1636 With regard to multilevel governance (i.e., national, regional, international), during discussions at
UNICPOLOS II in 2001, a suggestion was made to create links between national and
regional institutions, with the support of relevant global bodies.1637 A need for more
integration in the area of marine scientific research was also suggested. This is
particularly important because the area of marine scientific research traditionally
does not interact with other areas of governance. In this regard, it was suggested
during UNICPOLOS, that marine scientific research needs:
[t]o ensure that the results of marine science can be understood, assimilated
and used by decision makers and resource managers, and that decisions
drawing on marine science take, where applicable, full account of socioeconomic factors and traditional ecological knowledge.1638

1634

Juda, International Law and Ocean Use, 209.
LOSC, art. 244(2).
1636
Report of the Second UNICPOLOS, A/56/121 of 22/06/01, para. 6, page 5.
1637
Report of the Second UNICPOLOS, A/56/121 of 22/06/01, para. 12, page 5.
1638
Report of the Second UNICPOLOS, A/56/121 of 22/06/01, para. 12, page 5.
1635

384

Consideration of socio-economic factors and traditional ecological knowledge have
yet to take place but the suggestion made at UNICPOLOS points to more crosssectoral and integrated approaches in the area of marine science.

8.1.2 The Evolution of the Institutional Framework for Ocean Governance
during Pre-LOSC, LOSC and Post-LOSC Periods
The same path of segmentation that characterises the legal framework for ocean
governance also characterises its institutional framework. As discussed in Chapter 6,
the Pre-LOSC period is characterised by the consolidation of segmented institutions
based on a system of specialisation and division of labour. This was largely due to
the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. This system of governance which
can also be characterised as decentralised was embraced by the UN. Under the
umbrella of the UN, ocean governance is comprised of several sectoral agencies,
bodies and programs. These institutions often carried out exclusive mandates. Thus,
there is a specialised agency for fisheries (i.e. FAO), for navigation and vesselsources of pollution (i.e. IMO) and another for marine scientific research and ocean
observing systems (i.e. IOC). There is also a program responsible for prevention of
marine pollution at the regional level (i.e. UNEP).
These are only three of the 14 specialised agencies within the UN which include
ocean uses and/or marine resource management as part of their responsibilities.1639
These agencies are autonomous institutions with their own membership, budget,
staff, executive heads and policies. Thus, this trend of specialisation or the division
of labour that took place during the Pre-LOSC period created high levels of
segmentation within the overall governance system.
The perils of segmentation were well known by the UN founders; thus segmentation
was an intended result. At the time of its creation, the founders of the UN assumed
that the dangers of having a centralised organisation exclusively mandated to solve
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ocean problems were greater than ‘having a dispersed network’. However, the
problem of segmentation was further compounded by the lack of adequate powers of
certain UN supervisory bodies, such as the UNGA or its the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC), that possessed little powers over specialised agencies found
under its purview. Both UNGA and ECOSOC can only recommend actions to their
respective specialised agencies. Thus the system is structured to function in a
segmented manner.
As seen in Chapter 6, there is a need to incorporate in the mandate of these
decentralised and autonomous organisations an approach towards governance
comprised by the principles of international law. These principles are necessary for
effectively dealing with ocean problems. The SG Report reinforced that there was a
need for more ‘concerted action’ for the successful operation of the ‘decentralised
system of international Oceans Governance.’1640 The discussion now provides a
retrospective view on the developments and advancements towards the inclusion of
these principles in the practice of some organisations during the LOSC and PostLOSC periods.
The LOSC period did not offer any solutions for the lack of inter-agency cooperation
within the system. Instead, the LOSC added three more organisations to an already
overloaded system.1641 The LOSC also did not provide for the creation of an intersectoral institution and it continued to follow the same path of segmentation by
creating new agencies and permanent bodies with exclusive mandates. These
mandates dealt with: deep seabed mining for manganese nodules (i.e. ISA); settling
disputes concerning application and interpretation of LOSC provisions (i.e. ITLOS);
and matters related to the outer limits of member states’ continental shelf (i.e.
CLCS). The efficiency of the organisations created during the LOSC period is put to
the test in view of the fact that the mandate of the ITLOS tribunal overlaps with the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).
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A wave of change was initiated with the Post-LOSC period when the international
community started to discuss the negative effects resulting from the lack of
coordination and inter-agency cooperation within the system. Thus, the UNCED
dedicated chapter 38 of its Agenda 21 to discuss ‘International Institutional
Arrangements’ and the WSSD in 2002 attempted to devise new approaches to addres
the problem. As discussed in Chapter 6, the WSSD process enforced the need to
include non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as partners in the process of
governing the oceans. According to the WSSD outcomes, NGOs, along with
governmental and inter-governmental bodies, should participate actively in the
implementation of Agenda 21 and other initiatives.1642
From an institutional perspective, there has been awareness that inter-agency
cooperation was lacking within the UN governance system since the Pre-LOSC
period. There was growing recognition of the need for new approaches to govern the
world’s oceans. For instance, in 1972 the UNGA stated ‘that problems of the
environment constitute a new and important area for international cooperation and
that the complexity and interdependence of such problems require new
approaches’.1643 Similarly, in 1992, Agenda 21 in its Chapter 17 stated that ‘to pursue
the protection and sustainable development of the marine and coastal environment
and its resources, there is a need for new approaches to marine and coastal area
management and development, at the national, subregional, regional and global
levels.1644 The UN also endorsed international cooperation as one of the best
approaches to better manage coasts and oceans.1645
Furthermore, by virtue of Agenda 21, these ‘new approaches’ were qualified as
‘integrated in content and precautionary and anticipatory in ambit.’1646 In common
between these propositions is that these new approaches required more flexibility
from the organisations with ocean mandates in terms of applying their mandates in a
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more integrated, anticipatory, precautionary and cooperating manner. That is, given
the interrelatedness and multi-dimensional nature of ocean problems, the segmented
system that was in place within the UN had to adjust and devise ways to better
address ocean problems. After the convening of the UNCED, as endorsed in Chapter
38 of Agenda 21, the UN still continued with the ‘division of labour between various
parts of the UN’.1647 The Chapter 38 of Agenda 21 emphasised the structure of
assigning specific tasks to each of the agencies in accordance with their ‘terms of
reference and competitive advantages.’
Although the abolition of the system of exclusively mandated agencies is not a
possibility, emphasis needs to be given to the lack of inter-agency cooperation in
particular to deal with cross-sectoral issues. The WSSD process which would take
place a decade after the convening of the UNCED would emphasise this topic.
What is missing from the institutional framework of ocean governance was an
agency with adequate powers to exert the role of integrator and promote coordination
and inter-agency cooperation. During the WSSD process, institutional problems
within ocean governance were discussed. But, the WSSD did not create any
institutional arrangement. The WSSD process introduced what would be a solution
for the governance problems related to lack of inter-agency cooperation while
proposing the establishment of an effective, transparent and regular inter-agency
coordination mechanism on ocean and coastal issues within the United Nations
system. 1648 This inter-agency coordination mechanism would be later known as the
UN-OCEANS.
However, the creation of coordinating mechanisms, such as the one created by the
WSSD process, was not a new occurrence. Since the Pre-LOSC period and as a
result of UN global conferences such as the UNCHE and UNCED, it was suggested
that new mechanisms of coordination should be created to streamline the work of the
various UN bodies, agencies and programs. As discussed in Chapter 7,
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has been setting up coordinating mechanisms since its inception in the 1940s. In
common between these initiatives is that they are ‘permanent subsidiary bodies with
fixed periodicity of meetings and rigid reporting requirements.’1650 The outcomes of
these mechanisms were disappointing because they operated without adequate
powers to effect changes. That is, difficulties experienced by coordinating
organisations stem from the specialised agencies such as FAO, IMO, UNESCO/IOC,
which were originally structured to operate in isolation and carry out their mandates
independently. Thus, the UN and its members continued to replicate the same
‘mistakes’ while expecting different results by creating weak coordinating
mechanisms.
For instance, the UN-OCEANS was meant be a different mechanism because it
would no longer be a permanent body but it was designed to an ‘ad hoc, taskoriented arrangement with occasional meeting.’1651 Basically, the UN-OCEANS
would take advantage of the various bodies, agencies and programs within the UN by
assigning a task to each one of the them. Although this proposal encountered
mounting criticisms from delegates during UNICPOLOS meetings,1652

the UN-

OCEANS went ahead and formed task forces to address the following subjects: posttsunami response; creation of a regular process for global assessment of the marine
environment; biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction; and the protection of
the marine environment from land-based activities.1653
Although, these subject-areas are crucial for improving ocean governance, because
they require action and the involvement of several agencies to deal with them
efficiently, it remains uncertain whether this system of flexible, ad hoc task forces
can solve the structural problems within the UN as a whole. This was exactly the
basis of the criticism launched during the UNICPOLOS meetings.1654 These task
forces seemed only to create clusters comprised by a pool of agencies dealing with
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specific issues thus not solving coordination problems and inter-agency segmentation
in the system as whole. The ‘clusters’ formed by the UN-OCEANS were limited to
discuss the above-referred issues.
For instance, regarding the issue of marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction,
a task force was formed by the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea
(DOALOS), and the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).1655
DAOALOS and CBD lack sufficient power and mandates to promote cooperation
within the system of ocean governance as a whole. These agencies are pooling
efforts to deal with only one issue, marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction.
They might be successful and effective in dealing with this topic but these
institutions are unable to deal with the lack of cooperation between institutions in the
entire system.
Even to effect change within the context of its task forces, which is limited by their
specific subject-areas, the UN-OCEANS is encountering obstacles as a result of the
ingrained culture of segmentation with the UN. This is because the UN-OCEANS
needs to obtain mandates from the governing bodies that participate in the task
forces. For instance, CBD needs to allow some level of intervention of DOALOS in
their operations and how they manage their mandate regarding marine biodiversity
beyond national jurisdiction and vice-versa. This has been one of its major
operational challenges according to a recent assessment completed by the UNOCEANS leadership.1656
This example is indicative of how a modus operandi based on divisions of labour and
specialisation is ingrained in the institutional framework for ocean governance. It
seems that the UN has not been able to devise a proper coordinating mechanism to
deal with one of the main obstacles to inter-agency coordination. During
UNICPOLOS meetings, the main governance problem regarding its institutional
framework for ocean governance has been described in the following terms:
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[t]here are various lines of authority and that the primary duty of each agency
and program is to respond to its governing body from which it received its
mandate. Such conflicts or disparities might create internal governance
problems within the UN system.1657
That is, the lack of an agency with authority over the various agencies, bodies and
programs continues to plague the UN system, posing challenges for more effective
inter-agency overall. The lack of popularity of the UN-OCEANS and its overly
criticised modus operandi gave way to a wave of support among UN delegates for
the formation of ‘an inter-agency forum which would bring together, on a regular
basis, all the agencies and institutions of the United Nations system involved in
ocean affairs.’1658 UNICPOLOS was convened for the first time in 2000. Since then,
it has convened 11 meetings with very positive feedback from its participants.1659
According to both the UN Under-Secretary-Generals for Legal Affairs and for
Economic and Social Affairs, the UNICPOLOS meetings have promoted discussions
‘on the multidimensional and multidisciplinary aspects of oceans and the law of the
sea.’1660 In terms of practical outcomes, the UNICPOLOS meetings have led to
suggestions which subsequently were incorporated in some UNGA resolutions.
Additionally, some states and intergovernmental organisations have taken actions
based on its suggestions. The meetings also had a ‘re-invigorating effect’ on
UNGA’s debate regarding the oceans and the law of the sea.1661
Despite being well-received among UN members and intergovernmental
organisations, UNICPOLOS has limited leverage to promote structural changes
within the UN. This is because the meetings are nothing more than ‘mechanisms for
the discussion’ which are important but do not have enough authority to change
institutional structures. This is an indication that the system of ocean governance still
faces many challenges yet to be overcome if effective inter-agency cooperation is to
be achieved.
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Among the most remarkable outcomes of the UNICPOLOS process was the
inclusion of its recommendation within the UNGA resolutions. As seen in Chapter 6,
the UNGA does not possess adequate authority to exert changes in the modus
operandi of its specialised agencies. The UNGA resolutions can only rely on
‘exhortation and moral persuasion’1662 to promote any changes. The lack of adequate
powers of the UNGA to promote necessary changes, for instance, and of the
coordinating mechanisms set up by the UN, is just one of the many persisting
problems within the institutional framework for ocean governance. As discussed in
Chapter 6, other problems include: the lack of multi-sectoral and multi-level
approaches, the absence of an overarching global oceans organisation to coordinate
various ocean-mandated agencies, the lack of accountability, transparency and
implementation, and persistent lack of technical and financial resources.
If the principles of international law are integrated into the practice of the various
autonomous organisations (i.e. FAO, IMO, IOC, UNEP), this measure could assist in
overcoming the negative effects of the highly decentralised system of governance.
This is important in view of the absence of a strong centralised organisation to
coordinate ocean governance as a whole, and in view of the lack of adequately
empowered coordinating mechanisms.
Thus, cooperation between UN ocean-mandated agencies, bodies and programs
reduces segmentation. Integration between these institutions brings together their
mandates given that they deal with different areas i.e. fisheries-pollution; protectionnavigation. Precautionary approach assesses the unknown scientific risks to the
management of the ocean by bringing together the work of scientific organisations
and ocean planners. An ecosystem approach considers all aspects of ocean
governance and their impact to the marine ecosystem. In this regard, FAO has
successfully applied ecoystemic approach to its binding and non-binding fisheries
documents.
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8.2 The Origin of Segmentation in Ocean Governance
As discussed in Chapter 3, the evolution of ocean governance during the Pre-LOSC
period involved the consolidation of segmented legal and institutional frameworks.
This meant that during the Pre-LOSC period, in particular from the 1950s onwards,
sectoral treaties were adopted. These treaties are exclusively devoted to their
respective areas such as pollution, fisheries, and navigation. In fact, that was the only
approach that law makers could envision at the time. Although the biophysical and
ecosystem features of the oceans have always been a reality and acknowledged by
marine scientists for some time, this concept was not recognised in the law-making
processes of the time. Treaties were mainly adopted in strictly legal terms without
connecting legal concepts with other types of knowledge.
The same phenomenon occurred with the institutional framework for ocean
governance. After the creation of the UN in 1945, the Pre-LOSC period was then
characterised by the creation of several ocean mandated organisations. These
organisations and their associated treaties were also devoted to exclusive mandates
focused on particular sectors. There was little awareness of possible linkages that
could be formed between various overlapping sectors. As discussed in Chapter 6, this
resulted in the system operating in isolated clusters of organisations.
The proliferation of treaties and organisations in ocean governance started to be
perceived as problems during the second part of the Pre-LOSC period. Consequently,
this realisation prompted the codification efforts by the League of Nations and the
law of the sea conferences (UNCLOS I and II) to systematise the rules of
international maritime law in a cohesive manner. As described in Chapter 3, the
perception of the proliferation problem was expressed in the following terms: ‘there
has already been extensive state practice, precedent and doctrine’ in ocean
governance. This realisation of the problem justified the need to codify these legal
instruments under a coherent body of law. In terms of the institutional framework,
the proliferation of organisations was already requiring, according to the UNGA, ‘an
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urgent review in order to avoid overlapping and duplication of programmes and gaps
in competence’.1663
As seen in Chapter 3, the Pre-LOSC period went through a radical change with the
convening of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE).
Marking the end of the Pre-LOSC period, the UNCHE also marked the end of a lack
of awareness regarding the pervasive effects of segmentation towards effective ocean
governance. As ocean governance evolved over decades, the awareness of the
international community also evolved with respect to their understanding of
governance problems. In this regard, it has been stated:
[t]hat human understanding and concepts of the oceans have changed over
time as well as governmental approaches to the oceans and their uses.1664
With the UNCHE and its outcomes, the need for more international cooperation
surfaced.1665Governance approaches that incorporated notions of integration,1666 an
ecosystem view1667 and preventive approaches were also recognised.1668 The change in
paradigm occurred as a result of mounting environmental problems. These problems
included: ‘dangerous levels of pollution in water, air, and living beings; disturbances
to the ecological balance of the biosphere; and destruction and depletion of
irreplaceable resources’. All these problems have an interrelated and multidimensional nature, thus solutions to them require cooperation, integration, an
ecosystem view and preventive approaches. In relation to ocean problems, the
UNCHE focused on marine pollution. Given the interrelated and interconnected
nature of marine pollution, which involves various sectors of ocean governance, the
UNCHE relied heavily on international cooperation to prevent, reduce and control
pollution in the world’s oceans.
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As argued in Chapter 4, with the adoption of the LOSC, ocean governance gained
more coherence because this treaty regulated several ocean uses under one allencompassing document. In terms of segmentation, the adoption of the LOSC
partially reduced some problems associated with segmented legal instruments and
institutions. This was because ocean governance was structured in isolated clusters,
demonstrating the prevailing sectoral approach towards the management of ocean
uses and resources. This sectoral approach changed after the adoption of the LOSC.
However, as exposed in Chapter 4, the LOSC harbours conflicting concepts. On one
hand, it provides for new governance approaches, that is, international cooperation,
and ecosystem, integrated and preventive approaches. On the other hand, the LOSC
is predominantly structured in a sectoral manner. This segmentation is particularly
evident due to the fact that this treaty does not provide for regulation of crosssectoral issues. The absence of linkages between the various sub-systems in ocean
governance (i.e., navigation, pollution, fisheries, marine scientific research) indicates
that along with new governance approaches, ocean governance is still based on a
segmented structure. Both approaches coexist. The first approach is a traditional one
based on sectors. The second one is more holistic and purports the consideration of
the interrelatedness and multi-dimensional nature of ocean problems through the
application of the selected principles of international law. The consequences of the
coexistence of these two approaches will be discussed below.

8.2.1 Dichotomy between Traditional Segmented and the Holistic Approaches
towards Ocean Governance
In Chapter 4, a question was asked: ‘to what extent can appropriate ecosystem
concepts be applied in ocean management efforts in a world marked by political and
legal divisions?’1669 The answer to this question was that the traditional system of
jurisdictional divisions of ocean space can pose difficulties to ecosystem
management.1670 It was demonstrated that despite this clear dichotomy between
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fundamental principles within its text, the LOSC attempted to include a number of
provisions within its text in which ecosystem considerations were taken into account.
The LOSC did this without undermining rights conferred to states as a result of
political divisions or boundaries. This chapter showed the level of compromise
achieved by the LOSC drafters.
The most important treaty in ocean governance is the LOSC which is structured upon
a system of jurisdictional boundaries. For instance, the system of boundaries or
jurisdictional zones within the LOSC is comprised of 200 nautical miles (nm) of
exclusive economic zone (EEZ),1671 12 nm of territorial sea (TS), 1672 contiguous zone
(CZ), the Area,1673 high seas (HS) or international waters. This system caused
governance problems such as segmentation and posed some difficulties to ocean
management. However, it should be stated that the system of jurisdictional
boundaries will not likely be abolished in the foreseeable future. That is why the
international community devised legal concepts such as the principles of
international law to overcome some of the difficulties that the system of jurisdictions
imposes on ocean management. Some progress has been achieved over the years in
devising creative solutions to overcome these obstacles.
For instance, as covered in Chapter 5, when the provisions of the LOSC became
ineffective to conserve highly migratory and straddling stocks, the UN adopted a new
treaty known as the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks Agreement). As discussed in Chapter 5, the reason why
the LOSC provisions became obsolete is because of the mismatch between the
application of rigid jurisdictional boundaries and the management of highly
migratory species. As Borgese pointed out, ‘neither fish nor pollution will respect
man-made boundaries’.1674 While the legal framework set up by the LOSC was
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satisfactory for fishing stocks found solely within the EEZ of a coastal state or on the
high seas, problems arose when considering straddling and highly migratory fish
stocks.1675 This is because, the manner in which the LOSC provisions were designed
by its drafters, it was expected that these resources could be found neatly within or
outside the jurisdictional boundaries of a nation.
However, the fishing practice of certain distant water fishing nations (DWFN) was
undermining the conservation and management measures adopted by the coastal
states where these resources were found. By fishing in the area of high seas
immediate adjacent to a coastal states’ EEZ, the DWFN were undermining the
conservation and management measures of these coastal states or the RFO they were
part of. Thus, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement corrected this failure, an indication that
ocean governance can find creative solutions to overcome the rigidity of the
jurisdictional boundary system. However, the difficulties in overcoming this problem
cannot be minimised. For instance, the level of consensus achieved during the
conference that adopted the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is not very common in the
history of ocean governance. According to Fontaubert, the negotiation process of the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement broke new ground and it is considered to have gone
further than anyone expected.1676
The above example is just one that supports the claim that ‘the traditional zonal
approach is insufficient to resolve the problems encountered in the management of
ocean space.’1677 The selected principles of international law can greatly assist in
overcoming the difficulties the traditional jurisdictional system of boundaries
imposed on ocean management.
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8.3 Summary
This thesis analysed ocean governance from its beginning, characterised by the lack
of regulation, until the present, when a prolific and structured system of governance
sponsored by the UN emerged to address ocean issues. In its introductory chapter,
the thesis stated that despite the enactment of several ocean-related legal and policy
instruments and the establishment of numerous ocean-mandated institutions to
manage the oceans, a satisfactory deliverance of good ocean governance has not
occurred. This can be attested to by the continuing depletion of ocean resources and
the destruction of marine ecosystems. Chapter 1 proceeded to identify the two root
causes for the governance failures within the system of ocean governance. The first
cause was attributed to uncoordinated and incoherent proliferation of ocean-related
treaties and policies, and international organisations with ocean mandates. Secondly,
persisting governance problems resulted from the sectoral approach, upon which the
entire system of ocean governance was built.
In analysing the content of the concept of ocean governance, Chapter 2 demonstrated
that the concept is marked by confusion in regards to its scope and elements. In view
of the absence of conceptual elements that could offer a clear-cut definition for ocean
governance, Chapter 2 adopted a workable definition based on the premise of a
‘principled’ ocean governance. Thus, principles of international law (i.e.,
cooperation, integration and precautionary and ecosystem-based approaches) were
used as analytical tools to explain the concept of ‘good’ Ocean Governance. In
common between these principles is the fundamental notion that the ocean is an
interconnected and indivisible global system that needs to be managed as a whole. It
was argued that if these principles were adopted and implemented, they could
provide more coherence to a system negatively affected by fragmentation,
segmentation, overlaps and contradictions. Chapter 2 also highlighted the importance
of the principle of cooperation in particular, for delivering effective ocean
governance.
To facilitate the analysis of ocean governance’s evolution, the thesis divided the
analysis into three discrete temporal periods. Thus, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 examined the
evolution of the legal and policy framework for ocean governance during the Pre398

LOSC, LOSC and Post-LOSC periods, respectively. Chapter 3 demonstrated that
after an initial phase of non-regulation, which lasted for five centuries, ocean
governance initiated a period of intense ocean-related law and policy-making. The
uncoordinated adoption of treaties and policies resulted in governance problems of
segmentation and proliferation within the system of ocean governance. The PreLOSC period ended with a global policy effort, the UNCHE, in an attempt to imprint
more coherence onto the system of governance. Chapter 3 concluded that the
UNCHE process introduced groundbreaking legal concepts to ocean governance,
particularly in the area of marine pollution. The legal concepts introduced by the
UNCHE process were international cooperation, integration, prevention and
ecosystem considerations.
Because the LOSC has always been regarded as the most prominent treaty in ocean
governance, Chapter 4 is entirely devoted to analysing the legal framework brought
forth by the LOSC. Chapter 4 concluded that despite the LOSC incorporating the
principle of cooperation in many of its provisions and recognising the importance of
ecosystem, preventive and integrative approaches, the LOSC failed to considerably
reduce the levels of fragmentation and segmentation in the system. This is due to the
absence of a cross-sectoral or synergistic view of the oceans and the prevailing rule
of setting jurisdictional boundaries to manage the oceans. The absence of a crosssectoral view indicates that the LOSC is still structured on the basis of sectoral
management or disciplinary clusters. The prevailing rule of drawing political
boundaries ignores the unique indivisible ecosystem reality of the oceans.
Chapter 5 demonstrated the ways in which the framework for cooperation within the
LOSC was enhanced by advancements brought forth by new agreements and policy
instruments. Among the innovative measures were those that prevented noncooperating states from reaping the benefits in the context of a cooperating
agreement1678 and groundbreaking shipboarding provisions by non-flag states in the
areas of port security, which helped to combat IUU fishing and marine pollution. It
was also demonstrated that the Post-LOSC period, more frequently than during the
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UN Fish Stocks Agreement, art. 8(4).
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previous periods, witnessed the inclusion of all four principles of international law in
some of its policy and legal instruments.
The thesis argued that the same governance problems that affected the legal and
policy framework for ocean governance also negatively impacted its institutional
counterparts. Thus, Chapter 6 concluded that despite the duty to cooperate being
stipulated in the mandates of many of the UN ocean-mandated agencies and
programs, the segmented and sectoral manner in which the governance system is
structured, among other factors, required even more levels of inter-agency
cooperation and coordination between the various bodies, agencies and programs.
Chapter 6 based its findings on the assumption that because ocean problems are of an
interrelated nature, there is a need to address problems in a coordinated fashion to
overcome the fragmentation resulting from the system of specialisation in which the
UN ocean-mandated institutions were structured.
To address the persisting problem of lack of coordination between the various UN
ocean-mandated agencies and programs, a number of coordinating mechanisms were
devised by the UN in the last 30 years. These mechanisms of coordination are
analysed in Chapter 7. Chapter 7 concluded that despite the positive outcomes
brought forth by these coordinating mechanisms, they still failed to effectively
deliver cooperation and promote coherency within the system of ocean governance.
Furthermore, Chapter 7 argued that the main reason for the little success of these
coordinating mechanisms is that they do not possess adequate powers to exert a more
effective influence over the numerous autonomous UN bodies and programs with
ocean-related mandates.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that ocean governance has had
some positive developments in the past 30 years. These developments include the
incorporation of all the principles of international law that inform good ocean
governance within the text of some ocean-related policies and legal instruments
adopted during Post-LOSC period. Another advance within ocean governance is
embodied in the adoption of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which can be
considered a model in treaty-making. This is because it addressed the inadequacies in
the framework of the LOSC regarding cooperation for the conservation and
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management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, and expressly
embraced all the above-referred principles of international law. However, the thesis
also argued that ocean governance does not go far enough to eliminate persisting
governance problems in view of newly added challenges, such as the lack of
implementation and accountability, which continue to pose obstacles to the
deliverance of good ocean governance.

8.4 Suggestions to Overcome Some of the Governance Problems
From the analysis expounded in this thesis, a number of suggestions can be made on
how to overcome some of the persisting governance problems. These suggestions are
limited to ‘some’ of the problems because solving most problems will depend largely
on the political will of states which are parties to the various ocean related
agreements,

and

their

participation

as

members

of

ocean

mandated

intergovernmental organisations within the UN. The following are recommendations
that go beyond the notion that simply emphasising that these problems exist is
enough. From a legal viewpoint, more instruments should be adopted which
incorporate into their texts the principles of international law. As seen in Chapter 5,
this trend is currently taking its course in ocean governance which signals some
progress in this area. At the institutional level of the UN, much more needs to be
done. Studies could be conducted as to the feasibility of creating a world ocean
organisation with adequate powers to coordinate the various ocean related agencies,
bodies and programs. Alternatively, given the resistance that the creation of a new
institutional apparatus would cause within the UN, due to budget or other constraints,
more thought could be given to providing the UNGA with more powers to exercise
its supervisory functions over the various organisations with ocean-mandate within
the UN.
This solution would require a reform within the UN. Although challenging, it may
not be impossible. For example, before the 1960s, no member of the international
community could imagine that consensus could be achieved toward sharing the
benefits from the prospecting of manganese nodules (i.e. common heritage of
mankind), as proposed by the Ambassador of Malta, Dr. Arvid Parvo. What started
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as a speech by Dr. Parvo before the UNGA became a well structured system of
regulation enshrined in the most significant treaty in ocean governance, the LOSC.1679
A system encompassing the common heritage of mankind entails that ‘no state shall
claim sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its resources.’ 1680
Article 137(2) further stated that ‘all rights in the resources of the Area are vested in
mankind as a whole’. Therefore, reform within the UN is possible. To do this, it is
necessary that some agency, body, program or even some individual take a
leadership role to spearhead the necessary changes.
Another issue that surfaced from the analysis is that the UN repeatedly employed an
operational model that repeatedly failed. For instance, all of the coordinating
mechanisms set up during each of the three analytical periods (Pre-LOSC, LOSC and
Post-LOSC) presented the same problems. That is, they lacked adequate powers to
effectively coordinate the decentralised bodies, agencies and programs within the UN
that contained the oceans as part of their mandate. This practice of creating underfunded and disempowered institutional arrangements needs to stop. It is costly and
reinforces the voices of the critics of the UN, that the system is inefficient and overly
bureaucratic.1681
It has also been discussed in Chapter 6 highlighted the need for the various UN
bodies, agencies and programs to have their performance assessed by systems of
accountability. These systems of accountability would have to rely on different
instruments such as auditing schemes executed by outsiders, for instance, rather than
reports which are often prepared by the institution under scrutiny. The current system
of reporting to assess institutional performance is cumbersome, costly and
ineffective.
Finally, and more in harmony with the main focus of this thesis, is the need for the
UN, its members, its intergovernmental organisations and all other players in ocean
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LOSC, Part XI, The Area.
LOSC, art. 137(1).
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According to Meisler: ‘The [UN] system lent itself to waste, corruption, and bureaucratic
tyrannies.’ Stanley Meisler, United Nations: The First Fifty Years, (New York: Atlantic Monthly
Press, 1995), 227.
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governance to apply a more cross-sectoral approach towards ocean management. In
doing so, the interrelatedness and multi-dimensional nature of ocean problems would
be taken into consideration. It was demonstrated in this thesis that by adopting the
principles of international law in their practices, or introducing them in their legal
and policy instruments, the goal of more cross-sectoral governance has a greater
chance of being achieved. Lastly, the participation of NGOs is vital for the success of
integrated, cooperating, precautionary and ecosystem practices in ocean governance.
However, many NGOs can only participate as observers. A change in this regard
would require amendments in some of the constituent instruments of the various
ocean-related specialised agencies. The ideal of the WSSD in turning NGOs into
legitimate partners needs to be accomplished. That would require the specialised
agencies and other decision making fora to adapt to this reality.

8.5 Suggestions for Future Research
This thesis identified that governance problems can be characterised by segmentation
and proliferation within the system of ocean governance. It was demonstrated that
the inclusion of the principles of cooperation, integration, ecosystem and
precautionary approaches within legal instruments, and by utilising these approaches
to shape the mandates of organisations, can reduce governance problems. More
needs to be done in terms of implementation of these concepts to continue to reduce
governance problems and yield more benefits in terms of more sustainable
approaches towards governing the oceans. A similar study that focused on
implementation and the practices of the ocean-mandated organisations would give a
more detailed analysis of the difficulties in achieving cooperation, integration,
ecosystem and precautionary approaches. Such study would likely require case study
analysis and interviews of government officials regarding state practices in
incorporating the principles into their national legislations. The same method would
have to be used to assess the practice of the international organisations. The task
seems daunting but it is nevertheless needed to further the insights gained from this
thesis and to continue improving international ocean governance.
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In 2002, which marked the 20th anniversary of the opening for signatures of the
LOSC, the implementation of its terms was still a concern despite its almost
universal participation.1682 Also in 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable
Development (WSSD) was convened to address the major constraints hindering the
implementation of Agenda 21.1683 It has been proposed during the UNICPOLOS
meetings that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) should focus on the
need to improve implementation of both the binding and the nonbinding
instruments.1684 The growing interest on implementation in ocean governance is one
of the most important topics in the international agenda of discussions. Thus,
implementation needs to be addressed and this topic deserves more studies from
academic institutions. It has been said that there is an ‘implementation gap’ in ocean
governance: ‘there needs to be more commitment to this less glamorous task.’1685
Moreover, the governance problems identified in this thesis persist despite the
introduction of the new approaches in the ocean related treaties and policies
highlighted in these chapters. However, the interrelatedness of the oceans needs to be
fully embraced in the practice of governments and international organisations in
order to continue to reduce governance problems. Research could also be directed
towards answering the question posed in Chapter 4, that is, to what extent can
appropriate ecosystem concepts be applied in ocean management efforts in a world
marked by political and legal divisions?’1686 By continuing to shed light on this
question, progress will continue to be made in the pursuit of even more efficient and
‘good’ governance and management of the world’s oceans.
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Report of the Third UNICPOLOS, A/57/80 of 02/07/02, para. 1, page 4.
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